FSA Consults on Amendments to the Remuneration Code and Extension of its Scope

By: Ian Fraser, Philip J. Morgan, Victoria Green

The FSA has published a consultation paper proposing significant changes to its Remuneration Code, including a major increase in scope from the approximately 27 largest banks, building societies and broker-dealers operating in the UK that are currently covered to over 2,500 FSA-authorised banks, building societies, asset managers, UCITS investment firms and some firms engaged in corporate finance, venture capital, the provision of financial advice and stockbrokers. The asset managers within the scope of the proposed rules are those to which the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive rules apply, other than so-called exempt CAD firms which do not exercise investment discretion.

To view the complete alert online, click here.
 

Dodd-Frank Next Steps...

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act") represents the most dramatic revision of the U.S. financial regulatory framework since the Great Depression.

K&L Gates lawyers and policy professionals have been actively involved in many aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act and have sought to provide our clients and friends with updated information and analysis on some of its key provisions. Through focused and coordinated efforts of our Financial Services, Corporate and Policy and Regulatory practice areas, K&L Gates has prepared a series of alerts on key provisions of the Act. Below we list the financial reform alerts that we have distributed to date on the Dodd-Frank Act, all of which may be accessed electronically through a link to our Financial Reform webpage.

 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Registered Investment Companies

By: Diane E. Ambler, Edward G. Eisert, Alan P. Goldberg, Mary C. Moynihan, Stevens T. Kelly

The core provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) for the most part focus on areas of the financial services industry other than the registered fund sector. However, the Dodd-Frank Act’s sweeping expansion of federal regulation in the financial sector will affect investment companies and the investment management industry as a whole, generally in indirect and often subtle ways. Moreover, many of the more controversial issues under consideration during the legislative process were left to be resolved by regulatory studies and rulemakings, and in some cases further remedial legislation, deferring their resolution to a future date.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Municipal Securities Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act - August 1, 2010

Financial Reform Bill Strengthens Regulation, Expands Potential Liability of Credit Rating Agencies - July 22, 2010

Congressional Overhaul of the Derivatives Market in the United States - July 21, 2010

Dodd-Frank Act Includes Immediate Change to 'Accredited Investor' Definition for Natural Persons - July 21, 2010

Originate-to-Distribute Lives on in Securitizations of Plain Vanilla Residential Mortgages: The Securitization Reform Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act - July 21, 2010

A New Era: Depository Institutions and Their Holding Companies Face a Deluge of Regulatory Changes - July 20, 2010

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon - July 19, 2010

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

Municipal Securities Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

By: Stacey H. Crawshaw-Lewis, Deanna L. S. Gregory, Carol Juang McCoog

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). The Dodd-Frank Act includes several provisions of potential interest to participants in the municipal bond market. The Dodd-Frank Act will require registration and regulation of previously unregulated swap and other municipal advisors. The Dodd-Frank Act also addresses the composition and authority of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”) and funding of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”). Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act directs a number of studies regarding the municipal securities market, including a study to address “the advisability of the repeal or retention of” the Tower Amendment.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Financial Reform Bill Strengthens Regulation, Expands Potential Liability of Credit Rating Agencies - July 22, 2010

Congressional Overhaul of the Derivatives Market in the United States - July 21, 2010

Dodd-Frank Act Includes Immediate Change to 'Accredited Investor' Definition for Natural Persons - July 21, 2010

Originate-to-Distribute Lives on in Securitizations of Plain Vanilla Residential Mortgages: The Securitization Reform Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act - July 21, 2010

A New Era: Depository Institutions and Their Holding Companies Face a Deluge of Regulatory Changes - July 20, 2010

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon - July 19, 2010

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

 

SEC Proposes Reform of Rule 12b-1, Mutual Fund Distribution Payment Framework

By Diane E. AmblerMark C. AmorosiRobert J. ZutzBrian M. Johnson, and Andrea Ottomanelli Magovern

On July 21, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed a new rule and rule and form amendments that would restructure the regulatory framework for payments by mutual funds for the marketing and distribution of fund shares (the “Proposal”).  The Proposal, which was unanimously approved for public comment, would continue to allow the use of fund assets to pay for distribution expenses, but would implement a new approach to regulating such payments.  This new approach would break out the types of asset-based distribution fees currently paid pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 into two components—fees for marketing and services, and asset-based sales charges—both of which could be used to finance distribution-related activities.      

As described in the attached Alert, the Proposal would limit fees for marketing and services to 25 basis points per year and establish cumulative limits for asset-based sales charges imposed in addition to the fees for marketing and services.  The Proposal also would substantially reduce the duties placed upon fund boards with respect to the payment of asset-based distribution fees.  In addition, the Proposal would require enhanced disclosure of these and other charges in transaction confirmations and would require funds to provide conforming disclosures in their registration statements, among other documents.  The Proposal also includes a component that would permit, but not require, funds to establish classes of shares to sell through broker-dealers that would determine their own sales compensation, rather than simply imposing the charges described in the prospectus as required under current law.  

To view the complete alert online, click here.

The New Hedge Fund Regulatory Era Begins

K&L Gates Webinar Recording

By Michael S. Caccese, Nicholas S. Hodge, Rebecca O'Brien Radford, George Zornada .

Program Overview
On July 21, President Obama signed into law the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010." The new law will require all hedge fund managers (with certain exceptions for small and mid-sized managers) to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and will subject them to regulatory oversight both under the Investment Advisers Act and under a new systemic risk regime administered by the SEC and a new Financial Stability Oversight Council. Under an amended version of the Volcker Rule, federally insured depository institutions and financial holding companies will face strict limitations on sponsoring and investing in hedge funds. In addition, the legislation has increased the enforcement powers and budget of the SEC, which is now focused as never before on hedge funds.

If you were unable to join us for the original presentation on July 27, 2010, you may access the webinar recording and presentation materials by clicking here.

 

Congressional Overhaul of the Derivatives Market in the United States

By: Edward G. Eisert, Charles R. Mills, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Lawrence B. Patent, Gordon F. Peery

On July 15, 2010, the U.S. Senate passed by a 60-39 vote the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), following earlier passage of the legislation by a 237 to 192 vote in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 30, 2010. On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law.

To view the complete alert online, click here

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

“Originate-to-Distribute” Lives on in Securitizations of Plain Vanilla Residential Mortgages: The Securitization Reform Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act - July 21, 2010

Dodd-Frank Act Includes Immediate Change to “Accredited Investor”
Definition for Natural Persons
- July 21, 2010 

A New Era: Depository Institutions and Their Holding Companies Face a Deluge of Regulatory Changes - July 20, 2010

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon - July 19, 2010

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010
 
Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010
 
New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

 

"Originate-to-Distribute" Lives on in Securitizations of Plain Vanilla Residential Mortgages: The Securitization Reform Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act

By: Steven M. Kaplan, Sean P. Mahoney, Anthony R.G. Nolan

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”) constitutes the most sweeping financial reform package since the 1930s. Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Title IX”), entitled the “Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010” enacts a grab bag of substantial changes to capital markets regulation and practices in the hope of putting back in their bottles the twin genies of moral hazard and lax regulation that are widely viewed as the tinder that sparked the great credit conflagration of 2008. Subtitle D of Title IX, entitled “Improvements to the Asset-Backed Securitization Process” (“Subtitle D”), has been of particular interest to capital markets participants both because practices in securitization markets are widely credited with contributing uniquely to the credit crisis and because of the sense of many that the resuscitation of robust securitization markets is one of the key predicates to an economic recovery.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Dodd-Frank Act Includes Immediate Change to “Accredited Investor”
Definition for Natural Persons
- July 21, 2010 

A New Era: Depository Institutions and Their Holding Companies Face a Deluge of Regulatory Changes - July 20, 2010

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon - July 19, 2010

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010
 
Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010
 
New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

Dodd-Frank Act Includes Immediate Change to "Accredited Investor" Definition for Natural Persons

By: Kristy T. Harlan, Vincent J. Pisano

On July 21, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Among the many provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act is a change to the definition of "accredited investor" under the Securities Act of 1933, which takes effect immediately and may impact issuers currently engaged in private offerings.

 To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

A New Era: Depository Institutions and Their Holding Companies Face a Deluge of Regulatory Changes - July 20, 2010

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon - July 19, 2010

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010
 
Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010
 
New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

A New Era: Depository Institutions and Their Holding Companies Face a Deluge of Regulatory Changes

By: Rebecca H. Laird, Sean P. Mahoney, Collins R. Clark

On June 30, 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the conference report on H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act" or "Act"), which restructures the regulatory framework for most banking organizations. The U.S. Senate followed suit on July 15, 2010. The Act is expected to be signed into law shortly. Although the full impact of the Dodd-Frank Act cannot be assessed until implementing regulations are released, depository institutions and their affiliates face new regulators, increased activities restrictions and capital requirements, and numerous other fundamental changes in how they are regulated.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon - July 19, 2010

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

HVCC's Sunset and Other Appraisal Reforms on the Horizon

By: Nanci L. Weissgold, Kerri M. Smith

Congress is poised to eliminate the contentious Home Valuation Code of Conduct, (the “HVCC”), and with the HVCC set to sunset, more expansive (and expensive) appraisal reforms are on the horizon. Tucked within the massive Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) are provisions that will strengthen appraiser independence and enforcement, regulate the use of broker price opinions (“BPOs”), set standards for pricing of appraisals and appraiser valuation model products (“AVMs”), and subject appraisal management companies (“AMCs”) to potential federal and state oversight.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies… Will It Work? - July 16, 2010

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies... Will It Work?

By: Stanley V. Ragalevsky, Sarah J. Ricardi

One of the glaring problems exposed by the recent financial crisis has been the absence of supervisory authority to deal effectively with the insolvency or collapse of significant, nonbank financial companies.  While bank regulators have long been empowered to close and liquidate insolvent banks to protect the public, there was no comparable authority vested in any financial services regulator to close and liquidate insolvent bank holding companies or other kinds of financial companies.  To make matters worse, when several systemically important financial companies were on the verge of collapse in September 2008, they were deemed “too big to fail” and given significant government assistance.  Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”) addresses the absence of regulatory authority to liquidate systemically important, nonbank financial companies by creating an “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) process to allow the Treasury Secretary to close and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to wind up these companies.      

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance

By: Diane E. Ambler, András P. Teleki, Collins R. Clark

Two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) specifically target the insurance industry and are intended to promote a higher level of uniformity in the U.S. insurance industry regulatory landscape. First, the Federal Insurance Office Act of 2010 (“FIO Act”) creates a new Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) within the Department of the Treasury and signals the beginning of a new era of federal involvement, at least at the macro level, in the U.S. insurance industry. Significantly, the FIO Act does not include a federal insurance charter provision, long sought by many in the insurance industry, and the states will remain the primary insurance regulatory authority. Second, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (“NRRA”) changes how authority over some forms of insurance is allocated among the states.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions

By: David L. Beam

The last ten years have been a period of consistent expansion of federal preemption for national banks and federal thrifts. That period of expansion will come to a grinding halt if the Senate passes and President Obama signs the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”), which most observers expect to happen shortly after the Senators return from recess on July 12.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform that are being prepared by K&L Gates. Below is a list of other alerts in the series that have already been published:

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act

By: Edward G. Eisert, Rebecca H. Laird, Cary J. Meer, Mark D. Perlow

The authors acknowledge the assistance of associates Megan Munafo and Jarrod Melson in the preparation of this Alert.

The long-awaited financial reform bill, now entitled The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Bill”), appears to be moving toward passage by the Senate and enactment into law later this month. This Alert provides an overview of those provisions of the Dodd-Frank Bill that are likely to most directly affect investment advisers to hedge, private equity and venture capital funds, wherever such advisers and funds are domiciled.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform that are being prepared by K&L Gates. Below is a list of other alerts in the series that have already been published:

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV)

By: Kristie D. Kully, Laurence E. Platt

The Mortgage Reform Act and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, part of the comprehensive Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform package under final Hill consideration, will likely melt any hopes for other than plain vanilla residential mortgage loans. Makers of "strawberry" or "rocky road" loans will likely face enhanced scrutiny, and may face increased damages, extended exposure to borrower claims, and risk retention requirements. In this client alert, we summarize the hefty provisions in the Mortgage Reform Act that would require creditors to consider a borrower’s ability to repay; the safe harbor for plain vanilla loans; the restructuring of mortgage originator compensation; and other amendments to TILA, HOEPA, FCRA, HMDA, and the S.A.F.E. Act. In the end, as consumers, the industry, and the federal regulatory agencies work to implement these changes, Supreme Court Justice Breyer may be the final authority on plain vanilla mortgages and the Mortgage Reform Act’s other ambiguous provisions.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator

By: Melanie H. Brody, Stephanie C. Robinson

The centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Act from a consumer protection standpoint is Title X, the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. The Act will create a powerful consumer financial protection watchdog, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The majority of existing federal consumer financial protection laws will come under the Bureau's purview, and the Bureau will have broad authority to enforce those laws and to issue its own rules under the Act. This alert describes the Bureau, including its structure, objectives, functions, jurisdiction, rulemaking authority and enforcement powers.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation

By: James E. Earle

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”), while delayed as the Senate leadership searches for votes, is almost certain nevertheless to be enacted in mid-July 2010. While the Act’s primary purpose is to broadly reform the regulation of the financial services industry, within the massive text of the Act lurk new requirements that may impact executive compensation and corporate governance practices at most public companies, not just banks. This alert highlights these key executive compensation and governance changes.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Margo A. Dey, Akilah Green, Justin D. Holman

On June 30, 2010, the House adopted the conference report on H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Bill” or “Bill”). The Senate is expected to follow suit when it returns from recess later in July. This alert provides a high-level summary and analysis of the significant aspects of the Bill. In the days ahead, K&L Gates will be issuing alerts addressing in detail the various provisions of the Bill.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

New UK Government Announces Bank Levy and Likely New Measures on Bank Remuneration Policies

By: Philip J. Morgan and Neil Nick Robson

On 22 June 2010, the UK's new Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, delivered the new Government's “emergency” budget. Amongst a package of other measures, he announced a bank levy from 1 January 2011, and plans to carry out further work to tackle unacceptable bank bonuses, including a consideration of the costs and benefits of a “Financial Activities Tax” on bank profits and remuneration.

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Financial Services Authority to be scrapped in major overhaul of UK financial regulation

By: Philip J. Morgan and Nicholas Brown

UK Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne yesterday announced the scrapping of the Financial Services Authority as part of a major shake-up of the regulation of financial services in the UK.

The FSA will be replaced by three new entities:

  • a prudential regulator, which will be a subsidiary of the Bank of England, and will be responsible for oversight of UK-based retail lenders, investment banks, building societies and insurers, and regulation of capital requirements of financial institutions;
  • a Consumer Protection and Markets Authority, responsible for the protection of consumers and day-to-day policing of financial firms; and
     
  • a financial crime agency, incorporating the current financial crime powers of the FSA, the Serious Fraud Office and the Office of Fair Trading.
     
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CFTC Staff Issues Advisory on Trading of Foreign Security Futures, but Availability Remains Limited

By: Lawrence B. Patent

On June 8, 2010, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) Division of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight (“DCIO”) issued an Advisory regarding the extent to which certain sophisticated customers located in the United States may transact in foreign security futures products (“FSFP”). The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued an Order on this subject about a year ago, on June 30, 2009, as described in a previous K&L Gates Alert.

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Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers

By: Edward G. Eisert, Mark D. Perlow, Megan B. Munafo

On Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Senate voted 59-39 to adopt the financial services bill now known as H.R. 4173, the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” (the “Senate Bill”).   The Senate Bill is based on the draft Chairman’s Mark released by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) on March 15, 2010, as amended by a package of technical amendments.  A bipartisan Congressional conference committee has now been constituted  to resolve the differences between the Senate Bill and the House bill, which has the same bill number, but is entitled “The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009,” passed by the House on December 12, 2009 (the “House Bill”).  The Democratic Congressional leadership anticipates that these differences can be resolved and a final bill presented to the President for enactment into law by early July.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010"

On May 20, 2010, the Senate passed the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” as amended (“Senate Bill”). Congressional leadership has indicated that conference committee proceedings will take place in June, making it likely that the legislation will be passed by the House and Senate before the July 4th Recess and signed into law by the President shortly thereafter.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

The EU's proposed Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive

By: Vanessa C. Edwards and Philip J. Morgan

In separate votes on 17 and 18 May, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (the two arms of the EU legislature) adopted their respective positions on the infamous Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“the Directive”). The versions approved, however, differ significantly from each other, and the discussions will now move on to the so-called “Trialogue” procedure, involving the Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission, in an attempt to arrive at a final, definitive text acceptable to all three institutions. Although the Commission is not strictly part of the legislature, the new Internal Market Commissioner, Michel Barnier, is likely to have a significant influence in negotiating the final text given the differences between the two versions. It is hoped to have the Directive agreed in July, but this is widely regarded as over-ambitious.

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Senator Dodd Releases Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation: The Home Stretch?

On Monday, March 15, 2010, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) released a Chairman's Mark of the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010. The Bill, which has been in development for months, is intended to replace the Discussion Draft previously circulated by Chairman Dodd on November 10, 2009 and is different in many respects from H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, which was passed by the House on December 12, 2009. The Senate Banking Committee is scheduled to begin marking up the legislation on March 22.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

 

New Regulatory Approaches to Short Selling in the U.S. and the EU

By: Kay A. Gordon, Dr. Wilhelm Hartung, Cary J. Meer, Philip J. Morgan, Mark D. Perlow, Neil Nick Robson, Richard Guidice, Jr

Changes in the regulatory approach to the short selling of listed securities have recently been announced in both the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU). In the U.S., rule amendments were recently adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission that generally restrict market participants' ability to sell short listed securities whose price has dropped by at least 10% in a single day. In the EU, a new regulatory proposal would (to the extent adopted by the EU member states) require private disclosure of net short positions above a 0.2% threshold to the applicable regulator, and public disclosure to the market of such positions above a 0.5% threshold. We summarize in this alert what these changes entail and what each will mean for market participants.

To view the complete alert online, click here.
 

SEC Publishes Concept Release on Market Structure, Proposes Risk Management Rules for Sponsored Access

By: Mark D. Perlow and C. Dirk Peterson

On January 14, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to issue a concept release intended to elicit public comment on a broad range of questions relating to the efficiency and fairness of the public equity markets (the "Concept Release"). The Concept Release revisited issues that the SEC raised and addressed nearly five years ago in a comprehensive set of market, trading and reporting rules codified in Regulation NMS. Shortly after publishing the Concept Release, the SEC also published a release proposing a new risk management rule requiring firms that sponsor trading access to exchanges and alternative trading systems (ATSs) to establish (and periodically evaluate) a system of controls intended to limit potential financial exposure and to ensure compliance with relevant regulatory requirements (the "Sponsored Access Release"). These recent market-structure initiatives form part of the SEC's ongoing review of the equity markets and follow two discrete SEC rule-making initiatives from 2009 currently under consideration.

To read the complete alert online, click here.

Global Government Solutions 2010: The Year Ahead

Contacts: Diane E. Ambler, Michael J. Missal, Matt T. Morley, Mark D. Perlow

2009 brought a further transformation in the relationship between business and government. Regardless of political systems or philosophies, governments around the world became more dynamic and intrusive in response to the financial crisis.

This 2010 Annual Report, prepared by members of the K&L Gates Global Government Solutions initiative, contains concise articles that seek to forecast likely government actions and priorities regarding a broad spectrum of topics.

To view the report, click here.

 

FDIC Raises Further Obstacles to Private Equity Investments in Failed Institutions

By: Sean P. Mahoney

As 2010 begins, the FDIC has indicated that private equity investors will face increased challenges in making investments in failed institutions, as certain approaches to making such investments without becoming subject to onerous FDIC requirements will not be approved.

