Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance

By: Diane E. Ambler, András P. Teleki, Collins R. Clark

Two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) specifically target the insurance industry and are intended to promote a higher level of uniformity in the U.S. insurance industry regulatory landscape. First, the Federal Insurance Office Act of 2010 (“FIO Act”) creates a new Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) within the Department of the Treasury and signals the beginning of a new era of federal involvement, at least at the macro level, in the U.S. insurance industry. Significantly, the FIO Act does not include a federal insurance charter provision, long sought by many in the insurance industry, and the states will remain the primary insurance regulatory authority. Second, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (“NRRA”) changes how authority over some forms of insurance is allocated among the states.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010"

On May 20, 2010, the Senate passed the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” as amended (“Senate Bill”). Congressional leadership has indicated that conference committee proceedings will take place in June, making it likely that the legislation will be passed by the House and Senate before the July 4th Recess and signed into law by the President shortly thereafter.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Senator Dodd Releases Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation: The Home Stretch?

On Monday, March 15, 2010, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) released a Chairman's Mark of the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010. The Bill, which has been in development for months, is intended to replace the Discussion Draft previously circulated by Chairman Dodd on November 10, 2009 and is different in many respects from H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, which was passed by the House on December 12, 2009. The Senate Banking Committee is scheduled to begin marking up the legislation on March 22.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

 

Global Government Solutions 2010: The Year Ahead

Contacts: Diane E. Ambler, Michael J. Missal, Matt T. Morley, Mark D. Perlow

2009 brought a further transformation in the relationship between business and government. Regardless of political systems or philosophies, governments around the world became more dynamic and intrusive in response to the financial crisis.

This 2010 Annual Report, prepared by members of the K&L Gates Global Government Solutions initiative, contains concise articles that seek to forecast likely government actions and priorities regarding a broad spectrum of topics.

To view the report, click here.

 

Insurance Recovery For Dubai Credit Default Losses

By: Neal R. Brendel, Roberta D. Anderson

The recent announcement by the government of Dubai that it would be seeking a stand-still on debt repayments by Dubai World, and its subsidiary, Nakheel PJSC, has shaken the global financial markets and investment community. In the immediate wake of Dubai's announcement, creditors have begun to review their rights under UAE federal insolvency law and the law of other potentially applicable jurisdictions, as well as examining other available options for minimizing the financial impact of Dubai's credit crisis. This Alert is designed to assist companies by providing a general overview of the applicable insurance coverages that may cover such losses and discussing considerations for developing a plan to pursue potential insurance recovery.

To read the complete alert online, click here.

Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, Summary and Comparison to House Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) released a discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009." Chairman Dodd has been developing the Senate version of the regulatory reform package over several months. Until recently, the Chairman was working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL). However, Chairman Dodd recently decided to proceed only with the Democrats on the Committee.

At the time of this writing, the House Financial Services Committee is completing its markup of the House regulatory reform package. With the Senate and House taking different approaches in several respects, debate on significant aspects of the regulatory reform package will continue.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Claims Notification: Don't Give Insurers an Excuse Not to Pay

By: Sarah TurpinJane Harte-Lovelace

The credit crunch has already given rise to numerous third party claims against financial institutions in the US, primarily by disgruntled investors and shareholders.   While the "tsunami" of litigation predicted by many lawyers has not yet arrived in the UK, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the scandal involving Bernard Madoff's $50 billion Ponzi scheme raises the prospect of similar claims (and related investigations) emerging.   In these circumstances, companies are well advised to consider the state of their insurance coverage, particularly under Professional Indemnity/Errors & Omissions and Directors & Officers' Liability policies.  In particular, companies should pay close attention to the importance of well-drafted claims notification provisions in their insurance policies.  Companies should also be alert to the need for prompt notification to their insurers in the event of a claim or circumstances that may give rise to a claim. 

Below is a checklist of some practical points to consider in connection with insurance placed in the London market and governed by English law, although many of the points have equal application in other jurisdictions, particularly the US. 

