Global Government Solutions 2010: The Year Ahead

Contacts: Diane E. Ambler, Michael J. Missal, Matt T. Morley, Mark D. Perlow

2009 brought a further transformation in the relationship between business and government. Regardless of political systems or philosophies, governments around the world became more dynamic and intrusive in response to the financial crisis.

This 2010 Annual Report, prepared by members of the K&L Gates Global Government Solutions initiative, contains concise articles that seek to forecast likely government actions and priorities regarding a broad spectrum of topics.

To view the report, click here.

 

House Passes Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 11, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4173, the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009,” by a vote of 223 to 203. 27 Democrats voted against the bill and no Republicans voted in favor of the bill.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws: Compromise Provisions in Financial Reform Bill Would Scale Back Existing Preemptions for Federally-Chartered Banks

By: David L. Beam  

One of the most controversial subjects in banking law over the past decade has been federal preemption of state laws for federally-chartered banks (i.e., national banks and federal thrifts) and their operating subsidiaries. Under current law, regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) preempt almost all state consumer protection laws for national banks and federal thrifts, respectively. When a federal law “preempts” a state law for an institution, it effectively exempts that institution from having to comply with the state law. This preemption has also been extended to operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts as well as (in certain situations) agents and other third parties acting on behalf of those institutions.

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Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation Moves to House Floor

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 2, the House Financial Services Committee passed final bills comprising the House version of the financial regulatory reform legislation. House Floor consideration is expected as early as the week of December 7. The Senate Banking Committee is also expected to begin marking up the discussion draft of the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009” the week of December 7.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Private Funds and Broker-Dealers Under Dodd's Restoring American Financial Stability Act

By: Edward G. Eisert and Carolyn A. Jayne

I. Introduction.

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd introduced his discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009” (“RAFSA”). This draft of more than 1,100 pages in length consolidates the various components of the Administration’s regulatory reform proposals. Set forth below is an overview of those provisions of RAFSA that most directly affect investment advisers to funds that rely upon the exemptions from registration set forth in Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (collectively, “Private Funds”) and that materially differ from the provisions of HR 3818, the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009,” which would require certain private fund managers to register with and be regulated by the SEC, and HR 3817, the “Investor Protection Act of 2009,” passed by the House Financial Services Committee on October 27, 2009 and November 4, 2009, respectively. (For more information about the RAFSA in general, see K&L Gates alert Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009. For a discussion of the Obama Administration’s proposed legislation, see K&L Gates alert The Obama Administration’s Proposal for the Registration of Investment Advisers to Private Investment Funds: The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.)

A. Title IV of RAFSA - “Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others.”

Private Equity Funds. Title IV provides a new exemption from registration for advisers to “Private Equity Funds,” a term to be defined by the SEC within six months after the enactment of the Act. Within the same time frame, the SEC also will be required to issue final rules regarding records to be maintained by such advisers and reports to be provided by such advisers to the SEC.

Venture Capital Funds and Family Offices. In addition, Title IV: (i) provides an exemption from registration for advisers to “Venture Capital Funds,” a term to be defined by the SEC within six months after the enactment of RAFSA; and (ii) provides a new exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) for a “Family Office,” a term to be defined by the SEC. Title IV does not include an exemption for midsized private funds (i.e., funds that have “assets under management in the United States of less than $150,000,000”) and does not impose any recordkeeping and reporting obligations on Venture Capital Funds as does HR 3818.

Financial Thresholds for Registration of an Adviser Under the Advisers Act and for an Accredited Investor. Also, RAFSA raises to $100 million the threshold for non-exempted investment advisers to be required to register with the SEC.

Title IV directs the SEC to increase the “financial threshold for an accredited investor,” as defined in Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, in an amount determined to be “appropriate and in the public interest, in light of price inflation . . .” and to adjust such threshold no less frequently than once every five years to “reflect the percentage increase in the cost of living.”

Independent Custodian. Title IV authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registered investment advisers to use an independent custodian to hold client assets.

Reports and Records. Title IV excludes a provision in HR 3818 requiring registered investment advisers to provide reports, records and other documents to “investors, prospective investors, counterparties, and creditors” as the SEC may prescribe as “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.” At the same time, Title IV increases the required information to be filed in such records or reports to include valuation methodologies of the fund, types of assets held and side arrangements or side letters, whereby certain investors in a fund obtain more favorable rights or entitlements than other investors. However, off-balance sheet leverage, required to be filed with the SEC under HR 3818, is not required to be filed under Title IV. Title IV requires the SEC to report annually to Congress regarding how it has used the data collected thereunder “to monitor the markets for the protection of investors and the integrity of the markets.” Title IV also contemplates an agreement of confidentiality when information is provided to Congress.

Studies and Reports to Congress. Lastly, Title IV directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct studies and submit reports to Congress on three subjects: (i) the appropriate criteria for determining financial thresholds or other criteria needed to qualify as an “accredited investor” and eligibility to invest in “hedge funds (within one year of the enactment of RAFSA)”; (ii) the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization to oversee “hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds (within one year of the enactment of RAFSA)”; and (iii) the state of short selling in the stock market, with particular attention to the impact of recent rule changes and the incidence of the failure to deliver shares sold short (within two years of the enactment of RAFSA).

B. Title IX of RAFSA - “Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities.”

Fiduciary Standards of Broker-Dealers Providing Investment Advice. Title IX takes a different approach than HR 3817, the “Investor Protection Act,” to the issue presented by investment advisers and broker-dealers currently being subject to somewhat different duties to clients. As amended, HR 3817 provides that brokers, dealers, and advisers shall have the duty “to act in the best interest of the customer without regard to [compensation]” and that the standard of conduct for brokers and dealers “shall be no less stringent than” the standard for advisers under the Advisers Act. HR 3817 would retain the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of investment adviser.

In contrast, Title IX would eliminate from the definition of “investment adviser” in the Advisers Act the categorical exception for a broker or dealer (without regard to whether any advice it provides is “incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer . . . ”). Title IX then would amend Section 206 of the Advisers Act to grant the SEC authority by rule to exempt any person or transaction, or any class of persons or transactions, from the prohibition under Section 206(3) thereof regarding principal transactions, if the SEC determines that such exemption is “for the protection of investors; and the adviser provides investors with adequate protections against conflicts of interest or principal transactions that are not in the best interests of the investors.”

Title IX also provides that “[n]othing in [Section 205 of the Advisers Act, which regulates the terms of investment advisory contracts] prohibits an investment adviser from entering into an investment advisory relationship that provides for the payment of an asset management fee or a commission.”

Lastly, Title IX would provide that it would be unlawful for an adviser “to fail to disclose to any client or prospective client any material limitation on the range of investment products about which the investment advisor gives advice . . . .”

Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers. RAFSA also takes a different approach than HR 3817 to the oversight of certain advisers and broker-dealers. Currently, HR 3817 authorizes FINRA to oversee any investment adviser who has any legal or financial connection with a registered broker-dealer (although HFSC Chairman Frank has declared his intention to oppose this last-minute amendment to HR 3817 when presented to the full House). In contrast, by eliminating the exception for brokers or dealers under the definition of “investment adviser,” RAFSA appears to subject both advisers and broker-dealers to oversight by the SEC under the Advisers Act. In addition, as mentioned above, Title IV would require the Comptroller General to conduct a study of the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization to oversee hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds.

II. Analysis.

A. The Definition of a “Hedge Fund.”

There is no statutory definition of a “hedge fund” and, as commonly used, the term “hedge funds” refers to private funds that follow a broad range of different investment strategies and employ leverage to greatly different degrees. If RAFSA is enacted in its present form, exemptions from registration will be provided to “venture capital funds” and “private equity funds” only. As a result of these provisions, and references to “hedge funds” in RAFSA, it appears that, by process of elimination, all other Private Funds might be deemed to be “hedge funds” unless the SEC also defines that term. Because of blurring of the lines between the hedge fund, private equity fund and other private fund industries, it is likely that the SEC will have difficulty in defining these terms and, accordingly, there is the not insignificant risk that the SEC will err on the side of overinclusiveness in requiring adviser registration.