In August 2009, the FDIC issued its “Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions” (the “Policy Statement,” issued August 26, 2009 and available here), which generally subjects private investors in failed institutions to, among other things, increased capital requirements at the bank level, limits on transactions with their affiliates, prohibitions on silo ownership structures, and mandatory holding periods. The Policy Statement contained exceptions to its applicability, and many investors have been structuring their transactions to take advantage of these exceptions.
 

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FDIC Proposes Far-Reaching Changes to the Legal Isolation Safe Harbor: New Requirements May Affect Securitization Sponsors, Servicers and Investors

By Sean P. Mahoney and  Anthony R. G. Nolan

A possible rule change being considered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) may make it difficult for banks and other securitization market participants to manage risks associated with FDIC conservatorship or receivership of sponsoring banks.  This troubling development warrants attention not only from banks, but also from other participants in bank securitization transactions including servicers, rating agencies, law firms and auditors.   

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC Adopts Amendments to the Proxy Rules Concerning Disclosure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance

By: Phillip J. Kardis IIVincent J. Pisano, Douglas J. Ellis

On December 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted amendments (the “Amendments”) to its executive compensation and corporate governance disclosure requirements. The Amendments are effective on February 28, 2010. Accordingly, many public companies face significant new disclosure requirements for the 2010 proxy season.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Dubai: Growing Pains For Islamic Investments?

By: Jonathan Lawrence, Philip J. Morgan, and Neil Nick Robson

The recent announcements from Dubai have turned the spotlight onto Islamic investments. The attached client alert assesses the structure, enforceability, risks and valuation issues specifically associated with the Dubai Nakheel sukuk bond and the increased uncertainty regarding the legal structures and insolvency regimes underpinning Islamic investment structures in the region. Even though the Government of Abu Dhabi and the UAE Central Bank have recently bailed out the real estate development company Nakheel and its parent company, Dubai World, there is no guarantee that they will do so again in the future. As a result of these factors, investment managers should consider examining all their Islamic investments, particularly those connected to Dubai, and working with valuation firms to determine how to approach the valuation of such investments.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

The SEC Weighs In on the Valuation of Net Equity for Madoff Victims

 By: Richard A. Kirby and R. James Mitchell

On December 9, 2009, almost one year to the day that Bernard L. Madoff was revealed to have perpetrated the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the SEC revealed its position with respect to the approach that it believes the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) should take in defining the net equity of Madoff claimants.

The SIPC Trustee has previously taken the position that net equity for Madoff’s victims should be measured on a cash-in/cash-out basis, rather than using the stated values on account statements fabricated by Madoff. This measure of net equity rejects all claims filed by victims whose net withdrawals equaled or exceeded their principal investments.

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House Passes Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 11, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4173, the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009,” by a vote of 223 to 203. 27 Democrats voted against the bill and no Republicans voted in favor of the bill.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws: Compromise Provisions in Financial Reform Bill Would Scale Back Existing Preemptions for Federally-Chartered Banks

By: David L. Beam  

One of the most controversial subjects in banking law over the past decade has been federal preemption of state laws for federally-chartered banks (i.e., national banks and federal thrifts) and their operating subsidiaries. Under current law, regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) preempt almost all state consumer protection laws for national banks and federal thrifts, respectively. When a federal law “preempts” a state law for an institution, it effectively exempts that institution from having to comply with the state law. This preemption has also been extended to operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts as well as (in certain situations) agents and other third parties acting on behalf of those institutions.

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CFTC and SEC Issue Joint Orders to Permit Increased Trading of Futures Contracts on Volatility Indices and Security Futures

By: Lawrence B. Patent

Last month, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued two Joint Orders that (1) permit increased trading of futures contracts on volatility indices, and (2) expand the universe of security futures under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). In both instances, the agencies worked together to find solutions to permit investors to trade a broader range of products, while retaining meaningful protections to investors in those markets. Given the prospect that regulatory reform will require greater cooperation between these two agencies, these Joint Orders suggest that the agencies can overcome any jurisdictional competition to act for the benefit of investors and the financial markets. 

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Administration Creates Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Seeking Nationwide Coordination of Law Enforcement Efforts

Matt T. Morley, Richard A. Kirby, and Andrew Edwin Porter

The Obama Administration has recently announced the formation of a task force designed to coordinate federal, state and local efforts to investigate and prosecute fraud and other financial misconduct. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) expands and supplants an earlier task force created to combat corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal.

While the simple reconstitution of a task force is unlikely to dramatically alter the law enforcement landscape, this development may be one part of a more sweeping set of changes that could result in considerable increases in the magnitude, focus and efficiency of efforts to pursue financial wrongdoing. 

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Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation Moves to House Floor

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 2, the House Financial Services Committee passed final bills comprising the House version of the financial regulatory reform legislation. House Floor consideration is expected as early as the week of December 7. The Senate Banking Committee is also expected to begin marking up the discussion draft of the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009” the week of December 7.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Private Funds and Broker-Dealers Under Dodd's Restoring American Financial Stability Act

By: Edward G. Eisert and Carolyn A. Jayne

I. Introduction.

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd introduced his discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009” (“RAFSA”). This draft of more than 1,100 pages in length consolidates the various components of the Administration’s regulatory reform proposals. Set forth below is an overview of those provisions of RAFSA that most directly affect investment advisers to funds that rely upon the exemptions from registration set forth in Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (collectively, “Private Funds”) and that materially differ from the provisions of HR 3818, the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009,” which would require certain private fund managers to register with and be regulated by the SEC, and HR 3817, the “Investor Protection Act of 2009,” passed by the House Financial Services Committee on October 27, 2009 and November 4, 2009, respectively. (For more information about the RAFSA in general, see K&L Gates alert Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009. For a discussion of the Obama Administration’s proposed legislation, see K&L Gates alert The Obama Administration’s Proposal for the Registration of Investment Advisers to Private Investment Funds: The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.)

A. Title IV of RAFSA - “Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others.”

Private Equity Funds. Title IV provides a new exemption from registration for advisers to “Private Equity Funds,” a term to be defined by the SEC within six months after the enactment of the Act. Within the same time frame, the SEC also will be required to issue final rules regarding records to be maintained by such advisers and reports to be provided by such advisers to the SEC.

Venture Capital Funds and Family Offices. In addition, Title IV: (i) provides an exemption from registration for advisers to “Venture Capital Funds,” a term to be defined by the SEC within six months after the enactment of RAFSA; and (ii) provides a new exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) for a “Family Office,” a term to be defined by the SEC. Title IV does not include an exemption for midsized private funds (i.e., funds that have “assets under management in the United States of less than $150,000,000”) and does not impose any recordkeeping and reporting obligations on Venture Capital Funds as does HR 3818.

Financial Thresholds for Registration of an Adviser Under the Advisers Act and for an Accredited Investor. Also, RAFSA raises to $100 million the threshold for non-exempted investment advisers to be required to register with the SEC.

Title IV directs the SEC to increase the “financial threshold for an accredited investor,” as defined in Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, in an amount determined to be “appropriate and in the public interest, in light of price inflation . . .” and to adjust such threshold no less frequently than once every five years to “reflect the percentage increase in the cost of living.”

Independent Custodian. Title IV authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registered investment advisers to use an independent custodian to hold client assets.

Reports and Records. Title IV excludes a provision in HR 3818 requiring registered investment advisers to provide reports, records and other documents to “investors, prospective investors, counterparties, and creditors” as the SEC may prescribe as “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.” At the same time, Title IV increases the required information to be filed in such records or reports to include valuation methodologies of the fund, types of assets held and side arrangements or side letters, whereby certain investors in a fund obtain more favorable rights or entitlements than other investors. However, off-balance sheet leverage, required to be filed with the SEC under HR 3818, is not required to be filed under Title IV. Title IV requires the SEC to report annually to Congress regarding how it has used the data collected thereunder “to monitor the markets for the protection of investors and the integrity of the markets.” Title IV also contemplates an agreement of confidentiality when information is provided to Congress.

Studies and Reports to Congress. Lastly, Title IV directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct studies and submit reports to Congress on three subjects: (i) the appropriate criteria for determining financial thresholds or other criteria needed to qualify as an “accredited investor” and eligibility to invest in “hedge funds (within one year of the enactment of RAFSA)”; (ii) the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization to oversee “hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds (within one year of the enactment of RAFSA)”; and (iii) the state of short selling in the stock market, with particular attention to the impact of recent rule changes and the incidence of the failure to deliver shares sold short (within two years of the enactment of RAFSA).

B. Title IX of RAFSA - “Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities.”

Fiduciary Standards of Broker-Dealers Providing Investment Advice. Title IX takes a different approach than HR 3817, the “Investor Protection Act,” to the issue presented by investment advisers and broker-dealers currently being subject to somewhat different duties to clients. As amended, HR 3817 provides that brokers, dealers, and advisers shall have the duty “to act in the best interest of the customer without regard to [compensation]” and that the standard of conduct for brokers and dealers “shall be no less stringent than” the standard for advisers under the Advisers Act. HR 3817 would retain the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of investment adviser.

In contrast, Title IX would eliminate from the definition of “investment adviser” in the Advisers Act the categorical exception for a broker or dealer (without regard to whether any advice it provides is “incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer . . . ”). Title IX then would amend Section 206 of the Advisers Act to grant the SEC authority by rule to exempt any person or transaction, or any class of persons or transactions, from the prohibition under Section 206(3) thereof regarding principal transactions, if the SEC determines that such exemption is “for the protection of investors; and the adviser provides investors with adequate protections against conflicts of interest or principal transactions that are not in the best interests of the investors.”

Title IX also provides that “[n]othing in [Section 205 of the Advisers Act, which regulates the terms of investment advisory contracts] prohibits an investment adviser from entering into an investment advisory relationship that provides for the payment of an asset management fee or a commission.”

Lastly, Title IX would provide that it would be unlawful for an adviser “to fail to disclose to any client or prospective client any material limitation on the range of investment products about which the investment advisor gives advice . . . .”

Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers. RAFSA also takes a different approach than HR 3817 to the oversight of certain advisers and broker-dealers. Currently, HR 3817 authorizes FINRA to oversee any investment adviser who has any legal or financial connection with a registered broker-dealer (although HFSC Chairman Frank has declared his intention to oppose this last-minute amendment to HR 3817 when presented to the full House). In contrast, by eliminating the exception for brokers or dealers under the definition of “investment adviser,” RAFSA appears to subject both advisers and broker-dealers to oversight by the SEC under the Advisers Act. In addition, as mentioned above, Title IV would require the Comptroller General to conduct a study of the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization to oversee hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds.

II. Analysis.

A. The Definition of a “Hedge Fund.”

There is no statutory definition of a “hedge fund” and, as commonly used, the term “hedge funds” refers to private funds that follow a broad range of different investment strategies and employ leverage to greatly different degrees. If RAFSA is enacted in its present form, exemptions from registration will be provided to “venture capital funds” and “private equity funds” only. As a result of these provisions, and references to “hedge funds” in RAFSA, it appears that, by process of elimination, all other Private Funds might be deemed to be “hedge funds” unless the SEC also defines that term. Because of blurring of the lines between the hedge fund, private equity fund and other private fund industries, it is likely that the SEC will have difficulty in defining these terms and, accordingly, there is the not insignificant risk that the SEC will err on the side of overinclusiveness in requiring adviser registration.

B. Expanded Jurisdiction of State Regulation of Advisers.

If enacted in its present form, investment advisers that do not advise Venture Capital Funds or Private Equity Funds, would not come within one of the other narrow exemptions from registration under the Advisers Act, and have assets under management of less than $100 million would not be eligible to register with the SEC. Such advisers would be subject to regulation under the laws of the states in which they do business and, consequently, if they do business in more than one state might incur increased costs and be subject to increased regulatory burdens.

C. Treatment of Non-U.S. Domiciled Private Funds and Advisers.

Although much of the exemption provided for “foreign private advisers” is identical in both RAFSA and HR 3818, RAFSA includes one key revision to the definition of “foreign private adviser.” HR 3818 provides that a foreign private adviser must have fewer than 15 clients in the U.S. “during the preceding 12 months.” RAFSA provides no time frame for such calculation. Theoretically, non-U.S. domiciled advisers would be unable to rely upon this exemption under RAFSA after they have an aggregate of 15 U.S. clients over an unlimited period of time, regardless of whether such clients remain active clients.

RAFSA also modifies the definition of “Private Fund” in a manner that potentially is beneficial to U.S. and non-U.S. domiciled advisers to certain non-U.S. funds. RAFSA defines a “Private Fund” to be a fund that relies upon either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and “either - (i) is organized or otherwise created under the laws of the United States or of a State; or (ii) has 10 percent or more of its outstanding securities owned by U.S. persons.” HR 3818 defines “Private Fund” to be any fund that relies upon either of those exemptions. Thus, RAFSA provides a limited exception from the definition of “Private Fund” for a fund organized in a non-U.S. jurisdiction if only a small percentage of its interests is held by “United States persons.”

Under RAFSA, non-U.S. domiciled advisers also would benefit to the same extent as U.S. domiciled advisers from the new exemptions from registration for advisers to “venture capital funds” and “private equity funds.”

 

Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, Summary and Comparison to House Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) released a discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009." Chairman Dodd has been developing the Senate version of the regulatory reform package over several months. Until recently, the Chairman was working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL). However, Chairman Dodd recently decided to proceed only with the Democrats on the Committee.

At the time of this writing, the House Financial Services Committee is completing its markup of the House regulatory reform package. With the Senate and House taking different approaches in several respects, debate on significant aspects of the regulatory reform package will continue.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Redoubling Efforts on the Financial Reform Debate: House Approaches Floor Vote, While Senate Gets Underway

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

Over the past several weeks, Congress has accelerated the financial regulatory reform effort, which will dramatically restructure the legislative and regulatory framework that governs the financial services industry. Late last week, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) announced that the Committee will complete its markup of the financial regulatory reform bills by November 20.

As the House approaches Floor consideration of the regulatory reform package, the Senate is getting underway with its parallel effort. On November 10, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT), who until recently had been working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-GA), released a discussion draft in the form of a single large bill. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC/CFTC Report on Harmonization of Regulation and How it May Affect Investment Advisers

By: Lawrence B. Patent, Mary C. Moynihan

On October 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued “A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation” (Report). The Report was issued in response to a request in the Administration White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform.

The Report contains 20 recommendations. This Alert will focus upon the recommendations in the Report that may be of greatest interest to investment advisers: (1) the potential “uniform” standards of “fiduciary” duties for persons providing investment and commodity trading advice for securities and futures; (2) aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act; and (3) aligning the reporting requirements for private funds. The Alert also discusses the other recommendations, some of which may indicate enhanced opportunities for portfolio margining across markets and the prospect of greater clarity and expedited judicial review of new products that straddle jurisdictional lines. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

K&L Gates' Investment Management Newsletter

By: Stephen J. Crimmins, Nicholas S. Hodge, Melissa S. Holmes, Thomas F. Joyce, Beth R. Kramer, Richard A. Kirby, Mary C. Moynihan, Megan B. Munafo, Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Roger S. Wise

The Fall 2009 Edition of K&L Gates' Investment Management newsletter is offered as a timely aid in addressing the myriad regulatory issues confronting the investment management industry. Watch for future issues discussing up-to-the-minute developments and trends in the industry.

To view the complete newsletter, please click here.

Analysis of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Legislation: Top Ten Issues

By:  Stephanie C. Robinson

The Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform plan is progressing through Congress. Last week, the House Financial Services Committee voted to approve H.R. 3126, the bill that would create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency. As we reported in a prior publication, the agency would have extremely broad regulatory and enforcement authority over providers of consumer financial products and services, with the power to impose high penalties. See our Mortgage Banking & Consumer Financial Products alert, Million Dollar Baby: The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, for a complete discussion of the bill as introduced.

The committee spent the past couple of days considering and voting on dozens of proposed amendments to Chairman Barney Frank's (D-MA) original version of the bill. This alert highlights some of the issues we are being asked about most and what has changed since the bill's July 8, 2009 introduction.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC Holds Securities Lending Roundtable

By: Benoit N. Jacqmotte and Mark D. Perlow

On September 29 and 30, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) held a roundtable on securities lending and short sales. On the first day, four panels of investor and industry representatives provided an overview of the securities lending market and discussed investor protection concerns, potential improvements to securities lending, and potential regulatory action in the area. On the second day, two panels addressed possible short sale pre-borrow requirements and additional short sale disclosure. This summary addresses the first-day roundtable on securities lending.

In a securities lending arrangement, the owner of securities lends out securities to market participants in exchange for a fee, upon posting of collateral (both of which, in the United States, usually take the form of cash). An institutional investor such as a mutual or pension fund will typically engage a custodial bank or other lending agent to handle the lending of securities to brokers and reinvestment of the collateral. Brokers borrow securities for a number of reasons, including for delivery of timely trade settlements and to lend to clients seeking to enter into short sales. In a short sale, a security is borrowed and sold in the market with the expectation that the security will be purchased later at a lower price (and returned to the lender), allowing the short seller to pocket the difference.

The commissioners and panelists generally agreed that securities lending is a critical component of proper market functioning because, among other reasons, such lending creates greater liquidity and enhances the ability to effect short sales (which in turn permit greater price discovery). With the intense scrutiny of short sales during the financial crisis and large losses suffered by certain institutional investors in their securities lending programs, the SEC has decided to shed light on and explore possible regulation in what SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has called an “opaque” market.

Panel discussion focused on transaction price transparency, fee splits, cash reinvestment, proxy voting issues, the possible use of central counterparties and possible regulation. In general, while securities lending-related pricing information is available from various services, the price terms of loans tend to be individually negotiated between lending agents and brokers and depend in part on depth of information available to such parties. SEC staff members have previously expressed concern about the lack of transparency in both pricing and the supply of securities available for lending.

Net prices for borrowing securities are typically negotiated between parties and can range widely depending on such negotiations and market forces. For easy-to-borrow and highly liquid securities, lenders typically “rebate” to borrowers a substantial portion of the return they earn from reinvesting the cash collateral posted by a borrower. For hard-to-borrow securities, lenders can obtain a “negative rebate” from borrowers, in which borrowers must pay lenders a substantial rate of interest on the cash collateral for the right to borrow the relevant securities. This means that the effective cost of borrowing securities can range from a few basis points for easy-to-borrow securities to 20% and higher for hard-to-borrow securities.

Fee split arrangements between lenders and agents, under which an agent generally takes 10 to 50% of the net fees earned by a lender under its securities lending program, and the indemnification, termination and other provisions of these arrangements, appear to depend on the leverage and sophistication of the parties. Under these arrangements, securities lenders frequently delegate to their lending agents the task of reinvesting their cash collateral, usually pursuant to written guidelines in which the agent usually disclaims that it is acting as an investment adviser or manager. Given the fee splits between a lender and agent, an agent has an incentive to manage the reinvestment to yield the highest returns. Before the financial crisis, some agents reinvested securities lending cash collateral in instruments, for example in the securities of structured investment vehicles (or SIVs), that suffered from illiquidity and substantial losses during the financial crisis. Some lenders were unable to return collateral to borrowers who had returned loaned securities, and the decline in the value of these lenders’ cash collateral had to be marked to market, causing net asset value declines for these lenders.

These lenders, who had traditionally viewed the reinvestment of cash collateral as a low-risk business for a small reward, were caught flat-footed with substantial losses and liabilities. Some panelists suggested that such lenders placed undue reliance on their agents to make investment decisions or may not have fully understood the risks involved with these reinvestment programs. According to some panelists, while mutual funds tended to have the capacity and staff sophistication to “shop” among and negotiate these terms with different agents, other lenders, including smaller pension funds, did not have the capacity and expertise to negotiate in the same manner and may have been more susceptible to losses and liabilities under these arrangements. These panelists urged the SEC to consider requiring agents to make greater disclosures to all lenders regarding the range of instruments in which cash collateral may be reinvested and the risks inherent in such programs.