  • Check the policy provisions relating to claims notification and consider whether there is any scope for improvement.   The English Court of Appeal recently criticised the claims notification provisions in a Professional Indemnity policy as "a patchwork of provisions, which have no doubt been largely drawn from other policies but do not all fit well together".

     
  • Make sure that any notice of claims and of circumstances is given in a timely manner.  The notice provision will normally stipulate the period within which notice has to be given and this can vary from a specified time period to "immediately" or "as soon as practicable".  Failure to comply could prove fatal if the clause is a condition precedent to the insurer's liability under the policy.

     
  • Don't assume that the absence of the words "condition precedent" means that the notice provision will not be construed as such.  Harsh as it may seem, the English (and US) courts may hold that the requirement to give valid notice is a condition precedent even though not described as such in the policy.  English courts may allow insurers to deny liability for breach of a condition precedent, even if they have not suffered any prejudice as a result.  The position is similar in the US where, in contrast to comprehensive general liability policies, some US courts have not required an insurer to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from untimely notice under a claims-made policy.

     
  • Set up and maintain proper internal lines of communication to ensure early identification of any errors or problems which may require notification.  This is especially relevant to businesses with global operations, particularly those based in jurisdictions where less importance is placed on the need for early notification.  In these circumstances, it may prove particularly beneficial to limit the requirement to notify to those claims or circumstances which are known to the group risk manager or general counsel.

     
  • Make sure the notice of any circumstance is sufficiently detailed.  Some policies require detailed particulars to be given, including the identity of any potential claimants and the types of claim anticipated.  The insurer may seek to deny cover if it considers that inadequate details have been given.

     
  • Make sure the notice of any circumstance is sufficiently broad to cover all potential claims regarded as real risks.   The policy will usually contain a “deeming” provision to the effect that any claim arising from a circumstance notified to insurers will be deemed to have been made within the policy period.  However, if the notice is not sufficiently broad and additional claims materialise which have no causal connection with the circumstance originally notified, then the deeming provision may not apply and the policy will not respond.

     
  • Don't be economical with the truth!  A preliminary notice couched in vague terms — perhaps to avoid the prospect of higher premiums at renewal — may be held inadequate for claims notification purposes.  There is, however, a balance to be drawn between being too vague and too specific:  a notification which is too specific may enable insurers to limit their liability if the claim expands into something much wider than suggested in the original notification.

     
  • If the matter is subject to further investigation and/or dependent upon future developments, make this clear and update the notification as further information comes to light. 

     
  • Review and update the notification prior to renewal.

     
  • Make sure notification is given to all insurers (including Lloyd's Underwriters and Co-Insurers).  The policy will normally provide an address where notices must be sent.  Some policies provide for notice to be sent to a broker or solicitor but, unless they are authorised by the insurers to act as their agents for claims notification purposes, they merely act as a conduit, and it is vital to ensure that the notice is actually received by the relevant insurers.  Notice to the broker or solicitor may not in itself be sufficient.

     
  • Make sure notification is also given to any excess layer insurers, where there is any possibility that the claim will impact on those layers.  The excess layer policies may not necessarily have the same notice provisions as the primary layer, and notice to the primary layer insurers alone is unlikely to be sufficient.  This could prove catastrophic for high-value claims where the excess layer insurance may prove essential.

Whatever the jurisdiction, but certainly in England and the US, it is vital that policyholders take a proactive approach to claims notification.   Early advice both prior to and at the time of notification could prove invaluable. 

Please contact Jane Harte-Lovelace (020 7360 8280 or jane.harte-lovelace@klgates.com) or Sarah Turpin (020 7360 8285 or sarah.turpin@klgates.com ) if you would like further information.