B. Expanded Jurisdiction of State Regulation of Advisers.

If enacted in its present form, investment advisers that do not advise Venture Capital Funds or Private Equity Funds, would not come within one of the other narrow exemptions from registration under the Advisers Act, and have assets under management of less than $100 million would not be eligible to register with the SEC. Such advisers would be subject to regulation under the laws of the states in which they do business and, consequently, if they do business in more than one state might incur increased costs and be subject to increased regulatory burdens.

C. Treatment of Non-U.S. Domiciled Private Funds and Advisers.

Although much of the exemption provided for “foreign private advisers” is identical in both RAFSA and HR 3818, RAFSA includes one key revision to the definition of “foreign private adviser.” HR 3818 provides that a foreign private adviser must have fewer than 15 clients in the U.S. “during the preceding 12 months.” RAFSA provides no time frame for such calculation. Theoretically, non-U.S. domiciled advisers would be unable to rely upon this exemption under RAFSA after they have an aggregate of 15 U.S. clients over an unlimited period of time, regardless of whether such clients remain active clients.

RAFSA also modifies the definition of “Private Fund” in a manner that potentially is beneficial to U.S. and non-U.S. domiciled advisers to certain non-U.S. funds. RAFSA defines a “Private Fund” to be a fund that relies upon either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and “either - (i) is organized or otherwise created under the laws of the United States or of a State; or (ii) has 10 percent or more of its outstanding securities owned by U.S. persons.” HR 3818 defines “Private Fund” to be any fund that relies upon either of those exemptions. Thus, RAFSA provides a limited exception from the definition of “Private Fund” for a fund organized in a non-U.S. jurisdiction if only a small percentage of its interests is held by “United States persons.”

Under RAFSA, non-U.S. domiciled advisers also would benefit to the same extent as U.S. domiciled advisers from the new exemptions from registration for advisers to “venture capital funds” and “private equity funds.”

 

Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, Summary and Comparison to House Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) released a discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009." Chairman Dodd has been developing the Senate version of the regulatory reform package over several months. Until recently, the Chairman was working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL). However, Chairman Dodd recently decided to proceed only with the Democrats on the Committee.

At the time of this writing, the House Financial Services Committee is completing its markup of the House regulatory reform package. With the Senate and House taking different approaches in several respects, debate on significant aspects of the regulatory reform package will continue.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Redoubling Efforts on the Financial Reform Debate: House Approaches Floor Vote, While Senate Gets Underway

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

Over the past several weeks, Congress has accelerated the financial regulatory reform effort, which will dramatically restructure the legislative and regulatory framework that governs the financial services industry. Late last week, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) announced that the Committee will complete its markup of the financial regulatory reform bills by November 20.

As the House approaches Floor consideration of the regulatory reform package, the Senate is getting underway with its parallel effort. On November 10, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT), who until recently had been working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-GA), released a discussion draft in the form of a single large bill. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

K&L Gates' Investment Management Newsletter

By: Stephen J. Crimmins, Nicholas S. Hodge, Melissa S. Holmes, Thomas F. Joyce, Beth R. Kramer, Richard A. Kirby, Mary C. Moynihan, Megan B. Munafo, Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Roger S. Wise

The Fall 2009 Edition of K&L Gates' Investment Management newsletter is offered as a timely aid in addressing the myriad regulatory issues confronting the investment management industry. Watch for future issues discussing up-to-the-minute developments and trends in the industry.

To view the complete newsletter, please click here.

Analysis of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Legislation: Top Ten Issues

By:  Stephanie C. Robinson

The Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform plan is progressing through Congress. Last week, the House Financial Services Committee voted to approve H.R. 3126, the bill that would create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency. As we reported in a prior publication, the agency would have extremely broad regulatory and enforcement authority over providers of consumer financial products and services, with the power to impose high penalties. See our Mortgage Banking & Consumer Financial Products alert, Million Dollar Baby: The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, for a complete discussion of the bill as introduced.

The committee spent the past couple of days considering and voting on dozens of proposed amendments to Chairman Barney Frank's (D-MA) original version of the bill. This alert highlights some of the issues we are being asked about most and what has changed since the bill's July 8, 2009 introduction.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Congress Builds on Obama Financial Regulatory Reform Approach, as Reform Efforts Proceed

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page and Collins R. Clark

Congress continues to move forward expeditiously on the financial services regulatory reform effort. Over the past several weeks, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), in conjunction with other key committee members, has released additional legislative proposals building on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform plan, while Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL) develop a separate regulatory reform package. At the same time, these Committees have kept up a remarkably ambitious hearing schedule. This update provides an overview of significant recent developments, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

House and Senate Take Expedited But Divergent Approaches to Financial Regulatory Reform Plan

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley and Karishma Shah Page

As Congress increasingly focuses its attention on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform (FRR) plan, the biggest change of late has to do with timing. For months, most observers have expected the House Financial Services Committee to consider the Obama proposals piecemeal, with Senate consideration following House approval. Now it is clear that the House and Senate are moving forward simultaneously, but on divergent paths. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) is championing and improving the Administration proposals, and plans to move legislation to the House Floor this fall in five basic pieces (Consumer Financial Protection Agency, OTC derivatives, systemic risk, National Banking Supervisor, investor protection). These pieces reflect the groupings of the various proposals as introduced by the Administration (e.g., “systemic risk” includes the Financial Services Oversight Council, Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies, and securitization). Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) has his own ideas in key areas, many of which go further than the Obama plan. Chairman Dodd currently plans to bring a single, omnibus reform bill to the Senate Floor. Short updates on the major FRR provisions follow:

  1. The Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) - The FSOC is one of the simplest aspects of the FRR and therefore almost certain to occur. It is basically the successor to the current President’s Working Group on Capital Markets, with a dedicated staff at the Treasury Department and the addition of the heads of the FDIC, and the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency and the National Bank Supervisor. A key question is what role the FSOC will play with respect to systemic risk. If Chairman Dodd has his way, it will assume some of the functions contemplated for the Federal Reserve in the Obama/Frank plan.
  2. Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) - As expected, serious questions have been raised about the Fed’s capacity to provide consolidated supervision of large, integrated financial institutions. There is a growing political backlash to what some view as overreaching to position the Federal Reserve as the primary systemic risk regulator. The fact that large non-depository institutions could be regulated as Tier 1 FHCs is reminding many on the Hill that they really do not trust the Federal Reserve, and that the role of a central bank may be somewhat inconsistent with such a prominent regulatory function.
  3. National Bank Supervisor - As many expected, the Administration’s effort to squeeze all federally chartered financial institutions into the bank model is falling short. The thrift charter appears likely to be preserved, industrial loan companies (ILCs) grandfathered, and credit card lenders will not be deemed banks. Given the failure to close the other Bank Holding Company Act “non-bank loopholes,” many also see no reason to abolish the exception for non-depository trust companies. Nonetheless, Chairman Dodd has said the Administration proposal does not go far enough and would like to see further consolidation among the banking regulators. Chairman Frank favors preserving the dual state and federal banking systems. The outcome is uncertain.
  4. Securitization - This remains a four-letter word for the time being. It is currently disfavored and, certainly, the days of passing along 100% of the default risk to investors are over. In short, keeping originators’ “skin in the game” remains a primary objective of Chairman Frank and other key policy makers.
  5. The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) - In the interest of co-opting business interests, Congressional Oversight Panel Chairwoman Elizabeth Warren, who first proposed the CFPA, has been thrown under the proverbial bus. Chairman Frank recently circulated an updated CFPA bill. In its current form, the bill exempts non-financial companies and jettisons requirements for “plain vanilla” products. As such, Chairman Frank has made it much harder for even some Republicans to oppose the CFPA. Indeed, banks may even conclude that subjecting their competitors (e.g., non-depository mortgage originators, payday lenders, etc.) to the same regulatory burdens they have faced for years might be worthwhile after all. 
  6. Private Fund Investment Advisor Registration Act - As currently drafted, the Obama plan would require the registration and regulation of virtually all private fund managers, including hedge funds, private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, and even family investment pools. Much of the alternative fund industry seems to have embraced “reform” in hopes of being favorably positioned in the rulemaking process. Alas, such a strategy failed convincingly in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley.
  7. Resolution authority - There has been much discussion about how to unwind systemically significant failing institutions. Chairman Frank has referred to such powers as a “death sentence.” The FDIC resolution powers regarding banks will be expanded, probably extended to Treasury, and the SEC will be given similar responsibility with regard to the regulated entities within its purview. As an aside, requiring Treasury to sign off on Federal Reserve uses of authority under FRA section 13(3) is (discount) window dressing, since Treasury is de facto fulfilling that role now.
  8. OTC derivatives - In the wake of AIG and its credit default swaps, there is a clear consensus around centralized clearing of all derivatives, and a majority preference for exchange trading of standardized contracts. On August 11, the Administration introduced its OTC derivatives proposal as the “final piece” of its legislative proposals. However, there are a number of competing proposals, including S. 1691, which was recently introduced by Senate Securities Subcommittee Chairman Jack Reed (D-RI). All of these proposals would provide strong regulation of all major participants in the OTC derivative markets, and would create new anti-fraud and market manipulation enforcement powers.
  9. Credit rating agencies - House Financial Services Capital Markets Subcommittee Chairman Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) recently circulated a discussion draft that builds on the Obama proposal to have the SEC comprehensively regulate Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs), and would impose information sharing requirements, as well as “collective liability” on the entire industry for a monetary judgment against any NRSRO relating to a credit rating. It is difficult to imagine that this provision will survive, but it clearly reflects a great deal of consternation about the industry (see pp. 30-31).
  10. Executive compensation - Shareholder say-on-pay proxy votes and compensation committee independence are soon to become part of the ever-expanding corporate governance montage.
  11. Insurance - While the insurance industry appears to have escaped the CFPA, there will be a new Office of National Insurance at Treasury that will aggregate state insurance data. Together with the FSOC, and Tier 1 FHC supervision by the Fed, the insurance industry may end up wishing it had reached consensus on a federal charter. Stay tuned for more in the next Congress.