Panelists discussed the potential use of non-cash collateral in the securities lending process, noting that the posting of certain securities as collateral for the borrowing of securities is widely used in Europe. Some panelists suggested that the buildup of cash balances in securities lenders’ accounts caused volatility in lenders’ portfolios because the reinvestment of this collateral drove earnings during good economic periods and led to losses during bad periods. However, other panelists cautioned that while the use of other securities as collateral for securities lending (including short-term government debt securities) could mitigate some of these risks, the use of securities as collateral could introduce other risks, including correlation (or lack thereof) between the market risk of the collateral and that of underlying loaned securities.

Under securities lending arrangements, the borrower of securities generally becomes the record owner of the securities for proxy voting purposes if it owns the securities on the relevant record date. The interests of the short seller may not be aligned with those of the “long” holders of a company’s securities, including the lender: for instance, the short seller might want to vote against accepting a tender offer at a premium to the market price, since the offer would drive up the stock’s price and cause a loss in value in the seller’s short position.

Panelists discussed the record-keeping, conflicts of interests and other issues surrounding such proxy voting issues. Some panelists urged securities lenders to pay more attention to proxy voting to make sure they are able to maintain voting rights, by recalling loaned securities or otherwise, to give input on corporate action in line with their interests as “long” holders. Panelists representing both lenders and broker-dealers agreed that lenders appeared to face no difficulties or adverse consequences from recalling their loaned securities, such as being penalized by broker-dealers by losing future securities lending opportunities, and that lenders could address many of these issues by considering their proxy voting and related goals and adopting policies and procedures to give them effect.

Panelists also considered whether there should be central counterparties for securities lending, both to enhance price discovery for securities lending and to address counterparty risk. Several panelists asserted that, because price discovery was available to many lenders and their agents through pricing services, and since the collateral for borrowed securities was generally made in cash in an amount exceeding the price of the relevant security, the incremental value of using central counterparties would be minimal. Other panelists stated that the expanded use of central counterparties would have a positive impact on risk management and the transparency of the pricing and liquidity of securities lending.

Several panelists also urged the SEC to crack down on unregistered finders seeking to locate securities on behalf of broker-dealers for borrowing purposes, especially from retail owners of securities. According to these panelists, retail investors were particularly susceptible to misapprehending the risks, terms and consequences of lending securities in their portfolios. Richard Ketchum, chief executive of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, stated that the organization is considering the adoption of rules designed to require broker-dealers to better disclose to their customers the risks and consequences of securities lending.

In her closing remarks, Chairman Schapiro stressed the SEC’s commitment to review the securities lending market’s benefits and pitfalls and to assess whether changes should be made in the regulation of the market. The SEC is accepting comments regarding issues addressed in the roundtable until October 30, 2009.
 

Congress Builds on Obama Financial Regulatory Reform Approach, as Reform Efforts Proceed

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page and Collins R. Clark

Congress continues to move forward expeditiously on the financial services regulatory reform effort. Over the past several weeks, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), in conjunction with other key committee members, has released additional legislative proposals building on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform plan, while Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL) develop a separate regulatory reform package. At the same time, these Committees have kept up a remarkably ambitious hearing schedule. This update provides an overview of significant recent developments, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Reforming the SEC and FINRA: Evolution or Revolution?

By: Richard A. Kirby and Melissa S. Holmes

Last week, FINRA released a report by the 2009 Special Review Committee that examines in detail the failure of FINRA’s examination program to detect the Stanford and Madoff frauds (the FINRA Report). The Special Committee recommends a series of reforms to FINRA examinations for adoption by FINRA management and its board, including items that would require SEC approval and – with respect to jurisdiction over registered investment advisers - Congressional action. These reforms would significantly expand FINRA’s enforcement and regulatory reach beyond its current mandate. 

The FINRA Report follows on the heels of the final recommendations of the SEC Inspector General for reforming the agency’s Division of Enforcement operations (the SEC Report), which grew out of his earlier scathing critique of the SEC’s failures to identify the Madoff fraud. The Director of Enforcement has agreed to adopt and implement all of the SEC Report’s recommendations. While many of the proposed FINRA reforms outlined in the FINRA Report would take time to implement (if they are implemented at all), the immediate changes to the respective examination and enforcement programs of FINRA and the SEC triggered by these reviews are being felt by financial services firms immediately and they will need to react to these changes.

FINRA Reforms

A. The FINRA Report concludes that FINRA should seek authority from Congress to regulate activities under the Investment Advisers Act. It suggests that if FINRA had this authority, it may have discovered Madoff’s Ponzi scheme through its regular examination process after he registered as an investment adviser in 2006. The SEC has not taken a public position on this proposal. The current Obama Financial Regulatory Reform does not contemplate an SRO regulatory structure for investment advisers, nor do any of the current proposals being considered by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank or Senate Banking Chairman Chris Dodd. Please see recent Blog posting called "House and Senate Take Expedited But Divergent Approaches to Financial Regulatory Reform Plan." It would be surprising if this jurisdictional reach by FINRA gets traction in the present Congress. 

B. The FINRA Report also recommends that FINRA seek SEC authority to broaden its authority to examine not only outside business activities of associated persons of members, but also affiliates of member firms. This expansion of FINRA’s regulatory reach would give it broader investigative powers than the SEC itself. It remains to be seen how the SEC will react to this proposal.

C. The FINRA Report notes that FINRA staff declined to pursue inquiries into complaints about Stanford’s high-pressure sales of CDs issued by its off-shore Antigua bank affiliate because of a concern that the CDs were not securities. This decision apparently was made by non-attorneys and contrary to the specific position of the SEC Fort Worth Regional Office on the issue, and was taken without fully informed consultation with FINRA General Counsel. The FINRA staff’s surprisingly and well-documented timid view of its jurisdictional limits, which appear to have had a material impact on its failure to pursue complaints related to Stanford, provides an interesting contrast to the Special Committee’s recommendation of a much more expanded and robust jurisdictional scope for FINRA going forward.

D. One recommendation from the FINRA Report that FINRA itself can implement is the proposal to increase FINRA’s fraud detection capacity and to focus more heavily on so-called “cause” examinations. The shift to an examination program focused primarily on items triggered for cause, however, would transform the examination staff to an adjunct of the FINRA enforcement division. Assuming this recommendation is adopted by the FINRA board, it could require members and associated persons to prepare for and approach future examinations with a much more guarded approach. Management will need to promptly assess the allegations that trigger the cause examination and independently determine whether the cause determination is warranted and, if so, whether remedial action is appropriate.

E. The FINRA Report notes that it is standard practice of FINRA not to defer to another regulatory agency’s parallel enforcement efforts, unless there is an express request to defer made by the SEC or other agency. This statement will come as a surprise to many practitioners who have successfully persuaded FINRA to defer its own review of an enforcement matter on burdensomeness grounds where there is a parallel SEC or DOJ investigation into the same conduct. It remains to be seen how this newly announced FINRA policy will be applied in practice. 

SEC Enforcement Reforms

While the SEC IG proposed myriad reforms regarding training and oversight at the SEC, financial services firms are most likely to be affected by reforms relating to the staffing and handling of complaints as well as a proposed more targeted focus of examinations. 

A. A new Office of Market Intelligence will be created within the Enforcement Division to coordinate the process of reviewing and evaluating tips and complaints. In addition, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro is seeking Congressional authority to reward whistleblowers with financial incentives.

B. The SEC will work to deploy adequately qualified staff with experience tailored to the matters at issue in a specific investigation. The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) hopes to fill new “Senior Specialized Examiner” positions with professionals with experience in areas such as valuation, sales and forensic accounting. Dealing with such specialized professionals could result in a streamlining and acceleration of the enforcement investigation and examination process for financial services firms. Whether this results in a fairer process for these firms remains to be seen.

C. Finally, the Enforcement Division will institute a more rigorous and systematized process for the planning, oversight and management of the investigation process, including the processes for both opening and closing investigations. Although more targeted investigations may lighten the burden on financial services firms in some respects, OCIE, like FINRA, intends to increase its focus on “cause” investigations. This focus raises the same concerns as it does with FINRA’s shift in emphasis and puts greater burdens on financial services firms to more carefully prepare for and respond to issues raised in examinations and investigations. It will also increase the need for management to conduct its own independent review of the matter under scrutiny.

House and Senate Take Expedited But Divergent Approaches to Financial Regulatory Reform Plan

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley and Karishma Shah Page

As Congress increasingly focuses its attention on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform (FRR) plan, the biggest change of late has to do with timing. For months, most observers have expected the House Financial Services Committee to consider the Obama proposals piecemeal, with Senate consideration following House approval. Now it is clear that the House and Senate are moving forward simultaneously, but on divergent paths. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) is championing and improving the Administration proposals, and plans to move legislation to the House Floor this fall in five basic pieces (Consumer Financial Protection Agency, OTC derivatives, systemic risk, National Banking Supervisor, investor protection). These pieces reflect the groupings of the various proposals as introduced by the Administration (e.g., “systemic risk” includes the Financial Services Oversight Council, Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies, and securitization). Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) has his own ideas in key areas, many of which go further than the Obama plan. Chairman Dodd currently plans to bring a single, omnibus reform bill to the Senate Floor. Short updates on the major FRR provisions follow:

  1. The Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) - The FSOC is one of the simplest aspects of the FRR and therefore almost certain to occur. It is basically the successor to the current President’s Working Group on Capital Markets, with a dedicated staff at the Treasury Department and the addition of the heads of the FDIC, and the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency and the National Bank Supervisor. A key question is what role the FSOC will play with respect to systemic risk. If Chairman Dodd has his way, it will assume some of the functions contemplated for the Federal Reserve in the Obama/Frank plan.
  2. Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) - As expected, serious questions have been raised about the Fed’s capacity to provide consolidated supervision of large, integrated financial institutions. There is a growing political backlash to what some view as overreaching to position the Federal Reserve as the primary systemic risk regulator. The fact that large non-depository institutions could be regulated as Tier 1 FHCs is reminding many on the Hill that they really do not trust the Federal Reserve, and that the role of a central bank may be somewhat inconsistent with such a prominent regulatory function.
  3. National Bank Supervisor - As many expected, the Administration’s effort to squeeze all federally chartered financial institutions into the bank model is falling short. The thrift charter appears likely to be preserved, industrial loan companies (ILCs) grandfathered, and credit card lenders will not be deemed banks. Given the failure to close the other Bank Holding Company Act “non-bank loopholes,” many also see no reason to abolish the exception for non-depository trust companies. Nonetheless, Chairman Dodd has said the Administration proposal does not go far enough and would like to see further consolidation among the banking regulators. Chairman Frank favors preserving the dual state and federal banking systems. The outcome is uncertain.
  4. Securitization - This remains a four-letter word for the time being. It is currently disfavored and, certainly, the days of passing along 100% of the default risk to investors are over. In short, keeping originators’ “skin in the game” remains a primary objective of Chairman Frank and other key policy makers.
  5. The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) - In the interest of co-opting business interests, Congressional Oversight Panel Chairwoman Elizabeth Warren, who first proposed the CFPA, has been thrown under the proverbial bus. Chairman Frank recently circulated an updated CFPA bill. In its current form, the bill exempts non-financial companies and jettisons requirements for “plain vanilla” products. As such, Chairman Frank has made it much harder for even some Republicans to oppose the CFPA. Indeed, banks may even conclude that subjecting their competitors (e.g., non-depository mortgage originators, payday lenders, etc.) to the same regulatory burdens they have faced for years might be worthwhile after all. 
  6. Private Fund Investment Advisor Registration Act - As currently drafted, the Obama plan would require the registration and regulation of virtually all private fund managers, including hedge funds, private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, and even family investment pools. Much of the alternative fund industry seems to have embraced “reform” in hopes of being favorably positioned in the rulemaking process. Alas, such a strategy failed convincingly in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley.
  7. Resolution authority - There has been much discussion about how to unwind systemically significant failing institutions. Chairman Frank has referred to such powers as a “death sentence.” The FDIC resolution powers regarding banks will be expanded, probably extended to Treasury, and the SEC will be given similar responsibility with regard to the regulated entities within its purview. As an aside, requiring Treasury to sign off on Federal Reserve uses of authority under FRA section 13(3) is (discount) window dressing, since Treasury is de facto fulfilling that role now.
  8. OTC derivatives - In the wake of AIG and its credit default swaps, there is a clear consensus around centralized clearing of all derivatives, and a majority preference for exchange trading of standardized contracts. On August 11, the Administration introduced its OTC derivatives proposal as the “final piece” of its legislative proposals. However, there are a number of competing proposals, including S. 1691, which was recently introduced by Senate Securities Subcommittee Chairman Jack Reed (D-RI). All of these proposals would provide strong regulation of all major participants in the OTC derivative markets, and would create new anti-fraud and market manipulation enforcement powers.
  9. Credit rating agencies - House Financial Services Capital Markets Subcommittee Chairman Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) recently circulated a discussion draft that builds on the Obama proposal to have the SEC comprehensively regulate Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs), and would impose information sharing requirements, as well as “collective liability” on the entire industry for a monetary judgment against any NRSRO relating to a credit rating. It is difficult to imagine that this provision will survive, but it clearly reflects a great deal of consternation about the industry (see pp. 30-31).
  10. Executive compensation - Shareholder say-on-pay proxy votes and compensation committee independence are soon to become part of the ever-expanding corporate governance montage.
  11. Insurance - While the insurance industry appears to have escaped the CFPA, there will be a new Office of National Insurance at Treasury that will aggregate state insurance data. Together with the FSOC, and Tier 1 FHC supervision by the Fed, the insurance industry may end up wishing it had reached consensus on a federal charter. Stay tuned for more in the next Congress.

Finally, with both the House and Senate moving forward quickly, the timetable for successfully advocating changes in much of the legislation will likely be truncated. Ultimately, the differences between the House and Senate versions will be reconciled in conference committee, a process largely shielded from public scrutiny (or influence). Please see the K&L Gates alert Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort for a comprehensive overview of the Obama plan. In addition, detailed analysis on many of the Obama proposals may be found on http://www.globalfinancialmarketwatch.com/.

Carbon Markets: CFTC Seeks Primary Authority Over Both Cash and Derivative Markets

By: Lawrence B. Patent

In testimony relating to“cap-and-trade” legislation currently pending in Congress, the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Gary Gensler, has urged that his agency be designated as the primary regulator of carbon trading, with authority over both cash transactions and derivative instruments. In a prepared statement for his September 9, 2009 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Chairman Gensler advocated CFTC regulation of both the trading of futures contracts in emission allowances and offset credits for greenhouse gases (GHG), and the cash market transactions in those allowances and credits. At the same time, Chairman Gensler recognized the need for the involvement of other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in the “cap” part of cap-and-trade, to oversee related functions such as the allocation of GHG emission allowances, the establishment of standards for allowances and credits, and the maintenance of a central registry for such instruments. CFTC regulation would include oversight of the trade execution system, oversight of the clearing of trades, and protection against fraud, manipulation and other abuses. Chairman Gensler called for prompt reporting of all transactions in both GHG emissions cash and futures markets, and for a central registry of all transactions, to be updated on at least a daily basis.

Chairman Gensler’s testimony follows introduction by Senator Feinstein of S. 1399, the Carbon Market Oversight Act of 2009, which would grant the CFTC authority over both GHG emission allowances and offset credits, and derivatives thereon. Currently, the CFTC has authority only over futures transactions in derivative instruments, but not over cash transactions in the products underlying those derivatives. If enacted, S. 1399 would, for the first time, extend CFTC jurisdiction to a cash market – that is, the market for GHG emission allowances and credits that will arise under any cap-and-trade scheme – with the power to adopt and enforce rules for cash market transactions in those products. 

Among the rules that the CFTC would be likely to impose on those cash markets would be standardization of contracts and centralized trading and clearing.The CFTC takes the view that derivative instruments should, to the extent possible, be defined by standardized contracts, and traded and cleared centrally. Chairman Gensler envisions a similar regime for GHG emission allowances and offset credits, urging that they should be traded only on centralized marketplaces, rather than on an off-exchange basis through ISDA or other documentation. 

Chairman Gensler advocated that the CFTC is the appropriate regulator of the trading of GHG emission allowances and offset credits because of its experience and expertise in regulating markets involving derivatives on similar instruments. He noted that the CFTC already oversees the trading and clearing of derivative contracts based on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide allowances and offsets. Chairman Gensler also argued that carbon markets have similarities to several different markets that fall within the CFTC’s regulatory authority because, like agricultural commodities, there will be a yearly “crop” and important programmatic regulations governing the nature of the product, and because emission allowances and offset credits will be government-issued, similar to Treasury-issued debt instruments. Chairman Gensler further pointed out that the CFTC recently issued a proposed determination to classify the Carbon Financial Instrument contract traded on the Chicago Climate Exchange as a significant price discovery contract, which, if finalized, would give the CFTC full oversight authority over the contract and additional experience regulating cash emissions contracts. 74 Fed. Reg. 42052 (Aug. 20, 2009). Certain commenters responding to the CFTC’s request for comment on the proposed determination, however, have questioned the CFTC’s assertion of jurisdiction in that matter. See Letter from R. Trabue Bland, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Assistant General Counsel, IntercontinentalExchange, to David Stawick, Secretary, CFTC, Sept. 4, 2009. 

CFTC regulation of GHG emission allowances and offset credits is by no means certain, and Congress has some difficult choices to make. The cap-and-trade bill that passed the House of Representatives earlier this year, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), would give such jurisdiction to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), with CFTC jurisdiction limited to derivatives trading in those instruments. See Title III, Subtitle D of that bill, beginning at page 1027 thereof. In this regard, the House bill is consistent with the existing cap-and-trade program involving sulfur dioxide emissions that was begun almost two decades ago under the administration of the EPA, which maintains jurisdiction over the cash market trading in sulfur dioxide emissions trading to this day, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7651b and regulations promulgated thereunder. 

Competing regulatory jurisdiction over the energy space is not new. The CFTC and the FERC recently engaged in a jurisdictional dispute over which agency should pursue allegations of manipulation of the NYMEX natural gas futures market by Amaranth Advisors, with both the CFTC and the FERC ultimately settling separate actions against the company on the same day, August 12, 2009, which included a total civil monetary penalty due to the U.S. Treasury in the amount of $7.5 million, and continuing to pursue separate actions against Brian Hunter, who was the lead trader in natural gas products for Amaranth. Earlier this year, the CFTC sought unsuccessfully to persuade the Federal Trade Commission not to adopt regulations that the CFTC saw as impinging upon its exclusive jurisdiction over regulated energy futures markets. 74 Fed. Reg. 40685 (Aug. 12, 2009).

Historically, the CFTC has taken the position that the Commodity Exchange Act expressly vests it with exclusive regulatory and civil enforcement jurisdiction over all transactions in regulated futures and option contracts and the markets in them. Such exclusive jurisdiction, it has argued, assures that participants and intermediaries in those markets will be governed by a comprehensive set of statutory and regulatory standards and requirements administered by a single regulator, and that these markets will not be subjected to multiple different and potentially conflicting statutory and regulatory standards, interpretations and enforcers. 

Yet while the CFTC has not hesitated to use its enforcement powers against those who it alleges seek to use cash market transactions to attempt to manipulate cash and futures commodity prices, the CFTC has not previously sought to regulate cash markets for energy, agricultural or financial products. Any such CFTC regulatory authority, however, would appear to overlap with other agencies’ existing jurisdiction over related products, because the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange Act extends only to exchange-traded futures and option contracts. A regulatory framework where the CFTC has general authority over cash markets may be problematic, given the potential for legal uncertainty and increased costs for market participants as they seek to comply with multiple and potentially inconsistent federal regulations. Beyond this, these legislative debates may also embolden other agencies to seek to expand their own respective jurisdictions, so as to reach into the CFTC’s traditional jurisdiction over derivatives.