Insurance Coverage for Claims Arising from the Credit Crisis: Policyholders Should Take Steps to Preserve Their Rights to Coverage for Lawsuits and Investigations

By: Gregory S. Wright

I. Introduction
In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis triggered a wave of litigation and regulatory action involving not only the lenders that sold subprime mortgages, but also the issuers, underwriters, and other financial institutions that participated in the securitization of the mortgages and the sale of securities backed by the subprime loans.  The credit crisis of the last few months has exacerbated (and likely will continue to exacerbate) this wave of litigation and regulatory action, not only by increasing the number of claims, but also by expanding the universe of targets to include companies and individuals that were not directly involved in the sale or securitization of subprime loans.

Given this expanding crisis, many corporations (as well as their officers and directors) will be forced to incur substantial sums to defend such claims, to settle such claims, and/or to pay judgments.  In many cases, insured companies and their officers and directors should be entitled to coverage for such costs under their Directors’ and Officers’ (“D&O”) liability policies.  While this article focuses on D&O coverage, policyholders also should consider the potential for coverage under other policies, such as Errors and Omissions liability policies and Fiduciary liability policies.

It should be noted that the terms of D&O policies vary widely.  In addition, one should assume that insurers will assert all available defenses to such claims based on the specific policy language and facts at issue.  Given the potential for coverage, policyholders facing claims and investigations should carefully review their D&O policies and should take appropriate steps in order to maximize their potential insurance recoveries.

II. Credit Crisis Litigation and Investigations
The subprime mortgage crisis, and the ensuing credit crisis, has produced a wide array of claims, lawsuits, and government investigations.  Companies and individuals in a rapidly expanding list of industries have been impacted.  Many of the claims at issue target individuals who are commonly insured under D&O policies (e.g., individual directors and officers), as well as the target entity itself, and allege conduct that often potentially triggers coverage under D&O policies, such as alleged misstatements in public filings, negligent misrepresentations, and/or breaches of fiduciary duties.  Merely to illustrate, this wave of litigation and investigations includes the following types of current claims, all of which potentially may trigger coverage under D&O policies:

  • Lawsuits by shareholders against lenders and certain directors and officers alleging (in part) that defendants made false and misleading statements to the public about subprime lending activities.

     
  • Lawsuits by shareholders against investment banks and certain directors and officers alleging misstatements about the value of and risks associated with subprime-backed assets.

     
  • Lawsuits by investors against financial institutions and certain directors and officers alleging that the defendants that sold them mortgage-backed securities misrepresented the risks associated with such securities.

     
  • Class action lawsuits against failed banks, related holding companies, and related officers and directors, alleging that the defendants misled investors about the financial status of the bank, violated securities laws, committed fraud, made negligent misrepresentations, etc.

     
  • Class action lawsuit on behalf of preferred shareholders of Fannie Mae and Lehman Brothers alleging false statements by named officers and directors in connection with the offerings.

     
  • Class action lawsuits against companies not directly involved in the subprime area (such as Constellation Energy), as well as their directors and officers, alleging failure to make appropriate disclosures about exposures arising from credit problems of trading partners (e.g., Lehman Brothers).

     
  • Class action lawsuits and regulatory investigations against companies concerning auction rate securities.   The lawsuits allege in general that the companies failed to make appropriate disclosures about the risks associated with auction rate securities.  Some (but not all) of the lawsuits name individual directors and officers.  While most of the lawsuits have been filed on behalf of the purchasers of the auction rate securities, at least one lawsuit was filed on behalf of shareholders of the entity (Merrill Lynch) that sold the auction rate securities to other investors.  See also M. King, SEC and FINRA Focusing on Individuals in Auction Rate Securities Investigationavailable here.

     
  • SEC investigations into possible market manipulation in connection with short selling in the securities of financial institutions.  See B. Ochs, Manipulation Tied to Short Selling a Top Enforcement Priority, available here.

     
  • FBI and DOJ criminal investigations regarding accounting, disclosure, and corporate governance matters.  See M. Ricciuti, DOJ Opens Criminal Investigations under New Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Entitiesavailable here.