Finally, with both the House and Senate moving forward quickly, the timetable for successfully advocating changes in much of the legislation will likely be truncated. Ultimately, the differences between the House and Senate versions will be reconciled in conference committee, a process largely shielded from public scrutiny (or influence). Please see the K&L Gates alert Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort for a comprehensive overview of the Obama plan. In addition, detailed analysis on many of the Obama proposals may be found on http://www.globalfinancialmarketwatch.com/.

Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort

By: Diane E. Ambler, Philip M. Cedar, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Vanessa C. Edwards, Edward G. Eisert, David H. Jones, Steven M. KaplanSean P. Mahoney, J. Matthew Mangan, Philip J. Morgan, Mary C. Moynihan, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Clair E. Pagnano, Lawrence B. Patent, Karishma Shah Page

Since June 17, 2009, when the Obama Administration unveiled its financial regulatory reform plan, there has been a flurry of executive branch and legislative branch activity.  The frenetic pace of the reform effort is expected to resume in the fall, as Congress works to resolve the many highly controversial issues presented by the plan.  The traditional August Congressional recess now underway provides an opportunity to take stock of this historic capital markets reform effort.  This alert provides an overview of the most significant developments so far, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

A New Playing Field for the Banking Industry: the National Banking Supervisor and Systemic Risk

By: Rebecca H. Laird, Edward G. Eisert, Stanley V. Ragalevsky, Sean P. Mahoney, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Collins R. Clark

On July 22 and 23, 2009, the U.S. Department of Treasury released nine legislative proposals affecting banking institutions and their holding companies.  The various parts of this proposed legislation interact in a manner that, if enacted, will change the banking industry’s playing field in unprecedented ways.  These changes aim to end regulatory arbitrage and minimize systemic risk.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

OTC Derivatives Legislation Continues to Take Form

By: Gordon F. Peery, Lawrence B. Patent, Anthony R.G. Nolan

 Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives in late July 2009 gave the financial services industry a glimpse of legislative initiatives that, if enacted into law, may dramatically transform the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market. Congress will debate the aggressive legislative initiatives detailed in this Alert soon after it reconvenes following its August recess. The initiatives go hand-in-hand with the rest of the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform mandates. In order to understand the importance of the July 2009 initiatives, it is first necessary to briefly review industry, regulatory and legislative efforts to reform the OTC derivatives market earlier this year.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Congress Launches Capital Markets Reforms

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

In the days before adjourning for the week-long Memorial Day Recess, Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed into law three significant pieces of financial services legislation, kicking off what is likely to be the beginning of a comprehensive capital markets reform effort. This piecemeal yet swift approach suggests the manner in which Congress may proceed with financial services reforms moving forward.

Congress Passes Bills on Fraud, Credit Cards, and Mortgages

  • Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act. On May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law S. 386, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA; P.L. 111-21). The legislation, which the Senate approved on May 14 by a voice vote and the House passed on May 18 by a 338-52 vote, provides federal authorities with enhanced funding and expanded powers over a broad range of financial crimes (see K&L Gates Alert Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009). In addition, FERA establishes an independent Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, modeled after the Pecora Commission of the 1930s (see below and K&L Gates Alert A Congressional Investigation of Wall Street Looms).
  • Helping Families Save Their Homes Act. On the same day, President Obama signed into law S. 896, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-22). The bill, which was passed with broad bipartisan support in both the House and the Senate on May 19, enhances the Hope for Homeowners Program and provides the Federal Housing Administration with the authority to engage in foreclosure mitigation programs (for more information about other mortgage-related provisions in the bill, see K&L Gates Alert New Disclosure Obligation Imposed on Assignees ). In addition, the legislation also increases FDIC and National Credit Union Administration borrowing authority and extends the increased $250,000 deposit insurance limit to 2013.  
  • Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act. The same week, Congress passed and the President signed H.R. 627, the Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-24). The legislation, which was also passed with significant bipartisan support in both chambers, bans certain credit card company practices including double-cycle billing and late fees on issuer delayed crediting of payments, prohibits certain changes in interest rates, and requires expanded disclosure of credit card terms and agreements.
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Financial Stability Plan Begins to Take Shape

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

On February 10, 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner outlined the Obama Administration’s plan to address the financial crisis.  The Financial Stability Plan (FSP) represents a shift from the previous Administration’s implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which focused largely on capital injections into financial institutions under the Capital Purchase Plan (CPP).  In addition to continuing capital injections, the FSP expands efforts to increase consumer and small business lending, will create a public-private investment fund to purchase toxic assets from banks, and includes a housing support and foreclosure mitigation component. 

Capital Assistance Program
The Treasury Department will continue to make TARP equity investments in certain financial institutions through the Capital Assistance Program (CAP).  Under CAP, the 19 largest banking institutions with assets over $100 billion will be required to participate in a coordinated supervisory forward-looking capital assessment (i.e., a “stress test”) to determine whether the firm has the capital necessary to continue lending and to absorb future losses.  If Treasury determines that a firm has inadequate capital, it will have six months to raise it privately, and if it does not succeed, it will be compelled to take CAP funds.  Banking institutions with consolidated assets of less than $100 billion will also be eligible for CAP funds.  Eligibility is consistent with the criteria and process established for CPP. 

Capital provided under CAP will be in the form of cumulative mandatorily convertible preferred stock and will carry a nine percent dividend yield.  The security will be convertible into common equity, at the issuer’s option, at a ten percent discount to the price prevailing prior to February 9, 2009; however, the security will automatically be converted into common equity if it has not been redeemed or converted after seven years.  Treasury will place its capital investments in a newly created entity, the Financial Stability Trust, and will publicly disclose its CAP investments on the Internet.  At this time, CAP is only available to publicly traded qualifying financial institutions.  The deadline for applying is May 25, 2009.

Consumer and Small Business Lending
The FSP aims to increase consumer and small business lending through a massive expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) from $200 billion to $1 trillion.  The Treasury will provide $100 billion in TARP funds to backstop the Federal Reserve loan facility. 