The CFTC already has a robust agenda to address, including possible federal position limits on energy futures trading, reporting to Congress on efforts to harmonize its regulatory framework with that of the SEC, and helping to shape the evolving regulatory program for what have been off-exchange derivatives that were exempt from federal regulation. This is an ambitious agenda that will likely require the CFTC to develop additional resources for its implementation. Its proposed new authority over GHG emission allowances and offset credits adds to the list and, from a jurisdictional perspective, may be the most complicated item of all.

FDIC Raises Barriers for New Entrants to Banking Industry

By: Sean P. Mahoney

After a few high-profile investments in banking organizations by private equity firms, the FDIC appears to be rethinking its policies on new entrants into the banking industry. This trend is evidenced by two recent FDIC pronouncements indicating the regulator’s increased scrutiny of certain private equity acquisitions and more strict limitations on the business activities of certain newly created banks.

The FDIC’s Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions (the “Policy Statement”) (issued August 26, 2009 and available here), relates only to acquisitions of failed banks by private equity firms, including acquisitions made through the use of a new charter from any regulator. Although the Policy Statement generally does not extend to transactions outside the context of FDIC conservatorship or receivership, it may also extend to so-called “inflatable charters” or small banks acquired to facilitate the acquisition of failed institutions. Nevertheless, it contains a number of burdensome provisions that apply only to the acquisition of failed banks by private equity firms, but not to other acquirers. These provisions include:

  • a requirement to maintain the bank’s Tier 1 common equity ratio at 10% or more for three years following the acquisition;
  • prohibitions on the acquired bank extending loans to any of its private equity investors or any entity in which any such investor owns 10% of the equity;
  • a prohibition on silo ownership structures (e.g., structures with parallel ownership between the bank and a private equity fund); and
  • a requirement that the private equity investor commit to hold its investment in the bank for three years or more.

At the same time, the Policy Statement may create artificial barriers to entry and competitive imbalances among private equity firms, as the FDIC reserved authority to exempt from the Policy Statement investors that have held investments in banks that retain one of the two highest examination ratings for a period of seven or more years. In other words, certain experienced bank investors may not be subject to the more stringent standards contained in the Policy Statement.

The FDIC also recently issued “Enhanced Supervisory Procedures for Newly Insured FDIC-Supervised Depository Institutions,” FIL-50-2009 (the “Enhanced Supervisory Procedures”) (issued August 28, 2009 and available here). The Enhanced Supervisory Procedures impose increased regulation upon investors who enter the banking industry for the first time by forming new state-chartered banks. The Enhanced Supervisory Procedures apply only to de novo FDIC-insured state banks, and not to de novo national banks or federal savings banks. 

While all de novo banks are required to conduct their first three years of operations within the bounds of a business plan submitted to regulators as part of the chartering process (during which time they are subject to more frequent examinations), the Enhanced Supervisory Procedures expand that period to seven years for newly formed state banks that have the FDIC as a primary regulator.

Although the Policy Statement and Enhanced Supervisory Procedures do create new barriers, they also provide a regulator-sanctioned framework for private equity firms to bid on failed institutions. It remains to be seen whether such barriers are significant enough to deter private equity investors.

Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort

By: Diane E. Ambler, Philip M. Cedar, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Vanessa C. Edwards, Edward G. Eisert, David H. Jones, Steven M. KaplanSean P. Mahoney, J. Matthew Mangan, Philip J. Morgan, Mary C. Moynihan, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Clair E. Pagnano, Lawrence B. Patent, Karishma Shah Page

Since June 17, 2009, when the Obama Administration unveiled its financial regulatory reform plan, there has been a flurry of executive branch and legislative branch activity.  The frenetic pace of the reform effort is expected to resume in the fall, as Congress works to resolve the many highly controversial issues presented by the plan.  The traditional August Congressional recess now underway provides an opportunity to take stock of this historic capital markets reform effort.  This alert provides an overview of the most significant developments so far, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

A New Playing Field for the Banking Industry: the National Banking Supervisor and Systemic Risk

By: Rebecca H. Laird, Edward G. Eisert, Stanley V. Ragalevsky, Sean P. Mahoney, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Collins R. Clark

On July 22 and 23, 2009, the U.S. Department of Treasury released nine legislative proposals affecting banking institutions and their holding companies.  The various parts of this proposed legislation interact in a manner that, if enacted, will change the banking industry’s playing field in unprecedented ways.  These changes aim to end regulatory arbitrage and minimize systemic risk.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

OTC Derivatives Legislation Continues to Take Form

By: Gordon F. Peery, Lawrence B. Patent, Anthony R.G. Nolan

 Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives in late July 2009 gave the financial services industry a glimpse of legislative initiatives that, if enacted into law, may dramatically transform the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market. Congress will debate the aggressive legislative initiatives detailed in this Alert soon after it reconvenes following its August recess. The initiatives go hand-in-hand with the rest of the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform mandates. In order to understand the importance of the July 2009 initiatives, it is first necessary to briefly review industry, regulatory and legislative efforts to reform the OTC derivatives market earlier this year.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Congress Launches Capital Markets Reforms

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

In the days before adjourning for the week-long Memorial Day Recess, Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed into law three significant pieces of financial services legislation, kicking off what is likely to be the beginning of a comprehensive capital markets reform effort. This piecemeal yet swift approach suggests the manner in which Congress may proceed with financial services reforms moving forward.

Congress Passes Bills on Fraud, Credit Cards, and Mortgages

  • Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act. On May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law S. 386, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA; P.L. 111-21). The legislation, which the Senate approved on May 14 by a voice vote and the House passed on May 18 by a 338-52 vote, provides federal authorities with enhanced funding and expanded powers over a broad range of financial crimes (see K&L Gates Alert Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009). In addition, FERA establishes an independent Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, modeled after the Pecora Commission of the 1930s (see below and K&L Gates Alert A Congressional Investigation of Wall Street Looms).
  • Helping Families Save Their Homes Act. On the same day, President Obama signed into law S. 896, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-22). The bill, which was passed with broad bipartisan support in both the House and the Senate on May 19, enhances the Hope for Homeowners Program and provides the Federal Housing Administration with the authority to engage in foreclosure mitigation programs (for more information about other mortgage-related provisions in the bill, see K&L Gates Alert New Disclosure Obligation Imposed on Assignees ). In addition, the legislation also increases FDIC and National Credit Union Administration borrowing authority and extends the increased $250,000 deposit insurance limit to 2013.  
  • Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act. The same week, Congress passed and the President signed H.R. 627, the Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-24). The legislation, which was also passed with significant bipartisan support in both chambers, bans certain credit card company practices including double-cycle billing and late fees on issuer delayed crediting of payments, prohibits certain changes in interest rates, and requires expanded disclosure of credit card terms and agreements.
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FDIC and OTS Approve Private Equity Group's Acquisition of Failed Thrift, But Guidelines for Commercial Bank Investments Remain Unclear

By: Stanley V. RagalevskySean P. Mahoney

On May 20, 2009, the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) approved the acquisition of a failed thrift institution, BankUnited, FSB, by a group of private equity investors. The FDIC, as receiver of the failed institution, accepted the private equity investors’ bid as the least cost resolution of the failure. In approving the transaction, the OTS permitted the transaction to be structured in a way that allowed the constituent members of the investor group to remain free of the regulatory restrictions that apply to those who control thrift institutions. The transaction thus offers important precedent as to how purchases of failed institutions may be accomplished by private equity firms. It also highlights significant uncertainty regarding private equity investments in commercial banks.

Historically, investors in depository institutions and their holding companies have sought to avoid investments that would be considered “controlling” under the federal banking laws. Control of a depository institution, either directly or indirectly, can lead to limitations on the activities of the controlling company, requirements to support financially the subsidiary depository institution, and also subject transactions between the depository institution and the affiliates of the controlling investor to certain restrictions. Moreover, investors deemed to have “control” of a depository institution generally must register as a bank, financial, or thrift holding company, with ongoing regulation and reporting requirements. These restrictions have discouraged investment in banks and holding companies at a time when these organizations desperately need to attract additional capital. (See also K&L Gates client alert, Non-Controlling Investments in Banking Institutions and Their Holding Companies).

In the BankUnited transaction, the investor group formed two holding companies (a top-tier and an intermediate-level entity) to acquire the bank’s shares, and the holding companies applied for regulatory approval as savings and loan holding companies, which was required to permit them to acquire control of the bank. At the same time, each of the constituent investors – none of whom had beneficial ownership of more than 25 percent of the voting securities of either the holding companies or the bank – disclaimed control of the bank by filing a Rebuttal of Control Agreement, along with a rebuttal of the presumption of control, with the OTS. Significantly, the OTS accepted the investors’ position that the investor group members were not acting in concert. By effectively determining that the act of forming an investment vehicle to acquire control of a bank was not concerted action, OTS appears to have eased the way for private equity club deals to acquire federal savings banks and state-chartered savings banks that elect to be regulated by the OTS.

In its press release announcing the resolution of the BankUnited matter, the FDIC indicated that it would publish guidance on eligibility for non-bank firms to bid on failed banks and the terms and conditions for such investments. Such guidance should prove valuable to private equity firms wishing to bid on failing banks.

Unfortunately, the structure approved in the BankUnited deal, while approved for a savings and loan holding company, may not translate to the commercial bank sector. Commercial bank holding companies are regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”), which specifically declined to adopt guidance on simultaneous minority investments in depository institutions (i.e., “club” deals) in its September 22, 2008 guidance on non-controlling investments in banks. Thus, it remains unclear whether the Federal Reserve would accept, as OTS has, that investment firms could disclaim control when forming a common investment vehicle. This leaves significant uncertainty in the regulatory framework applicable to private equity investments in commercial banks. Also uncertain is the status of the so-called “silo” structure whereby individual investors in a private equity fund can invest in a bank thereby avoiding the private equity fund from taking control of the target bank. The Federal Reserve appears to disfavor the silo structure, and the Bank United order does not provide any guidance to how the OTS and FDIC view it.

Unless and until the Federal Reserve issues guidance on this issue or rules on a transaction similar to the BankUnited deal, it will remain unclear the extent to which groups of private equity firms will be able to take over and recapitalize failing commercial banks.

SEC Chairman Schapiro Defends Agency, Maps Out Strategy for Revival

By: Mark D. Perlow

Congress, the media and the public have subjected the SEC to harsh criticism in recent months, charging that it failed to prevent the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and to detect the long-running Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff. While the accusations are somewhat unfair – banking regulators failed to prevent the insolvency of many large depository institutions, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority also failed to detect the Madoff fraud – these charges have achieved considerable political traction, and many recent proposals for regulatory reform would strip authority from the SEC or merge it into a new or already existing regulatory agency, such as the CFTC.

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, however, has made clear that she intends to assert aggressively the continuing importance and relevance of the agency. In particular, in a recent speech, Chairman Schapiro made the case for the SEC and its distinctive brand of financial regulation. She stated her view that the capital markets require a different type of regulation than do financial institutions, one that is focused on the protection of investors rather than on the safety and soundness of key institutions. She argued that investor protection requires an agency that is independent and experienced in dealing with the capital markets, an implicit criticism of banking regulators as too closely tied to the banks they regulate. She detailed the SEC’s past regulatory achievements, including regulatory regimes that have fostered successful exchanges, clearing agencies, mutual funds, investment advisers and broker-dealers, all of which (other than the largest investment banks) have functioned without a systemic failure during the current crisis. Although she does not put it this way, she is arguing that if the SEC did not exist, it would have to be invented.

Nonetheless, Chairman Schapiro admitted that the SEC has not performed up to expectations recently, and she mapped out the agency’s recent efforts to revitalize itself. First and foremost, she emphasized that the SEC’s enforcement program would be tougher and more efficient. She signaled the SEC’s intention to bring “meaningful cases that have the greatest impact and send a strong message.” In an effort to achieve these goals, the agency has eliminated controversial procedures requiring the staff to get pre-approval of the full Commission to launch a formal investigation or to negotiate settlements that include penalties. In addition, the SEC will engage a consulting firm to help the agency determine how best to sort through the countless tips and complaints it receives each year. The agency will also improve training and hire staff analysts (who may not necessarily be lawyers) with more financial industry experience. These reforms will resonate with practitioners with experience of the bureaucratic ways of the enforcement program. Subjects of SEC investigations can expect to face an even more relentless Division of Enforcement.

Schapiro also summarized some of the key elements of the SEC’s current pipeline of cases, making clear the agency’s intent to bring “message” cases – 150 hedge fund investigations, two dozen municipal securities investigations, and 50 cases involving credit default swaps (“CDS”), collateralized debt obligations and other derivatives. Recently announced enforcement actions have filled out this story further: the SEC has brought several dozen cases against alleged Ponzi schemes; the first insider trading case based on transactions in CDS; a case alleging manipulation of a municipal securities market; a case alleging that an investment adviser did not have adequate procedures to protect against conflicts of interest in its proxy voting procedures; an action against the manager of a money market fund that broke the buck for allegedly inadequate disclosures; and a case against executives of a subprime lender for allegedly misleading investors about the riskiness of its loan portfolio.

As Schapiro pointed out, the SEC also has a full rule-making agenda. In April, it proposed reinstating the short-sale uptick rule (or some variant on it); in May, it proposed a revamp of the client asset custody regime for registered investment advisers, including proposals to require surprise audits and independent compliance reviews, with the clear intent to prevent another Madoff. The SEC has also issued a controversial proposal to provide public company and investment company shareholders with access to the company’s proxy statement both to nominate a short slate of directors and to propose amendments to company nomination process bylaws. Schapiro’s willingness to take up this topic, which has been considered in various forms almost since the creation of the SEC and vigorously opposed by many industry groups, reflects her determination to restore the agency’s reputation with the public by picking a high-profile fight. Later this month, the SEC will propose new rules on money market funds, and is considering an expansion of the municipal pay-to-play rules and municipal securities disclosure, new rules regulating hedge funds, and seeking authority over whistleblower actions.

The Obama Administration has stated that it wants to see Congress pass a financial regulatory bill by the end of the year, and the chairs of the relevant Congressional committees have agreed to this timetable. The SEC is on a mission to demonstrate its importance and competence before the serious legislative sausage-making begins in the fall, all against the backdrop of deep public disillusionment with the financial sector. As one aspect of that campaign, subjects of SEC investigations and examinations, and industries targeted in SEC rulemaking proposals, should expect a tougher fight than at any time in recent memory.

Regulatory Reform and the Mutual Fund Industry

By: Mary C. MoynihanDiane E. Ambler

Although mutual funds have not been implicated as a cause of the financial crisis, many investors have experienced the crisis most directly through the plummeting value of their mutual fund investments. As Washington moves to address the myriad issues arising from the crisis, the mutual fund industry should expect to see changes that will directly affect how funds—and their advisers, distributors and custodians—do business. Changes of particular interest to the mutual fund industry are discussed below.

Change to Primary Regulator for Registration of Mutual Funds, Broker-Dealers and Advisers
Lawmakers are considering several configurations for a new regulatory regime. These include consolidation of the SEC with the CFTC—although Barney Frank, the powerful chair of the House Financial Services Committee, has expressed doubts as to whether such consolidation will happen. Another idea involves the creation of a financial products safety commission. Whether that proposal will take hold is unclear, although key Democrats in the Senate and House have submitted a bill to create the commission. Even if it were created, the White House is reported to support a plan under which the new financial products safety commission would focus on consumer products such as mortgages and credit cards, but would not have jurisdiction over securities (and therefore mutual funds), which would instead be regulated by the new agency resulting from a merger of the SEC and CFTC. Because the proposals are likely to trigger a turf war in Congress and among the affected agencies, it is still too early to predict the outcome. Lawmakers are also still waiting for final proposals from the Obama administration.

Money Market Funds
Money market funds have drawn closer regulatory scrutiny since the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck in September, spurring large-scale redemptions from money market funds with large institutional investor bases and a guarantee program from the U.S. Treasury. While the Group of 30 proposed earlier this year that funds that maintain a stable $1 NAV be regulated as special purpose banks, this proposal does not seem to have gained traction. However, a consensus has developed on the need to tighten the rules governing money market funds’ portfolio assets’ credit quality, maturity and liquidity. The first detailed proposal came in March from a task force convened by the Investment Company Institute, which included proposals to (1) impose daily and weekly minimum liquidity requirements; (2) stress test the portfolio; (3) tighten portfolio maturity limits; (4) raise credit quality standards on portfolio investments; (5) address client concentration risks; (6) disclose portfolio investments monthly; (7) require additional risk disclosures; (8) authorize suspending redemptions for several days for failing funds; and (9) establish a nonpublic reporting scheme to regulators for all money market investors. The SEC has not yet produced a detailed proposal. However, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has made clear that the SEC will propose tougher rules later this month that will “extend beyond” the ICI task force proposals. The staff is examining the credit quality, maturity and liquidity provisions currently applicable to money market funds and considering whether more fundamental changes are needed, including floating rate net asset values for money market funds.

“Proxy Access” and “Say on Pay”
In May, the SEC proposed a new “proxy access” rule that would set a tiered system under which shareholders may nominate candidates for election to boards of directors. For example, for companies with a market cap of $700 million or more, shareholders owning at least 1% of the voting securities would be eligible to nominate directors. By some estimates, this could increase by three or four times the number of contested director elections that funds must evaluate in exercising proxies. In addition, funds themselves would be subject to the proposed rule, which would allow shareholders to nominate fund directors. Finally, funds with ownership positions in excess of the thresholds would need to determine whether they should be proposing director candidates for portfolio companies. These proposals would transform a fund’s traditional analysis of “buy vs. sell” and force new decision-making concerning voting and management. Also in May, Senators Charles Schumer and Maria Cantwell introduced a “shareholder bill of rights” that would require non-binding shareholder votes on how executives are paid. The bill is not likely to pass in its current form but, particularly in view of the action taken earlier this year by the House to limit compensation of recipients of TARP money, any reform package is likely to include some corporate governance component.

Emerging Best Practices Relating to Risk Management
Many fund advisers and boards are examining whether the events of the past year suggest that they need additional risk monitoring programs to evaluate risk elements in the portfolio and the adviser’s organization. There is no “one size fits all” answer to the risk management puzzle, and the precise actions that a fund family and its board should take with respect to risk assessment are highly subjective and based on many different factors, including the nature of the fund family’s investments, experience with risk, organizational structure, and nature of investors. Nonetheless, the SEC has indicated that risk will be a central concern, suggesting that advisers may need to develop a more robust approach to risk management and that fund boards may wish to consider creating a risk management oversight committee or adding responsibility for risk oversight to an existing committee, such as compliance or investment performance.

Target Date Funds
In a May speech to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum, SEC Chair Schapiro stated that the SEC is closely examining target date funds due to concerns with performance of the funds during the market decline. As these funds approach their “target” date, their asset allocations should move toward a more conservative allocation, often referred to as a fund's “glide path.” Some funds may have established more aggressive glide paths based on the assumption that investors would continue to maintain their investments, and partially live off the proceeds following retirement. This could be particularly problematic for a target date fund underlying a college investment plan, since those investors would need to access their investment at or near the fund’s target date. Chairman Schapiro stated that the SEC staff would be closely reviewing target date funds’ disclosure about their glide paths and asset allocations, examining whether the same target date funds underlie both retirement and college savings plans and considering whether the target dates in some funds’ names are misleading. Chairman Schapiro also challenged fund directors to review their funds’ allocations between asset classes.

Custody of Client Assets by Investment Advisers
Following the Madoff scandal, the SEC has moved swiftly to propose new rules governing the custody of client funds held by all registered investment advisers. The proposed rules would require advisers to undergo an annual surprise examination by an independent public accountant to verify client assets. In the case of assets that are not maintained by an independent qualified custodian, the rules would require a “SAS-70” report from an independent public accountant registered with and inspected by PCAOB that includes an opinion covering controls over custody of client assets. The proposed rules would not apply to custody of assets held by mutual funds, but would affect advisers with respect to other classes of client funds.

