Global Government Solutions 2010: The Year Ahead

Contacts: Diane E. Ambler, Michael J. Missal, Matt T. Morley, Mark D. Perlow

2009 brought a further transformation in the relationship between business and government. Regardless of political systems or philosophies, governments around the world became more dynamic and intrusive in response to the financial crisis.

This 2010 Annual Report, prepared by members of the K&L Gates Global Government Solutions initiative, contains concise articles that seek to forecast likely government actions and priorities regarding a broad spectrum of topics.

To view the report, click here.

 

SEC Adopts Amendments to the Proxy Rules Concerning Disclosure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance

By: Phillip J. Kardis IIVincent J. Pisano, Douglas J. Ellis

On December 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted amendments (the “Amendments”) to its executive compensation and corporate governance disclosure requirements. The Amendments are effective on February 28, 2010. Accordingly, many public companies face significant new disclosure requirements for the 2010 proxy season.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Dubai: Growing Pains For Islamic Investments?

By: Jonathan Lawrence, Philip J. Morgan, and Neil Nick Robson

The recent announcements from Dubai have turned the spotlight onto Islamic investments. The attached client alert assesses the structure, enforceability, risks and valuation issues specifically associated with the Dubai Nakheel sukuk bond and the increased uncertainty regarding the legal structures and insolvency regimes underpinning Islamic investment structures in the region. Even though the Government of Abu Dhabi and the UAE Central Bank have recently bailed out the real estate development company Nakheel and its parent company, Dubai World, there is no guarantee that they will do so again in the future. As a result of these factors, investment managers should consider examining all their Islamic investments, particularly those connected to Dubai, and working with valuation firms to determine how to approach the valuation of such investments.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

The SEC Weighs In on the Valuation of Net Equity for Madoff Victims

 By: Richard A. Kirby and R. James Mitchell

On December 9, 2009, almost one year to the day that Bernard L. Madoff was revealed to have perpetrated the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the SEC revealed its position with respect to the approach that it believes the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) should take in defining the net equity of Madoff claimants.

The SIPC Trustee has previously taken the position that net equity for Madoff’s victims should be measured on a cash-in/cash-out basis, rather than using the stated values on account statements fabricated by Madoff. This measure of net equity rejects all claims filed by victims whose net withdrawals equaled or exceeded their principal investments.

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House Passes Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 11, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4173, the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009,” by a vote of 223 to 203. 27 Democrats voted against the bill and no Republicans voted in favor of the bill.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Dubai World Debt and Nakheel Sukuk - Apocalypse Now?

By: David H. Jones and Andrew V. Petersen

It was no ordinary day. On 25 November 2009, the Dubai government announced through its Supreme Fiscal Committee (SFC) that its Dubai Financial Support Fund (DFSF) would spearhead the restructuring of Dubai World’s financial obligations. The resulting tsunami sent shockwaves through the world markets, as it raised doubts over the Gulf Emirate's ability to meet its financial obligations. Investors with interests in Dubai and its debt market were exposed. Or were they?

As the dust settled, it became clear that Dubai World was seeking to restructure just $26 billion (€17bn, £16bn) out of a total debt of $60 billion.  As a first step in the restructuring process, Dubai World and its subsidiaries, Nakheel PJSC (“Nakheel”) and Limitless LLC (“Limitless”), the real estate developer and investor famous for projects such as the spectacular Palm Jumeirah, requested their creditors agree to a “standstill” on repayments and an extension of a near-term maturity until at least 30 May 2010. The most urgent problem facing Dubai World is a $3.52 billion sukuk (the world’s biggest), an Islamic financial instrument, issued by Nakheel, and maturing on 14 December 2009 along with its two other outstanding sukuk, with a par value of $1.75 billion. To complicate matters further, the sukuk is guaranteed by Dubai World. With this requested restructuring, the legal system of the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") faced an unprecedented test. This Alert provides an overview of what this development means to those with exposure to Dubai World and Nakheel debt, by examining the applicable Islamic financing concepts and the regional legal uncertainty, the question of what creditors should do as well as outlining possible implications for investors and buyers interested in taking advantage of the opportunities that may arise.

To read the complete alert online, click here.

Creditors' Rights in the UAE

By: Paul de CordovaJeffrey N. RichTony GriffithsDr. Sabine Konrad  

The recent announcement by the government of Dubai that it would be seeking a stand-still on debt repayments by Dubai World and its subsidiary Nakheel PJSC has sent shock waves around the globe and raises questions regarding the rights of creditors in the UAE.  This Alert highlights some key features of UAE federal insolvency law which may be relevant to those who have dealings with debtors in the UAE.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Administration Creates Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Seeking Nationwide Coordination of Law Enforcement Efforts

Matt T. Morley, Richard A. Kirby, and Andrew Edwin Porter

The Obama Administration has recently announced the formation of a task force designed to coordinate federal, state and local efforts to investigate and prosecute fraud and other financial misconduct. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) expands and supplants an earlier task force created to combat corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal.

While the simple reconstitution of a task force is unlikely to dramatically alter the law enforcement landscape, this development may be one part of a more sweeping set of changes that could result in considerable increases in the magnitude, focus and efficiency of efforts to pursue financial wrongdoing. 

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SEC/CFTC Report on Harmonization of Regulation and How it May Affect Investment Advisers

By: Lawrence B. Patent, Mary C. Moynihan

On October 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued “A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation” (Report). The Report was issued in response to a request in the Administration White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform.

The Report contains 20 recommendations. This Alert will focus upon the recommendations in the Report that may be of greatest interest to investment advisers: (1) the potential “uniform” standards of “fiduciary” duties for persons providing investment and commodity trading advice for securities and futures; (2) aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act; and (3) aligning the reporting requirements for private funds. The Alert also discusses the other recommendations, some of which may indicate enhanced opportunities for portfolio margining across markets and the prospect of greater clarity and expedited judicial review of new products that straddle jurisdictional lines. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

K&L Gates' Investment Management Newsletter

By: Stephen J. Crimmins, Nicholas S. Hodge, Melissa S. Holmes, Thomas F. Joyce, Beth R. Kramer, Richard A. Kirby, Mary C. Moynihan, Megan B. Munafo, Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Roger S. Wise

The Fall 2009 Edition of K&L Gates' Investment Management newsletter is offered as a timely aid in addressing the myriad regulatory issues confronting the investment management industry. Watch for future issues discussing up-to-the-minute developments and trends in the industry.

To view the complete newsletter, please click here.

Congress Builds on Obama Financial Regulatory Reform Approach, as Reform Efforts Proceed

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page and Collins R. Clark

Congress continues to move forward expeditiously on the financial services regulatory reform effort. Over the past several weeks, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), in conjunction with other key committee members, has released additional legislative proposals building on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform plan, while Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL) develop a separate regulatory reform package. At the same time, these Committees have kept up a remarkably ambitious hearing schedule. This update provides an overview of significant recent developments, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Reforming the SEC and FINRA: Evolution or Revolution?

By: Richard A. Kirby and Melissa S. Holmes

Last week, FINRA released a report by the 2009 Special Review Committee that examines in detail the failure of FINRA’s examination program to detect the Stanford and Madoff frauds (the FINRA Report). The Special Committee recommends a series of reforms to FINRA examinations for adoption by FINRA management and its board, including items that would require SEC approval and – with respect to jurisdiction over registered investment advisers - Congressional action. These reforms would significantly expand FINRA’s enforcement and regulatory reach beyond its current mandate. 

The FINRA Report follows on the heels of the final recommendations of the SEC Inspector General for reforming the agency’s Division of Enforcement operations (the SEC Report), which grew out of his earlier scathing critique of the SEC’s failures to identify the Madoff fraud. The Director of Enforcement has agreed to adopt and implement all of the SEC Report’s recommendations. While many of the proposed FINRA reforms outlined in the FINRA Report would take time to implement (if they are implemented at all), the immediate changes to the respective examination and enforcement programs of FINRA and the SEC triggered by these reviews are being felt by financial services firms immediately and they will need to react to these changes.

FINRA Reforms

A. The FINRA Report concludes that FINRA should seek authority from Congress to regulate activities under the Investment Advisers Act. It suggests that if FINRA had this authority, it may have discovered Madoff’s Ponzi scheme through its regular examination process after he registered as an investment adviser in 2006. The SEC has not taken a public position on this proposal. The current Obama Financial Regulatory Reform does not contemplate an SRO regulatory structure for investment advisers, nor do any of the current proposals being considered by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank or Senate Banking Chairman Chris Dodd. Please see recent Blog posting called "House and Senate Take Expedited But Divergent Approaches to Financial Regulatory Reform Plan." It would be surprising if this jurisdictional reach by FINRA gets traction in the present Congress. 

B. The FINRA Report also recommends that FINRA seek SEC authority to broaden its authority to examine not only outside business activities of associated persons of members, but also affiliates of member firms. This expansion of FINRA’s regulatory reach would give it broader investigative powers than the SEC itself. It remains to be seen how the SEC will react to this proposal.

C. The FINRA Report notes that FINRA staff declined to pursue inquiries into complaints about Stanford’s high-pressure sales of CDs issued by its off-shore Antigua bank affiliate because of a concern that the CDs were not securities. This decision apparently was made by non-attorneys and contrary to the specific position of the SEC Fort Worth Regional Office on the issue, and was taken without fully informed consultation with FINRA General Counsel. The FINRA staff’s surprisingly and well-documented timid view of its jurisdictional limits, which appear to have had a material impact on its failure to pursue complaints related to Stanford, provides an interesting contrast to the Special Committee’s recommendation of a much more expanded and robust jurisdictional scope for FINRA going forward.

D. One recommendation from the FINRA Report that FINRA itself can implement is the proposal to increase FINRA’s fraud detection capacity and to focus more heavily on so-called “cause” examinations. The shift to an examination program focused primarily on items triggered for cause, however, would transform the examination staff to an adjunct of the FINRA enforcement division. Assuming this recommendation is adopted by the FINRA board, it could require members and associated persons to prepare for and approach future examinations with a much more guarded approach. Management will need to promptly assess the allegations that trigger the cause examination and independently determine whether the cause determination is warranted and, if so, whether remedial action is appropriate.

E. The FINRA Report notes that it is standard practice of FINRA not to defer to another regulatory agency’s parallel enforcement efforts, unless there is an express request to defer made by the SEC or other agency. This statement will come as a surprise to many practitioners who have successfully persuaded FINRA to defer its own review of an enforcement matter on burdensomeness grounds where there is a parallel SEC or DOJ investigation into the same conduct. It remains to be seen how this newly announced FINRA policy will be applied in practice. 

SEC Enforcement Reforms

While the SEC IG proposed myriad reforms regarding training and oversight at the SEC, financial services firms are most likely to be affected by reforms relating to the staffing and handling of complaints as well as a proposed more targeted focus of examinations. 

A. A new Office of Market Intelligence will be created within the Enforcement Division to coordinate the process of reviewing and evaluating tips and complaints. In addition, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro is seeking Congressional authority to reward whistleblowers with financial incentives.

B. The SEC will work to deploy adequately qualified staff with experience tailored to the matters at issue in a specific investigation. The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) hopes to fill new “Senior Specialized Examiner” positions with professionals with experience in areas such as valuation, sales and forensic accounting. Dealing with such specialized professionals could result in a streamlining and acceleration of the enforcement investigation and examination process for financial services firms. Whether this results in a fairer process for these firms remains to be seen.

C. Finally, the Enforcement Division will institute a more rigorous and systematized process for the planning, oversight and management of the investigation process, including the processes for both opening and closing investigations. Although more targeted investigations may lighten the burden on financial services firms in some respects, OCIE, like FINRA, intends to increase its focus on “cause” investigations. This focus raises the same concerns as it does with FINRA’s shift in emphasis and puts greater burdens on financial services firms to more carefully prepare for and respond to issues raised in examinations and investigations. It will also increase the need for management to conduct its own independent review of the matter under scrutiny.

Carbon Markets: CFTC Seeks Primary Authority Over Both Cash and Derivative Markets

By: Lawrence B. Patent

In testimony relating to“cap-and-trade” legislation currently pending in Congress, the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Gary Gensler, has urged that his agency be designated as the primary regulator of carbon trading, with authority over both cash transactions and derivative instruments. In a prepared statement for his September 9, 2009 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Chairman Gensler advocated CFTC regulation of both the trading of futures contracts in emission allowances and offset credits for greenhouse gases (GHG), and the cash market transactions in those allowances and credits. At the same time, Chairman Gensler recognized the need for the involvement of other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in the “cap” part of cap-and-trade, to oversee related functions such as the allocation of GHG emission allowances, the establishment of standards for allowances and credits, and the maintenance of a central registry for such instruments. CFTC regulation would include oversight of the trade execution system, oversight of the clearing of trades, and protection against fraud, manipulation and other abuses. Chairman Gensler called for prompt reporting of all transactions in both GHG emissions cash and futures markets, and for a central registry of all transactions, to be updated on at least a daily basis.

Chairman Gensler’s testimony follows introduction by Senator Feinstein of S. 1399, the Carbon Market Oversight Act of 2009, which would grant the CFTC authority over both GHG emission allowances and offset credits, and derivatives thereon. Currently, the CFTC has authority only over futures transactions in derivative instruments, but not over cash transactions in the products underlying those derivatives. If enacted, S. 1399 would, for the first time, extend CFTC jurisdiction to a cash market – that is, the market for GHG emission allowances and credits that will arise under any cap-and-trade scheme – with the power to adopt and enforce rules for cash market transactions in those products. 

Among the rules that the CFTC would be likely to impose on those cash markets would be standardization of contracts and centralized trading and clearing.The CFTC takes the view that derivative instruments should, to the extent possible, be defined by standardized contracts, and traded and cleared centrally. Chairman Gensler envisions a similar regime for GHG emission allowances and offset credits, urging that they should be traded only on centralized marketplaces, rather than on an off-exchange basis through ISDA or other documentation. 