Under TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) will provide non-recourse funding to eligible borrowers owning eligible collateral.  Eligible collateral includes certain asset-backed securities (ABS) that have at least two AAA ratings and that have auto loans, student loans, credit card loans, or small business loans as the underlying credit exposure.  The minimum TALF loan amount is $10 million, and the loan will have a three-year term and be subject to either a fixed or a floating interest rate.  In addition, the TALF loans will be subject to haircuts ranging from five to 16 percent, depending on the category of the ABS offered as collateral.  For additional details on TALF, see K&L Gates Newsstand Alerts The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility in Sharper Focus and The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Takes Form.  The initial round of loans will be awarded on March 25, 2009; TALF terms and conditions may be modified for subsequent rounds.  The Federal Reserve has indicated that ABS backed by rental, commercial, and government vehicle fleet leases and ABS backed by small ticket equipment, heavy equipment, and agricultural equipment loans and leases might be made eligible for the April funding of the TALF.

In addition, Treasury and the Small Business Administration (SBA) will launch the Small Business and Community Lending Initiative.  Although details have not yet been announced, initial plans indicate that the Initiative will finance the purchase of AAA-rated SBA loans in an effort to increase liquidity in secondary markets for small business loans and increase SBA loan guarantees up to 90 percent.

Public-Private Investment Fund
The FSP will also create a much-anticipated new Public-Private Investment Fund (Fund) to purchase toxic assets from banking institutions.  The Fund would make these purchases by providing government capital and financing to leverage purchases by private capital.  In addition, the Fund would rely on private sector buyers to price the value of the assets.  The initial scale of the Fund will be $500 billion, but may be expanded up to $1 trillion.  Treasury is expected to release details on the operation of the Fund in the near future.

Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
The FSP also includes a housing component, the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (Plan).  The first pillar of the Plan will support borrowers who have a solid payment history but are unable to refinance their mortgages because their current loan-to-value ratios are above 80 percent due to a loss in home value.  The program would make 4 to 5 million of these homeowners eligible to refinance their existing Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac mortgages at today’s low interest rates.  

The second pillar of the Plan, the $75 billion Homeowner Stability Initiative, creates a mortgage modification program for at-risk homeowners that have loans on owner-occupied properties with unpaid balances up to $729,750.  Loan servicers must enter into a program agreement with Treasury in order to participate.  Participating loan servicers must then apply a net present value (NPV) test on each loan at risk of imminent default or at least 60 days delinquent, unless explicitly prohibited by contract.  If the NPV of the expected cash flow is greater under a modification scenario, the servicer must modify the loan such that the monthly payment is no more than 31 percent of the borrower’s gross monthly income.  In exchange for the modification, the government will:

  • Subsidize the lender or investor for the cost of reducing monthly payments from 38 to 31 percent of gross monthly income;
  • Provide servicers with a $1,000 payment for each modification and an additional $1,000 per year for loans that continue to perform; and
  • Provide payments of $1,500 to lenders or investors and $500 to servicers for modifications made to borrowers that are current on their payments.

Finally, Treasury will increase funding to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through the purchase of preferred stock.  In order to fund this commitment, Treasury will use $200 billion made available under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act.

Additional Conditions
Increasingly, government assistance comes with stricter terms and conditions.  Firms receiving assistance from the FSP will be subject to the following conditions:

  • Recipients will be required to submit lending plans and monthly lending reports.  This information will be publicly disclosed on the website financialstability.gov.
  • Recipients will be required to commit to participating in mortgage foreclosure mitigation programs consistent with Treasury guidelines.
  • Recipients will be restricted from paying quarterly common dividend payments, repurchasing privately-held shares, and pursuing acquisitions until the government’s investment is repaid.
  • Recipients must comply with Treasury’s guidelines on executive compensation, “say on pay” shareholder votes, and luxury purchase disclosure.
  • Recipients are prohibited from certain lobbying activities.

The FSP initiatives will continue to take shape in the coming months as details are released.  The K&L Gates public policy group is closely monitoring these developments on behalf of the firm’s policy clients.

Government Efforts to Prevent Mortgage Foreclosures: Modifications, Refinancings and Cram Downs

By: Laurence E. PlattKerri M. Smith

Using a trio of tools to triage those whom it realistically can seek to help, the federal government has stepped up its efforts to fight residential mortgage foreclosures.   Announcement of the details of the Obama Administration’s Making Home Affordable Program (“the Plan”) on March 4, 2009, makes clear that the federal government will rely on loan modifications, refinancings and cram downs to try to keep borrowers in their homes.  In addition, the recent passage of H.R. 1106, Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (“H.R. 1106” or “the Bill”), by the House of Representatives, bolsters the Plan’s agenda by allowing bankruptcy judges unilaterally to modify mortgage loans, and providing a safe harbor against investor liability for servicers that make loan modifications subject to the Plan. 

While most elements of the Administration’s Plan can proceed without Congressional approval, the House Bill must be passed by the Senate to become law.  No one can tell in advance whether these anti-foreclosure lifelines will work in an increasingly deteriorating economy.  While the individual consumer who ultimately saves his or her home from foreclosure will appreciate the effort, many investors and unemployed borrowers are less hopeful about these measures.

To view our complete alert online, click here.

CFTC Nominee Calls for Increased Regulation of Derivatives

By: Lawrence B. Patent

Introduction
Gary Gensler, President Obama’s nominee for Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), testified at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (the “Agriculture Committee”) on February 25, 2009; the Agriculture Committee approved his nomination on March 16.  In his opening statement, he mentioned four priorities that he would pursue if confirmed by the full Senate:  (1) vigorous enforcement to prevent fraud and manipulation in futures and options markets; (2) position limits across all markets and platforms where there is a finite supply of the underlying commodity; (3) generally requiring the clearing and exchange trading of derivative instruments, and direct regulation of derivatives dealers; and (4) working with regulators around the globe to protect Americans impacted by world financial markets.  The first and last of these goals are often cited by nominees to federal regulatory positions, and they are to be expected.  The remainder of this article will focus upon his other goals, those concerning position limits and enhanced regulation of derivatives, which represent a departure from the current regulatory framework yet are in keeping with recent legislative initiatives.

Trading and Clearing of Derivatives
Mr. Gensler’s statements at his confirmation hearing are consistent with some of the recent bills before Congress addressing regulation of derivatives and the energy markets.   Mr. Gensler did acknowledge that his current views may not be consistent with positions that he took as a senior official in the Treasury Department under President Clinton in the late 1990s, leading up to the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).  The CFMA provided greater legal certainty for trading in financial and energy swaps by exempting those instruments (and certain related markets) from regulation by the CFTC or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Mr. Gensler stated that his views have since “evolved” and that there should have been more aggressive regulation of derivatives to protect the American public.  Thus, Mr. Gensler’s current views are generally compatible with the regulatory direction of the provisions of H.R. 977, the “Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009,” addressing over-the-counter (“OTC”) commodity derivatives.  That bill was approved by voice vote of the House Committee on Agriculture on February 12, 2009 (and the subject of a prior K&L Gates Alert).  H.R. 977 would generally require the clearing of all swap transactions, but would leave open the possibility of reporting certain swap transactions to the CFTC if a clearing organization did not want to clear them. 

S. 272, the “Derivatives Integrity Act of 2009,” which was introduced by Senator Harkin (D-Iowa) on January 15, 2009, goes beyond H.R. 977’s requirement for clearing to require that all swaps be traded exclusively on CFTC-regulated exchanges.  That provision would effectively eliminate all OTC transactions in commodity derivatives.  Senator Harkin, who is Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, tried to press Mr. Gensler during the confirmation hearing to support the thrust of his bill.  Although Mr. Gensler indicated that he generally supported the concept of the greater transparency that would be provided by exchange trading and clearing of swaps, he resisted committing to support exchange trading of all swaps with no exceptions.  Mr. Gensler recognized that there could be cases where customized transactions would not fit readily into an exchange-traded, clearinghouse framework, and exceptions might be necessary to accommodate such instruments.  Senator Harkin expressed the view that it would be too easy to vary a particular term of a contract so that it could be labeled as “customized” rather than standardized and thereby permit such instruments to evade the exchange-trading requirement.