When the dust settles, the investment management landscape will undoubtedly be much changed. Mutual funds will likely be subject to new rules, regulated by a reconstituted regulator, and, especially if hedge funds and other unregulated entities face more regulation, will encounter a new competitive environment. Industry participants should closely monitor these developments and may wish to provide input into policy choices that will have direct implications for them and their investors.

"The Days of Big Bonuses are Over ..."

By: Daniel Wise

So said Gordon Brown in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis that shook the City in October of last year. This sentiment has been echoed by the Treasury Committee’s report published on 15 May which stated that “bonus driven remuneration structures led to a lethal combination of reckless and excessive risk taking.” As the recession begins to deepen in the UK, unemployment continues to rise and city financiers lick their wounds following a record low bonus round this year, a web of employment law issues arise out of employer reaction to this paradigm shift in the financial markets.

Primary among these are issues as to the legality of City employers’ attempts to slash bonus awards or recoup payments already received, and how to shape the bonus elements of remuneration structures in senior level service contracts to reflect changes in the expectations of both employers and employees in an environment that has grown intolerant of the fat cat/big bonus City culture.

Bonus Litigation
Hundreds of staff members at Dresdner Kleinwort have lodged claims to recover tens of millions of pounds in unpaid bonuses resulting from the decision of its new owner, Commerzbank, to slash compensation payouts. A raft of similar claims are expected against other financial institutions as employers come under increased commercial pressure to reduce or eliminate bonus payments, particularly in circumstances where organisations are now effectively Government run.

Depending on the specific employer bonus structure, the legal ramifications of trimming such bonus payments may be significant. Many employers will have established contractual obligations to certain levels of bonus payment in recent years, either through custom and practice, or as a part of negotiated service agreements to attract particular stars in the financial community. For example, many banks in recent years have introduced a “Golden Hello” scheme to new joiners, guaranteeing a minimum level of bonus for all or a portion of their first bonus year, regardless of performance during that period. These payments are designed to compensate new recruits for the bonus they have lost leaving their previous employer midway through a bonus year. A refusal to honour such a contractual provision will almost certainly be unlawful.

Another common trend that has developed in the City in recent years has been to link bonuses to performance targets, creating an irreducible contractual entitlement once these personal performance targets are hit, irrespective of the bank’s overall performance. These targets are often short term, and often paid out in lump sum cash awards. Despite the current climate and the potential difficulties banks are now facing, if such bonuses are not paid in circumstances where performance targets have been hit, again the employee is likely to have a strong claim for the recovery of this sum.

Thus where banks have bowed to commercial pressure to reduce bonuses as a result of a disastrous bonus year and a pessimistic financial forecast for 2009, the Courts may well rule against them, given the case law in recent years in favour of an employee’s contractual entitlement to certain levels of bonus payment irrespective of the economic climate and/or the strength of the particular bank’s financial position.

When addressing the restructure of bonus schemes for future years, many UK employment lawyers caution against changing too much too quickly, although in the current economic climate many financial institutions will have no choice. For example, adoption of the recent FSA Code’s principles and replacing what was previously a contractual bonus structure with deferred bonus scheme, may cause wholesale team moves to competing institutions along with a raft of constructive unfair dismissal claims from departing employees arising out of the bank’s breach of its implied duty of trust and confidence. However, the financial landscape will also be a major factor in assessing the commercial risk of these claims being brought. If either the majority of other banks are unwilling to take on new recruits or are adopting similar schemes for their employees, there will be little practicable risk of this legal consequence.

Repaying a Bonus
The clarion call through both the press and in political circles for high-profile, senior-level executives to repay bonuses which have already been awarded also throws up some interesting issues for UK employment lawyers. One individual who bowed to public pressure and repaid a substantial bonus is Michael Fingleton, chief executive of Irish Nationwide, who in March of this year voluntarily returned his €1 million bonus awarded for 2008. In his statement to the press at the time. Mr. Fingleton was at pains to point out that the bonus was “a contractual and binding agreement... which [he] was legally entitled to receive….” His move came in response to both political and commercial pressure, rather than as a consequence of any legal obligation to do so. This is of course correct. In circumstances of this kind, particularly where payment of the bonus is pursuant to a contractual entitlement, any employer’s remedies against senior executives to compel repayment are limited, unless specific contractual provision has been made for this within the service agreement. In circumstances of alleged regulatory breach by a financial institution, employers are in a much weaker position in the UK than in the US, where the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires certain levels of senior executives to repay incentive based remuneration in specific instances of securities law breaches.

Making provision for a contractual term forcing repayment in these circumstances is now an issue that many UK banks are grappling with. The move to include such a term is not without its difficulties.

Firstly, the UK law on penalty clauses will cause such a contractual provision to be unenforceable if it provides for repayment of a bonus as a result of a breach of contract and the repayment is deemed to be a penalty. In determining this, a Court will consider whether the payment is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered by the bank arising out of the breach or simply a penalty. If it is the latter, the clause will be unenforceable. However, case law on this subject suggests that where there is a bona fide attempt to pre-estimate loss, such a clause may be upheld, despite the fact that the figures differ from the actual loss caused.

Secondly, the purpose behind the clause must be to compensate the employer rather than to act as a deterrent. It is often the case in a financial context that breach by a senior executive could lead to substantial monetary losses, and in circumstances where such losses far exceed the amount required to be repaid by the director it will be easy for the employee to suggest the repayment was not to compensate the bank, but to act as a deterrent. Whilst it is possible to put together a sliding scale of repayment which is directly linked to loss flowing from the breach, persuading a senior executive to sign up to such a clause may well be an unsurpassable hurdle to any subsequent challenge.

Thirdly, proving that the breach occurred is often a practical difficulty in consequent litigation, particularly in the context of complex financial dealing structures where a Court is asked to determine the reasonableness of a decision arrived at based on complex assessments of commercial risk. This hurdle can often make such a clause unworkable.

An alternative approach to clauses of this kind is to avoid any linkage with a breach of contract by connecting a repayment obligation to external measures of some kind. These alternative contractual terms are commonly known as “no fault” repayment agreements. These provisions eliminate the risk of being struck down as a penalty clause, and can provide the employer with the ability to require repayment in various different circumstances, including when the bank itself has performed particularly badly in any given year. Whilst it is important that such clauses are drafted to ensure that sufficient clarity exists to allow them to be enforceable, other than this drafting hurdle such a clause can be relatively effective.

Employers generally have not previously used such clauses due to a concern that such a provision in a bank’s standard service agreement may deter strong senior executives from joining. However, depending on the mood of the general public going forward, both in the US and the UK, as well as an increased scarcity of positions at a senior level, banks may well find themselves in much stronger negotiating positions when drafting senior level service agreements.

Some of the suggested models for recovering all or a portion of a bonus already paid without linking this repayment request to contractual breach have been discussed in the context of clawback provisions which are also referred to in the FSA Code. The three common types of clause are as follows:

  • Clawbacks due to over-estimated performance - Such a clause can be used when a bonus is linked directly to performance conditions or performance is one of the criteria taken into account when awarding a discretionary payment. The clawback provision will be operative where the performance criteria were initially thought to be satisfied but later turned out to have been overstated. This clause will be effective provided it is exercised objectively and reasonably.
  • Clawbacks for negative developments - This provision is triggered by certain specified negative developments occurring within a set period after the bonus is paid. The negative development should be something which is not personally linked to the employee but rather an objective development such as the bank announcing a major loss.
  • Clawbacks for unrecognised breach at the time of payments - This form of provision is not as safe legally given its close nexus to the penalty clause principle. However, case law suggests that such a clawback provision which becomes operative when an employer discovers serious breach by the employee (which occurred prior to payment of a bonus) may well be enforceable, and will not be struck down as an unenforceable penalty clause.

The extent to which some or all of these contractual measures will become commonplace will in a large part be shaped by global trends, and in particular the US’s reaction. Now that the world’s key financial centres are so closely aligned, it would be foolhardy to approach these sorts of issues as isolated domestic problems, and any reaction and/or solution will almost inevitably follow the tide of global opinion.

No Lazy Days of Summer for the Consumer Credit Industry

By: Steven M. KaplanKerri M. Smith

The consumer credit industry has been subject to legislative and regulatory changes occurring at a dizzying velocity.

On May 22, 2009, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 became law, amending the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) to establish fair and transparent practices relating to the extension of open-end consumer credit plans and gift cards. TILA also was amended in the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, signed two days prior. Further, on that May 20, 2009 date, President Obama issued a Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies directing federal agencies to take appropriate action if preemption regulations do not meet certain requirements, which could affect almost every segment of the consumer finance industry.

Federal regulators have also been active. For example, the Federal Trade Commission initiated rulemaking proceedings on June 1, 2009 to address unfair and deceptive practices in the mortgage industry, as required by Congress’ 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act. Concurrently, the federal financial institution regulatory agencies are issuing proposed rules requiring mortgage loan originators who are employees of agency-regulated institutions to meet the registration requirements of the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008.

While the industry scrambles to come to grips with the array of new requirements, two of the issues garnering much attention are the residential mortgage loan servicer safe harbor and the new TILA disclosure obligations on purchasers of residential mortgage loans, found in the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (“the Act”).

The servicer safe harbor, as discussed in section 201 of the Act, provides that a mortgage loan servicer will be shielded from liability from any party to whom it owes a duty “to maximize the net present value,” based solely on its implementation of a “qualified loss mitigation plan” (“QLMP”), so long as that QLMP is deemed to be in the best interest of all investors or other parties. The Act determines that a servicer acts in the best interest of all investors (again, when it has an express duty to maximize net present value) if it makes a QLMP where: (1) default has occurred, is imminent, or reasonably foreseeable, as those terms are defined in the Department of Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Plan guidelines (“HAMP”); (2) the property is occupied by the debtor as a primary residence; and (3) the servicer reasonably determines, consistent with HAMP, that a QLMP for a particular property or a class of properties will result in greater principal recovery than foreclosure of that property. Further, the Act defines a QLMP as a plan described or authorized by the HAMP, or a refinancing under the federal Hope for Homeowners program. It may surprise some, but the new servicer safe harbor contains no express provisions regarding the superseding of contractual restrictions. The ambiguity is even more pronounced when compared to the House’s safe harbor provision in H.R. 1106, which was not enacted into law, but which did contain such express provisions.

Meanwhile, the Act also provides that purchasers of residential mortgage loans have affirmative disclosure obligations to consumers, and subjects them to civil liability if they fail to comply. The statute provides that it is effective upon enactment, which means that the first disclosures are required by Friday, June 19, 2009. One of the fundamental questions regarding this obligation, however, is which purchasers are subject to this new disclosure obligation.

Section 404 of the Act amends TILA to provide that “a creditor that purchases or is assigned a mortgage loan must notify the borrower in writing of a sale or transfer of his or her mortgage loan, not later than 30 days after the transaction’s completion.”  The notice must include the following information:

  • the identity, address, and telephone number of the new creditor;
  • the transfer date;
  • how to reach an agent or party having authority to act on behalf of the new creditor;
  • the location of the place where transfer of ownership of the debt is recorded; and
  • any other relevant information regarding the new creditor.

The Act’s use of the term “creditor” to describe the “new owner” conflicts with TILA’s preexisting definition of creditor as the one to whom the loan was “originally payable.” This conflict in statutory terms makes it very difficult for the mortgage industry to know who must comply with the new law. Additionally, there are several other ambiguities contained in the new disclosure requirement, including whether the obligation should apply to so-called short-term transfers and the specific information that must be included in the disclosure.

Some might say that in the policy makers’ wish to enact legislation, clarity was compromised. Thus, we hope that future laws and regulations will be clearer than those recently enacted. If federal policymakers continue regulating at this fast pace, credit industry participants may need to swap their beach reading for copies of the Federal Register and the Congressional Record.

TALF Investments: Progress and Political Risk

By: Anthony R.G. Nolan

The Term Asset-Backed Securities Liquidity Facility (“TALF”) was announced in February 2009 and first implemented in the following month. As an emergency lending facility established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “New York Fed”) pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, TALF provides non-recourse term financing for the purchase of highly rated asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities at attractive rates. Although it is backed by a $200 billion credit facility from the Treasury, it is not considered a TARP program subject to the Emergency Economic Stimulus Act of 2009 (“EESA”). However, because of the involvement of the New York Fed in the program as well as its close association with TARP, prospective borrowers have had to weigh the political risks of their involvement and the extent to which governmental authorities could access information about their activities and their investors. 

In the first three subscriptions that occurred in March, April and May 2009, TALF borrowings financed approximately $16 billion in newly issued asset-backed securities, facilitating over $24 billion in issuance of asset-backed securities. After a slow start, and considerable hesitation by investors over participating in the April subscription owing to political and other risks, the TALF program appears to have come into its own in the May subscription, with approximately $10.5 billion of TALF subscriptions facilitating the issuance of approximately $13.5 billion of TALF eligible securities. Subscriptions for the June funding appear to be on track to increase substantially from the May subscription level.

The acceleration of TALF subscriptions reflects several factors. These include

  • expansion of the scope of asset classes eligible for TALF funding;
  • clarification by the New York Fed and the Treasury that private TALF participants are not (without more) subject to the executive compensation restrictions of the EESA;
  • increased experience with the TALF subscription process and the streamlining of TALF borrowing logistics, which increased the comfort level of investors and others with the program; and
  • the sense that TALF was a constructive force in the markets for asset-backed securities and consumer credit.

These considerations acted to counter prospective participants’ concerns about political risk, which appeared to have come to a peak following the disclosure in March 2009 that employees of AIG Financial Products had been paid $165 million in retention bonuses after the company had received TARP funds. However, recent political and legislative developments may make it more likely that Congress will obtain information about TALF investment funds and their investors through audits of the New York Fed or of TALF borrowers by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).  This concern may dampen the willingness of funds to borrow under TALF to the extent that spreads on TALF-eligible ABS continue to compress to a point where perceived risks outweigh rewards.

The contractual path of transparency is familiar to participants in the TALF borrowing process. Section 11.1 of the TALF Master Loan and Security Agreement (the “MLSA”) authorizes the Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”) to obtain reports or statements that it reasonably requests with respect to the borrowing and the collateral. Section 11.3 of the MLSA also authorizes the New York Fed to obtain “know-your-customer” (“KYC”) information submitted by a borrower to the primary dealer acting as its agent for TALF borrowings.

Primary dealers have recently been expanding the scope of KYC diligence required for TALF investment funds to “look through” the fund to get information about investors who own (directly or indirectly) 10% or more of a class of securities in the fund.  The extent of the look-through varies among dealers, with different formulations covering direct, intermediate and/or ultimate owners of the borrower. KYC information is typically given to dealers under confidentiality restrictions, and the MLSA obligates the New York Fed to comply with any confidentiality restrictions.  However, the New York Fed is permitted to disclose any information it receives to oversight bodies (including Congress) to the extent required by applicable law or regulations or by subpoena.  Once so disclosed, information given in confidence may become publicly available.  Therefore, the scope of KYC disclosure that TALF investment funds make to their primary dealers could be a crucial issue for direct and indirect investors in those funds.

The increasing level of KYC diligence has coincided with expressions of concern by the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, in its April report to Congress, that a look-through is appropriate to ensure that TALF not be used to leverage proceeds of crime. Even though TALF is not a TARP program, policymakers and enforcement agencies have been concerned about moral hazard implications of non-recourse TALF borrowings (at a 6-1 leverage ratio) by public-private investment funds established under the Treasury’s Public-Private Investment Program (“PPIP”). This moral hazard arises from the potential of such leverage to dilute the risk of loss of private equity investors in PPIP funds even beyond the dilution implicit in the Treasury’s co-investments in the equity of those vehicles. To the extent that private parties have limited “skin in the game,” they may have disincentives to conduct appropriate due diligence on financed assets or establish a fair price, which could harm a fundamental taxpayer protection in the design of TALF and PPIP by potentially exposing the public purse, as represented by the New York Fed and the Treasury, to a heightened risk of loss.

Recent legislative developments may also be providing a separate avenue to disclosure of information about investors in TALF funds.  Section 8.01(d) of the enrolled version of Senate bill S.896 (Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009) permits the GAO to conduct audits, including onsite examinations, of any action taken by the Board under the authorizing legislation for TALF “with respect to a single and specific partnership or corporation.”  Section 8.01(c) of that bill provides that it may obtain access to any entity receiving TALF funding in connection with such audits.  A separate bill introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R.1207 (Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009), provides for a report to Congress with respect to GAO audits of the Board.  It appears that sponsors of this legislation conceive of it as a basis for Congress to obtain information with respect to TALF borrowers and their investors.

New CFTC Proposals Address New FCM Capital Requirements for Cleared OTC Transactions, and New Investment Restrictions for Customer Margin Funds

By: Lawrence B. PatentCharles R. Mills

Recent rule proposals of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") continue the agency’s interest in securing a stronger regulatory grip on over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives and protection of customer deposits of futures margin. While it is not surprising that the CFTC would consider such amendments in light of recent economic conditions, the proposals could have the effect of further decreasing the number of future commission merchants ("FCMs"), as well as leading to less-well-capitalized FCMs, and resulting in reduced liquidity in the system just as clearing of OTC derivatives becomes more prevalent.

The proposals would mandate that an FCM’s minimum capital requirements treat cleared OTC transactions in a manner equivalent to exchange-traded transactions. In the same release, the CFTC requested comment on whether to increase the minimum adjusted net capital for firms dually-registered as FCMs and securities broker-dealers ("BDs") to equal the combined (aggregate) net capital requirements of the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Currently, these dually-registered firms need only maintain the greater of the amounts required by the CFTC or SEC.

In the October 24, 2008 issue of this Newsletter, we reported on a CFTC interpretation published on October 2, 2008, which states that, in an FCM bankruptcy, claims related to OTC contracts cleared by a derivatives clearing organization ("DCO") will be entitled to the same preferential treatment as claims that are based upon exchange-traded futures contracts. The CFTC’s rule proposals published May 7, 2009 provide that an FCM’s required adjusted net capital include an amount equal to ten percent of the maintenance margin level of customer and non-customer cleared OTC derivative positions. FCMs also would be required to take the same haircuts on proprietary cleared OTC derivative positions that are required for exchange-traded futures and options: 100 percent of maintenance margin if the FCM is a member of the clearing organization, and 150 percent if the FCM is not a member.

Incorporating Cleared OTC Positions Into Minimum Financial Requirements
The proposed amendments would apply to OTC derivatives, including credit default swaps, that are submitted for clearing on any (1) U.S. DCO, (2) non-U.S. clearing organization permitted to clear such transactions under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction, (3) multilateral clearing organization authorized under Section 409 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, which could also be non-U.S., or (4) securities clearing organization. The CFTC stated that it is proposing these amendments because DCOs have become significant clearers of OTC derivatives and that this development has increased the risk exposure of FCMs in a manner not currently reflected in CFTC regulations. The proposed amendments, however, would extend to OTC derivatives beyond those cleared by DCOs and held in segregated customer accounts, and thereby include OTC derivatives other than those whose holders are to be accorded preferential treatment in the event of the FCM’s bankruptcy.

The idea underlying the CFTC’s proposal – that enhanced capital requirements might be thought to provide greater customer and systemic protections against the risk of defaults by FCMs – must be examined and weighed against the fact that higher financial requirements for FCMs in a poor economy could reduce the number of FCMs participating in clearing OTC transactions, thereby reducing liquidity and concentrating systemic risk among fewer market participants. The CFTC’s proposals might also provide an incentive for FCMs not to submit OTC positions for clearing if the capital impact would be too severe, and may also cause customers to avoid clearing as well if clearing fees would be increased.

Minimum Capital Requirements for FCM/BDs
Although the CFTC did not propose a specific amendment to its regulations concerning the minimum adjusted net capital required for dually-registered FCM/BDs, it solicited comments on whether to change that level from the greater of to the sum of the amounts required by CFTC and SEC. The CFTC explained that it was soliciting comments on this issue because, in the event of liquidation, an FCM/BD’s assets would be available to satisfy any unsecured claims of creditors, including any unsecured claims of futures and securities customers. Requiring that an FCM/BD maintain the sum of the CFTC and SEC minimums would, in the CFTC’s view, reflect more fully the scope of customer business and increase the “equity available to satisfy . . . unsecured claims of customers.”