III. Potential Coverage under D&O Policies
In general, D&O policies afford coverage for “Claims” against an “Insured” alleging “Wrongful Acts” that result in a covered “Loss.”  The availability of coverage turns on the definitions of such terms (which vary widely), other policy terms and conditions, and the nature of the specific allegations in the claim at issue.

Claim.   D&O policies generally afford coverage for “claims.”  All (or virtually all) D&O policies include “lawsuits” within the definition of “claim,” but coverage for regulatory or criminal investigations varies widely.  For example, certain D&O policies define “claim” to include SEC investigations commenced by the service of a subpoena on an insured person or criminal proceedings commenced by the return of an indictment, information, or similar document.  Other D&O policies cover a broader array of informal investigations, while other policies limit coverage to investigations commenced by a “formal order” of investigation.  In any event, given the broad array of policy language available in the market, insureds should not wait for lawsuits to be filed before analyzing the potential for coverage.

Entity Coverage.    In addition to covering claims against insured directors and officers, many D&O policies afford coverage for claims against the insured entity itself (for example, many D&O policies cover so-called “Securities Claims” filed against the insured entity, including class action securities lawsuits).   The inclusion of “entity coverage” in D&O policies often helps insurers and policyholders avoid disputes on how to allocate defense costs and/or settlement payments among covered individuals and the entity itself.

Loss.   The definition of “loss” in D&O policies varies widely.  For example, some policies expressly cover fines, penalties, multiplied damages, and punitive damages, when permitted by law.  Some D&O policies do not.  In addition, insurers and policyholders frequently litigate (and courts recently have reached conflicting opinions on) the availability of coverage for so-called “disgorgement,” “restitution,” and/or for losses paid pursuant to Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.  See, e.g., Bank of America Corp. v. SR International Business Ins. Co., 2007 WL 4480057 (N.C. Super. 2007) (holding that settlement of Section 11 claim may be covered under D&O policy).

Conduct Exclusions.   Insurers also may seek to rely on various exclusions in the relevant policy to deny coverage for subprime-related claims.  For example, insurers may seek to rely on so-called conduct exclusions, which bar coverage for certain claims relating to criminal or fraudulent activity or for claims alleging that the insured received a profit to which he or she was not legally entitled.  Again, it should be noted that the terms of these exclusions vary widely.  Some exclusions arguably bar coverage when the excluded conduct is merely alleged.  However, in most policies, the exclusions do not apply unless the insurer meets its burden of proving that the excluded conduct “in fact” occurred or unless the excluded conduct is established via a “final adjudication.”  When the policy at issue includes the “in fact” test or “final adjudication” test, insureds are often entitled to coverage for defense costs and/or settlements that are made without any finding or admission with respect to the excluded conduct.  In addition, many D&O policies contain severability provisions that prevent the insurer from imputing the knowledge or conduct of one insured to other insureds, which in effect preserves coverage for the “innocent insureds” and/or the company itself.

Defense Issues.   In many D&O policies, the insurer is not obligated to defend a claim, but rather is required to reimburse the policyholder’s defense costs.  Nevertheless, certain D&O policies state that the policyholder should not incur defense costs or settle a claim without the consent of the insurer.   In addition, certain D&O policies require the policyholder to obtain the insurer’s consent with respect to the selection of defense counsel (such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).  To avoid potential insurer defenses, policyholders may wish to consider taking steps to address any conditions in the policy related to defense and/or cooperation with the insurer.

Rescission Issues.   In response to claims alleging misleading statements in a public filing, insurers often attempt to rescind the policy at issue entirely to the extent the public filing at issue was attached to or incorporated by reference into the insured’s “application” for coverage.  State law on this defense varies widely, but most courts impose a high burden of proof on insurers to demonstrate (among other things) that the alleged misrepresentation was material and that the insurer in fact relied on the alleged misrepresentation when it decided to issue the policy.  In addition, many current D&O policies make coverage non-rescindable for certain types of claims or certain insureds.  Further, many D&O policies contain strict severability clauses that limit the insurer’s right to rescind to only those individuals that had specific knowledge of the misstated facts.