Regulation of Financial Swap Dealers
Mr. Gensler did express support for another facet of S. 272 -- the regulation of financial swap dealers (H.R. 977 does not provide for such regulation).  Mr. Gensler stated that the entities involved in financial swap transactions needed to be subject to minimum financial, business conduct and reporting requirements.  He stated that it was not enough for other affiliates of a swap dealer or its corporate parent holding company to be subject to regulation by the CFTC or the SEC; rather, in his view, the entity that is a party to financial swap transactions must itself be subject to minimum financial, business conduct and reporting requirements.  Mr. Gensler indicated that the new requirements would apply to the 15 or 20 swap dealers that are involved in the vast majority of such transactions.  Such a policy reversal would certainly be a large step away from the exemptive framework for swaps under the CFMA.

Position Limits
Mr. Gensler also indicated his support for H.R. 977’s objective of establishing position limits for physically deliverable commodities that have a finite supply.  Part of the original purpose of H.R. 977 when it was introduced last year was to impose speculative limits on energy-related futures and options, because trading in those products has been blamed by many as contributing heavily to the run-up in gasoline prices last summer (although that view is disputed by the CFTC’s Office of Chief Economist and several other studies).  In addition, Mr. Gensler expressed support for the regulation of OTC trading of energy and metals in the same manner as agricultural swaps.  Agricultural swaps currently trade in accordance with CFTC regulations that date back almost 20 years, rather than pursuant to statutory exemptions, which in the case of energy and metals can fully exclude them from the reach of the CFTC.  Accordingly, regulating OTC trading in energy and metals in the same manner as agricultural commodities would confer more power to the CFTC to impose restrictions on such trading.  It appears that Mr. Gensler would not slow down efforts to increase the regulatory scrutiny of energy derivatives.

Relief Requests
Legislation regulating derivatives and imposing new speculative limits will likely take several months to finalize.  Mr. Gensler also noted during his testimony two areas of CFTC procedures that he would want to review that may not require any additional legislative action (although H.R. 977 would mandate that CFTC conduct such a review).  Mr. Gensler indicated that he wants to review any exemptions granted from hedging restrictions and position limits in the past 20 years by the CFTC, and that he also wants to review the “no-action” letter process, which is used, among other purposes, to grant exemptions for foreign energy markets.  Mr. Gensler indicated that some decisions on requests for no-action relief could remain at the staff level, but he implied that certain matters previously handled by staff should be considered by the Commissioners.  The overall message from Mr. Gensler is clear:  his regime as Chairman of the CFTC will tend towards greater regulation and stricter scrutiny of requests for exemption or no-action relief.

Compliance with TARP Executive Compensation Restrictions Subject to SEC Enforcement

By: Brian A. Ochs

A little-noticed recent amendment to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §5221 (“EESA”), may provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with a prominent role in enforcing the executive compensation and corporate governance requirements under the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).  The amendment, which was signed into law on February 17 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “Recovery Act”) (Pub. L. No. 111-5), requires the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or their equivalents) of any public company that receives TARP funds to certify compliance with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance restrictions as part of the company’s annual SEC filing.  Much like the required officer certifications regarding internal controls and disclosure controls that have been part of the legal landscape since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the effect of the EESA certification requirement is to focus personal responsibility for EESA compliance on CEOs and CFOs, with the potential for securities fraud or other charges to be brought by the SEC in the event of false certifications.

EESA and the Treasury Department’s Interim Rules on Executive Compensation
As originally enacted, section 111(b) of EESA directed that any financial institution that sells troubled assets to the Treasury Department must meet certain standards of executive compensation and corporate governance.  These standards included: (1) eliminating incentives for senior executives to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the financial value of the institution; (2) a “clawback” provision for the recovery by the institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on financial statements or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and (3) a prohibition on “golden parachute” payments to senior executive officers.  (Generally, “senior executives” means the five highest paid officers of the company.)

In October 2008 and January 2009, the Treasury Department announced rules to implement the executive compensation requirements of section 111 for participants in the TARP Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”).   (The Treasury Department separately provided guidance for certain other TARP programs.)  Among other things, the January rule required the principal executive officer of each participating financial institution to certify to TARP’s Chief Compliance Officer that the institution was in compliance with the executive compensation requirements set forth in EESA.  The Treasury Department further noted in the January rule that a false certification could subject the certifier to federal criminal penalties for false statements under 18 U.S.C. §1001.  See CPP Executive Compensation Final Rule (Jan. 16, 2009). 

The Recovery Act Amendments
The Recovery Act (Section 7001) expanded the significance of these provisions in several important respects.  First, it directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose new and expanded executive compensation and corporate governance standards on all recipients of TARP funds.   In addition to the restrictions found in the original section 111, these standards must bar payment of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation during the period that a TARP obligation is outstanding (except for payments made in restricted stock comprising no more than one-third of the individual’s total compensation, and not fully vesting during the period that the obligation is outstanding), and must prohibit any compensation plan that would encourage earnings manipulation.  The number of employees to which the new compensation limitations apply varies by provision, in many cases going beyond the original five “senior executive officers” to as many as the next 20 most highly compensated officers.  In addition, the Recovery Act amendments require SEC registrants that receive TARP funds to establish a board compensation committee, comprised entirely of independent directors, and also require boards of directors to implement company-wide policies regarding excessive or luxury expenditures.

Section 7001 of the Recovery Act also requires the CEO and CFO (or their equivalents) of each recipient of TARP funds that has publicly traded securities to “provide a written certification of compliance by the TARP recipient with the requirements of this section … together with annual filings required under the securities laws….”  (Certifications are to be provided to the Secretary of the Treasury if the entity receiving TARP funds is not a publicly traded company.)  The SEC has determined that it will not give effect to the certification requirement until the Secretary of the Treasury establishes standards to implement section 7001 of the Recovery Act.  This approach follows the views expressed by Senator Christopher Dodd, the author of the executive compensation provisions of the Recovery Act, in a February 20 letter to SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro.

Analysis
The requirement that CEO and CFO certifications be filed with a TARP recipient’s annual report to the SEC will unambiguously subject public companies that receive TARP funds and their executives to SEC scrutiny and potential enforcement action for failure to comply with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance requirements.  This is because any material false statement in an SEC filing may be charged as a securities fraud or other securities violation, depending on the actor’s level of intent.  In the current environment, regulators are likely to view a certification that an entity receiving TARP funds is in compliance with requirements concerning executive compensation and corporate governance as being material to investors.  In particularly egregious cases, criminal prosecution for securities fraud could also result.

Further, because the CEO and CFO will each be considered the “maker” of statements in the EESA certifications, these executives could be exposed to personal liability under the securities laws for compliance failures that result in false certifications.  Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most companies have instituted formal procedures such as compliance checklists, sub-certifications by managers with line responsibilities, and disclosure committee reviews, to support the CEO and CFO certifications required by that Act.  Entities that receive TARP funds will need to consider implementing similar structured processes to support the CEO’s and CFO’s annual certifications under EESA.
 

Damages Theories for Financial Institutions Injured by Changes in Government Regulation

By: David T. CaseBrendon P. Fowler 

With the nearly unparalleled upheaval in world financial markets and the resulting impact on the nation’s financial institutions, many entities have either gone bankrupt or become subject to increasing levels of Government intervention, regulation, and oversight.   The Government also continues to consider actions to address “toxic” assets and to stimulate financial activity.  While Government action may ultimately lead the way to financial recovery for the broad economy, in some instances the Government may take actions, such as changing federal regulatory schemes and related contracts, that nonetheless inflict harm on individual companies.  In those situations, developments in a series of cases relating to an earlier financial crisis may provide guidance in navigating the risks of increased Government regulation and oversight, and the measure of any damages that might be recovered. 

During the Great Depression, forty percent of the nation’s home mortgages went into default, and 1,700 of the nation’s approximately 12,000 savings institutions failed.   This led to significant Government oversight of the savings and loan, or "thrift" industry, in the form of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as well as the passage of numerous laws such as the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933.  This regulatory regime remained in place until the financial crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when, in order to retain deposits, thrifts were compelled to offer interest rates to depositors that exceeded the stream of income from the thrifts’ long-term, low-rate mortgages.  Over 400 thrift institutions failed by 1983, and by the mid-1980s, it became clear that Government regulatory efforts to resolve the crisis were not succeeding.  As a result, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), which resulted in regulations that imposed more stringent capital standards on thrifts.  Many thrifts, particularly ones that had acquired failed thrifts under agreements with the Government, were immediately thrown out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements and became subject to seizure by thrift regulators. 