The CFTC proposal presumes that, if capital requirements are increased, enterprises would continue to organize themselves so that futures and securities business is conducted through a single entity. Currently, a BD may decide that it makes sense to operate its futures business through the same legal entity, because such business is normally smaller than its securities business, and where that is the case, such a structure does not increase its minimum capital requirement (i.e., under the “greater of” formulation, the SEC minimum will exceed the CFTC minimum and the futures business can be done “for free”). However, if that is no longer the case, and a dually-registered firm would experience an increase in its minimum capital requirement, the BD may decide to establish a subsidiary or affiliate that would be registered as an FCM with a relatively modest amount of capital as compared to that maintained by FCM/BDs. If so, and if the separate FCM were forced to liquidate in bankruptcy, there would likely be fewer assets available to satisfy unsecured creditor claims, including unsecured customer claims, than would be the case if the firm were an FCM/BD. A change from the “greater of” standard to a “sum of” requirement could therefore result in fewer assets available to creditors in a bankruptcy.

Comments on the proposal are due by July 6, 2009.

Investment of Customer Funds
The CFTC also recently issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning the investment of customer funds, which was published in the Federal Register on May 22, 2009. The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEAct") specifies that customer funds related to futures and options traded on a U.S. contract market may be invested by FCMs and DCOs only in U.S. government securities and municipal securities. Nevertheless, beginning in 2000, the CFTC used its general exemptive authority under Section 4(c) of the CEAct to permit the investment of customer funds in other instruments, including government sponsored enterprise securities, bank certificates of deposit, commercial paper, corporate notes, general obligations of a sovereign nation, and interests in money market mutual funds ("MMMFs"). Investment of funds of U.S.-located customers related to futures trading on non-U.S. exchanges is governed by CFTC Regulation 30.7, which does not limit the type of investment of such funds, but requires that an FCM maintain records that include a description of the obligations in which such investments were made.

CFTC Regulation 1.25, which governs the investment of customer funds related to trades made on U.S. contract markets, contains a general prudential standard that all permitted investments be “consistent with the objectives of preserving principal and maintaining liquidity.” The CFTC has been mindful of how important the earnings on investment of customer funds are to the net income of FCMs and thus had been open during the earlier part of this decade to an expansion of permissible investments. The CFTC noted that FCMs have managed the investment of customer funds and Regulation 30.7 funds responsibly during the recent economic downturn. However, the CFTC cited the market events of the past year, notably the failures of certain government sponsored enterprises, difficulties encountered by certain MMMFs in honoring redemption requests, illiquidity of certain adjustable rate securities, and turmoil in the credit ratings industry, as challenges to many of the fundamental assumptions regarding investment of customer funds. Although the CFTC in its advance notice states that it “welcomes comments . . . in support of any new instruments that might qualify as permitted investments,” the general tenor of the notice is directed towards soliciting comments concerning retaining, rescinding, or modifying existing authority. It would appear that the expansion of permissible investments is over.

The CFTC also is soliciting comment about applying the standards of Regulation 1.25 to Regulation 30.7, so that investment of customer funds related to trades on non-U.S. exchanges would be subject to the same limits applicable to funds related to trades on U.S. contract markets.

Any new restrictions on the investment of customer funds are likely to further squeeze the bottom line of FCMs, and contribute to a further contraction in the number of FCMs, which has been cut almost in half over the last 14 years (from 255 in August 1995 to 134 as of the end of 2008).

Comments are due by July 21, 2009.

Conclusion
It is not surprising that the CFTC would consider amendments to its regulations governing minimum capital requirements and the investment of customer funds following recent economic conditions. The proposals and requests for comment referred to above, however, could have the effect of further decreasing the number of FCMs, leading to less-well-capitalized FCMs, and resulting in a diminution of liquidity in the system just as clearing of OTC derivatives becomes more prevalent and desired, and even mandatory.

Financial Stability Plan Begins to Take Shape

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

On February 10, 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner outlined the Obama Administration’s plan to address the financial crisis.  The Financial Stability Plan (FSP) represents a shift from the previous Administration’s implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which focused largely on capital injections into financial institutions under the Capital Purchase Plan (CPP).  In addition to continuing capital injections, the FSP expands efforts to increase consumer and small business lending, will create a public-private investment fund to purchase toxic assets from banks, and includes a housing support and foreclosure mitigation component. 

Capital Assistance Program
The Treasury Department will continue to make TARP equity investments in certain financial institutions through the Capital Assistance Program (CAP).  Under CAP, the 19 largest banking institutions with assets over $100 billion will be required to participate in a coordinated supervisory forward-looking capital assessment (i.e., a “stress test”) to determine whether the firm has the capital necessary to continue lending and to absorb future losses.  If Treasury determines that a firm has inadequate capital, it will have six months to raise it privately, and if it does not succeed, it will be compelled to take CAP funds.  Banking institutions with consolidated assets of less than $100 billion will also be eligible for CAP funds.  Eligibility is consistent with the criteria and process established for CPP. 

Capital provided under CAP will be in the form of cumulative mandatorily convertible preferred stock and will carry a nine percent dividend yield.  The security will be convertible into common equity, at the issuer’s option, at a ten percent discount to the price prevailing prior to February 9, 2009; however, the security will automatically be converted into common equity if it has not been redeemed or converted after seven years.  Treasury will place its capital investments in a newly created entity, the Financial Stability Trust, and will publicly disclose its CAP investments on the Internet.  At this time, CAP is only available to publicly traded qualifying financial institutions.  The deadline for applying is May 25, 2009.

Consumer and Small Business Lending
The FSP aims to increase consumer and small business lending through a massive expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) from $200 billion to $1 trillion.  The Treasury will provide $100 billion in TARP funds to backstop the Federal Reserve loan facility. 

Under TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) will provide non-recourse funding to eligible borrowers owning eligible collateral.  Eligible collateral includes certain asset-backed securities (ABS) that have at least two AAA ratings and that have auto loans, student loans, credit card loans, or small business loans as the underlying credit exposure.  The minimum TALF loan amount is $10 million, and the loan will have a three-year term and be subject to either a fixed or a floating interest rate.  In addition, the TALF loans will be subject to haircuts ranging from five to 16 percent, depending on the category of the ABS offered as collateral.  For additional details on TALF, see K&L Gates Newsstand Alerts The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility in Sharper Focus and The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Takes Form.  The initial round of loans will be awarded on March 25, 2009; TALF terms and conditions may be modified for subsequent rounds.  The Federal Reserve has indicated that ABS backed by rental, commercial, and government vehicle fleet leases and ABS backed by small ticket equipment, heavy equipment, and agricultural equipment loans and leases might be made eligible for the April funding of the TALF.

In addition, Treasury and the Small Business Administration (SBA) will launch the Small Business and Community Lending Initiative.  Although details have not yet been announced, initial plans indicate that the Initiative will finance the purchase of AAA-rated SBA loans in an effort to increase liquidity in secondary markets for small business loans and increase SBA loan guarantees up to 90 percent.

Public-Private Investment Fund
The FSP will also create a much-anticipated new Public-Private Investment Fund (Fund) to purchase toxic assets from banking institutions.  The Fund would make these purchases by providing government capital and financing to leverage purchases by private capital.  In addition, the Fund would rely on private sector buyers to price the value of the assets.  The initial scale of the Fund will be $500 billion, but may be expanded up to $1 trillion.  Treasury is expected to release details on the operation of the Fund in the near future.

Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
The FSP also includes a housing component, the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (Plan).  The first pillar of the Plan will support borrowers who have a solid payment history but are unable to refinance their mortgages because their current loan-to-value ratios are above 80 percent due to a loss in home value.  The program would make 4 to 5 million of these homeowners eligible to refinance their existing Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac mortgages at today’s low interest rates.  

The second pillar of the Plan, the $75 billion Homeowner Stability Initiative, creates a mortgage modification program for at-risk homeowners that have loans on owner-occupied properties with unpaid balances up to $729,750.  Loan servicers must enter into a program agreement with Treasury in order to participate.  Participating loan servicers must then apply a net present value (NPV) test on each loan at risk of imminent default or at least 60 days delinquent, unless explicitly prohibited by contract.  If the NPV of the expected cash flow is greater under a modification scenario, the servicer must modify the loan such that the monthly payment is no more than 31 percent of the borrower’s gross monthly income.  In exchange for the modification, the government will:

  • Subsidize the lender or investor for the cost of reducing monthly payments from 38 to 31 percent of gross monthly income;
  • Provide servicers with a $1,000 payment for each modification and an additional $1,000 per year for loans that continue to perform; and
  • Provide payments of $1,500 to lenders or investors and $500 to servicers for modifications made to borrowers that are current on their payments.

Finally, Treasury will increase funding to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through the purchase of preferred stock.  In order to fund this commitment, Treasury will use $200 billion made available under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act.

Additional Conditions
Increasingly, government assistance comes with stricter terms and conditions.  Firms receiving assistance from the FSP will be subject to the following conditions:

  • Recipients will be required to submit lending plans and monthly lending reports.  This information will be publicly disclosed on the website financialstability.gov.
  • Recipients will be required to commit to participating in mortgage foreclosure mitigation programs consistent with Treasury guidelines.
  • Recipients will be restricted from paying quarterly common dividend payments, repurchasing privately-held shares, and pursuing acquisitions until the government’s investment is repaid.
  • Recipients must comply with Treasury’s guidelines on executive compensation, “say on pay” shareholder votes, and luxury purchase disclosure.
  • Recipients are prohibited from certain lobbying activities.

The FSP initiatives will continue to take shape in the coming months as details are released.  The K&L Gates public policy group is closely monitoring these developments on behalf of the firm’s policy clients.

Government Efforts to Prevent Mortgage Foreclosures: Modifications, Refinancings and Cram Downs

By: Laurence E. PlattKerri M. Smith

Using a trio of tools to triage those whom it realistically can seek to help, the federal government has stepped up its efforts to fight residential mortgage foreclosures.   Announcement of the details of the Obama Administration’s Making Home Affordable Program (“the Plan”) on March 4, 2009, makes clear that the federal government will rely on loan modifications, refinancings and cram downs to try to keep borrowers in their homes.  In addition, the recent passage of H.R. 1106, Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (“H.R. 1106” or “the Bill”), by the House of Representatives, bolsters the Plan’s agenda by allowing bankruptcy judges unilaterally to modify mortgage loans, and providing a safe harbor against investor liability for servicers that make loan modifications subject to the Plan. 

While most elements of the Administration’s Plan can proceed without Congressional approval, the House Bill must be passed by the Senate to become law.  No one can tell in advance whether these anti-foreclosure lifelines will work in an increasingly deteriorating economy.  While the individual consumer who ultimately saves his or her home from foreclosure will appreciate the effort, many investors and unemployed borrowers are less hopeful about these measures.

To view our complete alert online, click here.

Forfeiture of Madoff's Assets: Challenges for Victims

By: Richard A. KirbyRebecca L. Kline DubillScott P. Lindsay

On March 12, 2009, Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 counts of a criminal information filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”).  The information seeks forfeiture of all proceeds traceable to the commission of Madoff’s fraud in an amount “exceeding” $170 billion.  Assuming that the government can recover any additional assets through the exercise of its criminal or civil forfeiture powers, questions remain as to whether and how those assets will be distributed to Madoff’s victims.  Two recent large-scale securities fraud cases, Adelphia Communications Corp. and the Bayou Group, illustrate how protracted this process can be for victims.

Criminal forfeiture is a powerful tool that permits the government to seize a defendant’s assets that were used in, or were the fruits of, criminal activity.   The government also has civil forfeiture powers and can seize property related to criminal activity even if it does not belong to a convicted defendant.  Although as a separate matter the trustee appointed by the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (“SIPC”) in the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (“BMIS”) liquidation proceeding is also seeking to recover BMIS assets, the full range of the government’s forfeiture powers are broader than those of the SIPC trustee and may result in additional assets being recovered. 

Typically, forfeited assets are distributed to crime victims in one of two ways: (1) the petition for remission process, in which victims apply for remission from a victims’ fund administered by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”); or (2) restitution, in which the U.S. Attorney General “restores” the forfeited assets to the court overseeing the criminal cases, and the court distributes funds to victims through an order of restitution. 

In the Adelphia case, John and Timothy Rigas were convicted in 2004 on various counts relating to their looting of Adelphia’s corporate assets and forced to forfeit significant personal assets, including their Adelphia stock.   In 2005, pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement, the company that the Rigas’ had controlled, Adelphia, agreed to repurchase this forfeited stock for $715 million, which was paid into a victims’ compensation fund.  This victims’ fund is administered by DOJ under the petition for remission process and has faced substantial litigation over its protocols.  As a result, nearly nine years after the fraud was revealed, no distributions from the fund have yet been made to Adelphia’s creditors or shareholders. 

Bayou involved a $400 million Ponzi scheme.   In their plea allocutions, the Bayou principals agreed to forfeit both personal and corporate assets, including $100 million in Bayou funds, as well as several dozen Bayou investment assets.  The S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s Office appointed a receiver to collect and liquidate the assets so that they could be restored to the court overseeing the criminal proceedings for distribution to victims through an order of restitution.  Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office obtained possession of the $100 million in cash and other investments as a part of the preliminary forfeiture orders, it took almost three years to distribute the forfeited assets to victims.  The restitution process was further complicated and delayed due to litigation initiated by former investors, who had been sued in the Bayou bankruptcy on a clawback theory for return of fictitious profits and principal.  These former investors succeeded in establishing themselves as contingent victims for purposes of the restitution fund. 

If Adelphia and Bayou serve as a guide, it likely could be years before Madoff’s victims receive any distribution of property seized by the government through the exercise of its forfeiture powers.   This may provide an opportunity — given the massive scale of the fraud and the quasi-governmental nature of SIPC — for the government to chart a different course and use the established SIPC liquidation proceeding to distribute any assets it seizes to victims of Madoff’s scheme through a transfer of forfeited assets to the SIPC trustee.  Such a transfer could expedite the ultimate distribution of funds to Madoff’s victims and create certain efficiencies in the processing of claims and the handling of objections.  While it remains to be seen whether the government will be successful in identifying and seizing assets not already under the control of the SIPC trustee, it is not too soon to consider an alternative paradigm to the government’s traditional and slow-working forfeiture distribution mechanisms. 

Stanford Prosecutions Highlight Difficult Issues Posed by Company Counsel's Representation of Employees in Government Investigations

By: Matt T. MorleyMichael D. Ricciuti

The triggering event for the SEC’s action against Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and several of its senior executives appears to have been the abrupt public resignation of the company’s outside counsel.  This occurred the day after SEC testimony by one of Stanford’s executives, Laura Pendergest-Holt.  In apparently making what is known as a “noisy withdrawal,” counsel resigned and disavowed to the SEC all prior statements made by them in the matter.  The SEC promptly filed an action against Stanford and several executives, including Ms. Pendergest-Holt, who was also arrested on obstruction of justice charges.

In connection with the SEC’s investigation, company counsel had represented both the company and Ms. Pendergest-Holt.  According to press reports, counsel told the SEC that he represented the witness “insofar as she is an officer or director of one of the Stanford-affiliated companies.”  In many cases, it is potentially more efficient for company counsel to also represent individual officers and directors in government investigations.  But doing so often poses serious risks for conflict.  Although we do not know, and may never know, what precisely caused counsel to resign in the Stanford case, these events serve as a reminder of the risks involved where several parties share the same lawyers.  In such cases, parties need to consider in advance whether separate counsel should be retained and, if not, what will occur if a conflict subsequently arises.

When law enforcement officials first contact a company, it may seem – and may be the case – that the interests of individual employees are fully aligned with those of their employer. In some cases, at the outset of a criminal or SEC investigation, when the facts and/or the scope and focus of the probe may be unclear, corporate counsel may jointly represent the corporation and its individual officers, directors, and employees.  Pursuant to Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, such joint representation is permissible as long as it does not involve a conflict of interest.  For example, in the event that an individual becomes a “subject” or “target” of an investigation – that is, someone who may be indicted as the result of a criminal probe – joint representation of the company and any such individual is not possible, and the employee will need separate counsel.  Other circumstances, such as the discovery of additional facts, may also give rise to conflicts of interest between the company and its employees.

Indeed, in the internal investigation context, where company counsel represents only the company, employees are ordinarily provided with “Upjohn” warnings, making clear counsel is acting solely for the company, and that while the interview may be subject to the attorney-client privilege, the company and not the employee controls whether to assert that privilege.   Employees are told that the company remains free to waive the privilege and disclose the substance of the interview to third parties, including the government, as part of its effort to cooperate. 

Where company counsel also represents an employee, however, the Upjohn warning doesn’t fit, because counsel also has attorney-client relationships both with the company and with the employee, and the employee’s confidences cannot be revealed without his or her consent.   If the interests of the company and the employee diverge, a number of critical issues will promptly arise.  Counsel will generally be unable to represent both the company and the employee, and a change in representation will be required.  Will the individual be required to get separate counsel?  If that occurs, will company counsel remain free to represent the company?  If so, what will happen to the employee’s confidences that have been shared with company counsel?  Will the company be free to use that information as it chooses?  Will the company be able to disclose this information to the government?  The failure to resolve these questions in advance can harm both the company and the individual involved and thus, in a joint representation, it is wise to reach a clear and common understanding from the outset as to what will happen if the parties develop conflicting interests or objectives. 

These questions take on even greater significance given that, in recent years, it has become increasingly common for the SEC to cooperate closely with criminal authorities.  Documents and witness statements may be shared with criminal prosecutors without notice to the company or its employees – and in the current environment, one should assume that almost any SEC investigation involves criminal charges.  Indeed, press reports indicate that, at the beginning of Ms. Pendergest-Holt’s SEC testimony, counsel tried without success to learn whether there was a parallel criminal investigation in the matter.

No single solution to these issues can fit every situation, but there are a variety of ways to address these issues.  At a minimum, where counsel will represent multiple interests, the engagement letter should spell out the parties’ agreement as to what will happen in the event of a conflict.  Sometimes, individuals may decide to retain “shadow” counsel, who are fully involved in providing advice and preparing for testimony, but who may not make a public appearance in the matter.  In other circumstances, separate counsel may be the best choice.  One thing remains clear – those who become the focus of attention by government authorities need to consider these issues at the very start.

CFTC Nominee Calls for Increased Regulation of Derivatives

By: Lawrence B. Patent

Introduction
Gary Gensler, President Obama’s nominee for Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), testified at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (the “Agriculture Committee”) on February 25, 2009; the Agriculture Committee approved his nomination on March 16.  In his opening statement, he mentioned four priorities that he would pursue if confirmed by the full Senate:  (1) vigorous enforcement to prevent fraud and manipulation in futures and options markets; (2) position limits across all markets and platforms where there is a finite supply of the underlying commodity; (3) generally requiring the clearing and exchange trading of derivative instruments, and direct regulation of derivatives dealers; and (4) working with regulators around the globe to protect Americans impacted by world financial markets.  The first and last of these goals are often cited by nominees to federal regulatory positions, and they are to be expected.  The remainder of this article will focus upon his other goals, those concerning position limits and enhanced regulation of derivatives, which represent a departure from the current regulatory framework yet are in keeping with recent legislative initiatives.