Chairman Gensler advocated that the CFTC is the appropriate regulator of the trading of GHG emission allowances and offset credits because of its experience and expertise in regulating markets involving derivatives on similar instruments. He noted that the CFTC already oversees the trading and clearing of derivative contracts based on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide allowances and offsets. Chairman Gensler also argued that carbon markets have similarities to several different markets that fall within the CFTC’s regulatory authority because, like agricultural commodities, there will be a yearly “crop” and important programmatic regulations governing the nature of the product, and because emission allowances and offset credits will be government-issued, similar to Treasury-issued debt instruments. Chairman Gensler further pointed out that the CFTC recently issued a proposed determination to classify the Carbon Financial Instrument contract traded on the Chicago Climate Exchange as a significant price discovery contract, which, if finalized, would give the CFTC full oversight authority over the contract and additional experience regulating cash emissions contracts. 74 Fed. Reg. 42052 (Aug. 20, 2009). Certain commenters responding to the CFTC’s request for comment on the proposed determination, however, have questioned the CFTC’s assertion of jurisdiction in that matter. See Letter from R. Trabue Bland, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Assistant General Counsel, IntercontinentalExchange, to David Stawick, Secretary, CFTC, Sept. 4, 2009. 

CFTC regulation of GHG emission allowances and offset credits is by no means certain, and Congress has some difficult choices to make. The cap-and-trade bill that passed the House of Representatives earlier this year, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), would give such jurisdiction to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), with CFTC jurisdiction limited to derivatives trading in those instruments. See Title III, Subtitle D of that bill, beginning at page 1027 thereof. In this regard, the House bill is consistent with the existing cap-and-trade program involving sulfur dioxide emissions that was begun almost two decades ago under the administration of the EPA, which maintains jurisdiction over the cash market trading in sulfur dioxide emissions trading to this day, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7651b and regulations promulgated thereunder. 

Competing regulatory jurisdiction over the energy space is not new. The CFTC and the FERC recently engaged in a jurisdictional dispute over which agency should pursue allegations of manipulation of the NYMEX natural gas futures market by Amaranth Advisors, with both the CFTC and the FERC ultimately settling separate actions against the company on the same day, August 12, 2009, which included a total civil monetary penalty due to the U.S. Treasury in the amount of $7.5 million, and continuing to pursue separate actions against Brian Hunter, who was the lead trader in natural gas products for Amaranth. Earlier this year, the CFTC sought unsuccessfully to persuade the Federal Trade Commission not to adopt regulations that the CFTC saw as impinging upon its exclusive jurisdiction over regulated energy futures markets. 74 Fed. Reg. 40685 (Aug. 12, 2009).

Historically, the CFTC has taken the position that the Commodity Exchange Act expressly vests it with exclusive regulatory and civil enforcement jurisdiction over all transactions in regulated futures and option contracts and the markets in them. Such exclusive jurisdiction, it has argued, assures that participants and intermediaries in those markets will be governed by a comprehensive set of statutory and regulatory standards and requirements administered by a single regulator, and that these markets will not be subjected to multiple different and potentially conflicting statutory and regulatory standards, interpretations and enforcers. 

Yet while the CFTC has not hesitated to use its enforcement powers against those who it alleges seek to use cash market transactions to attempt to manipulate cash and futures commodity prices, the CFTC has not previously sought to regulate cash markets for energy, agricultural or financial products. Any such CFTC regulatory authority, however, would appear to overlap with other agencies’ existing jurisdiction over related products, because the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange Act extends only to exchange-traded futures and option contracts. A regulatory framework where the CFTC has general authority over cash markets may be problematic, given the potential for legal uncertainty and increased costs for market participants as they seek to comply with multiple and potentially inconsistent federal regulations. Beyond this, these legislative debates may also embolden other agencies to seek to expand their own respective jurisdictions, so as to reach into the CFTC’s traditional jurisdiction over derivatives.

The CFTC already has a robust agenda to address, including possible federal position limits on energy futures trading, reporting to Congress on efforts to harmonize its regulatory framework with that of the SEC, and helping to shape the evolving regulatory program for what have been off-exchange derivatives that were exempt from federal regulation. This is an ambitious agenda that will likely require the CFTC to develop additional resources for its implementation. Its proposed new authority over GHG emission allowances and offset credits adds to the list and, from a jurisdictional perspective, may be the most complicated item of all.

Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort

By: Diane E. Ambler, Philip M. Cedar, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Vanessa C. Edwards, Edward G. Eisert, David H. Jones, Steven M. KaplanSean P. Mahoney, J. Matthew Mangan, Philip J. Morgan, Mary C. Moynihan, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Clair E. Pagnano, Lawrence B. Patent, Karishma Shah Page

Since June 17, 2009, when the Obama Administration unveiled its financial regulatory reform plan, there has been a flurry of executive branch and legislative branch activity.  The frenetic pace of the reform effort is expected to resume in the fall, as Congress works to resolve the many highly controversial issues presented by the plan.  The traditional August Congressional recess now underway provides an opportunity to take stock of this historic capital markets reform effort.  This alert provides an overview of the most significant developments so far, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC Chairman Schapiro Defends Agency, Maps Out Strategy for Revival

By: Mark D. Perlow

Congress, the media and the public have subjected the SEC to harsh criticism in recent months, charging that it failed to prevent the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and to detect the long-running Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff. While the accusations are somewhat unfair – banking regulators failed to prevent the insolvency of many large depository institutions, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority also failed to detect the Madoff fraud – these charges have achieved considerable political traction, and many recent proposals for regulatory reform would strip authority from the SEC or merge it into a new or already existing regulatory agency, such as the CFTC.

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, however, has made clear that she intends to assert aggressively the continuing importance and relevance of the agency. In particular, in a recent speech, Chairman Schapiro made the case for the SEC and its distinctive brand of financial regulation. She stated her view that the capital markets require a different type of regulation than do financial institutions, one that is focused on the protection of investors rather than on the safety and soundness of key institutions. She argued that investor protection requires an agency that is independent and experienced in dealing with the capital markets, an implicit criticism of banking regulators as too closely tied to the banks they regulate. She detailed the SEC’s past regulatory achievements, including regulatory regimes that have fostered successful exchanges, clearing agencies, mutual funds, investment advisers and broker-dealers, all of which (other than the largest investment banks) have functioned without a systemic failure during the current crisis. Although she does not put it this way, she is arguing that if the SEC did not exist, it would have to be invented.

Nonetheless, Chairman Schapiro admitted that the SEC has not performed up to expectations recently, and she mapped out the agency’s recent efforts to revitalize itself. First and foremost, she emphasized that the SEC’s enforcement program would be tougher and more efficient. She signaled the SEC’s intention to bring “meaningful cases that have the greatest impact and send a strong message.” In an effort to achieve these goals, the agency has eliminated controversial procedures requiring the staff to get pre-approval of the full Commission to launch a formal investigation or to negotiate settlements that include penalties. In addition, the SEC will engage a consulting firm to help the agency determine how best to sort through the countless tips and complaints it receives each year. The agency will also improve training and hire staff analysts (who may not necessarily be lawyers) with more financial industry experience. These reforms will resonate with practitioners with experience of the bureaucratic ways of the enforcement program. Subjects of SEC investigations can expect to face an even more relentless Division of Enforcement.

Schapiro also summarized some of the key elements of the SEC’s current pipeline of cases, making clear the agency’s intent to bring “message” cases – 150 hedge fund investigations, two dozen municipal securities investigations, and 50 cases involving credit default swaps (“CDS”), collateralized debt obligations and other derivatives. Recently announced enforcement actions have filled out this story further: the SEC has brought several dozen cases against alleged Ponzi schemes; the first insider trading case based on transactions in CDS; a case alleging manipulation of a municipal securities market; a case alleging that an investment adviser did not have adequate procedures to protect against conflicts of interest in its proxy voting procedures; an action against the manager of a money market fund that broke the buck for allegedly inadequate disclosures; and a case against executives of a subprime lender for allegedly misleading investors about the riskiness of its loan portfolio.

As Schapiro pointed out, the SEC also has a full rule-making agenda. In April, it proposed reinstating the short-sale uptick rule (or some variant on it); in May, it proposed a revamp of the client asset custody regime for registered investment advisers, including proposals to require surprise audits and independent compliance reviews, with the clear intent to prevent another Madoff. The SEC has also issued a controversial proposal to provide public company and investment company shareholders with access to the company’s proxy statement both to nominate a short slate of directors and to propose amendments to company nomination process bylaws. Schapiro’s willingness to take up this topic, which has been considered in various forms almost since the creation of the SEC and vigorously opposed by many industry groups, reflects her determination to restore the agency’s reputation with the public by picking a high-profile fight. Later this month, the SEC will propose new rules on money market funds, and is considering an expansion of the municipal pay-to-play rules and municipal securities disclosure, new rules regulating hedge funds, and seeking authority over whistleblower actions.

The Obama Administration has stated that it wants to see Congress pass a financial regulatory bill by the end of the year, and the chairs of the relevant Congressional committees have agreed to this timetable. The SEC is on a mission to demonstrate its importance and competence before the serious legislative sausage-making begins in the fall, all against the backdrop of deep public disillusionment with the financial sector. As one aspect of that campaign, subjects of SEC investigations and examinations, and industries targeted in SEC rulemaking proposals, should expect a tougher fight than at any time in recent memory.

Treasury and Budget Minister of Luxembourg Calls for Arbitration of Madoff Claims

By: Ian MeredithSean Kelsey

For investors, advisors, liquidators and institutions contemplating their exposure, or potential exposure, to the European dimensions of Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme, there have been notable recent developments in one of the key European centres of the funds industry, where the unwinding of the Madoff scandal has recently intersected with a significant current trend in international commercial dispute resolution.

Many of the Madoff-related claims in Europe are being brought in Luxembourg, estimated to be Europe’s largest funds centre. Prominent among these are suits seeking compensation and access to documents from Luxembourg units of UBS AG (“UBS”), custodian bank for two Madoff feeder funds, Access International Advisors LLC’s LuxAlpha Sicav-American Selection and Luxembourg Investment Fund. More than twenty suits have been dealt with to date, according to reports. Luxembourg’s Treasury and Budget Minister, Luc Frieden, anticipates “dozens” more, and some commentators suggest they could run into the hundreds. 

On April 28, Mr. Frieden urged custodian banks, fund liquidators, investors and all other parties to Madoff-related lawsuits in Luxembourg to agree to settle their differences by resort to international arbitration. Mr. Frieden believes that international arbitration - possibly seated in London or Paris - would provide a more appropriate, and a quicker solution than pursuit of such claims through the Luxembourg courts. Mr. Frieden also stated that he believed such an approach would be “in the best interest of the fund industry.”

Any solution along these lines would require the agreement of UBS, and might involve provisions permitting claimants to opt in (rather than requiring them to opt out).  In some respects, Mr. Frieden’s proposal chimes with the increasing availability of representative or “class” action as a tool for dispute resolution in a number of jurisdictions around the world, and indeed the uses to which that tool is already being put in connection with Madoff-related claims. In the United States, where class action litigation has been long established, investors are pursuing a variety of such claims against a host of feeder funds and advisors. In the arbitration context, class arbitrations have existed in the United States for over 25 years, and the American Arbitration Association has had rules for their conduct since 2003. At least one New York law firm is reportedly filing a number of Madoff-related group arbitrations. International class arbitration has been gaining in prominence more recently, and several international class arbitrations seated in the United States are currently known to exist. Enforcement, under the New York Convention, of awards resulting from international class arbitrations has, however, the potential to create issues, particularly if parties seek to enforce against assets located in jurisdictions less familiar with the class concept.

In a separate development, on April 24, a Luxembourg court selected a handful of “test cases” from more than fifty Madoff-related lawsuits that have been filed against UBS by individual investors to assess the validity of their claims for compensation. This would appear to hold out at least the possibility that claimants may be willing to pursue class-based lawsuits by way of international class arbitration if they, and UBS, perceive any advantages in doing so.

We will look to provide a more detailed analysis of the disputes landscape flowing from recent upheavals in the capital markets in a future edition of this newsletter.

Forfeiture of Madoff's Assets: Challenges for Victims

By: Richard A. KirbyRebecca L. Kline DubillScott P. Lindsay

On March 12, 2009, Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 counts of a criminal information filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”).  The information seeks forfeiture of all proceeds traceable to the commission of Madoff’s fraud in an amount “exceeding” $170 billion.  Assuming that the government can recover any additional assets through the exercise of its criminal or civil forfeiture powers, questions remain as to whether and how those assets will be distributed to Madoff’s victims.  Two recent large-scale securities fraud cases, Adelphia Communications Corp. and the Bayou Group, illustrate how protracted this process can be for victims.

Criminal forfeiture is a powerful tool that permits the government to seize a defendant’s assets that were used in, or were the fruits of, criminal activity.   The government also has civil forfeiture powers and can seize property related to criminal activity even if it does not belong to a convicted defendant.  Although as a separate matter the trustee appointed by the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (“SIPC”) in the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (“BMIS”) liquidation proceeding is also seeking to recover BMIS assets, the full range of the government’s forfeiture powers are broader than those of the SIPC trustee and may result in additional assets being recovered. 

Typically, forfeited assets are distributed to crime victims in one of two ways: (1) the petition for remission process, in which victims apply for remission from a victims’ fund administered by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”); or (2) restitution, in which the U.S. Attorney General “restores” the forfeited assets to the court overseeing the criminal cases, and the court distributes funds to victims through an order of restitution. 

In the Adelphia case, John and Timothy Rigas were convicted in 2004 on various counts relating to their looting of Adelphia’s corporate assets and forced to forfeit significant personal assets, including their Adelphia stock.   In 2005, pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement, the company that the Rigas’ had controlled, Adelphia, agreed to repurchase this forfeited stock for $715 million, which was paid into a victims’ compensation fund.  This victims’ fund is administered by DOJ under the petition for remission process and has faced substantial litigation over its protocols.  As a result, nearly nine years after the fraud was revealed, no distributions from the fund have yet been made to Adelphia’s creditors or shareholders. 