A number of thrifts adversely affected by the new regulations sued the Government, alleging that the passage of FIRREA breached the contracts under which the thrifts had previously agreed to acquire other failed institutions.  In United States v. Winstar Corporation, 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996), the Supreme Court held that where the Government entered into contracts with regulated financial institutions, promising to provide particular regulatory treatment in exchange for the assumption of liabilities, the risk of regulatory change fell to the Government, even though Congress subsequently changed the law and barred the Government from honoring its agreements.  Following this ruling, the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed a series of cases where the allegations were that the Government had indeed breached its contractual obligations to various thrifts through the passage of FIRREA.  This group of cases, which is often denoted as the “Winstar-related cases,” may provide significant guidance for any cases that derive from the present crisis.

As a general matter, damages in the Winstar-related cases are based on one of three damages theories:   expectancy damages, reliance damages, or restitution damages. 

Expectancy, or “lost profit” damages, protect a bank’s expectation interest by seeking to put that institution in as good a position as it would have been had the institution’s contract with the Government been fully performed, without also providing plaintiff with a windfall.   If successful, this theory for recovery typically produces the largest quantum of damages for an injured bank, but lost profits have historically been difficult to prove and recover in the Winstar-related context.  Nevertheless, a recent Winstar-related decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) upheld the trial court’s acceptance of a lost profits theory that established, by way of expert testimony and models, that the Government’s implementation of FIRREA caused lost profit damages to the affected thrift.  See First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Rochester v. United States, 290 Fed. Appx. 349, 2008 WL 3822567 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The injured thrift established with reasonable certainty its lost profits of $85 million to the satisfaction of the courts, and the Federal Circuit upheld the trial court’s reliance on plaintiff’s damages expert, and the projections of the growth (and profits) the thrift would have experienced absent the Government breach.  Id. at 357.

Reliance damages, often sought or pled in the alternative to expectation damages, are intended to address harm resulting from the thrift’s change of position in reliance on its contract with the Government.   The underlying principle in reliance damages is that a party who relies on another party’s contractual promise is entitled to damages for any losses actually sustained as a result of the breach of that promise.  Glendale Federal Bank v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In Glendale, the Federal Circuit affirmed the use of a reliance damage calculation because “for purposes of measuring the losses sustained … as a result of the Government’s breach, reliance damages provide a firmer and more rational basis” than the alternative theories argued by the parties in that case.  Id. at 1383.  Reliance damages can include both pre- and post-breach activities and costs by the thrift, and have been described as the “ideal” theory for “wounded bank” damages.  Glendale Federal Bank v. United States, 378 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding trial court’s award of $381 million).

Restitution damages may be sought when proof of lost profits or reliance damages fails.  The idea behind restitution is to restore the non-breaching party to the position he would have been in had there never been a contract to breach.  Specifically, a restitution theory seeks to recover any benefit that the non-breaching party may have given to the breaching party, but such damages should not be awarded if the award would result in a windfall to the non-breaching party.  See Southwest Investment Co., Inv. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 182, 197 (Fed. Cl. 2004).  Accordingly, an institution must carefully consider whether benefits conferred on the Government might nonetheless be offset fully by benefits received from the Government, as “the non-breaching party is not entitled, through the award of damages, to achieve a position superior to the one it would reasonably have occupied had the breach not occurred.”  Glendale Federal Bank v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In addition, restitution can be a challenging theory to pursue, for while a party may often be able to show benefits given to the Government, establishing an actual dollar value conferred can be difficult.  Id. at 1382 (under theory that thrift assumed risk and relieved Government of liabilities for a period of time in which the Government was able to deal with other failing thrifts, the value of Government’s time was more than zero but there is no proof of what in fact it was worth).  Where a specific dollar amount is clearly established, however, restitution may be awarded.  See 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 731, 744 (Fed. Cl. 2007).

In sum, the numerous Winstar-related decisions provide a body of law for institutions faced with a rapidly changing bank regulatory environment and possible breaches by the Government with respect to current contracts.  Familiarity with the types of damages theories and models employed by past thrift litigants against the Government may help today’s institutions develop a viable remedy if they are harmed by Government action.

UK Banking Stabilisation Measures -- January 2009 Update

By: Claudia HarrisonKatie Hillier

1. Introduction
 

Since the introduction of the stabilisation measures we reported in the previous edition of this newsletter, the global economic downturn has intensified, prompting the UK government to announce further efforts to combat financial instability and support economic recovery.  The new measures both extend and supplement the Special Liquidity Scheme, the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme and the Credit Guarantee Scheme described in the previous edition.  They do not have any immediate impact upon the draft legislation we reported previously.

2. Updates on Existing measures

2.1 Special Liquidity Scheme ("SLS") and Discount Window Facility
Upon the closure of the SLS at the end of this month, an alternative source of long-term liquidity will be provided under the discount window facility.  This is an existing facility provided by the Bank of England ("BoE") which ordinarily provides liquidity for periods not longer than 30 days and operates on similar principles to the SLS.  Under the new proposals, maturity periods of one year will be available with the aim of allowing banks to access longer-term liquidity support on demand.  The 30-day facility will continue to be available.

2.2 Credit Guarantee Scheme ("CGS")
The deadline for issuing debt to be guaranteed by this scheme is extended from 9 April 2009 to 31 December 2009.  All other aspects of the scheme will remain the same.

2.3 Bank Recapitalisation Scheme
Under this scheme, the UK government invested approximately £20bn in the Royal Bank of Scotland plc ("RBS").  The government is converting the £5bn of this stake that are held in preference shares into ordinary shares, thereby increasing its common holdings from 58% to nearly 70%.  This conversion will reduce by approximately £6bn the amount of preference dividends that RBS is required to pay each year to the UK government.  In return, RBS has committed to maintaining lending to large corporations, small businesses and homeowners at 2007 levels and to increase its lending activities by £6bn over the next year.  These commitments reflect the government's concern to protect the wider economy from the underlying lack of credit in the financial sector.

2.4 Financial Services Authority ("FSA") on Capital Ratios
The FSA has given additional guidance on its expectations regarding capital ratios for banks.  No new requirements are currently being proposed, as the FSA considers that the recent recapitalisation exercise undertaken by certain banks has created a sufficient capital buffer to withstand losses and facilitate new lending.  The guidance introduces the concept of counter-cyclical measures so that during good years banks build a capital 'buffer' on which they can draw in harder times.  The Basel Committee is now working to develop this principle and it is possible that the regulatory framework may be adapted in the longer term.

2.5 Northern Rock
There has been concern that the timetable set by the government for Northern Rock to repay its loans was requiring it to reduce its mortgage lending too quickly.  This reduction was working against the government's desire to expand mortgage lending, and so the deadlines for repayment by Northern Rock have been extended.

3. New Measures

3.1 Additional credit guarantee scheme
As well as extending the deadline of the CGS, the government has proposed a new guarantee scheme, commencing in April 2009, for certain triple-A rated asset-backed securities.  Eligible securities may be backed by mortgages and corporate/consumer debt and must have transparent structures.  Eligibility for institutions will be by the same criteria as the CGS.  Further details on this proposal are expected in the next few months.

The rationale for this scheme is, in part, the need to maintain banks' mortgage lending capacity.  Typically, mortgage-backed securities have supported a third of mortgage lending in the UK, and the government hopes that a guarantee scheme which supports the market in these securities will help to maintain banks' capacity for such lending activity. 

3.2 Asset Purchase Facility
The UK government is allocating a fund of £50bn to be used by the BoE to purchase certain high-quality private sector assets, including corporate bonds, syndicated loans and asset-backed securities.  The programme will come into effect from 2 February 2009, and purchases will be funded by the issue of Treasury bills.  The BoE will be authorised to use this facility for monetary policy purposes such as meeting the inflation target.  Further details of how this facility will operate are expected before the end of January.