Renewal Issues.   As noted above, the terms of D&O policies vary widely.  Further, insureds and insurers frequently negotiate certain terms of coverage during the renewal process.  With proper planning, insureds potentially may obtain coverage-enhancing changes to standard policy forms that may be outcome-determinative when a claim is filed.  Insureds frequently retain outside coverage counsel to review their D&O policies and participate in this renewal process.

IV. Conclusion
D&O policies offer a potentially valuable resource for policyholders facing claims arising from the subprime crisis and related credit crisis.  Policyholders should take steps now to preserve their rights to coverage.

FDIC Insurance Coverage for Securitization Servicing Accounts Leaves Some Investors in the Cold

By Anthony R.G. Nolan and Drew A. Malakoff

On October 10, 2008, the FDIC adopted an interim rule (the “Interim Rule”) that increases the standard maximum deposit insurance amount from $100,000 to $250,000, in accordance with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Of particular interest to securitization investors and servicers, the Interim Rule also simplifies the deposit insurance rules as they apply to mortgage servicing accounts. By doing so, it increases certainty for investors while enhancing liquidity for servicers of mortgage assets.

Prior to the enactment of the Interim Rule, funds on deposit in mortgage servicing accounts that represented principal and interest received on the underlying loans were insurable on a pass-through basis to each investor or security holder of a securitization or fund. The theory behind this approach was that payments of principal and interest on securitized mortgages were beneficially owned by the investors in the related mortgage-backed securities. As a practical matter, however, the FDIC’s prior approach to mortgage servicing accounts created some ambiguity as to the ability of individual investors to make a claim against the FDIC for amounts in a servicing account held by a depository institution that became subject to a receivership or conservatorship, particularly as securitizations became more complicated and incorporated different tranches of bonds with varying degrees of seniority or with specific rights to sub-pools of assets.

Under the FDIC’s prior approach, in order to determine what portion of each investor’s interest in the principal and interest payments deposited into a mortgage servicing account was covered by FDIC insurance, it was necessary to determine not only which investors had not exceeded their respective deposit insurance limits, but also which investors should have been allocated the next dollar of principal or interest based on the complex paydown rules contained in the transaction documents. This complex calculus, based on a deal’s distribution waterfall and the percentage of the relevant security each investor held, made it increasingly difficult to determine which of the many investors in a securitization vehicle had the rights to each dollar of principal or interest. Moreover, given the size of many of these transactions, it was also very likely that individual investors would far exceed the applicable insurance limit.

These considerations resulted in uncertainty among securitization investors as to the extent to which their allocated portions of loan payments would be covered by deposit insurance. Consequently, investors and rating agencies require that servicers remit funds from servicing accounts to a trustee account on a daily basis (or in some cases transfer the servicing account to another institution) whenever the servicers’ creditworthiness (as measured by credit ratings) decline below certain levels. This imposed a cost to depository institutions in the form of reduced liquidity, which has become a significant threat to the stability of financial markets in the recent challenging market conditions.

The Interim Rule reconciles the needs of mortgage-backed security investors for security with the needs of depository institutions for liquidity by changing the basis for insuring accounts in mortgage servicing accounts and, in many cases, increasing the amount actually covered in each such account. Because the Interim Rule makes it easier to determine what portion of payments beneficially owned by securitization investors are covered by FDIC deposit insurance, investors and rating agencies will be more likely to permit depository institutions that maintain mortgage servicing accounts to commingle amounts received on mortgage loans for longer periods, thus enhancing their liquidity. For this reason, the Interim Rule is a welcome development for depository institutions and investors participating in the mortgage securitization market. However, the Interim Rule as currently drafted — to cover only mortgage servicing accounts — does not go far enough in that it does not address these concerns as they arise in the securitization of non-mortgage related assets.