Trading and Clearing of Derivatives
Mr. Gensler’s statements at his confirmation hearing are consistent with some of the recent bills before Congress addressing regulation of derivatives and the energy markets.   Mr. Gensler did acknowledge that his current views may not be consistent with positions that he took as a senior official in the Treasury Department under President Clinton in the late 1990s, leading up to the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).  The CFMA provided greater legal certainty for trading in financial and energy swaps by exempting those instruments (and certain related markets) from regulation by the CFTC or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Mr. Gensler stated that his views have since “evolved” and that there should have been more aggressive regulation of derivatives to protect the American public.  Thus, Mr. Gensler’s current views are generally compatible with the regulatory direction of the provisions of H.R. 977, the “Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009,” addressing over-the-counter (“OTC”) commodity derivatives.  That bill was approved by voice vote of the House Committee on Agriculture on February 12, 2009 (and the subject of a prior K&L Gates Alert).  H.R. 977 would generally require the clearing of all swap transactions, but would leave open the possibility of reporting certain swap transactions to the CFTC if a clearing organization did not want to clear them. 

S. 272, the “Derivatives Integrity Act of 2009,” which was introduced by Senator Harkin (D-Iowa) on January 15, 2009, goes beyond H.R. 977’s requirement for clearing to require that all swaps be traded exclusively on CFTC-regulated exchanges.  That provision would effectively eliminate all OTC transactions in commodity derivatives.  Senator Harkin, who is Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, tried to press Mr. Gensler during the confirmation hearing to support the thrust of his bill.  Although Mr. Gensler indicated that he generally supported the concept of the greater transparency that would be provided by exchange trading and clearing of swaps, he resisted committing to support exchange trading of all swaps with no exceptions.  Mr. Gensler recognized that there could be cases where customized transactions would not fit readily into an exchange-traded, clearinghouse framework, and exceptions might be necessary to accommodate such instruments.  Senator Harkin expressed the view that it would be too easy to vary a particular term of a contract so that it could be labeled as “customized” rather than standardized and thereby permit such instruments to evade the exchange-trading requirement.

Regulation of Financial Swap Dealers
Mr. Gensler did express support for another facet of S. 272 -- the regulation of financial swap dealers (H.R. 977 does not provide for such regulation).  Mr. Gensler stated that the entities involved in financial swap transactions needed to be subject to minimum financial, business conduct and reporting requirements.  He stated that it was not enough for other affiliates of a swap dealer or its corporate parent holding company to be subject to regulation by the CFTC or the SEC; rather, in his view, the entity that is a party to financial swap transactions must itself be subject to minimum financial, business conduct and reporting requirements.  Mr. Gensler indicated that the new requirements would apply to the 15 or 20 swap dealers that are involved in the vast majority of such transactions.  Such a policy reversal would certainly be a large step away from the exemptive framework for swaps under the CFMA.

Position Limits
Mr. Gensler also indicated his support for H.R. 977’s objective of establishing position limits for physically deliverable commodities that have a finite supply.  Part of the original purpose of H.R. 977 when it was introduced last year was to impose speculative limits on energy-related futures and options, because trading in those products has been blamed by many as contributing heavily to the run-up in gasoline prices last summer (although that view is disputed by the CFTC’s Office of Chief Economist and several other studies).  In addition, Mr. Gensler expressed support for the regulation of OTC trading of energy and metals in the same manner as agricultural swaps.  Agricultural swaps currently trade in accordance with CFTC regulations that date back almost 20 years, rather than pursuant to statutory exemptions, which in the case of energy and metals can fully exclude them from the reach of the CFTC.  Accordingly, regulating OTC trading in energy and metals in the same manner as agricultural commodities would confer more power to the CFTC to impose restrictions on such trading.  It appears that Mr. Gensler would not slow down efforts to increase the regulatory scrutiny of energy derivatives.

Relief Requests
Legislation regulating derivatives and imposing new speculative limits will likely take several months to finalize.  Mr. Gensler also noted during his testimony two areas of CFTC procedures that he would want to review that may not require any additional legislative action (although H.R. 977 would mandate that CFTC conduct such a review).  Mr. Gensler indicated that he wants to review any exemptions granted from hedging restrictions and position limits in the past 20 years by the CFTC, and that he also wants to review the “no-action” letter process, which is used, among other purposes, to grant exemptions for foreign energy markets.  Mr. Gensler indicated that some decisions on requests for no-action relief could remain at the staff level, but he implied that certain matters previously handled by staff should be considered by the Commissioners.  The overall message from Mr. Gensler is clear:  his regime as Chairman of the CFTC will tend towards greater regulation and stricter scrutiny of requests for exemption or no-action relief.

Compliance with TARP Executive Compensation Restrictions Subject to SEC Enforcement

By: Brian A. Ochs

A little-noticed recent amendment to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §5221 (“EESA”), may provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with a prominent role in enforcing the executive compensation and corporate governance requirements under the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).  The amendment, which was signed into law on February 17 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “Recovery Act”) (Pub. L. No. 111-5), requires the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or their equivalents) of any public company that receives TARP funds to certify compliance with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance restrictions as part of the company’s annual SEC filing.  Much like the required officer certifications regarding internal controls and disclosure controls that have been part of the legal landscape since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the effect of the EESA certification requirement is to focus personal responsibility for EESA compliance on CEOs and CFOs, with the potential for securities fraud or other charges to be brought by the SEC in the event of false certifications.

EESA and the Treasury Department’s Interim Rules on Executive Compensation
As originally enacted, section 111(b) of EESA directed that any financial institution that sells troubled assets to the Treasury Department must meet certain standards of executive compensation and corporate governance.  These standards included: (1) eliminating incentives for senior executives to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the financial value of the institution; (2) a “clawback” provision for the recovery by the institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on financial statements or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and (3) a prohibition on “golden parachute” payments to senior executive officers.  (Generally, “senior executives” means the five highest paid officers of the company.)

In October 2008 and January 2009, the Treasury Department announced rules to implement the executive compensation requirements of section 111 for participants in the TARP Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”).   (The Treasury Department separately provided guidance for certain other TARP programs.)  Among other things, the January rule required the principal executive officer of each participating financial institution to certify to TARP’s Chief Compliance Officer that the institution was in compliance with the executive compensation requirements set forth in EESA.  The Treasury Department further noted in the January rule that a false certification could subject the certifier to federal criminal penalties for false statements under 18 U.S.C. §1001.  See CPP Executive Compensation Final Rule (Jan. 16, 2009). 

The Recovery Act Amendments
The Recovery Act (Section 7001) expanded the significance of these provisions in several important respects.  First, it directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose new and expanded executive compensation and corporate governance standards on all recipients of TARP funds.   In addition to the restrictions found in the original section 111, these standards must bar payment of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation during the period that a TARP obligation is outstanding (except for payments made in restricted stock comprising no more than one-third of the individual’s total compensation, and not fully vesting during the period that the obligation is outstanding), and must prohibit any compensation plan that would encourage earnings manipulation.  The number of employees to which the new compensation limitations apply varies by provision, in many cases going beyond the original five “senior executive officers” to as many as the next 20 most highly compensated officers.  In addition, the Recovery Act amendments require SEC registrants that receive TARP funds to establish a board compensation committee, comprised entirely of independent directors, and also require boards of directors to implement company-wide policies regarding excessive or luxury expenditures.

Section 7001 of the Recovery Act also requires the CEO and CFO (or their equivalents) of each recipient of TARP funds that has publicly traded securities to “provide a written certification of compliance by the TARP recipient with the requirements of this section … together with annual filings required under the securities laws….”  (Certifications are to be provided to the Secretary of the Treasury if the entity receiving TARP funds is not a publicly traded company.)  The SEC has determined that it will not give effect to the certification requirement until the Secretary of the Treasury establishes standards to implement section 7001 of the Recovery Act.  This approach follows the views expressed by Senator Christopher Dodd, the author of the executive compensation provisions of the Recovery Act, in a February 20 letter to SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro.

Analysis
The requirement that CEO and CFO certifications be filed with a TARP recipient’s annual report to the SEC will unambiguously subject public companies that receive TARP funds and their executives to SEC scrutiny and potential enforcement action for failure to comply with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance requirements.  This is because any material false statement in an SEC filing may be charged as a securities fraud or other securities violation, depending on the actor’s level of intent.  In the current environment, regulators are likely to view a certification that an entity receiving TARP funds is in compliance with requirements concerning executive compensation and corporate governance as being material to investors.  In particularly egregious cases, criminal prosecution for securities fraud could also result.

Further, because the CEO and CFO will each be considered the “maker” of statements in the EESA certifications, these executives could be exposed to personal liability under the securities laws for compliance failures that result in false certifications.  Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most companies have instituted formal procedures such as compliance checklists, sub-certifications by managers with line responsibilities, and disclosure committee reviews, to support the CEO and CFO certifications required by that Act.  Entities that receive TARP funds will need to consider implementing similar structured processes to support the CEO’s and CFO’s annual certifications under EESA.
 

Damages Theories for Financial Institutions Injured by Changes in Government Regulation

By: David T. CaseBrendon P. Fowler 

With the nearly unparalleled upheaval in world financial markets and the resulting impact on the nation’s financial institutions, many entities have either gone bankrupt or become subject to increasing levels of Government intervention, regulation, and oversight.   The Government also continues to consider actions to address “toxic” assets and to stimulate financial activity.  While Government action may ultimately lead the way to financial recovery for the broad economy, in some instances the Government may take actions, such as changing federal regulatory schemes and related contracts, that nonetheless inflict harm on individual companies.  In those situations, developments in a series of cases relating to an earlier financial crisis may provide guidance in navigating the risks of increased Government regulation and oversight, and the measure of any damages that might be recovered. 

During the Great Depression, forty percent of the nation’s home mortgages went into default, and 1,700 of the nation’s approximately 12,000 savings institutions failed.   This led to significant Government oversight of the savings and loan, or "thrift" industry, in the form of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as well as the passage of numerous laws such as the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933.  This regulatory regime remained in place until the financial crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when, in order to retain deposits, thrifts were compelled to offer interest rates to depositors that exceeded the stream of income from the thrifts’ long-term, low-rate mortgages.  Over 400 thrift institutions failed by 1983, and by the mid-1980s, it became clear that Government regulatory efforts to resolve the crisis were not succeeding.  As a result, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), which resulted in regulations that imposed more stringent capital standards on thrifts.  Many thrifts, particularly ones that had acquired failed thrifts under agreements with the Government, were immediately thrown out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements and became subject to seizure by thrift regulators. 

A number of thrifts adversely affected by the new regulations sued the Government, alleging that the passage of FIRREA breached the contracts under which the thrifts had previously agreed to acquire other failed institutions.  In United States v. Winstar Corporation, 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996), the Supreme Court held that where the Government entered into contracts with regulated financial institutions, promising to provide particular regulatory treatment in exchange for the assumption of liabilities, the risk of regulatory change fell to the Government, even though Congress subsequently changed the law and barred the Government from honoring its agreements.  Following this ruling, the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed a series of cases where the allegations were that the Government had indeed breached its contractual obligations to various thrifts through the passage of FIRREA.  This group of cases, which is often denoted as the “Winstar-related cases,” may provide significant guidance for any cases that derive from the present crisis.

As a general matter, damages in the Winstar-related cases are based on one of three damages theories:   expectancy damages, reliance damages, or restitution damages. 

Expectancy, or “lost profit” damages, protect a bank’s expectation interest by seeking to put that institution in as good a position as it would have been had the institution’s contract with the Government been fully performed, without also providing plaintiff with a windfall.   If successful, this theory for recovery typically produces the largest quantum of damages for an injured bank, but lost profits have historically been difficult to prove and recover in the Winstar-related context.  Nevertheless, a recent Winstar-related decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) upheld the trial court’s acceptance of a lost profits theory that established, by way of expert testimony and models, that the Government’s implementation of FIRREA caused lost profit damages to the affected thrift.  See First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Rochester v. United States, 290 Fed. Appx. 349, 2008 WL 3822567 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The injured thrift established with reasonable certainty its lost profits of $85 million to the satisfaction of the courts, and the Federal Circuit upheld the trial court’s reliance on plaintiff’s damages expert, and the projections of the growth (and profits) the thrift would have experienced absent the Government breach.  Id. at 357.

Reliance damages, often sought or pled in the alternative to expectation damages, are intended to address harm resulting from the thrift’s change of position in reliance on its contract with the Government.   The underlying principle in reliance damages is that a party who relies on another party’s contractual promise is entitled to damages for any losses actually sustained as a result of the breach of that promise.  Glendale Federal Bank v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In Glendale, the Federal Circuit affirmed the use of a reliance damage calculation because “for purposes of measuring the losses sustained … as a result of the Government’s breach, reliance damages provide a firmer and more rational basis” than the alternative theories argued by the parties in that case.  Id. at 1383.  Reliance damages can include both pre- and post-breach activities and costs by the thrift, and have been described as the “ideal” theory for “wounded bank” damages.  Glendale Federal Bank v. United States, 378 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding trial court’s award of $381 million).

Restitution damages may be sought when proof of lost profits or reliance damages fails.  The idea behind restitution is to restore the non-breaching party to the position he would have been in had there never been a contract to breach.  Specifically, a restitution theory seeks to recover any benefit that the non-breaching party may have given to the breaching party, but such damages should not be awarded if the award would result in a windfall to the non-breaching party.  See Southwest Investment Co., Inv. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 182, 197 (Fed. Cl. 2004).  Accordingly, an institution must carefully consider whether benefits conferred on the Government might nonetheless be offset fully by benefits received from the Government, as “the non-breaching party is not entitled, through the award of damages, to achieve a position superior to the one it would reasonably have occupied had the breach not occurred.”  Glendale Federal Bank v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In addition, restitution can be a challenging theory to pursue, for while a party may often be able to show benefits given to the Government, establishing an actual dollar value conferred can be difficult.  Id. at 1382 (under theory that thrift assumed risk and relieved Government of liabilities for a period of time in which the Government was able to deal with other failing thrifts, the value of Government’s time was more than zero but there is no proof of what in fact it was worth).  Where a specific dollar amount is clearly established, however, restitution may be awarded.  See 1st Home Liquidating Trust v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 731, 744 (Fed. Cl. 2007).

In sum, the numerous Winstar-related decisions provide a body of law for institutions faced with a rapidly changing bank regulatory environment and possible breaches by the Government with respect to current contracts.  Familiarity with the types of damages theories and models employed by past thrift litigants against the Government may help today’s institutions develop a viable remedy if they are harmed by Government action.

Arbitration of Disputes Arising from the Financial Crisis

By: Clare TannerPaul F. Donahue

The current turmoil in financial markets has led to an increase in disputes involving financial institutions.   Parties may have entered into transactions in better times with little consideration given to the forum in which future disputes would play out.  In today’s far more challenging circumstances, the choice of forum may be central to the satisfactory resolution of disputes. 

In some areas, it is common for disputes involving financial institutions to be resolved through arbitration.  The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest self-regulatory organization, i.e., non-governmental regulator, for all securities firms doing business in the United States.  (FINRA’s rulemaking, however, is subject to approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).)  Both individual and institutional customers can require a FINRA member to arbitrate disputes.  Indeed, most, if not all, securities broker/dealers will refuse to do business with customers who do not agree to arbitrate disputes.  Disputes between FINRA members may also be submitted to arbitration.

The financial crisis has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of cases referred to FINRA arbitration.   In 2007, slightly more than 3,000 arbitration cases were filed.  In 2008, the number was almost 5,000 and the upward trend has only increased in 2009.  The number of cases filed in January 2009 was double that of a year earlier. 

An award handed down by a FINRA tribunal last month, arising from transactions in auction rate securities, illustrates the enormous magnitude of disputes arising from the financial crisis and the speed with which they can be resolved through arbitration.  The FINRA tribunal ordered Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, a brokerage unit of the Swiss bank, to pay $400 million to its customer STMicroelectronics NV, a European semiconductor maker.  STMicroelectronics claimed it had authorized Credit Suisse to make investments in top-rated securities backed by U.S. Government guaranteed student loans, but instead the funds were invested in collateralized debt obligations some of which were backed by sub-prime mortgages.  The entire process including 28 hearing sessions over two months took just under a year.  Any court proceeding would undoubtedly have taken far longer.  Nonetheless, STMicroelectronics, according to the award, incurred more than $4 million in legal fees during that time.

While FINRA members can be compelled to arbitrate customer disputes and most require their customers to agree to arbitrate disputes, other financial institutions have traditionally been reluctant to commit to arbitration and have preferred to submit disputes to national courts.   Some of the risks and benefits associated with arbitration as a means of resolving disputes involving financial institutions can be illustrated by reference to FINRA’s procedures. 

Confidentiality
As is common with arbitration, FINRA arbitrations are confidential.   The evidence submitted and procedural and substantive hearings are not open to the public.  Although FINRA arbitral awards are made public, that is the exception, not the rule for most arbitrations unless the parties agree otherwise.  FINRA awards are not necessarily fully reasoned and may simply amount to a requirement that one party pay as was the case in the STMicroelectronics case.  Under a recent rule approved by the SEC, however, beginning next month, if both parties request it, FINRA arbitrators will have to give an “explained decision,” i.e., “a fact based award stating the general reasons for the decision” but which need not include legal authorities or damage calculations.

Confidentiality can be a significant attraction of arbitration as it avoids both financial institutions and their institutional clients airing their dirty laundry in public.   In current markets, disputes may give rise to a damaging loss of confidence in the financial institution.  Equally, even if sophisticated institutional customers feel they have been misled by a financial institution, they may wish to avoid public allegations that they share some responsibility or may not want detailed aspects of their financial dealings laid open to public scrutiny.  In disputes between sophisticated commercial enterprises, the risk of adverse publicity is seldom limited to one party. 

Arbitration will not be appropriate where a financial institution seeks to establish a legal precedent that will be publicly available.  Only a court ruling can provide that and, of course, it can be a double-edged sword.

The Tribunal
FINRA’s arbitration rules for customer disputes generally provide for a three-person tribunal with one “industry member” and two independent members.  Under a rule change effective at the end of this month the size of cases to be decided by a single arbitrator will increase to $100,000.  Three-arbitrator panels are intended to provide both industry knowledge and experience while also protecting the customer’s interests, but some have criticised such panels as too industry friendly.  Under a pilot program now underway for 400 cases, several securities firms have agreed to have panels made up of three independent arbitrators.  FINRA’s approach may not be appropriate in all cases and, for example, the arbitration rules of the London-based City Disputes Panel provide that the tribunal will usually consist of a legally qualified chairman and two experienced financial services practitioners.

Given the complex and technical nature of modern financial products, there may be a significant advantage in decisions being reached by tribunals with necessary expert knowledge.   Both financial institutions and their institutional customers may prefer such a tribunal to the vagaries of a jury trial in the U.S.  The speed at which law and market practice change are such that, even in jurisdictions where disputes may come before an experienced judge, a tribunal made up of industry experts may still be preferable.  

Procedure
Recent rule changes have sharply curtailed the ability to obtain a summary determination of a dispute in FINRA arbitrations.   The loss of the opportunity of having a frivolous claim dismissed at an early stage may be unattractive for respondents and correspondingly attractive for claimants in those jurisdictions where summary determination is only available to a claimant.  However, expedited procedures are available by agreement between the parties in both FINRA arbitrations and in other arbitral rules.  Equally, the absence of, or restrictions on, wide-ranging discovery exercises and pre-trial depositions found in FINRA and other arbitral rules may mean that, even without a summary determination, arbitration is still more attractive than litigation through national courts.

Finality
The ability to challenge an arbitration award is usually strictly limited and FINRA arbitration is no exception.   The attraction of a final award is that the cost and risk associated with any given dispute can be more easily judged.  The prospect of a defaulting party endlessly prolonging the proceedings while attempting to protect assets against enforcement is greatly diminished as is the prospect of a successful party deciding to settle simply to end the bloodletting.  

Enforcement
Many financial transactions will have an international element, as illustrated by the STMicroelectronics case.   A party may be reluctant to commence proceedings in the home court of the other party fearing “home advantage.”  Even if the parties agree to resolve disputes in the courts of a neutral state, many national courts will not permit parties to “manufacture” jurisdiction and simply will not hear such cases.  Even when they do, the successful party still faces the cost and difficulty of enforcing that judgment in another country. 