3.3 Asset Protection Scheme ("APS")
The UK government, for a fee, will provide banks with insurance against future credit losses on their riskiest assets.  The government will assess the likely performance of assets under consideration in order to set the level of probable loss and the fee to be charged.  The APS will then cover a substantial part of any loss sustained over and above this probable loss, i.e., the exceptional loss.  In addition, in order to incentivise participating institutions to minimise their losses, the institution will also have to bear a proportion (for example, 10%) of the exceptional loss.  The scheme is available to UK-incorporated authorised deposit takers with more than £25bn of eligible assets.  It intends to target the assets most affected by current economic conditions with a view to reducing uncertainty about the value of such assets.  In order to support wider economic recovery, participants will have to provide a commitment to the government to maintain lending to creditworthy borrowers in a commercial manner.  Further details of the scheme are expected to be issued by the end of February.

4. Conclusion
The theme running through this latest package of measures is an effort to limit the effect of the financial crisis on the wider economy.  In the aftermath of the collapse of a number of high street retailers, and as monthly unemployment increases reach levels last seen in 1991, this objective is understandable.  However, it remains to be seen whether on the high street are already beyond the reach of such protection.

Efforts to Stem the Financial Crisis Likely to be Followed by Significant Reform of Financial Services Regulation

By:  Daniel F. C. Crowley, Patrick G. Heck

Recent Policy Responses
The recent public policy responses to the credit crisis have been geared toward restoring liquidity in the credit markets, enhancing transparency, and prohibiting certain trading practices.   Foremost among these measures has been H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008   (“EESA” or “the Act”), in response to the Department of the Treasury’s (“Treasury”) request for authority to spend up to $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets.  The Act is intended to improve the capital positions of financial institutions and allow them to once again extend credit.  Other stop-gap measures by the regulatory agencies, as discussed elsewhere in this newsletter, have been geared toward reducing volatility and restoring orderly markets.

EESA, which was passed by the House and signed by President Bush on Friday, October 3, 2008, authorizes up to $700 billion for the Treasury for a troubled asset relief program (TARP) to purchase, and a Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund to insure, illiquid financial instruments. The Act allows Treasury to immediately use $250 billion, with an additional $100 billion if the president certifies such a need. The president would have to provide a written request for the remaining $350 billion, which could be subject to expedited congressional approval.

The Act

  • Creates the Financial Stability Oversight Board, comprised of the Fed Chairman, the Secretaries of Treasury and HUD, the FHFA Director, and the SEC Chairman.
  • Creates various reporting and oversight requirements.
  • Waives FAR and provides for streamlined contracting procedures.
  • Establishes a Congressional Oversight Panel in the legislative branch to “review the current state of the financial markets and the regulatory system.”
  • Places limits on senior executive compensation for some participating financial institutions.
  • Requires Treasury to develop programs to reduce foreclosures and encourage lenders to modify mortgage terms.
  • Prohibits use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for future money market guarantee programs.
  • Authorizes the SEC to suspend mark-to-market accounting (FAS 157).
  • Increases the federal budget debt ceiling to $11.315 trillion.
  • Temporarily increases the FDIC insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000.

The text of the Act and a section-by-section analysis may be found on the House Financial Services Committee website: http://financialservices.house.gov/.  

EESA Tax Provisions
EESA also contains a number of important tax provisions that have not received a great deal of attention. There are three tax provisions related to the rescue plan:

  1. Extension of exclusion of income from discharge of qualified principal residence indebtedness.  Generally, when homeowners have parts of their mortgages forgiven, they immediately owe income taxes on the amount of indebtedness forgiven.   To prevent homeowners from facing higher tax bills, the housing relief bill passed by Congress earlier this year allowed homeowners caught up in the mortgage crisis to avoid paying tax on forgiven mortgage debts through 2009.  EESA will extend through 2012 the housing bill provision that forgives income from the cancellation of indebtedness.  The proposal does not extend the relief to home equity loans.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $362 million over ten years. 

     
  2. Gain or loss from sale or exchange of certain preferred stock.  Federal law limits the allowable investments for banks, and many community banks therefore invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock – which became worthless when the government bailed out those companies.  EESA includes a proposal to allow financial institutions or financial institution holding companies to treat their Fannie and Freddie losses as ordinary losses. Applying to any preferred stock that was owned on September 6, 2008 or sold between January 1 and September 6, 2008, this provision will allow banks to claim the book benefit of the loss on their tax returns, therefore reducing the need to obtain additional capital from the FDIC or investors.  Policy makers believe that this proposal should also prevent some community banks from becoming insolvent.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $3.045 billion over ten years, with $2.7 billion of the cost occurring in 2009. 

     
  3. Special rules for tax treatment of executive compensation of employers participating in the troubled assets relief program.  The EESA contains non-tax measures aimed at limiting executive compensation and “golden parachute” severance packages overall for companies and executives participating in the buyout.  Additionally, EESA modifies the tax treatment of executive compensation and severance packages.  The deductibility of executive compensation for companies participating in the troubled asset relief program will be cut in half – from the $1 million level in current law – to $500,000.  Performance-based compensation is included in the $500,000 limitation.  Companies will also lose deductions currently available for excessively large severance packages.  Executives receiving severance packages will continue to face a 20 percent excise tax on payments once they reach an excessive threshold, and that tax will now be due if the executive leaves for reasons other than a standard retirement for which they are eligible – not just if the company changes hands, as in current law.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the amount of revenue gain from these provisions is indeterminate as it will depend on how the underlying troubled asset program is implemented.     

In addition, the Act extends dozens of expired or expiring tax provisions (the so-called “tax extender package”), including the Alternative Minimum Tax and disaster relief, energy tax incentives and a host of other provisions.  Several of these provisions might be of interest to the financial services community.  For example, the package includes: 1) broker reporting of a customer’s basis in securities transactions; 2) an extension of tax-free distributions from IRAs to certain public charities through 2009; 3) an extension of the exception under Subpart F for active financing income through 2009; 4) an extension of the look-through treatment of payments between related CFCs under foreign personal holding company income rules; and 5) the modification of the tax treatment of offshore nonqualified deferred compensation for certain tax indifferent parties.  The package does not include a further delay in the implementation of the worldwide interest allocation rules.

Finally, in addition to the various tax provisions listed above, the package contains a provision that would lower the tax preparer standard for undisclosed positions from “more likely than not” to “substantial authority” (the same standard that currently applies to taxpayers) with the exception for tax shelters (reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies). 

The Long View
In the slightly longer term, these unprecedented market events will likely lead to the most significant revisions to the legal and regulatory framework for financial services since the Great Depression. 

  • Revamping the structure of financial services regulation.   Beginning in January 2009, the 111th Congress will consider comprehensive legislation to restructure the regulation of financial services.  A primary consideration will be the respective roles of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC and the CFTC with respect to oversight of the capital markets.  Some of the proposals under consideration were outlined in the Treasury’s March 2008 “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”

     
  • Regulation of previously unregulated products and entities. Current discussions also include new reporting and other regulatory requirements for a broad array of financial products and market participants that have, until now, been subject to relatively little regulation, including commodities, derivatives, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds.  Some products that currently trade over-the-counter may soon be required to trade on exchanges and, more generally, all market participants with the potential to impact the economy will almost certainly be under increased scrutiny.

     
  • Among the other issues that will likely be considered as part of this comprehensive reform effort are:
    • Credit rating agency reforms,
    • Enhanced government agency enforcement authorities, and
    • Recommendations of the Congressional Oversight Panel created by EESA. 

       
  • Tax. With respect to federal tax issues relating to investments, determination of the appropriate tax rates on capital gains and dividends and the appropriate tax treatment of derivatives, as well as retirement savings incentives, will receive considerable attention.

     
  • Retirement Plans. Finally, there will almost certainly be a renewal of efforts to increase disclosure with respect to defined contribution plan fees. 