Litigation: Financial Institutions Have Remedies for a Breach of Contract by the Federal Government

By David T. Case

The evolving efforts of the U.S. Government to address the turmoil in the financial markets echo in many respects Government actions to address the “crisis” in the savings and loan industry in the 1980s. As a consequence, the litigation against the Government resulting from the regulatory reform of the savings and loan industry provides a useful template in the event that the current reforms cause the Government to breach promises of specific regulatory treatment. In particular, under the previous litigation, the Government has been held liable for breach of contract, and substantial damages have been awarded, including damages for lost profits.

Looking back to the 1980s, regulators were faced with the possibility of widespread failure by savings and loans, along with a corresponding threat to the deposit insurance funds and potentially enormous liquidation costs. Many early efforts to solve the savings and loan crisis resulted in contracts between savings and loans and the Government in which the Government promised specific treatment under pertinent regulations. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) entered into varying forms of such agreements, either as a means of directly avoiding seizure of failing institutions, or indirectly avoiding such seizures by encouraging healthy thrifts to acquire failing institutions.

Subsequent efforts to resolve the savings and loan crisis culminated in the passage and implementation of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), and in implementing the provisions of that law, the Government breached many of its earlier promises. These breaches caused a wave of claims against the Government, and one critical lesson from the tumult is that contracts with the Government for specific regulatory treatment are enforceable, and the Government will be liable for damages caused by its breach of contract. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, where the Government entered into contracts with regulated financial institutions, promising to provide financial institutions with “particular regulatory treatment in exchange for their assumption of liabilities that threatened to produce claims against the Government as insurer,” the risk of regulatory change fell to the Government, even though “Congress subsequently changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements.” United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996).

The application of these principles was recently affirmed in a case presenting a scenario remarkably reminiscent of current Government attempts to address the turmoil in the financial markets: First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rochester v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 106 (2007), aff’d 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17331 (Aug. 13, 2008). Four failing savings and loans were merged into First Federal, and the Government provided financial assistance to the institution, replaced senior management, selected members of the Board of Directors, and exercised substantial control over First Federal’s operations.

First Federal later claimed that the Government had breached its contract with First Federal by failing to honor its agreement to allow First Federal to operate at reduced capital levels. The contract had been agreed to between First Federal and FSLIC as part of a reorganization of First Federal, and the agreement was intended to permit the Association to return to financial health as an alternative to seizure, following a lengthy period of insolvency, and to save FSLIC the costs of liquidating the Association. Following this 1986 agreement, First Federal’s business prospered until 1989, when Congress passed FIRREA, nullifying all contracts between the FSLIC and thrift institutions to the extent that those contracts relaxed regulatory capital requirements for specific thrift institutions.

Finding liability against the Government, the court awarded First Federal $85 million in damages, primarily for lost profits, plus attorney’s fees and costs. The award was recently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. First Federal, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17331 (Aug. 13, 2008).

First Federal provides a roadmap for claims that arise as a result of the Government’s breach of contract, and if a financial institution believes it has such a claim against the Government, counsel should be consulted to evaluate appropriate steps to preserve and perfect the claim.

Fannie / Freddie Takeover Leaves CDS Investors PO'd

By: Gordon F. Peery

When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship on September 7, 2008, several leading dealers uncontroversially agreed that a bankruptcy credit event had occurred on credit derivative transactions referencing either of those institutions.  The occurrence of a credit event gave protection buyers the right to settle the transaction in exchange for a payment to compensate it for the loss of market value of specified deliverable obligations of the reference entity.  As it has done in the case of previous credit events on widely traded reference entities, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) has introduced an auction protocol to facilitate settlement of transactions by providing for cash settlement as an alternative to physical settlement.

A controversy arose over whether the principal-only component of debt securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (“PO Strips”) should be included in the list of deliverable obligations that could be valued for purposes of settlement.   This was an important issue for transaction counterparties because the buyer of protection on a credit default swap has no obligation to mitigate loss and is entitled to select the qualifying obligations that are “cheapest to deliver,” i.e., that have fallen most in value.  Unusually for a reference entity’s obligations following a credit event, most Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt obligations traded at or above par after the credit event occurred when it became clear that the United States would guarantee all debt securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on an equal basis.