Bayou involved a $400 million Ponzi scheme.   In their plea allocutions, the Bayou principals agreed to forfeit both personal and corporate assets, including $100 million in Bayou funds, as well as several dozen Bayou investment assets.  The S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s Office appointed a receiver to collect and liquidate the assets so that they could be restored to the court overseeing the criminal proceedings for distribution to victims through an order of restitution.  Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office obtained possession of the $100 million in cash and other investments as a part of the preliminary forfeiture orders, it took almost three years to distribute the forfeited assets to victims.  The restitution process was further complicated and delayed due to litigation initiated by former investors, who had been sued in the Bayou bankruptcy on a clawback theory for return of fictitious profits and principal.  These former investors succeeded in establishing themselves as contingent victims for purposes of the restitution fund. 

If Adelphia and Bayou serve as a guide, it likely could be years before Madoff’s victims receive any distribution of property seized by the government through the exercise of its forfeiture powers.   This may provide an opportunity — given the massive scale of the fraud and the quasi-governmental nature of SIPC — for the government to chart a different course and use the established SIPC liquidation proceeding to distribute any assets it seizes to victims of Madoff’s scheme through a transfer of forfeited assets to the SIPC trustee.  Such a transfer could expedite the ultimate distribution of funds to Madoff’s victims and create certain efficiencies in the processing of claims and the handling of objections.  While it remains to be seen whether the government will be successful in identifying and seizing assets not already under the control of the SIPC trustee, it is not too soon to consider an alternative paradigm to the government’s traditional and slow-working forfeiture distribution mechanisms. 

Stanford Prosecutions Highlight Difficult Issues Posed by Company Counsel's Representation of Employees in Government Investigations

By: Matt T. MorleyMichael D. Ricciuti

The triggering event for the SEC’s action against Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and several of its senior executives appears to have been the abrupt public resignation of the company’s outside counsel.  This occurred the day after SEC testimony by one of Stanford’s executives, Laura Pendergest-Holt.  In apparently making what is known as a “noisy withdrawal,” counsel resigned and disavowed to the SEC all prior statements made by them in the matter.  The SEC promptly filed an action against Stanford and several executives, including Ms. Pendergest-Holt, who was also arrested on obstruction of justice charges.

In connection with the SEC’s investigation, company counsel had represented both the company and Ms. Pendergest-Holt.  According to press reports, counsel told the SEC that he represented the witness “insofar as she is an officer or director of one of the Stanford-affiliated companies.”  In many cases, it is potentially more efficient for company counsel to also represent individual officers and directors in government investigations.  But doing so often poses serious risks for conflict.  Although we do not know, and may never know, what precisely caused counsel to resign in the Stanford case, these events serve as a reminder of the risks involved where several parties share the same lawyers.  In such cases, parties need to consider in advance whether separate counsel should be retained and, if not, what will occur if a conflict subsequently arises.

When law enforcement officials first contact a company, it may seem – and may be the case – that the interests of individual employees are fully aligned with those of their employer. In some cases, at the outset of a criminal or SEC investigation, when the facts and/or the scope and focus of the probe may be unclear, corporate counsel may jointly represent the corporation and its individual officers, directors, and employees.  Pursuant to Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, such joint representation is permissible as long as it does not involve a conflict of interest.  For example, in the event that an individual becomes a “subject” or “target” of an investigation – that is, someone who may be indicted as the result of a criminal probe – joint representation of the company and any such individual is not possible, and the employee will need separate counsel.  Other circumstances, such as the discovery of additional facts, may also give rise to conflicts of interest between the company and its employees.

Indeed, in the internal investigation context, where company counsel represents only the company, employees are ordinarily provided with “Upjohn” warnings, making clear counsel is acting solely for the company, and that while the interview may be subject to the attorney-client privilege, the company and not the employee controls whether to assert that privilege.   Employees are told that the company remains free to waive the privilege and disclose the substance of the interview to third parties, including the government, as part of its effort to cooperate. 

Where company counsel also represents an employee, however, the Upjohn warning doesn’t fit, because counsel also has attorney-client relationships both with the company and with the employee, and the employee’s confidences cannot be revealed without his or her consent.   If the interests of the company and the employee diverge, a number of critical issues will promptly arise.  Counsel will generally be unable to represent both the company and the employee, and a change in representation will be required.  Will the individual be required to get separate counsel?  If that occurs, will company counsel remain free to represent the company?  If so, what will happen to the employee’s confidences that have been shared with company counsel?  Will the company be free to use that information as it chooses?  Will the company be able to disclose this information to the government?  The failure to resolve these questions in advance can harm both the company and the individual involved and thus, in a joint representation, it is wise to reach a clear and common understanding from the outset as to what will happen if the parties develop conflicting interests or objectives. 

These questions take on even greater significance given that, in recent years, it has become increasingly common for the SEC to cooperate closely with criminal authorities.  Documents and witness statements may be shared with criminal prosecutors without notice to the company or its employees – and in the current environment, one should assume that almost any SEC investigation involves criminal charges.  Indeed, press reports indicate that, at the beginning of Ms. Pendergest-Holt’s SEC testimony, counsel tried without success to learn whether there was a parallel criminal investigation in the matter.

No single solution to these issues can fit every situation, but there are a variety of ways to address these issues.  At a minimum, where counsel will represent multiple interests, the engagement letter should spell out the parties’ agreement as to what will happen in the event of a conflict.  Sometimes, individuals may decide to retain “shadow” counsel, who are fully involved in providing advice and preparing for testimony, but who may not make a public appearance in the matter.  In other circumstances, separate counsel may be the best choice.  One thing remains clear – those who become the focus of attention by government authorities need to consider these issues at the very start.

Arbitration of Disputes Arising from the Financial Crisis

By: Clare TannerPaul F. Donahue

The current turmoil in financial markets has led to an increase in disputes involving financial institutions.   Parties may have entered into transactions in better times with little consideration given to the forum in which future disputes would play out.  In today’s far more challenging circumstances, the choice of forum may be central to the satisfactory resolution of disputes. 

In some areas, it is common for disputes involving financial institutions to be resolved through arbitration.  The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest self-regulatory organization, i.e., non-governmental regulator, for all securities firms doing business in the United States.  (FINRA’s rulemaking, however, is subject to approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).)  Both individual and institutional customers can require a FINRA member to arbitrate disputes.  Indeed, most, if not all, securities broker/dealers will refuse to do business with customers who do not agree to arbitrate disputes.  Disputes between FINRA members may also be submitted to arbitration.

The financial crisis has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of cases referred to FINRA arbitration.   In 2007, slightly more than 3,000 arbitration cases were filed.  In 2008, the number was almost 5,000 and the upward trend has only increased in 2009.  The number of cases filed in January 2009 was double that of a year earlier. 

An award handed down by a FINRA tribunal last month, arising from transactions in auction rate securities, illustrates the enormous magnitude of disputes arising from the financial crisis and the speed with which they can be resolved through arbitration.  The FINRA tribunal ordered Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, a brokerage unit of the Swiss bank, to pay $400 million to its customer STMicroelectronics NV, a European semiconductor maker.  STMicroelectronics claimed it had authorized Credit Suisse to make investments in top-rated securities backed by U.S. Government guaranteed student loans, but instead the funds were invested in collateralized debt obligations some of which were backed by sub-prime mortgages.  The entire process including 28 hearing sessions over two months took just under a year.  Any court proceeding would undoubtedly have taken far longer.  Nonetheless, STMicroelectronics, according to the award, incurred more than $4 million in legal fees during that time.

While FINRA members can be compelled to arbitrate customer disputes and most require their customers to agree to arbitrate disputes, other financial institutions have traditionally been reluctant to commit to arbitration and have preferred to submit disputes to national courts.   Some of the risks and benefits associated with arbitration as a means of resolving disputes involving financial institutions can be illustrated by reference to FINRA’s procedures. 

Confidentiality
As is common with arbitration, FINRA arbitrations are confidential.   The evidence submitted and procedural and substantive hearings are not open to the public.  Although FINRA arbitral awards are made public, that is the exception, not the rule for most arbitrations unless the parties agree otherwise.  FINRA awards are not necessarily fully reasoned and may simply amount to a requirement that one party pay as was the case in the STMicroelectronics case.  Under a recent rule approved by the SEC, however, beginning next month, if both parties request it, FINRA arbitrators will have to give an “explained decision,” i.e., “a fact based award stating the general reasons for the decision” but which need not include legal authorities or damage calculations.

Confidentiality can be a significant attraction of arbitration as it avoids both financial institutions and their institutional clients airing their dirty laundry in public.   In current markets, disputes may give rise to a damaging loss of confidence in the financial institution.  Equally, even if sophisticated institutional customers feel they have been misled by a financial institution, they may wish to avoid public allegations that they share some responsibility or may not want detailed aspects of their financial dealings laid open to public scrutiny.  In disputes between sophisticated commercial enterprises, the risk of adverse publicity is seldom limited to one party. 

Arbitration will not be appropriate where a financial institution seeks to establish a legal precedent that will be publicly available.  Only a court ruling can provide that and, of course, it can be a double-edged sword.

The Tribunal
FINRA’s arbitration rules for customer disputes generally provide for a three-person tribunal with one “industry member” and two independent members.  Under a rule change effective at the end of this month the size of cases to be decided by a single arbitrator will increase to $100,000.  Three-arbitrator panels are intended to provide both industry knowledge and experience while also protecting the customer’s interests, but some have criticised such panels as too industry friendly.  Under a pilot program now underway for 400 cases, several securities firms have agreed to have panels made up of three independent arbitrators.  FINRA’s approach may not be appropriate in all cases and, for example, the arbitration rules of the London-based City Disputes Panel provide that the tribunal will usually consist of a legally qualified chairman and two experienced financial services practitioners.

Given the complex and technical nature of modern financial products, there may be a significant advantage in decisions being reached by tribunals with necessary expert knowledge.   Both financial institutions and their institutional customers may prefer such a tribunal to the vagaries of a jury trial in the U.S.  The speed at which law and market practice change are such that, even in jurisdictions where disputes may come before an experienced judge, a tribunal made up of industry experts may still be preferable.  

Procedure
Recent rule changes have sharply curtailed the ability to obtain a summary determination of a dispute in FINRA arbitrations.   The loss of the opportunity of having a frivolous claim dismissed at an early stage may be unattractive for respondents and correspondingly attractive for claimants in those jurisdictions where summary determination is only available to a claimant.  However, expedited procedures are available by agreement between the parties in both FINRA arbitrations and in other arbitral rules.  Equally, the absence of, or restrictions on, wide-ranging discovery exercises and pre-trial depositions found in FINRA and other arbitral rules may mean that, even without a summary determination, arbitration is still more attractive than litigation through national courts.

Finality
The ability to challenge an arbitration award is usually strictly limited and FINRA arbitration is no exception.   The attraction of a final award is that the cost and risk associated with any given dispute can be more easily judged.  The prospect of a defaulting party endlessly prolonging the proceedings while attempting to protect assets against enforcement is greatly diminished as is the prospect of a successful party deciding to settle simply to end the bloodletting.  

Enforcement
Many financial transactions will have an international element, as illustrated by the STMicroelectronics case.   A party may be reluctant to commence proceedings in the home court of the other party fearing “home advantage.”  Even if the parties agree to resolve disputes in the courts of a neutral state, many national courts will not permit parties to “manufacture” jurisdiction and simply will not hear such cases.  Even when they do, the successful party still faces the cost and difficulty of enforcing that judgment in another country. 

Arbitration awards made in a country which is a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards can be enforced in any other Convention State, by the local court giving effect to the award as if it were a court judgment.  This is subject to limited, mostly due process, exceptions.

Conclusion
Arbitration is not a panacea — as with litigation through the courts, expense and delay can be features of arbitration — but there are advantages for disputes between financial institutions or between financial institutions and their institutional clients, particularly where there is an international element.   Even parties who did not commit to arbitration at the outset may still agree, after a dispute has arisen, that arbitration is a more suitable dispute resolution mechanism.  A failure to consider arbitration may leave parties at a disadvantage and, of course, it is always best to make the decision at the outset, before disputes arise.

FSA Action Suggests Need for Financial Services Firms to Take Effective Anti-Corruption Compliance Measures

By: Robert V. Hadley,  Matt T. Morley

On 5 January 2009 the FSA imposed a penalty of £5.25 million on the insurance brokerage firm Aon Limited because the firm lacked adequate systems and controls to address the risk that third parties would make corrupt payments to assist Aon in winning business in overseas jurisdictions.  See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/aon.pdf.  The FSA’s Final Notice alleged that due to these failures, the firm had made sixty-six "suspicious payments" totalling more than US$5 million.  The Final Notice, which Aon consented to, states that the firm’s procedures failed to require adequate training of relevant personnel as to bribery and corruption risks, adequate due diligence prior to the retention of third party representatives, and appropriate monitoring of those relationships going forward.  In addition, Aon’s supervisory committees were not provided with adequate information or otherwise did not assess whether the firm’s corruption risks were being effectively managed.

The FSA’s action is particularly notable for several reasons.

  • While the FSA is not directly empowered with jurisdiction over domestic or foreign corruption offenses, which are ordinarily the responsibility of the police or the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO"), the FSA has a specific statutory objective to prevent financial crime.  The Final Notice makes clear that Aon was fined for breaches of FSA Principle 3 ("A firm must take reasonable care to control its affairs responsibly, with adequate risk management systems").  Conceivably, the FSA could also act in such cases under Principle 1 ("a firm must conduct its business with integrity").  Of course, a firm is likely to more readily agree to a public statement of a systems and controls failure than to acting without integrity, but, for the FSA, the level of fine, the publicity, and the resulting deterrent value of the FSA action remains the same.

     
  • Aon already had in place a policy that prohibited corrupt payments such as the ones that came to light.  Yet, as US law enforcement authorities have so often emphasized with regard to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a “paper program” is not enough, and firms must also take additional steps, such as training, due diligence, monitoring and auditing, in a meaningful effort to assure compliance.