Our Public Policy & Law group is closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

Industry and Regulators Respond to Extraordinary Pressures on Money Market Funds

By: Arthur C. Delibert 

Recent turmoil in the securities markets, affecting financial companies in particular, has imposed unprecedented stress on money market funds, as some institutional investors have sought to liquefy their holdings at the very moment that many money funds have found it difficult to raise cash.  These pressures have resulted in some extraordinary market and regulatory events.  Illustrative of the pressures facing the industry and regulators:

  • On September 16, The Primary Fund, a money market series of The Reserve Fund, announced that it had “broken the dollar” – i.e., that the mark-to-market value of its portfolio assets had fallen below $0.995 per share. (LINK)  In fact, the fund said, its per-share net asset value had fallen to 97 cents, primarily from holding paper issued by Lehman Brothers, which had filed for bankruptcy on September 15.  This is only the second time a registered money fund has broken the dollar, the last such event having occurred in 1994. (Reserve has subsequently reported that the assets available may be higher than 97 cents per share.)

    Subsequently, Ameriprise Financial Services filed suit against The Reserve Fund and its manager, alleging that certain large investors had been tipped off about the Fund’s impending problem, allowing those investors to remove their money before the NAV was reduced.

     
  • On September 18, Putnam Investments announced that it was suspending sales of its institutional Putnam Prime Money Market Fund and would liquidate the fund.  Within days, Putnam and Federated Investors, Inc. announced that Federated Prime Obligations Fund would acquire the assets of the Putnam money fund and that all shareholders would receive shares of the Federated fund worth $1.00 per share.

In the face of these pressures, many money funds have resorted to extraordinary measures:

  • Many funds have drawn on lines of credit previously arranged through their custodian banks and others.  The Federal Reserve made extra cash available to these banks to fund the loans.

     
  • Some funds have made use of their authority under Section 22 of the 1940 Act to withhold payment on redemption orders for up to seven days, rather than the same-day or overnight payment offered in fund prospectuses “under normal circumstances.”  Such extensions can be difficult for customers, who expect to have prompt access to assets held in money funds.

     
  • Other funds have used authority reserved in their prospectuses to pay redemptions through the in-kind distribution of portfolio securities.  These distributions potentially raise two questions under the 1940 Act:
  1. Funds may have filed with the SEC irrevocable elections under Section 18 of the 1940 Act, allowing them to make redemptions in kind for shareholders seeking redemptions in excess of $250,000 or 1% of the fund’s net assets, whichever is less, in any 90 day period, but committing them to pay lesser redemptions in cash.  Such filings have become less common since 1996, meaning that some funds have greater flexibility in this area.
  2. Redemptions paid in kind to shareholders that are affiliates of the fund because they hold 5% or more of the fund’s outstanding securities may raise questions under Section 17 of the 1940 Act, which restricts principal transactions with affiliates.  Funds can rely on a 1999 no-action letter issued by the SEC staff, which permits in-kind payments to affiliates provided the fund’s board either approves the transaction or has adopted certain procedures to assure the fairness of such distributions. 

There have also been extraordinary actions from the regulators:

  • Some money funds have sought permission from the SEC under Section 22(e) of the 1940 Act to suspend redemptions.   On September 22, the SEC issued an order (effective as of September 17) authorizing two Reserve Funds to suspend redemptions for an indefinite period, while they engage in an orderly liquidation. (LINK)

     
  • On September 19, the Federal Reserve temporarily exempted member banks from provisions of the Federal Reserve Act to permit the banks to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from affiliated money market funds. (LINK)

    On September 25, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter permitting such purchases. Such purchases by fund affiliates would normally raise issues under Section 17 of the 1940 Act.  Rule 17a-9 permits fund affiliates to purchase securities from money market funds if they are no longer “eligible securities” under Rule 2a-7 – i.e., if they have deteriorated in quality. The no-action letter permits such purchases even if the security is still eligible. 

     
  • On September 19, the Treasury announced a program of money market fund insurance.   Funds wishing to apply for the insurance must do so by Wednesday, October 8.  (LINK)

According to the announcement, Treasury is establishing this program under existing authority, using the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund.  Treasury’s authority may be limited somewhat by the Economic Stabilization Act which, as of this writing, is still under consideration by Congress.  The insurance initially will be available for a period of three months, at which point Treasury may renew it for a total period of up to a year, but participating funds would be required to pay an additional fee.

The insurance applies only to assets in a fund on September 19, the day the program was announced.  This limit was apparently adopted at the urging of the banking industry, which was concerned that if money fund insurance were available for unlimited amounts of new assets flowing into the funds, large deposits would flee the banks. The program is available only to funds registered under both the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act.

Funds wishing to apply to the program must obtain approval of their boards of directors, as the application requires that the board, including a majority of independent directors, determine that “entering into” the Guarantee Agreement, as well as “fulfillment of its obligations …  are in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders.”  Fund boards must take into consideration a number of factors before entering into such an Agreement.

Recent Short Selling Regulations and Their Potential Impact on Financial Markets

By: Kay A. Gordon, Mark D. Perlow 

In response to the recent extraordinary events in the U.S. and worldwide markets, during the past two weeks the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a series of emergency regulatory measures regarding short sales of securities.  First, on September 17 and 18, 2008, the SEC issued orders temporarily banning short sales in certain financial stocks and requiring certain institutional money managers to report their new short sales of certain publicly traded securities on new Form SH (collectively, the “Emergency Orders”).  The SEC also amended Regulation SHO and Rule 10b-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit “naked” short selling—the short sale of securities that one has not already borrowed—and adopted a new antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21, aimed at manipulative and deceptive practices in short selling.  In addition, the SEC chairman announced enforcement initiatives aimed at preventing “naked” and “manipulative” short selling.   The SEC has taken these actions in the hope that they would help to restore fair and orderly markets and curtail declines in securities prices.  On October 1, the SEC extended all of these emergency measures until October 17.  However, the ban on selling certain financial stocks provided that it would expire after the effectiveness of the EESA.  Therefore, the ban expires on Wednesday October 8 at 11:59 p.m.

On September 21, the SEC amended the Emergency Orders to expand (1) the list of issuers in whose securities the SEC has temporarily banned short selling, (2) the scope and duration of certain market maker exceptions, and (3) the types of securities exempted.  The SEC also stated that institutional investment managers’ short sale disclosures would be non-public for two weeks after filing. The SEC adopted these amendments to address the current and anticipated technical and operational issues raised by the Emergency Orders, as well as to coordinate with similar actions restricting short sales by foreign regulators.

In addition to the actions of the SEC, the U.K. Financial Services Authority and the French, German, Australian and many other regulators have adopted similar restrictions on short selling and, in certain cases, increased short selling disclosure requirements in an effort to restore market integrity and stability in these extreme market conditions.  Consequently, the policy level response to the perceived threat and the uncertainty generated by naked short selling was global, if not globally coordinated, in practice making it difficult for any manager to engage in forum shopping.

Many financial institutions, lawmakers and regulators have supported the SEC’s ban and limits on short sales, based on their concern that short sellers have contributed to the current market turmoil by spreading false information and using manipulative trading tactics.   In contrast, many hedge fund managers and other investors have objected to these measures, suggesting that risk management failures and poor business strategies are to blame for the current market instability.  They have argued that short selling provides liquidity and an important price discovery mechanism in the market and that the inability of managers to engage in short selling with respect to certain securities may adversely affect the markets both in the long and short terms.  Critics of the ban also point out that a temporary SEC order banning naked short selling in July failed to prevent the decline of stock prices while it was in effect.

The increased disclosure obligations have also given rise to concerns that managers will have to disclose proprietary methods and that companies whose securities are being sold short would retaliate against these managers when the managers’ short positions are publicly released.   The short selling ban may have also been particularly damaging to certain quantitative funds, which  were left unable to implement their disclosed and intended strategies.  In addition, short sellers were also constrained on another front:  many institutional investors that lend portfolio stock holdings have been recalling their stock, and some have suspended their stock lending programs altogether, which has made it harder or more expensive to borrow certain stocks.   Some industry participants believe that short sellers will adjust to the ban by switching to other instruments that are not subject to the ban, e.g., single stock futures and options, whose price movements will ultimately be reflected in the prices of the affected stocks.