Protection buyers would have benefited from the inclusion of PO Strips in the list of deliverable obligations because those obligations continued to trade below par following the credit event, reflecting that the market value of stripped securities depends not only on the issuer’s perceived creditworthiness but also on broader market factors such as interest rates and inflation.   On cash settlement of a credit derivative transaction, a protection buyer would have been entitled to receive a payment equal to the difference between the notional amount of the transaction and the market value of the PO Strip selected for valuation.  ISDA’s board of directors concluded that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac PO Strips cannot be delivered in settlement of credit derivative transactions because they do not technically constitute “borrowed money” as defined in the 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions.  This conclusion is based in part on the fact that as a stripped security a PO Strip represents only part of a repayment obligation, and is also based on the conclusion that a PO Strip is not issued as a “bond” or “note” by the relevant issuer but is rather a product of the book-entry rules for obligations of each GSE in book-entry form on the Federal Reserve Banks’ book-entry system because the stripping of debt securities into interest and principal components occurs after their “issuance.”

Insurance Regulatory Developments Affecting Credit Derivatives
On September 22, 2008, the New York State Department of Insurance issued Circular Letter No. 19, which sets forth best practices for financial guarantee insurers.  Circular Letter No. 19 announced new guidelines that, for the first time, will establish that some credit default swaps that have previously not been subject to state regulation as insurance products will be deemed to constitute “the doing of an insurance business” within the meaning of Section 1101 of the New York Insurance Law.  The new guidelines, which will be effective January 1, 2009, establish that a credit default swap will be considered an insurance contract when the buyer owns or is reasonably expected to own the reference obligation.  In essence, a party who owns the reference obligation for a credit default swap will be presumed to have entered into the transaction in order to obtain indemnification for loss on that obligation.  Under the new guidance, credit default swaps would be subject to regulation and will be issuable only by entities licensed to conduct insurance business.  The guidance does not extend to so-called “naked swaps,” which are not insurance and cannot be regulated by state insurance authorities.

Harmonisation of EU Regulation of Persons Acquiring Financial Sector Firms

By: Philip J. Morgan

In general, a person seeking to acquire a stake of 10% or more in an EU credit institution, securities firm or insurance firm has to obtain prior approval from the relevant local regulator.  However, the current EU directives mandating the relevant approvals process permit Member States to impose additional requirements over those in the relevant directives.  This has left scope for national regulators to adopt protectionist practices such as making unreasonable requests for information during the approvals process, refusing applications or imposing conditions on grounds unrelated to the purpose of the underlying directives.

This problem, which has impeded cross border acquisitions across Europe contrary to the aims of the EU Financial Services Action Plan, is now being addressed by the Acquisitions Directive (2007/44/EC) (the “Directive”) which is required to be brought into law in EU Member States by 21 March 2009.  The Directive's aim is to facilitate and encourage cross border acquisitions by increasing certainty, clarity and transparency, and Member States are not permitted to impose rules additional to those in the Directive.

The Directive seeks to harmonise the supervisory approvals process by setting out the entire procedure to be applied by regulatory authorities including fixing deadlines, limiting the ability of regulators to "stop the clock" by asking questions, and clearly laying down uniform prudential criteria for the assessment (which are the only criteria that may be applied).

In the UK, the adoption of the new rules is not currently expected to make any very material changes to the current "change in control" regime, although there will be a slight shortening of about a week of the period, currently 3 months,  within which the Financial Services Authority must make its decision.

Harmonisation of the rules across the EU should, however, mean that anyone, including those from outside the EU, looking to acquire European financial firms may find that task somewhat more straightforward.  This might be expected to trigger, or at least facilitate, a new wave of consolidation in the European banking, insurance and securities industries.