     
  • Aon promptly self-reported to the Serious and Organised Crime Agency ("SOCA") and the FSA its discovery of the questionable payments.  The firm went on to conduct its own internal review of its anti-bribery systems and controls, and all payments to third party representatives for the previous six years.  Aon implemented all recommendations resulting from this review, and took disciplinary action against personnel found to have been involved.  Aon co-operated fully with the FSA's investigation.  While these steps, and the cost involved, were taken into account by the FSA when assessing/agreeing the financial penalty imposed, the firm did not avoid sanctions.

Margaret Cole, the FSA's Director of Enforcement, said that the fine "sends a clear message to the UK financial services industry that it is completely unacceptable for firms to conduct business overseas without having in place acceptable anti-bribery and corruption systems and controls".  Ms. Cole added that the FSA "has an important role to play" in UK steps against overseas corruption.

There are at least two important messages being sent by the FSA by its action against Aon.  First and most clearly, the case makes clear that the FSA expects regulated firms to have effective anti-corruption compliance measures in place – not simply a policy prohibiting corrupt payments, but coordinated efforts to require training of relevant personnel; due diligence on agents and other intermediaries acting on the firm’s behalf; monitoring and auditing compliance with the policy; and disciplinary action where violations of the policy occur.  Firms that fail to take these steps face potential sanctions under Principle 3.

Beyond this, the Aon case sets the precedent that in the eyes of the FSA regulated firms are required to self-report potential overseas corruption violations to the FSA.   FSA Principle 11 provides that "a firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose to the FSA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would expect notice."  We know the FSA's position from the Aon case, notwithstanding the FSA’s lack of criminal jurisdiction over such conduct, and that such matters are discloseable under Principle 11 also follows from the fact that firms are authorised by the FSA and individuals are approved by the FSA on the basis of their being "fit and proper." 

Disclosure of such matters may also be driven by the obligation of persons in the regulated sector (very broadly the financial services industry) to inform the SOCA where there is a suspicion of money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.   UK prosecutors regard any revenue from a contract obtained through a corrupt payment or offer of payment as the proceeds of crime, so that possession or any dealing with such funds is potentially a money laundering offence. Accordingly, the risk of a failure to disclose an offence or the need to set up a defence of SOCA's consent by disclosure to SOCA arises in almost every case where there is a suspicion of corruption. Once the need or obligation to make a report to SOCA is triggered, a regulated firm would be taking a serious risk by not also disclosing to the FSA under Principle 11. 

Overseas corruption is a hot topic in England and Wales, and the SFO has also taken recent steps to increase enforcement activity, increasing its manpower dedicated to looking at these matters by over 50% in 2008.  Last year saw the first UK convictions for overseas corruption, with the conviction of the head of the British company CBRN in connection with security services contracts in Uganda (see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep/23/ukcrime.law).  The SFO also reached a settlement with the construction company Balfour Beatty, in which that company admitted to historic accounting irregularities in some of its African operations.  Balfour Beatty paid a civil fine of £2.5million and was not subjected to criminal prosecution.  This case can be seen as a model for the SFO’s efforts to create a culture of self-reporting and to increase deterrence in the overseas corruption field.  In this way, the SFO can be seen to be taking enforcement steps without running the risk of a failed prosecution.

Both the SFO’s settlement with Balfour Beatty and the FSA's approach to Aon bear a strong resemblance to efforts by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Department of Justice to pursue violations of their anticorruption statute, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  The great majority of such cases are resolved by violators consenting to the entry of court orders finding legal violations and imposing significant financial penalties as well as disgorgement of profits, as in the recent case involving Siemens AG and the imposition of more than $1 billion in fines.  As in the Siemens case, a further condition of these kinds of settlements is the creation of remedial programmes and the installment of external monitors, at the company’s considerable expense, empowered to review the firm's anti-corruption programmes for several years and report back to law enforcement authorities.  Self-reporting of potential violations is also encouraged by US authorities, who state that the consequences of violations will be less severe for those who come forward voluntarily. 

It remains to be seen whether the SFO’s resolution of the Balfour Beatty case will provide a model for future cases, but in the financial services arena, the die seems to have been cast by the Aon case by the rather straightforward application of the FSA’s Principles to require regulated firms to implement anti-corruption compliance programs.

State Securities Regulators -- Stepping Up Enforcement Examinations and Investigations in the Wake of Madoff and Industry Migration Trends

By: David N. Jonson

The North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") started the new year off with an ambitious agenda at its annual Winter Enforcement Conference on January 8-11, in Coronado, California.  The conference, which is open only to state, federal and FINRA enforcement attorneys and investigators, featured panels on Enforcement Trends, Enforcement Best Practices, Broker-Dealer Sales Tactics, and Enforcement Implications of the Financial Crisis.  The attendees also met to discuss strategy and tactics in six specialized NASAA enforcement groups: Enforcement Technology, Enforcement Trends, Special Project Development and Coordination, Attorney Investigator Training, Litigation Forum, and Enforcement Zones.

State securities regulators, who have regulated the securities industry since before federal securities laws and the SEC were created by Congress during the New Deal, have always been mindful of the erosion of their regulatory power by federal initiatives advocated by both the SEC and the securities industry itself.  Although the securities industry's clout in Washington today is arguably at its weakest level in decades, the states are also aware that any new financial services regulatory scheme from Washington could still result in a diminution of state authority.  Accordingly, even though recent multi-state regulatory enforcement actions in the areas of research analyst conflict of interests and auction rate securities have been widely viewed as successful by investors, consumer groups and some influential members of Congress, the states clearly do not intend to stray too far from the kitchen while a new regulatory pie is being baked.

To continue demonstrating their value during this time of regulatory change, state securities regulators will continue to focus on local cases with a common national theme (e.g. , auction rate securities and senior citizen issues).   However, since the states have also detected an unprecedented number of registered representatives departing broker-dealers to form smaller, state-registered investment advisory firms, the states have also indicated that they will dramatically increase the number of proactive examinations, investigations and enforcement actions against such firms. 

There are several reasons for the states' increased interest in these new investment advisers.   As an overarching factor, the effects of the Madoff matter cannot be understated.  No state securities regulator, many of whom serve at the pleasure of statewide elected officials, wants to have to explain how or why they missed clues or leads that, if properly investigated, would have shut down a would-be Madoff in their jurisdiction.  Therefore, future state examinations and investigations — regardless of whether or not a whistleblower provides a roadmap of where to look — will be far more thorough than in the past.  As a result, subjects of these inquiries should expect to find that responding to such matters will involve considerably more time and expense than they may have grown accustomed to in prior years. 

Second, state regulators are very concerned that since the majority of the new advisers may not be accustomed to handling compliance and other administrative details themselves, and because adequate compliance takes time and money and may be less of a priority than client development, state regulators theorize that these advisers are more likely to be deficient in carrying out such duties.  Some states will even be taking the unusual step of conducting introductory examinations of newly registered advisory firms. 

Third, some regulators believe that most of the representatives who left broker-dealers to form their own advisory firms may not have been in the upper echelon (or "top producers") at their former firms, and now, under pressure to pay their own way, may be more desperate to generate business through questionable advice or investment opportunities that they would not have attempted to solicit while at their prior firms.   (Interestingly, some state regulators — especially those who considered the term "top producer" to be questionable when viewed from the client's perspective — took a more charitable view of the motives of the lower-producing representatives who recently became state-registered advisers.) 

State securities regulators have identified new, state-registered investment advisers as the latest "at risk" group who will bear the brunt of their regulatory and investigative scrutiny.   Given the deterrent effect and favorable publicity that can be generated from taking strong enforcement actions, the states can also be expected to continue availing themselves of the full array of media outlets on both the local and national level.

SEC Chair Nominee Sets Forth Regulatory Agenda

By: Mark D. Perlow

On January 15, 2009, Mary L. Schapiro, President Obama’s nominee to chair the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (“Committee”) in a hearing to consider whether to recommend her nomination to the full Senate.  Her appointment was confirmed by the Committee and the Senate on January 22.  During her confirmation hearing, Ms. Schapiro outlined her priorities for the days ahead.

Ms. Schapiro stated that her “first and foremost” priority will be to “move aggressively to reinvigorate enforcement at the SEC” — an implicit repudiation of the direction that SEC enforcement has taken under Chairman Christopher Cox.  Under Mr. Cox, the size of the enforcement staff has declined in recent years, and the Commission has instituted additional layers of review for the approval of an investigation.  In addition, it issued guidance that limited the circumstances under which monetary penalties can be imposed upon corporations, noting that in many cases penalties have the effect of harming the corporation’s innocent shareholders.  The SEC also instituted a pilot program requiring the Commission’s pre-approval for the enforcement staff to negotiate monetary penalties in settlements, with the Commission first approving an acceptable range for the penalties.  Critics contend that these measures have hamstrung and demoralized the enforcement staff, while defenders argue that they have restored balance to an overly aggressive program.  In either case, Ms. Schapiro’s chairmanship most likey will result in more aggressive enforcement.

Second, Ms. Schapiro articulated her vision of the SEC’s mission as the “investor’s advocate,” focused on “investor protection, transparency, accountability and disclosure.”  She expressed a desire to preserve these missions in the coming regulatory overhaul, which seems to concede that the SEC would serve as a regulator of business conduct but not as a prudential regulator of safety and soundness.  The U.S. Treasury’s Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, proposed in March 2008, advocated consolidating the many federal financial regulators into three – a market stability regulator, a prudential regulator, and a business conduct regulator, and this broad vision (if not the specifics of the Treasury’s proposals) has gained currency among the Congressional leadership.  Ms. Schapiro may have thus signalled that she will not fight to regain what the SEC has already in fact lost, the power to impose capital, liquidity and other prudential standards on systemically important broker-dealers.  Indeed, she implicitly endorsed regulatory consolidation when she expressed her view that one reason why regulators did not uncover the alleged Madoff fraud was the current “stovepiped” approach to regulation.  Nonetheless, she pointed out to a largely sympathetic Committee that the SEC’s core functions — examinations of investment companies and advisers and securities firms, regulation of corporate disclosure, exchange regulation and oversight — need to be preserved in any combined agency.

Ms. Schapiro also said that the SEC’s approach to regulating credit rating agencies should be reconsidered.  These firms have garnered much criticism for allegedly allowing their standards to slip in overrating many of the asset-backed securities that now clog the balance sheets of financial institutions.  In particular, the business model of these firms has come under attack:  because the issuer of the security pays the rating agency, critics, including the SEC itself, have alleged that this conflict of interest compromised the independence and methods of the ratings agencies.  Ms. Schapiro said that two ideas in particular merit attention – first, requiring that the rating agencies receive their compensation from small transaction or listing fees rather than from the issuers of securities, and second, establishing a dedicated regulator with powers modelled after those of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to set standards and conduct comprehensive examinations.

Ms. Schapiro also advocated mandatory SEC registration and regulation of hedge fund managers.  While she acknowledged that the SEC does not currently have this authority, since the agency’s effort to impose a hedge fund registration rule was struck down by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, Ms. Schapiro recognized that Congress will likely soon expressly grant the SEC this authority.  Ms. Schapiro said that the agency will begin working on proposals that will govern hedge fund disclosures and provide for “better and stronger checks and balances.”  Even before Congress enacts any legislation, such rules could be applied to hedge fund managers currently registered with the SEC.

Ms. Schapiro indicated that the SEC would move forward with shareholder proxy access, an issue with a long and contested history.  In 2004, then-SEC Chairman William Donaldson prompted the Commission to propose a complicated rule that would have allowed shareholders that crossed certain ownership percentage and longevity thresholds to place a limited number of director nominees on an issuer’s own proxy.  However, business groups strongly opposed the rule, and Donaldson stepped down before it could be adopted.  In 2007, pressured by a Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that questioned the SEC staff’s interpretation of the SEC proxy rules, the Commission under Chairman Cox adopted a rule permitting issuers to omit access proposals from their proxy materials, which engendered opposition from some institutional shareholders’ groups.  Ms. Schapiro pointed out that many other leading non-U.S. markets mandate proxy access, and she stated her preference for “the U.S. to enter that club.”  However, she signalled that she would not force through a proposal, only that she was going to immediately begin discussing with other Commissioners a proxy access proposal along Donaldson’s lines.

Ms. Schapiro testified that she will re-evaluate the SEC’s current path towards the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”), thereby moving away from U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  Chairman Cox made the globalization of capital markets a theme of his tenure, and he pushed the SEC to adopt a “roadmap” to the adoption of IFRS, subject to the completion of certain “milestones.”  Ms. Schapiro stated that she would not be bound by this roadmap, and indeed she expressed concerns that make clear that the SEC will move slowly on the issue.  In particular, she questioned the independence of the International Accounting Standards Board, which governs IFRS, and pointed out that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires U.S. public companies to operate under standards promulgated by an independent authority.  She also noted that conversion to IFRS would be extremely expensive and thus more burdensome during a recession, and her comments indicated concerns that IFRS, which are principles-based (rather than rules-based, as is U.S. GAAP), were not detailed enough to be effective.  Each of these concerns mirrors public criticisms of IFRS by opponents of their U.S. adoption.

She similarly indicated that the SEC will reconsider whether to grant “mutual recognition” to other countries’ securities exchanges and broker-dealers.  One of Chairman Cox’s initiatives on globalization, mutual recognition would recognize that certain countries have market regulatory schemes equal in effectiveness to that of the U.S.  Exchanges in these countries would be allowed direct access to U.S. customers, and their broker-dealers would be permitted to operate in the U.S. and transact with U.S. customers, in each case without registration with or regulation by the SEC.  Advocates of mutual recognition argue that it would eliminate unnecessary obstacles to international investing, whereas critics argue that mutual recognition would eliminate the superior investor protections under the U.S. regulatory regime.  Ms. Schapiro sided with the critics and questioned whether mutual recognition was “headed in the right direction.”

Finally, Ms. Schapiro testified that she will rebuild the SEC’s Office of Risk Assessment (“ORA”) and that she wants risk assessment to “permeate everything the SEC does.”  In particular, she pointed out that, given the limited number of SEC examiners, risk assessment would enable them to focus on the issues of greatest importance.  Chairman Donaldson created ORA in response to the market timing and late trading scandals in the mutual fund industry in 2003-2004, but Chairman Cox gave it less emphasis and fewer resources.  It is worth remembering that Chairman Donaldson created ORA in part to organize and give direction to a profusion of industry-wide, issue-focused but partially redundant “sweep” examinations that were burdening the fund and brokerage industries and wasting SEC staff resources.  Ms. Schapiro seemed to be signalling that ORA will perform a similar disciplining function, but it remains to be seen whether it will also inaugurate another era of large-scale sweep examinations.

Ms. Schapiro’s testimony indicates both that she has a clear idea where she wants to lead the SEC and that she is skilled at building political support for her agenda.   As a result, the securities and investment industries are almost certainly facing an era of tougher SEC enforcement and revitalized examinations, while the internationalization of SEC rules will be made a lower priority.  The SEC will also seek to increase the regulation of hedge funds and credit rating agencies.  While the extent of any regulatory reform is still unknown, these initiatives reflect the views of the large majority in Congress that these regulatory regimes need fixing and leave aside broader questions as to the need for a qualitative change of the SEC’s mission. 

OFAC Issues Guidance to Securities and Futures Firms Concerning Account Opening, OFAC Requirements Are Applicable to Everyone

By: Lawrence B. Patent

The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries and designated persons.  OFAC issued guidance dated November 5, 2008, to assist securities and futures firms in fulfilling their OFAC obligations when accepting new clients and evaluating client transactions.  OFAC’s guidance applies to investment advisers (IAs), securities broker-dealers (BDs), futures commission merchants (FCMs), introducing brokers in commodity interests, commodity pool operators (CPOs) and commodity trading advisors (CTAs).  OFAC’s guidance is important in three areas:

  • Although another arm of the Treasury Department, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), recently withdrew as outdated proposals published in 2002 and 2003 that would have required IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering (AML) programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFAC’s guidance notes that all U.S. persons, including securities and futures firms, are subject to the requirements of OFAC.

     
  • OFAC, unlike FinCEN’s approach under the BSA, requires that a BD or an FCM look through the intermediary to the underlying beneficial owners of an omnibus account for purposes of complying with OFAC requirements.

     
  • Although FinCEN permits clearing firms and introducing or executing firms to rely upon each other for performing certain AML functions, OFAC’s guidance states that it does not permit businesses to reallocate their legal liability to a third party with regard to statutes that OFAC administers – thus, if a securities or futures firm delegates OFAC compliance functions to others, the securities or futures firm, as well as the third party, could be held liable for any OFAC violations caused by the third party’s negligence.

OFAC’s guidance, which was issued almost immediately after FinCEN withdrew its outdated AML proposals, appears designed to remind all financial intermediaries of their obligations under OFAC, which is certainly a less well-known regulatory program compared to the AML programs administered by FinCEN.  The OFAC guidance also makes clear that OFAC has less concern than FinCEN about duplicative regulation, and OFAC, unlike FinCEN, does not accept the concept that different intermediaries perform certain roles in financial market transactions that should permit delegation of responsibility.  Despite OFAC’s statement that “[a] strong OFAC compliance program [will be] similar to . . . a brokerage firm’s Customer Identification Program,” in fact OFAC expects more of BDs and FCMs where omnibus accounts and certain other intermediaries are involved than does FinCEN.

OFAC Account Opening Requirements
A new customer’s identity should be verified before an account is opened or within a reasonable time period after account opening.  Securities and futures firms should screen the new customer against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list, known as the SDN list and accessible at www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtml, and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.  OFAC advises that firms should use risk-based factors to assess risks posed by each customer and transaction, asking questions such as:

  • Is the customer regulated by a federal functional regulator, widely known, or listed on an exchange?
  • Has the firm had any previous experience with the customer or does it have prior knowledge about the customer?
  • Is the firm facilitating a U.S. person’s investment in a foreign issuer or other company that conducts business in a sanctioned country?
  • Is the customer located in a high-risk foreign jurisdiction that is considered to be poorly regulated or in a known offshore banking or secrecy haven?
  • Is the customer located or does it maintain accounts in countries where local privacy laws, regulations, or provisions prevent or limit the collection of client identification or beneficial ownership information?

Periodic checks of “non-accountholders,” such as beneficiaries, guarantors or principals, may also be necessary, depending upon each firm’s specific risk profile.

Documenting OFAC Compliance
Securities and futures firms should maintain adequate documentation of the results of their screening against the SDN list and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.   In the event of a potential OFAC violation, both the adequacy of a company’s transaction processing system and its overall OFAC compliance program are taken into consideration when determining the severity of possible enforcement action. 

FinCEN Withdrawal of Proposed AML Rules for IAs, CPOs, CTAs and Hedge Funds
As noted above, in late October FinCEN withdrew rules proposed over five years ago that would have required IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds to adopt AML programs.  In issuing these withdrawal notices, FinCEN noted that it would not adopt such rules in the future without providing interested parties an additional opportunity to comment upon proposals.  FinCEN’s withdrawal appears to be based on the principle that AML programs for IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds are not necessary because their customer accounts are carried by and their transactions are executed through other financial institutions, BDs and FCMs that do have AML programs.  FinCEN noted that it has concluded major rulemakings concerning BSA compliance by BDs and FCMs since it proposed the now-withdrawn proposals related to IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds that have confirmed the adequacy of their AML protections.  OFAC’s guidance also focuses more upon the responsibility of BDs and FCMs and does not permit those entities to avoid liability under OFAC programs by pointing to introducing firms or firms engaged only in the transaction-execution process.

State Attorneys General - A Force to be Reckoned With

By: Paul F. Hancock

State attorneys general aspire to be the primary protectors of consumers. The housing collapse provided new opportunities for them to flex their muscles and seek a role in the development of solutions.  Federal preemption remains a controversial issue, but the threat of preemption has only caused state attorneys general to be more aggressive in the areas where they have legal authority.   Recently elected attorneys general have pledged to focus attention on the housing and financial markets, and we can reasonably expect attorneys general, as a group, to push the limits of their authority in addressing the issues.  Some examples of their actions in recent months are described below.

Auction-Rate Securities
Allegations of deception have provided a basis for attorney general involvement in auction-rate securities markets.  New York Attorney General Cuomo reached agreement with twelve financial institutions on claims that they “sold auction-rate securities as safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk.”  The institutions agreed to buy back the securities from certain customers, generally individuals and foundations, and otherwise provide restitution to “individual investors who were fraudulently sold auction-rate securities.”  Cuomo says that the settlements “returned over $50 billion back to investors’ hands.”  Similar settlements were reached by attorneys general in Massachusetts and Michigan.

Mortgage Fraud
Attorneys general have identified mortgage fraud, particularly inflated appraisals, as a major contributor to the housing crisis.  The Florida Attorney General sued ten companies and fifteen individuals that defrauded lenders by recruiting “straw buyers'” with good credit and conspiring with realtors to artificially inflate purchase prices.  Other states have filed similar claims.

Foreclosures
The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group released its third report on mortgage foreclosures at the end of September, contending that 80 percent of delinquent borrowers are not receiving meaningful foreclosure relief.  Although the Group’s collaboration with servicers is described as cooperative, a stronger stick is laying in wait.  After a number of states announced a settlement with Bank of America regarding the Countrywide portfolio that centers on loan modification, on October 7, the Group sent a letter to sixteen subprime servicers stating: “We urge you in the strongest possible terms to adopt a comprehensive, streamlined, and effective loan modification program as soon as possible.”  The implicit threat of prosecution is clear.

State attorneys general investigated and prosecuted deceptive conduct by foreclosure rescue companies.  This issue is a neat fit for traditional attorney general enforcement and is a priority in many states.

Loan Origination
The settlement with Bank of America regarding the Countrywide portfolio continues a trend of aggressive state attorney general action regarding home mortgage lending practices.  The attorneys general already have extracted major business changes in the lending industry through lawsuits and compelled settlements.  The monetary value of the attorney general settlements with Household ($484 million) and Ameriquest ($295 million), as well as the extensive loan modification relief obtained from Countrywide, certainly overshadow any action by federal agencies.  The only real question is which firm will be the next target – perhaps one of the sixteen servicers that received the October 7 letter, or the originators of the loans that they are servicing.

2008 Attorney General Elections
Eleven seats were up for election and the announced plans of the winners indicate a continued, and perhaps increased, focus on mortgage and financial markets. 

Chris Koster, newly elected in Missouri, and Richard Cordray, newly elected in Ohio, focused their campaigns on credit and foreclosure issues.  Other well-known attorneys general who already enjoy a strong reputation in seeking mortgage reform and foreclosure relief – such as Roy Cooper in North Carolina and Rob McKenna in Washington – were reelected.  Mark Shurtleff was reelected in Utah, as was Darrell McGraw in West Virginia; they have prioritized mortgage fraud and other credit-related issues.

First-term attorneys general were elected in Indiana (Greg Zoeller), Montana (Steve Bullock) and Oregon (John Kroger), and incumbents were reelected in Pennsylvania (Tom Corbett) and Vermont (William Sorrell).   All emphasized the importance of consumer protection in seeking office.

Conclusion
The states want a place at the remedial table.   Some offer an olive branch of cooperative efforts to work through the present crisis.  Others are more aggressive from the start.  But if conditions do not improve quickly, it can be expected that many states will join forces to compel reform, based on claims that consumers and investors were deceived or otherwise were victims of unfair practices of loan originators, servicers or secondary market participants.

State Securities Regulators - On the Warpath Against Principal Protected Notes?

By: David N. Jonson

Recent pronouncements from the North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") indicate that its members (state and Canadian provincial securities regulators) are fielding so many investor inquiries and complaints regarding Principal Protected Notes ("PPNs") that NASAA is considering the formation of a multistate investigative task force to investigate how PPNs were offered and sold.  Such a task force would likely be similar to the one that NASAA created earlier this year to investigate auction rate securities.

A PPN is a type of structured investment product designed to provide a return of principal investment at maturity (typically 3-8 years), plus the potential to earn additional returns that are tied to the performance of an equity or commodity index.  Accordingly, PPNs tend to attract investors who are risk-averse and long-term oriented, and who seek a guaranteed return of their principal investment.

In order to preserve principal and offer a degree of upside potential, PPNs are comprised of two components.  A portion of the principal is used to purchase a zero coupon bond with a face value equal to the full principal amount at maturity, assuring that the original amount invested will be returned, so long as the bond's issuer does not default during the life of the PPN.  The remainder of the principal amount is invested in options on an underlying index with the same expiration date as the PPNs maturity date.  The two primary risks of investing in PPNs are the credit risk of the issuer and the lack of liquidity, since PPNs are designed to be held until maturity.  The total size of the PPN market is estimated to be approximately $35 billion.

In the wake of the insolvency of some PPN issuers, state regulators have been contacted with allegations that the risks of these investments were misrepresented or that PPNs were sold to investors for whom they were unsuitable.  Given the volatility of today's financial markets and the speed with which bad news travels, investors in PPNs of solvent issuers have also expressed concerns about the safety of their investments.

Several key dynamics will influence whether NASAA's Board of Directors and Enforcement Section decide to create a PPN task force.  First, state securities regulators view themselves as the "local cops on the beat," and thus, the first line of defense in protecting investors.  If the number of investor complaints is significant enough, NASAA and its members will act quickly, as they did most recently in connection with NASAA’s auction rate securities task force, which took the leading regulatory role away from the SEC and FINRA.  Second, if one of the more active state securities regulators, such as the New York Attorney General or Massachusetts Secretary of State, takes early action, NASAA will be sure to organize a more widespread group of states to join the fray.  Third, although there is now a pro-regulation environment in Washington, NASAA and its members have historically been mindful of and concerned about any efforts to pre-empt the states from asserting their regulatory authority.  By acting quickly and decisively on the heels of their successful auction rate task force, NASAA members would be taking advantage of another opportunity to reemphasize the importance of the states' role in the securities regulatory arena.  We are continuing to monitor the situation through our NASAA contacts, and will report any material developments in the future.

Second Circuit Dismisses Its First "Foreign-Cubed" Securities Action for Lack of Jurisdiction

By: Michael J. King

Proclaiming that “we are an American court, not the world’s court,” the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently rejected an effort to extend U.S. jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions. The decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., – F.3d –, 2008 WL 4660742 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2008), arose in a so-called “foreign-cubed” securities class action case: an action brought by foreign investors, in foreign securities, purchased on a foreign securities exchange. Morrison, the first such case considered by the Second Circuit, offers a measure of reassurance to foreign issuers and investors who might otherwise avoid even tangential connections with U.S. capital markets due to fear of the U.S. legal system.

Australian investors sought to bring a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against National Australia Bank (“NAB”) and others, alleging securities fraud under U.S. law in connection with purchases of NAB securities on an Australian securities exchange. According to the plaintiffs, NAB’s subsidiary, HomeSide Lending, Inc. (“HomeSide”), a U.S. mortgage service provider, used improper accounting methods that overstated the value of its mortgage servicing rights (“MSR”). These improper accounting methods led NAB to write down $2 billion in the value of HomeSide’s MSR in 2001, resulting in significant declines in the price of NAB’s securities. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made false and misleading statements concerning HomeSide’s operations and its contributions to NAB’s financial health in filings with the SEC, foreign securities exchanges, in statements to the press, and in corporate documents.

Since it was confronted with allegations of securities fraud involving foreign securities transactions, the district court looked to the “effects” and the “conduct” tests developed by the Second Circuit for deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over such suits. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., -- F. Supp. 2d--, 2006 WL 3844465 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Under the effects test, a district court may exercise jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs where the alleged illegal activity causes a “substantial effect” on U.S. investors or markets. Under the conduct test, a district court may exercise jurisdiction if a defendant’s conduct in the United States was more than “merely preparatory” to the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act within the United States “directly caused” losses to foreign investors abroad.

The district court quickly concluded that the effects test did not support exercise of subject matter jurisdiction since the alleged fraud had very little, if any, effect in the U.S. markets. Moving to the conduct test analysis, the district court concluded that HomeSide’s alleged misconduct in the United States was immaterial to a securities fraud claim given the much more significant extra territorial conduct of NAB. Thus, the district court found that the foreign actions, not the domestic actions, “directly caused” the alleged harm in this case and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the appellants relied solely on the “conduct” component of the conduct and effects tests in support of their jurisdictional argument. Reviewing prior precedent, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that pursuant to “the ‘conduct’ component, subject matter jurisdiction exists if activities in this country were more than merely preparatory to a fraud and culpable acts or omissions occurring here directly caused losses to investors abroad . . .. Our determination of whether American activities ‘directly’ caused losses to foreigners depends on what and how much was done in the United States and on what and how much was done abroad.” Morrison, 2008 WL 4660742, at *4. The Second Circuit then reviewed the comparative significance of the conduct in the United States with those actions that occurred abroad and concluded that actions of NAB in Australia were significantly more central to the alleged fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors than the alleged manipulative accounting by HomeSide in the United States. In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit stressed that the responsibilities of NAB’s Australian headquarters included overseeing its own and its subsidiaries’ operations, and reporting to shareholders and to the financial community. The court also emphasized that NAB, not HomeSide, was the issuer of the securities and therefore was responsible for the public statements and filings and for relations with its investors. The Second Circuit also noted the absence of any allegation of harm to U.S. investors or markets and the lengthy chain of causation between HomeSide’s contribution to the misstatements and harm to investors. Based upon the totality of this analysis, the court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal. Id. at *7 & 8.

In addition to addressing for the first time the issues presented in a foreign-cubed class action case, the Second Circuit’s decision is significant because the court refused to replace the conduct test analysis with proposed alternative formulations for determining subject matter jurisdiction. Appellees and certain of the amici urged the court to adopt a bright-line rule that, in foreign-cubed cases, domestic conduct should never be enough and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established where the conduct in question has no effect in the United States or on U.S. investors. The court flatly rejected this proposal. The court also rejected the SEC’s proposed alternative standard proffered in its amicus brief that the “antifraud provisions of the securities laws [should] apply to transnational frauds that result exclusively or principally in overseas losses if the conduct in the United States is material to the fraud’s success and forms a substantial component of the fraudulent scheme.” The court’s implicit rejection of the SEC’s materiality test – the decision does not even address it – is particularly important because the materiality standard would likely permit more cases alleging transnational frauds to stay in U.S. courts. For example, the SEC amicus brief urged that, under the materiality test, jurisdiction existed in Morrison.

The decision provides needed stability in an area of the law that is important to non-U.S. companies considering investing in the United States who are concerned about the risks and burdens of U.S. class action lawsuits, existing foreign investors in the United States with similar concerns, and the financial markets and intermediaries that service such investors and potential investors. At a time when the U.S. plaintiff’s bar is taking deliberate steps to cultivate foreign claimants for U.S. class action suits, these protections are welcome. Although the conduct and effects tests are very fact specific, the Second Circuit’s decision to adhere to these tests when considering subject matter jurisdiction in transnational fraud cases provides a reliable framework for disposing of cases at a preliminary stage. This is particularly important to firms concerned about exposure to class actions, where attendant disruptions and defense costs alone can prove very burdensome, even where defendants have fully complied with the law.

Joint Federal-State Credit Default Swap Investigation Is Launched

By Irene C. Freidel and Anthony R.G. Nolan

The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan and the New York Attorney General’s Office confirmed last week that they have launched a joint investigation into operation of the largely unregulated $55 trillion dollar market for credit default swaps (“CDS”).

CDS are synthetic risk transfer devices whereby, in exchange for a premium, one party (the seller) agrees to make a payment to the other (the buyer) to protect the buyer from credit risk of one or more reference entities following the occurrence of a bankruptcy or other credit event with respect to such reference entity. Following the occurrence of a credit event, the buyer is entitled to receive a cash payment to compensate it for the decline in market value of selected obligations of the reference entity. Therefore, the value of a CDS to the buyer fluctuates with changes in the reference entity’s financial strength, increasing as the reference entity’s creditworthiness deteriorates and decreasing as the reference entity becomes more financially stable.

Since 2005, the CDS market has become very large and liquid, with an estimated $62 trillion notional amount of CDS outstanding globally in 2007. The growth of the CDS market has been premised to a great extent on light regulation of CDS transactions under commodities laws, securities laws, and insurance law. Most CDS are “security-based swap agreements” that are excluded in large part from SEC jurisdiction, although they are subject to antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws.

The current investigation represents an expansion of existing investigations by federal and New York State authorities into whether short-selling activity resulted in manipulation of the price of bonds and shares of financial services institutions. The purpose of the current effort is to determine whether investors manipulated the prices (or credit spreads) of CDS in uncompleted transactions that were nonetheless reported to data providers. Credit spreads for CDS affect the prices of the debt obligations issued by entities referenced in the CDS because those spreads are considered to be leading indicators of perceived financial stability of the reference entity. Thus, efforts to manipulate CDS pricing could benefit short sellers of financial obligations issued by the reference entities, who would benefit from a decline in the value of those obligations occasioned by fears that the reference entity might be under financial stress.

Collaboration of the two enforcement offices suggests that the investigation will be significant and wide-ranging in scope, and includes the possibility that U.S. Attorney Michael Garcia will seek information from foreign sources. To date, subpoenas have been issued by New York’s Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to a variety of large financial institutions, including stock exchanges, hedge funds, and several entities that are involved in the credit default swap trade process: Depository Trust Clearing Corp., Markit, and Bloomberg LP. Whether the investigation will result in any prosecutions is as yet unknown. The effort reflects a new aggressiveness in the use of antimanipulation enforcement jurisdiction to the derivatives market.

SEC Inspector General Finds Staff Misconduct in Investigations of Wall Street Firms. Reports Will Increase Pressure on SEC to "Get Tough"

By Brian A. Ochs

Significant disruptions in the market invariably lead to an increase in SEC enforcement activity, as regulators seek to determine whether those negative events resulted from violations of the federal securities laws. The aggressiveness of the SEC’s efforts in this regard will likely be further enhanced by two new reports from the SEC’s Inspector General (“IG”), H. David Kotz, that are highly critical of the Enforcement Division’s prior conduct of investigations involving major Wall Street firms. In each report, the IG raised questions about the Enforcement staff’s appearance of impartiality and recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the staff members involved, including the Director of the Enforcement Division and the head of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office.

The Enforcement Division has publicly, and in strong terms, contested the findings of at least one of the IG’s reports. Nonetheless, the IG’s charges of lax enforcement and the appearance of favorable treatment for major participants in the financial services industry seem certain to result in an even tougher and more difficult enforcement environment in the context of the SEC’s response to the current financial crisis.

Aguirre termination. The first report, issued on September 30, stemmed from charges by a former SEC Enforcement staff attorney, Gary Aguirre, that his supervisors gave improper preferential treatment to Morgan Stanley Chairman and CEO John Mack, and terminated Aguirre’s employment, when Aguirre sought to take Mack’s testimony as a possible tipper in an insider trading investigation involving hedge fund Pequot Capital Management. See “Re-Investigation of Claims by Gary Aguirre of Improper Preferential Treatment and Retaliatory Termination,” SEC Office of Inspector General (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg100708.pdf. An initial IG investigation in 2005, conducted by the current IG’s predecessor, exonerated the Enforcement staff. Congress held hearings, and in August 2007, the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committees issued a report critical of the Enforcement Division’s conduct of the Pequot investigation, and faulting the IG for failing to conduct a credible investigation into Aguirre’s charges. Following the Senate report, the IG retired, and Kotz was appointed as the SEC’s new IG in December 2007.

Importantly, the Kotz re-investigation did not find that Mack received any favorable treatment regarding the taking of his testimony. The IG received testimony from numerous past and present Enforcement officials that Enforcement cases are not affected by political considerations or the prominence of particular individuals. The IG also found that there had been reasonable strategic reasons for delaying Mack’s testimony.

Notwithstanding these findings, the IG went on to conclude that Enforcement staff supervisors had “conducted themselves in a manner that raised serious questions about the impartiality and fairness of the Pequot investigation.” Further, the IG determined that “there was a connection between the decision to terminate Aguirre and his seeking to take Mack’s testimony,” and that Enforcement “allowed inappropriate reasons to factor into its decision to terminate him.” The IG went on to directly criticize Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen and recommended that the SEC Chairman take disciplinary action against her for disclosing non-public information about the evidence against Mack to counsel for Morgan Stanley’s board of directors. In response to a request for information (because Morgan Stanley’s board was considering hiring Mack as CEO), Thomsen told the board’s counsel that the investigation had uncovered “smoke,” but no “fire,” concerning Mack.

Bear Stearns Investigation. In a second report, the IG found that the Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office had “failed to administer his statutory obligations and responsibilities to vigorously enforce compliance with [applicable] securities laws” in connection with an investigation into Bear Stearns’ role in valuing certain collateralized bond obligations and collateralized loan obligations that a client purchased from Bear Stearns. See “Failure to Vigorously Enforce Action Against W. Holding and Bear Stearns at the Miami Regional Office,” SEC Office of Inspector General (Sept. 30, 2008). The report was prepared in response to a request from Senator Charles Grassley (R. Iowa), ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, seeking information as to why the SEC had closed the investigation without any enforcement action.

According to the IG’s report, the head of the Miami office “abruptly” closed the investigation in 2007 after the staff had made progress negotiating several settlements. Further, the IG found that the fact that two of the defense counsel involved in the case were longtime friends of the head of the Miami office created an “appearance, to some, that they may have received favorable treatment.” While acknowledging that there was “no evidence of a direct connection between the relationship … and the decision to close the investigation,” the IG found the appearance of a conflict “disturbing,” noting that it “could potentially damage the reputation of the Commission.” (This finding of the IG seems particularly ill-considered, given that a large portion of the defense bar consists of attorneys who have previously served on the SEC staff. To suggest an apparent conflict of interest merely because defense attorneys may deal with former friends and colleagues on the SEC staff is to risk depriving clients of the best and most experienced counsel of their choice, a position that the SEC itself has never asserted.)

The IG went on to fault the Miami office staff for not coordinating its investigation with the Department of Justice, which was investigating a similar matter involving another Bear Stearns employee. The IG found that “[a] significant opportunity to coordinate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and uncover evidence of a systematic problem at Bear Stearns was also lost through neglect.” The IG recommended that the SEC Chairman take disciplinary action against the Director of the Miami office.

In a strongly worded response, the Enforcement Division characterized the IG’s report as “misleading,” filled with “speculation and innuendo,” as ignoring testimony showing that the decision to close the investigation was a sound one, and failing to comply with the IG’s “fundamental obligation to conduct a fair and impartial fact-finding.”

Likely impact of the IG reports. Against the backdrop of existing criticisms of the SEC for regulatory failures that contributed to the current financial crisis, the IG’s reports may provide the impetus for a period of unusually difficult, contentious, and highly critical oversight of the SEC’s enforcement function. Regardless of whether the IG’s conclusions in these cases were sound, the IG’s reports are likely to fuel critics in Congress and elsewhere who seek to contend that the Enforcement Division has failed in its responsibility to pursue aggressively misconduct at large banking firms.

To cite just one such example, Sen. Grassley has commented that the IG’s report on the Bear Stearns investigation provides “yet another example of the lack of vigorous enforcement at the SEC,” and “demonstrates the culture of deference at the SEC in dealing with big players on Wall Street.” http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg101008.pdf. Similarly, on October 21, Sen. Grassley wrote to SEC Chairman Cox concerning anonymous allegations he has received that, during the negotiations earlier this year that led to JP Morgan Chase’s (“JPMC”) takeover of Bear Stearns, Enforcement Director Thomsen disclosed information concerning the status of various investigations involving Bear Stearns to JPMC’s General Counsel, Stephen Cutler, who preceded Ms. Thomsen as Director of the Enforcement Division. Sen. Grassley wrote to Chairman Cox that “Such conduct would reinforce the appearance that Enforcement decisions, and disclosures of information about them, are sometimes based not on the merits, but rather on access to senior officials by influential representatives of power brokers on Wall Street. In light of these allegations and the ongoing financial crisis, there has never been a more critical time to take swift action to restore confidence in the SEC Enforcement Division.” http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg102108.pdf.

The SEC’s Enforcement Division and the Commission thus are likely to feel pressure to demonstrate heightened aggressiveness and firmness in future investigations and enforcement actions, particularly where major participants in the financial services sector are involved. The Enforcement staff will likely seek even more rapid progress in priority investigations than in the past, and may curtail opportunities for meaningful deliberation and dialogue that have historically proven beneficial both to the staff and to the subjects of complex investigations. While the staff will undoubtedly maintain its high standards of professionalism, it would be unsurprising if there is less flexibility and less willingness to entertain sound arguments regarding factual and legal defenses in an environment where staff members may be concerned that any concessions they make may subject them to criticism or even disciplinary action if they are perceived to be insufficiently vigorous in their enforcement of the securities laws.

New SEC Enforcement Manual Directs Staff Not to Seek Waivers of Attorney-Client Privilege

By Brian A. Ochs

On October 6, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) posted on its web site the first-ever SEC Enforcement Manual. (See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.) The publication of the manual reflects the first time that the SEC has committed to writing, in a single document, the various policies and procedures that govern investigations conducted by its Division of Enforcement. According to press accounts, the manual was prepared in response to a report issued in August 2007 by the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committees that criticized the SEC for its handling of an insider trading investigation involving hedge fund Pequot Capital Management (see separate article in this newsletter), and recommended that the SEC adopt a consistent set of procedures similar to the U.S. Attorneys Manual.

In large measure the Enforcement Manual does not break new ground, but instead describes practices that have been commonly understood for years. Notably, however, the Enforcement Manual does include the first comprehensive, written statement by the SEC on its view of the relationship between “cooperation” in an investigation and the assertion of attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. After years of controversy over this issue in the post-Enron era, during which parties often felt pressured by government investigators to waive privilege in order to receive full credit for cooperation, the Enforcement Manual makes clear that waiver is neither necessary nor expected. The manual’s key statements on this topic include:

  • “As a matter of public policy, the SEC wants to encourage individuals, corporate officers, and employees to consult counsel about potential violations of the securities laws.”

     
  • “The staff should not ask a party to waive the attorney-client or work product privileges, and is directed not to do so.” (Emphasis in original.) (This express direction is significant given that, as recently as last year, Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen acknowledged in a speech that waivers were still sometimes being requested – albeit “judiciously.”)

     
  • “The voluntary disclosure of information need not include a waiver of privilege to be an effective form of cooperation, as long as all relevant facts are disclosed.”

     
  • “Waiver of a privilege is not a pre-requisite to obtaining credit for cooperation. A party’s assertion of a legitimate privilege will not negatively affect their claim to credit for cooperation. The appropriate inquiry in this regard is whether, notwithstanding a legitimate claim of privilege, the party has disclosed all relevant underlying facts within its knowledge.”

With its emphasis on obtaining underlying facts, rather than on waivers of privilege, and in its direction that the SEC Staff should not seek waivers, the Enforcement Manual follows the path of the Department of Justice’s recent “Filip Memorandum,” which prohibits federal prosecutors from requesting privilege waivers (seeDOJ Issues New Guidance That Retreats From Aggressive Policies Followed in White Collar Cases,” K&L Gates White Collar Crime/Criminal Defense Alert (Sept. 24, 2008)).

Although senior Enforcement Division officials stated in the past that waiver of privilege was not required in order to obtain credit for cooperation, they had also indicated that the voluntary decision to waive privilege would receive enhanced credit, and some SEC enforcement orders reflected this approach. Among others, former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins had been a vocal critic of the practice of holding out privilege waiver as a “plus factor” in determining credit for cooperation.

Although it remains to be seen how the Enforcement Manual is applied in practice, the manual does not suggest that any “plus factor” calculus will be used in future cases. Instead, the manual emphasizes that waiver of privileges is not necessary to “effective cooperation.”

As the SEC expands and increases the pace of its investigations into possible wrongdoing in relation to the crisis in the financial sector, these provisions of the Enforcement Manual will hopefully bring clarity and consistency to Enforcement Division practices when parties seek to cooperate while still preserving attorney-client and work product privileges. This should provide important protections to companies (in particular those that conduct internal investigations), as well as to their officers and employees, as compared with the environment of a few years ago, when waivers of privilege were often viewed as necessary to receiving full credit for cooperation.

DOJ'S Resource Crunch Offers Strategic Options for Corporations in White Collar Cases

By Michael D. RicciutiClarence H. Brown and Leanne E. Hartmann

With the advent of the credit crisis, the Department of Justice (DOJ) – and particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorneys’ Offices – is faced with a daunting challenge at a time of decreasing budgets and strained resources. DOJ’s resource shortage presents an enhanced strategic opportunity to corporations who suspect that they are at risk for investigation or prosecution for criminal activity – or have been victimized by it. In brief, sometimes the distinction between a criminally culpable company and one that has been victimized is in the eyes of the beholder. Emphasizing the latter status serves as an opportunity.

Background. After the events of September 11, 2001, DOJ and the FBI made national security their top priority, but with a more refined focus. No longer was it enough for DOJ to investigate and prosecute terrorists. Instead, DOJ now seeks to prevent acts of terrorism – a far more difficult task than merely prosecuting terrorism, which are among the most challenging criminal cases. Unsurprisingly, to fulfill this aggressive mission, a huge portion of the resources of the FBI and DOJ were redeployed to fight terrorism. Now, with the massive credit crisis to contend with, DOJ and FBI have opened a series of financial investigations, reportedly involving Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, among approximately 1,500 others. Reports indicate that the FBI plans to double the number of agents focusing on financial crime, but also make clear that the FBI has hundreds fewer agents focused on this work than it did during the financial crisis involving savings and loans in the 1980s. It will be extremely challenging for the government to find the resources to handle these new complex and difficult cases.

Internal Investigations: Defensive Use. As discussed in the previous Global Financial Markets Group newsletter, the government has wide authority to bring charges in the corporate criminal context, but its own policies restrict its power to do so. In brief, a corporation may be criminally liable for the conduct (or omissions) of its agents committed within the scope of their duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation. This means that, as a matter of law, the crimes of any employee in the organization, regardless of his or her position on the organization chart, may be attributable to the company and the company could thus be charged criminally for them. DOJ has the discretion to bring a criminal case against the company under these circumstances – or not to do so. Whether DOJ exercises its discretion not to charge a company depends upon its analysis of the factors under DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (“the Principles”). The Principles put a premium on a company’s cooperation in helping DOJ investigate the alleged crime – exactly the type of cooperation DOJ sorely needs now that it is facing a global financial crisis and its own resource shortage.

Revised this past August, the Principles recognize that corporate crime is more difficult to investigate than crimes committed by individuals. As the Principles note:

In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself. It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries. Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been promoted, transferred or fired, or they may have quit or retired.

Because of these difficulties, the Principles acknowledge that “a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant evidence, among other things, and in doing so expeditiously.” (For more information regarding the Principles, see the United States Attorney’s Manual, Title 9, Chapter 9-28.700 et seq.)

From a defensive perspective, then, the company may seek to curry favor from DOJ and avoid being criminally charged through its cooperation. In cooperating under the Principles, a company with a good track record of compliance seeks, in essence, to demonstrate to the government that it should not be charged criminally on the basis of an employee’s criminal acts because that employee’s activities are inconsistent with the company’s otherwise positive compliance record, among other factors. Typically, conducting an independent internal investigation is a critical initial element in the company seeking credit for cooperation. Through an investigation of itself, the company discovers the relevant facts and – if it chooses to do so – can provide DOJ with a roadmap of the potential case from it. From DOJ’s perspective, cooperation credit is awarded where the corporation “timely disclosed the relevant facts about the putative misconduct” – and can result in DOJ not seeking to prosecute an otherwise well-run, compliant company because of its cooperation, among other factors.

There are significant risks to providing this cooperation. For instance, preparing an internal investigation develops a factual record which private litigants may later use to assert claims against the company and its officers and directors. Even so, with DOJ in short supply of agents to perform detailed investigations, providing this cooperation may be at a premium for the government – and may earn companies significant consideration when DOJ decides whether to bring criminal charges against the corporation. With an internal investigation in hand, companies can also often reap other benefits, such as identifying personnel who should be terminated for misconduct and deficient systems and procedures that need improvement, preparing earlier for shareholder and third-party litigation, and permitting the company to more effectively assist its board members, officers and employees in preparing for and giving testimony.

Internal Investigations: Offensive Use. There is also an offensive aspect to the use of internal investigations that is often overlooked. A company that suffers from the criminal conduct of an employee may be a defendant in a resulting prosecution – but may also be a victim of the wayward employee’s criminal acts. The company’s status as a victim is a fact on which the government does not always focus. A company thus should consider whether to use an internal investigation to proactively prod the United States Attorney’s Office to bring a criminal case against the employee wrongdoer. When the government is strapped for resources, it will often look favorably on a completed investigation that shows readily provable criminal wrongdoing, which will increase the likelihood that the government will take the case and prosecute it. Offensive use of the internal investigation accomplishes at least three goals:

First, it makes it clear to DOJ that the company should not be viewed as a potential defendant but rather as a victim, and, as such, is entitled to victim’s rights, to include the right to restitution from the employee. In a fraud case, where an employee has made off with company funds, a court in sentencing a convicted employee wrongdoer is empowered to order restitution as an element of the criminal judgment – forcing the employee to repay the company through a restitution order enforced by the Probation Department, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the Court. Such an order saves the company from pursuing repayment from the employee civilly, often an expensive and fruitless endeavor.

Second, seeking prosecution from the government is often relatively inexpensive. Once the internal investigation is done by the company, and the government accepts the case for prosecution, it is the government that bears the costs of the prosecution. The company only needs to cooperate with the government, typically far cheaper than defending itself and its employees in a criminal probe.

Third, a prosecution of a criminal employee sends a very clear message to other employees and to the government that the company will not tolerate criminal wrongdoing and will take very aggressive action against those who violate the rules. There can be no clearer zero-tolerance approach for criminal activity.

Conclusion. With DOJ facing a likely crush of new financial crimes cases, companies with potential exposure need to consider their options strategically. One important option is a credible, independent internal investigation done early and proactively, which can provide the company with both defensive and offensive benefits.

Recent Short Selling Regulations and Their Potential Impact on Financial Markets

By: Kay A. Gordon, Mark D. Perlow 

In response to the recent extraordinary events in the U.S. and worldwide markets, during the past two weeks the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a series of emergency regulatory measures regarding short sales of securities.  First, on September 17 and 18, 2008, the SEC issued orders temporarily banning short sales in certain financial stocks and requiring certain institutional money managers to report their new short sales of certain publicly traded securities on new Form SH (collectively, the “Emergency Orders”).  The SEC also amended Regulation SHO and Rule 10b-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit “naked” short selling—the short sale of securities that one has not already borrowed—and adopted a new antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21, aimed at manipulative and deceptive practices in short selling.  In addition, the SEC chairman announced enforcement initiatives aimed at preventing “naked” and “manipulative” short selling.   The SEC has taken these actions in the hope that they would help to restore fair and orderly markets and curtail declines in securities prices.  On October 1, the SEC extended all of these emergency measures until October 17.  However, the ban on selling certain financial stocks provided that it would expire after the effectiveness of the EESA.  Therefore, the ban expires on Wednesday October 8 at 11:59 p.m.

On September 21, the SEC amended the Emergency Orders to expand (1) the list of issuers in whose securities the SEC has temporarily banned short selling, (2) the scope and duration of certain market maker exceptions, and (3) the types of securities exempted.  The SEC also stated that institutional investment managers’ short sale disclosures would be non-public for two weeks after filing. The SEC adopted these amendments to address the current and anticipated technical and operational issues raised by the Emergency Orders, as well as to coordinate with similar actions restricting short sales by foreign regulators.

In addition to the actions of the SEC, the U.K. Financial Services Authority and the French, German, Australian and many other regulators have adopted similar restrictions on short selling and, in certain cases, increased short selling disclosure requirements in an effort to restore market integrity and stability in these extreme market conditions.  Consequently, the policy level response to the perceived threat and the uncertainty generated by naked short selling was global, if not globally coordinated, in practice making it difficult for any manager to engage in forum shopping.

Many financial institutions, lawmakers and regulators have supported the SEC’s ban and limits on short sales, based on their concern that short sellers have contributed to the current market turmoil by spreading false information and using manipulative trading tactics.   In contrast, many hedge fund managers and other investors have objected to these measures, suggesting that risk management failures and poor business strategies are to blame for the current market instability.  They have argued that short selling provides liquidity and an important price discovery mechanism in the market and that the inability of managers to engage in short selling with respect to certain securities may adversely affect the markets both in the long and short terms.  Critics of the ban also point out that a temporary SEC order banning naked short selling in July failed to prevent the decline of stock prices while it was in effect.

The increased disclosure obligations have also given rise to concerns that managers will have to disclose proprietary methods and that companies whose securities are being sold short would retaliate against these managers when the managers’ short positions are publicly released.   The short selling ban may have also been particularly damaging to certain quantitative funds, which  were left unable to implement their disclosed and intended strategies.  In addition, short sellers were also constrained on another front:  many institutional investors that lend portfolio stock holdings have been recalling their stock, and some have suspended their stock lending programs altogether, which has made it harder or more expensive to borrow certain stocks.   Some industry participants believe that short sellers will adjust to the ban by switching to other instruments that are not subject to the ban, e.g., single stock futures and options, whose price movements will ultimately be reflected in the prices of the affected stocks.

Manipulation Tied to Short Selling a Top Enforcement Priority

By: Brian A. Ochs

On September 19, 2008, the SEC announced a “sweeping expansion” of its ongoing investigation into possible market manipulation in connection with short selling in the securities of financial institutions. (LINK)  The investigation is focused on broker-dealers, hedge fund managers, and institutional investors with significant trading activity in financial issuers and with positions in credit default swaps.

As part of the investigation, the SEC is invoking its authority under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain information in the form of sworn, written statements.   According to published reports, the first of these demands was sent out on September 22 to more than two dozen hedge fund managers, requiring information relating to AIG, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Washington Mutual.  The SEC seldom invokes its section 21(a) power in enforcement investigations — usually opting to subpoena documents and testimony instead — and the fact that the Commission is doing so in this instance indicates the speed and seriousness with which the SEC plans to pursue these investigations.

The SEC’s expanded investigation promises heightened scrutiny of two issues which have been the subject of enforcement focus since early this year: the dissemination of false rumors to the marketplace as part of short selling schemes and abusive “naked” short selling.

  • False rumors and short selling

    • Last April, the SEC brought its first case alleging that a trader engaged in market manipulation by selling a company’s stock short at the same time that he intentionally disseminated a false rumor that had a depressing effect on the stock price. See SEC v. Paul S. Berliner (April 24, 2008). (LINK)  Other investigations are in progress, as well as an industry-wide sweep examination undertaken in conjunction with FINRA and the NYSE, that is focused on whether broker-dealers and investment advisers have reasonable controls and procedures to prevent the intentional creation or dissemination of false information. (LINK)

       
    • Given the prevalence of rumors of all types in the investment community, and how quickly rumors can spread, a key challenge to the SEC in any investigation will be to determine who is responsible for disseminating false rumors and whether those persons acted intentionally and with knowledge that the rumors were false. 

       
    • At the same time, the SEC’s focus on firm procedures indicates that the SEC will be looking to bring enforcement actions not only against individuals who are responsible for creating or disseminating false rumors, but also against any broker-dealers or investment advisers in the rumor chain that the SEC determines had lax oversight. 

       
    • Complicating matters is the fact that, on September 18, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced his own investigation into allegations of short selling in financial securities based upon false information. NYAG involvement not only increases pressure on the SEC to bring cases in this area, but is also a direct and formidable threat to the individuals and entities under scrutiny. Unlike SEC Enforcement staff, New York’s Assistant Attorneys General have considerably fewer levels of bureaucracy to wind through before they can bring a case - as they have repeatedly demonstrated in matters involving market timers, insurance brokers, lenders, ratings agencies, and purveyors of auction-rate securities, to name a few. Contrary to popular belief, Section 352 et seq. of NY General Business Law (aka the “Martin Act”) is not without its jurisdictional limitations and defenses, but it is nonetheless a potent starting point for the NYAG. Subpoenas issued thereunder must be handled with considerable caution.

       
  • “Naked” short selling

    • SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has observed that naked short selling can “turbocharge” false rumor/manipulation schemes. (LINK) 

      • Generally, the SEC defines naked short selling as “abusive” when the seller does not have shares available for delivery and intentionally fails to deliver stock within the standard three-day settlement cycle.

         
    • On September 18, 2008, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, which had been proposed in March 2008 to address the problem of short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or others about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. (LINK) The rule formed part of the SEC’s response, in the current financial crisis, to concerns about possible false rumors and abusive naked short selling of financial institutions and other issuers. 

       
      • Rule 10b-21 prohibits any person from submitting an order to sell an equity “if such person deceives a broker or dealer, a participant of a registered clearing agency, or a purchaser about its intention or ability to deliver the security on or before the settlement date, and such person fails to deliver the security on or before the settlement date.” (LINK)

         
      • In adopting the rule, the SEC noted that while, in its view, naked short selling as part of a manipulative scheme was already prohibited under general antifraud provisions, Rule 10b-21 is intended to highlight the specific fraud liability of persons who deceive other participants about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.

Of course, when short selling is facilitated by deceptive practices – such as intentionally spreading false rumors or misleading other participants about an intention to deliver stock – there is little doubt that the SEC can bring a case for securities fraud.   Another example of deceptive practices might be the use of nominee accounts or similar efforts to disguise the identity of the short seller.  But what if short selling is done in the open, with no accompanying acts of deception, albeit in large amounts and with the intent to drive a company’s stock price down? 

  • The SEC takes the position that even open trading, when done for a manipulative purpose (so-called “open market manipulation”), is fraudulent.   See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Thus, the Division of Trading and Markets has cautioned that “short sales effected to manipulate the price of a stock are prohibited” as an “abusive” short sale practices. (LINK)

     
  • Courts have taken varying positions on whether “open market manipulation,” without other deceptive conduct, can give rise to a cause of action.   However, in a recent opinion dealing with aggressive short selling by purchasers of “toxic convertible” securities, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “short selling – even in high volumes – is not, by itself manipulative.  … To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”  ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Wolfson, 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).

Given the Second Circuit precedent, in any future cases directed at aggressive short selling, the SEC will likely seek to allege other deceptive conduct in addition to short sales.   However, in light of the SEC’s need to demonstrate a strong response to the current crisis, the Commission can also be expected to press its theory that short selling, even if unaccompanied by any other deceptive practices, is unlawful if done for the purpose of depressing a company’s stock.

DOJ Opens Criminal Investigations Under New Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Entities

Perhaps not surprisingly, the FBI and DOJ have joined a host of other federal and state authorities and opened investigations stemming from the credit crisis.   On September 29, 2008, both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae separately announced that, in connection with a federal criminal investigation regarding accounting, disclosure and corporate governance matters, they had received federal grand jury subpoenas from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.  Both have pledged cooperation. Reportedly, the FBI is also looking into Lehman Brothers, AIG and 22 other institutions. 

The opening of such investigations was predictable.   Less predictable is whether DOJ will find evidence of criminal activity — particularly in an area as complex as mortgage financing. 

The New Guidelines
Leaving aside the likely results of these probes, the investigations come at something of a turning point for DOJ.  A little over a month ago, on August 28, DOJ revised its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (the “Principles”), which are part of the United States Attorneys’ Manual (“USAM”), the guidebook for all federal prosecutors.   (See the DOJ’s press release; the relevant USAM provisions can be found here.)

In the revision (henceforth the “2008 Principles”), DOJ retreated from its widely-criticized position that federal prosecutors could demand that corporations — and by extension, individuals — waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection as a necessary precondition in earning credit for cooperating with DOJ, a point of major dispute with the legal community at large.   This policy change, likely forced by Congress’ threats to mandate just such a reversal, is significant.  Most critically, in cases handled by DOJ, the new policy largely re-establishes the right of a corporation to confer with its attorneys without fear that the attorney-client privilege which protects those communications from disclosure will be sacrificed.  That said, it remains to be seen how the changed guidance will work in practice as these new Principles are tested in the crucible of high-profile investigations growing out of the current crisis. 

Federal prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to charge a corporate entity with a crime.  Companies may be held criminally liable for the conduct (or omissions) of their agents committed within the scope of their duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.  Thus, as a matter of law, the crimes of any employee in the organization, regardless of whether he or she occupies a high or low position on the organization chart, may be attributable to the company and the company can be charged criminally for them.  Whether DOJ seeks to bring a federal criminal case against the corporation in circumstances like these is a matter of discretion, which in turn depends upon the corporation’s cooperation as measured under the Principles.

The 2008 Principles contain several significant changes to DOJ policy guidance on charging companies with criminal conduct. 

  • Prohibition on requesting privilege waivers.   The 2008 Principles no longer require waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection to qualify for cooperation credit.  Indeed, the 2008 Principles prohibit prosecutors from requesting attorney-client and work-product waivers.  But they do permit those prosecutors to request that corporations produce facts, however they are gathered; “credit for cooperation will not depend on the corporation’s waiver of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, but rather on the disclosure of relevant facts.”  In other words, the 2008 Principles recognize that companies may voluntarily choose to waive the work-product and attorney-client privilege protections in providing facts, but they are not required to do so, and prosecutors cannot expressly seek an attorney-client waiver in making such a request. 

     
  • Indemnification of employees.  The 2008 Principles provide that prosecutors generally should not consider whether corporations indemnify their employees for legal fees incurred in defending themselves in criminal investigations or prosecutions, nor should prosecutors ask corporations to refrain from advancing attorney’s fees or providing counsel to employees under investigation or indictment.  Such practices should only be questioned by prosecutors if they are part of an effort to obstruct justice – such as “if fees were advanced on the condition that an employee adhere to a [false] version of the facts.”  

     
  • Joint defense agreements.   The 2008 Principles state that a corporation’s involvement in a joint defense agreement — an agreement by which potential defendants share information regarding the defense without losing the attorney-client privilege protecting the shared information from disclosure — “does not render a corporation ineligible to receive cooperation credit, and prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from entering into such agreement.”  The 2008 Principles add, however, that the government may properly request the corporation not share “sensitive information about the investigation that the government provided to the corporation” with others to get cooperation credit. 

It is unclear whether the sometimes fine line between a government request for facts and one that seeks a waiver of the privilege will be adhered to in practice by prosecutors.   In practical terms, companies and their lawyers involved in investigations into the credit crisis must be careful to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work-product protections, as the 2008 Principles put the burden of preserving these confidences on them.  Doing so may be critical – waiver of the privilege in producing information to the government in a criminal investigation is almost always considered by courts to be a waiver as to all other parties, including parties in civil actions.  Corporations facing criminal exposure are thus well advised to consult as early as possible with qualified criminal counsel to assist them in navigating these still-dangerous waters. 

SEC and FINRA Focusing on Individuals in Auction Rate Securities Investigation,

By: Michael J. King

In testimony before the House Financial Services Committee (“Committee”) on September 18, 2008, Linda Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, and Susan Merrill, FINRA Executive Vice-President and Chief of Enforcement, said that they were investigating individuals in connection with the sale of auction rate securities (“ARS”) and that they would bring enforcement actions against individuals if their ongoing investigations revealed misconduct.  Their prepared remarks may be found here and here.  Their complete testimony may be viewed here.  Committee Chairman Barney Frank convened the hearing in order to examine the continuing crisis in the market for ARS and to explore potential resolutions.

In August, the SEC announced preliminary settlements in principle with four broker-dealers (Citigroup, UBS, Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch) that will make available more than $40 billion in liquidity to purchasers of ARS.  Specific charges were not announced, but they will relate to alleged misrepresentations concerning safety and liquidity in the sale of ARS.  During the September 18 testimony, Ms. Merrill announced that FINRA had also entered into agreements in principle with five broker-dealers to settle charges related to the sale of ARS, pursuant to which the firms would offer to repurchase up to $1.8 billion of ARS from individual investors and some institutions.  FINRA charged the firms with supervisory violations and with using advertising and marketing materials that did not provide a sound basis for evaluating the purchase of ARS.  FINRA’s Press Release describing the agreements in principle in more detail can be read here.  Both the SEC and FINRA are continuing to investigate conduct at the settling firms and at other firms as well.  According to FINRA’s Press Release, 50 additional investigations have been opened and more are expected.

None of the SEC or FINRA actions announced to date have named any individuals. However, in response to Committee member questions about individual misconduct and accountability, Ms. Merrill stated that FINRA was investigating individual brokers and implied that they could be suspended or barred from the industry if FINRA found that they engaged in misrepresentations or suitability violations in connection with the sale of ARS.  In response to separate questions, Ms. Thomsen also said that the SEC’s investigations were ongoing and to the extent that individuals were involved in “bad behavior,” the SEC will pursue actions against them to the extent that they can “establish cases.”

Given the testimony of Ms. Thomsen and Ms. Merrill, and FINRA’s announcement that more investigations will be opened, even firms that are not currently the subject of regulatory inquiries should closely examine the conduct of individuals if the firm has sold a significant amount of ARS.  Although, so far, FINRA has only charged violations of advertising and supervision rules, sales practice violations can provide a separate basis for liability for the firm, and, of course, the individual salesperson.  Since the potential sanctions identified by Ms. Merrill are severe, firms will certainly want to know if they have salespersons who could face such sanctions.

Any firm that discovers clear misconduct in connection with ARS sales should consider disciplining the employee and making the customer whole, regardless of whether they are currently subject to regulatory scrutiny.   If there is a regulatory investigation, individuals may need separate counsel and the firm should review its indemnification and professional liability policies.  Firms should also review their compliance and supervisory procedures with regard to sales practices and make enhancements when appropriate.  Firms that have closely examined their employees’ activities, taken corrective and remedial action when necessary, and upgraded their compliance and supervisory procedures will be in a better position to deal with regulators whether they are currently involved in a regulatory investigation or become subject to one. 

Confronting Market Abuse: FSA Steps Up Criminal Enforcement in 2008

By: Philip J. Morgan, Robert V. Hadley

A hallmark of enforcement by the U.K. Financial Services Authority (the “FSA”) in 2008 has been the effort to establish that abusive behavior is likely to trigger severe personal consequences - so-called “credible deterrence.”  The FSA is now spreading the message that it is “getting tough” and intends to increase its focus on deterrence through enforcement action.

The FSA has been saying for some time that it intends to boost credible deterrence and engage senior management in particular in relation to its strategic priorities of combating market abuse and insider dealing by three strategies: higher financial penalties; greater focus on enforcement actions against individuals rather than or as well as firms; and the prosecution of criminal cases.  Yet many have wondered when the rhetoric would be matched by action.  In all of 2007 the FSA imposed just one fine for abuse-related activity.  By the start of 2008 the FSA had brought one successful criminal prosecution since its establishment under the current regulatory regime on 1 December 2001.  It had prosecuted nobody for the criminal offence of insider dealing.

Now, things appear to be starting to change. The FSA has said that in order to achieve its aim of credible deterrence it must prosecute “a steady stream” of criminal cases.  Thus, in January of this year the FSA launched its first criminal prosecution for insider dealing against two individuals, one of whom was an in-house counsel.  In July it commenced two more prosecutions, one against a former Cazenove partner. There are said to be several others in the pipeline.

Also, on July 29, 2008, an extensive dawn raid operation was mounted on various addresses by the FSA under search warrants.  Eight individuals were arrested. The FSA said that this was in connection with “a major ongoing investigation into insider dealing rings.” The FSA does not comment on ongoing investigations, but this was a further clear demonstration of intent.

Individuals, and especially senior management and others in the regulated sector, can be in no doubt that there is at least some risk of criminal prosecution for insider dealing and other market manipulation offences. The risk is not merely of financial penalty imposed on their firm, or even on them personally.  Certainly no one can any longer say that the FSA has never prosecuted anyone for such activities.  The FSA’s aim is that any person with access to inside information or other opportunity to abuse the market should believe that these criminal cases are the first of its “steady stream,” and to think clearly that that is not where they wish to swim.

The FSA also will point to other recent actions as evidence of its new, more aggressive posture toward enforcement.

In the past two months, the FSA fined Credit Suisse £5.6 million for the mismarking of certain positions resulting in an overstatement in published accounts corrected some eight days later, and fined a GE Money mortgage brokerage operation £1.1 million for defective systems and controls leading to its not accounting correctly for customer funds, so that, for example, mortgages were overpaid on redemption and clients’ money was not applied to their mortgage accounts promptly or accurately (both fines imposed after the FSA acknowledged the full cooperation of the firms and after applying the 30 percent reduction for settling at an early stage of the enforcement process).  These cases are examples of the higher financial penalties that the FSA intends to seek.

The FSA fined Land of Leather Limited in May in relation to inadequate systems and controls to prevent the sale of Payment Protection Insurance which was unsuitable for customers’ needs, but will stress that it also fined the company’s Chief Executive £14,000 (after a 30 percent early settlement reduction) in respect of the same matter. This shows the FSA’s willingness to pursue senior management on the basis of senior management’s responsibility for a firm’s regulatory compliance.

Similarly the FSA extracted an undertaking from Mr. Steven Harrison, an investment manager at a hedge fund, effectively that he stay out of the financial services industry for 12 months (in addition to a financial penalty of £52,500 - after the 30 percent early settlement reduction).  The allegation was market abuse in the sense of instructing colleagues to purchase certain bonds while in possession of inside information.  The final notice acknowledges that Mr. Harrison’s conduct was not deliberate in the sense that he did not consider at the time that he had inside information, but the FSA’s position was that he should have recognized that fact.  The FSA thus intends to promote deterrence not only by fining individuals, but also by affecting their continued ability to earn their livelihood in the financial services sector.