Arbitration awards made in a country which is a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards can be enforced in any other Convention State, by the local court giving effect to the award as if it were a court judgment.  This is subject to limited, mostly due process, exceptions.

Conclusion
Arbitration is not a panacea — as with litigation through the courts, expense and delay can be features of arbitration — but there are advantages for disputes between financial institutions or between financial institutions and their institutional clients, particularly where there is an international element.   Even parties who did not commit to arbitration at the outset may still agree, after a dispute has arisen, that arbitration is a more suitable dispute resolution mechanism.  A failure to consider arbitration may leave parties at a disadvantage and, of course, it is always best to make the decision at the outset, before disputes arise.

UK Banking Stabilisation Measures - March 2009 Update

By: Claudia HarrisonKatie Hillier

1. Introduction
Since our reports in the December 2008 and January 2009 editions of this newsletter, the UK government has released further details on several initiatives intended to combat the current economic downturn, and a number of UK based banks have announced their participation in the initiatives.   In addition, the Banking Act 2009 received royal assent on 12 February 2009.

2.  Update on Existing Measures

2.1 Special Liquidity Scheme ("SLS")
This scheme, which enabled banks to borrow liquid UK treasury bills in return for security over their illiquid assets, closed on 30 January 2009.   The Bank of England ("BoE") have confirmed that use of the scheme was considerable: 32 institutions borrowed £185bn in return for £287bn of collateral, mainly residential mortgage-backed securities and residential mortgage covered bonds. 

2.2 Bank Recapitalisation Scheme
On 7 March 2009, following recent falls in Lloyds Banking Group's share price and the release of Halifax Bank of Scotland's 2008 results, the UK government announced that its £4bn of preference shares in the Lloyds Banking Group will be converted into ordinary shares, which could increase the government's holding in the bank from 43.5% to 65%.

3.  New Measures

3.1 Asset Purchase Facility ("APF")
This commercial paper facility has been operational since 13 February 2009, and the BoE is in the process of consulting in relation to facilities to purchase corporate bonds, paper issued under the Credit Guarantee Scheme (under which the UK government issued guarantees in respect of certain debt instruments), syndicated loans and asset-backed securities created in viable securitisation structures.  Further, on 5 March 2009 the UK government authorised the BoE to use the APF for monetary policy purposes (including quantitative easing), giving permission to finance asset purchases using central bank reserves.  UK government debt, purchased in the secondary markets, has been added to the list of eligible assets, and purchases up to £150bn have been authorised, although at least £50bn of this should still be used to purchase private sector assets, as initially intended.

3.2 Asset Protection Scheme
Under this scheme, the UK government will 'insure' banks against losses on their riskiest assets.  Both the Royal Bank of Scotland ("RBS") and the Lloyds Banking Group have announced their intentions to participate in this scheme, in respect of assets totalling £325bn and £260bn respectively.  RBS will pay a £6.5bn fee and bear a first loss of up to £19.5bn, with Lloyds Banking Group paying a fee of £15.6bn and bearing a first loss of up to £25bn.  In order to support wider economic recovery, RBS and Lloyds have given lending commitments for 2009 of £25bn and £14bn respectively.  In response to political and popular pressure, the UK government has also secured assurances relating to remuneration policies in these banks.  What such assurances amount to is not yet known.  Lloyds, for example, has agreed to review its remuneration policies and implement changes needed to ensure its policies comply with the Financial Services Authority's (“FSA”) guidance in this area.  Whether this will produce substantive changes to policies remains to be seen. 

4. Banking Act 2009 (The "Act")
The Act is in substantially the same form as the bill which was presented to parliament last October (and referred to in the December edition of this newsletter); however some important amendments were made as the bill progressed through the legislative process and are incorporated in the legislation, which was passed on 12 February 2009. 

4.1 Reverse Transfers
Under the Act, the Treasury or the BoE (as applicable) can order that shares or property of a bank which have been transferred to a bridge bank or into temporary public ownership be transferred back to the seller even if the shares or property have been subject to subsequent onward transfers.   This flexibility was introduced as the UK government considered the time and information available prior to taking over a failing bank may not be sufficient to allow detailed due diligence of every part of the bank's business. 

4.2 Parent Companies
Following consultation with the FSA and the BoE, the Treasury may now take a UK-incorporated parent company of a bank into temporary public ownership, provided that the powers for dealing with failing banks under the special resolution regime have been triggered. Once under public ownership, the Treasury will have the same powers in respect of the parent company (and the banks within its group) as it would have in respect of the bank itself, including the ability to make forward and reverse transfers as well as appoint, remove and vary the service contracts of directors. 

4.3 Investment Banks
The Treasury may now adopt regulations to modify the application of insolvency law to, or establish a new insolvency procedure for, investment banks.   The Treasury can specify whether an institution is considered an investment bank for the purposes of such regulations, provided that it holds client assets and is authorised under Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 to carry out a "regulated activity".

5. Conclusion
The UK government hopes that the combination of purchasing assets together with providing guarantees and insurance will free up the credit markets for commercial and retail lending.  They are also attempting to deal with recent bonus and transparency issues by setting compliance with remuneration and disclosure policies as conditions to participation in certain schemes.  Whilst the statutory regulatory regime introduced under the Act has been hailed as the biggest shake up of the industry in a decade, it grants the UK government significant powers in relation to troubled banks which many commentators consider unnecessary and enables support which is given to the banks to be kept secret.   With the UK government now having majority stakes in two major high street banks, other global banks such as HSBC seeking to raise large amounts of capital through their existing shareholders, and reports that the level of national debt is equal to GDP, the jury is out on whether these latest measures will achieve their aim of improving market trust and confidence.

UK Banking Stabilisation Measures -- January 2009 Update

By: Claudia HarrisonKatie Hillier

1. Introduction
 

Since the introduction of the stabilisation measures we reported in the previous edition of this newsletter, the global economic downturn has intensified, prompting the UK government to announce further efforts to combat financial instability and support economic recovery.  The new measures both extend and supplement the Special Liquidity Scheme, the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme and the Credit Guarantee Scheme described in the previous edition.  They do not have any immediate impact upon the draft legislation we reported previously.

2. Updates on Existing measures

2.1 Special Liquidity Scheme ("SLS") and Discount Window Facility
Upon the closure of the SLS at the end of this month, an alternative source of long-term liquidity will be provided under the discount window facility.  This is an existing facility provided by the Bank of England ("BoE") which ordinarily provides liquidity for periods not longer than 30 days and operates on similar principles to the SLS.  Under the new proposals, maturity periods of one year will be available with the aim of allowing banks to access longer-term liquidity support on demand.  The 30-day facility will continue to be available.

2.2 Credit Guarantee Scheme ("CGS")
The deadline for issuing debt to be guaranteed by this scheme is extended from 9 April 2009 to 31 December 2009.  All other aspects of the scheme will remain the same.

2.3 Bank Recapitalisation Scheme
Under this scheme, the UK government invested approximately £20bn in the Royal Bank of Scotland plc ("RBS").  The government is converting the £5bn of this stake that are held in preference shares into ordinary shares, thereby increasing its common holdings from 58% to nearly 70%.  This conversion will reduce by approximately £6bn the amount of preference dividends that RBS is required to pay each year to the UK government.  In return, RBS has committed to maintaining lending to large corporations, small businesses and homeowners at 2007 levels and to increase its lending activities by £6bn over the next year.  These commitments reflect the government's concern to protect the wider economy from the underlying lack of credit in the financial sector.

2.4 Financial Services Authority ("FSA") on Capital Ratios
The FSA has given additional guidance on its expectations regarding capital ratios for banks.  No new requirements are currently being proposed, as the FSA considers that the recent recapitalisation exercise undertaken by certain banks has created a sufficient capital buffer to withstand losses and facilitate new lending.  The guidance introduces the concept of counter-cyclical measures so that during good years banks build a capital 'buffer' on which they can draw in harder times.  The Basel Committee is now working to develop this principle and it is possible that the regulatory framework may be adapted in the longer term.

2.5 Northern Rock
There has been concern that the timetable set by the government for Northern Rock to repay its loans was requiring it to reduce its mortgage lending too quickly.  This reduction was working against the government's desire to expand mortgage lending, and so the deadlines for repayment by Northern Rock have been extended.

3. New Measures

3.1 Additional credit guarantee scheme
As well as extending the deadline of the CGS, the government has proposed a new guarantee scheme, commencing in April 2009, for certain triple-A rated asset-backed securities.  Eligible securities may be backed by mortgages and corporate/consumer debt and must have transparent structures.  Eligibility for institutions will be by the same criteria as the CGS.  Further details on this proposal are expected in the next few months.

The rationale for this scheme is, in part, the need to maintain banks' mortgage lending capacity.  Typically, mortgage-backed securities have supported a third of mortgage lending in the UK, and the government hopes that a guarantee scheme which supports the market in these securities will help to maintain banks' capacity for such lending activity. 

3.2 Asset Purchase Facility
The UK government is allocating a fund of £50bn to be used by the BoE to purchase certain high-quality private sector assets, including corporate bonds, syndicated loans and asset-backed securities.  The programme will come into effect from 2 February 2009, and purchases will be funded by the issue of Treasury bills.  The BoE will be authorised to use this facility for monetary policy purposes such as meeting the inflation target.  Further details of how this facility will operate are expected before the end of January.

3.3 Asset Protection Scheme ("APS")
The UK government, for a fee, will provide banks with insurance against future credit losses on their riskiest assets.  The government will assess the likely performance of assets under consideration in order to set the level of probable loss and the fee to be charged.  The APS will then cover a substantial part of any loss sustained over and above this probable loss, i.e., the exceptional loss.  In addition, in order to incentivise participating institutions to minimise their losses, the institution will also have to bear a proportion (for example, 10%) of the exceptional loss.  The scheme is available to UK-incorporated authorised deposit takers with more than £25bn of eligible assets.  It intends to target the assets most affected by current economic conditions with a view to reducing uncertainty about the value of such assets.  In order to support wider economic recovery, participants will have to provide a commitment to the government to maintain lending to creditworthy borrowers in a commercial manner.  Further details of the scheme are expected to be issued by the end of February.

4. Conclusion
The theme running through this latest package of measures is an effort to limit the effect of the financial crisis on the wider economy.  In the aftermath of the collapse of a number of high street retailers, and as monthly unemployment increases reach levels last seen in 1991, this objective is understandable.  However, it remains to be seen whether on the high street are already beyond the reach of such protection.

FSA Action Suggests Need for Financial Services Firms to Take Effective Anti-Corruption Compliance Measures

By: Robert V. Hadley,  Matt T. Morley

On 5 January 2009 the FSA imposed a penalty of £5.25 million on the insurance brokerage firm Aon Limited because the firm lacked adequate systems and controls to address the risk that third parties would make corrupt payments to assist Aon in winning business in overseas jurisdictions.  See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/aon.pdf.  The FSA’s Final Notice alleged that due to these failures, the firm had made sixty-six "suspicious payments" totalling more than US$5 million.  The Final Notice, which Aon consented to, states that the firm’s procedures failed to require adequate training of relevant personnel as to bribery and corruption risks, adequate due diligence prior to the retention of third party representatives, and appropriate monitoring of those relationships going forward.  In addition, Aon’s supervisory committees were not provided with adequate information or otherwise did not assess whether the firm’s corruption risks were being effectively managed.

The FSA’s action is particularly notable for several reasons.

  • While the FSA is not directly empowered with jurisdiction over domestic or foreign corruption offenses, which are ordinarily the responsibility of the police or the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO"), the FSA has a specific statutory objective to prevent financial crime.  The Final Notice makes clear that Aon was fined for breaches of FSA Principle 3 ("A firm must take reasonable care to control its affairs responsibly, with adequate risk management systems").  Conceivably, the FSA could also act in such cases under Principle 1 ("a firm must conduct its business with integrity").  Of course, a firm is likely to more readily agree to a public statement of a systems and controls failure than to acting without integrity, but, for the FSA, the level of fine, the publicity, and the resulting deterrent value of the FSA action remains the same.

     
  • Aon already had in place a policy that prohibited corrupt payments such as the ones that came to light.  Yet, as US law enforcement authorities have so often emphasized with regard to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a “paper program” is not enough, and firms must also take additional steps, such as training, due diligence, monitoring and auditing, in a meaningful effort to assure compliance.

     
  • Aon promptly self-reported to the Serious and Organised Crime Agency ("SOCA") and the FSA its discovery of the questionable payments.  The firm went on to conduct its own internal review of its anti-bribery systems and controls, and all payments to third party representatives for the previous six years.  Aon implemented all recommendations resulting from this review, and took disciplinary action against personnel found to have been involved.  Aon co-operated fully with the FSA's investigation.  While these steps, and the cost involved, were taken into account by the FSA when assessing/agreeing the financial penalty imposed, the firm did not avoid sanctions.

Margaret Cole, the FSA's Director of Enforcement, said that the fine "sends a clear message to the UK financial services industry that it is completely unacceptable for firms to conduct business overseas without having in place acceptable anti-bribery and corruption systems and controls".  Ms. Cole added that the FSA "has an important role to play" in UK steps against overseas corruption.

There are at least two important messages being sent by the FSA by its action against Aon.  First and most clearly, the case makes clear that the FSA expects regulated firms to have effective anti-corruption compliance measures in place – not simply a policy prohibiting corrupt payments, but coordinated efforts to require training of relevant personnel; due diligence on agents and other intermediaries acting on the firm’s behalf; monitoring and auditing compliance with the policy; and disciplinary action where violations of the policy occur.  Firms that fail to take these steps face potential sanctions under Principle 3.

Beyond this, the Aon case sets the precedent that in the eyes of the FSA regulated firms are required to self-report potential overseas corruption violations to the FSA.   FSA Principle 11 provides that "a firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose to the FSA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would expect notice."  We know the FSA's position from the Aon case, notwithstanding the FSA’s lack of criminal jurisdiction over such conduct, and that such matters are discloseable under Principle 11 also follows from the fact that firms are authorised by the FSA and individuals are approved by the FSA on the basis of their being "fit and proper." 

Disclosure of such matters may also be driven by the obligation of persons in the regulated sector (very broadly the financial services industry) to inform the SOCA where there is a suspicion of money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.   UK prosecutors regard any revenue from a contract obtained through a corrupt payment or offer of payment as the proceeds of crime, so that possession or any dealing with such funds is potentially a money laundering offence. Accordingly, the risk of a failure to disclose an offence or the need to set up a defence of SOCA's consent by disclosure to SOCA arises in almost every case where there is a suspicion of corruption. Once the need or obligation to make a report to SOCA is triggered, a regulated firm would be taking a serious risk by not also disclosing to the FSA under Principle 11. 

Overseas corruption is a hot topic in England and Wales, and the SFO has also taken recent steps to increase enforcement activity, increasing its manpower dedicated to looking at these matters by over 50% in 2008.  Last year saw the first UK convictions for overseas corruption, with the conviction of the head of the British company CBRN in connection with security services contracts in Uganda (see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep/23/ukcrime.law).  The SFO also reached a settlement with the construction company Balfour Beatty, in which that company admitted to historic accounting irregularities in some of its African operations.  Balfour Beatty paid a civil fine of £2.5million and was not subjected to criminal prosecution.  This case can be seen as a model for the SFO’s efforts to create a culture of self-reporting and to increase deterrence in the overseas corruption field.  In this way, the SFO can be seen to be taking enforcement steps without running the risk of a failed prosecution.

Both the SFO’s settlement with Balfour Beatty and the FSA's approach to Aon bear a strong resemblance to efforts by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Department of Justice to pursue violations of their anticorruption statute, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  The great majority of such cases are resolved by violators consenting to the entry of court orders finding legal violations and imposing significant financial penalties as well as disgorgement of profits, as in the recent case involving Siemens AG and the imposition of more than $1 billion in fines.  As in the Siemens case, a further condition of these kinds of settlements is the creation of remedial programmes and the installment of external monitors, at the company’s considerable expense, empowered to review the firm's anti-corruption programmes for several years and report back to law enforcement authorities.  Self-reporting of potential violations is also encouraged by US authorities, who state that the consequences of violations will be less severe for those who come forward voluntarily. 

It remains to be seen whether the SFO’s resolution of the Balfour Beatty case will provide a model for future cases, but in the financial services arena, the die seems to have been cast by the Aon case by the rather straightforward application of the FSA’s Principles to require regulated firms to implement anti-corruption compliance programs.

FTC Consent Decree Alleges Mortgage Lender Failed to Ensure the Protection of Consumer Information Provided to a Third Party

By: David A. Tallman

A recent Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) action highlights the need for renewed focus, particularly by mortgage lenders, on the protection of borrowers’ personal financial information, including information made available to strategic partners.  On December 16, 2008, the FTC issued a final consent decree against a mortgage lender, Premier Capital Lending, Inc., alleging that the lender failed to adequately protect the non-public personal financial information of borrowers that it had provided to a third party.  The FTC claimed that by permitting a strategic partner to access consumer credit reports without verifying the third party's data security policies and procedures, the lender failed to comply with the FTC's Safeguards Rule.  The FTC also alleged that the lender committed a deceptive act in violation of the FTC Act, because boilerplate language in its privacy policy contained "false or misleading" statements regarding its information security practices. 

The consent decree concerned a company that finances the acquisition of manufactured homes.  In March 2006, the lender permitted the principal of a manufactured home seller to use a company log-in to obtain consumer reports for prospective home purchasers that could be referred to the company for mortgage financing.  The manufactured home seller obtained credit reports on eighty-three consumers using these credentials.  In July 2006, an unauthorized person hacked into the manufactured home seller’s computer.  The hacker used the log-in credentials to obtain over three hundred new consumer reports on individuals who were not customers of either the lender or the manufactured home seller.  The hacker was also able to access all of the eighty-three consumer reports that the seller had legitimately obtained.  While the lender promptly notified the three hundred non-customers of the data security breach, it allegedly did not realize that the hacker had accessed the eighty-three additional consumer reports until more than a year later.  These customers were not notified of the breach until September 2007.

According to the FTC, the lender failed to maintain reasonable and appropriate information security procedures.   Among other allegations, the FTC claimed that the lender never visited the seller’s workplace, performed a security audit on the seller’s computer network, or assessed the seller’s data security policies.  Further, the FTC alleged that the lender never reviewed its own account for obvious signs of unauthorized activity, such as an unusual number of consumer report requests or blatant irregularities in the information used to make the requests.  The FTC also claimed that after the breach occurred, the lender failed to maintain adequate procedures to assess the full scope and nature of the data security breach.

In the current market environment, financial institutions are increasingly permitting third parties to access borrower information in order to provide loss mitigation services, offer refinancing opportunities to distressed borrowers, track loan portfolio performance, or explore new business opportunities.  The settlement suggests that the FTC may continue to aggressively enforce the financial privacy protections contained in Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act against lenders and other financial institutions.  Mortgage lenders and servicers should consider developing and implementing information security programs that include robust auditing and oversight, both internally and with respect to strategic partners and third-party service providers.

For more information, please see: http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=5226.  Copies of the consent decree and related documents are available from the FTC at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723004/index.shtm.

State Securities Regulators -- Stepping Up Enforcement Examinations and Investigations in the Wake of Madoff and Industry Migration Trends

By: David N. Jonson

The North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") started the new year off with an ambitious agenda at its annual Winter Enforcement Conference on January 8-11, in Coronado, California.  The conference, which is open only to state, federal and FINRA enforcement attorneys and investigators, featured panels on Enforcement Trends, Enforcement Best Practices, Broker-Dealer Sales Tactics, and Enforcement Implications of the Financial Crisis.  The attendees also met to discuss strategy and tactics in six specialized NASAA enforcement groups: Enforcement Technology, Enforcement Trends, Special Project Development and Coordination, Attorney Investigator Training, Litigation Forum, and Enforcement Zones.

State securities regulators, who have regulated the securities industry since before federal securities laws and the SEC were created by Congress during the New Deal, have always been mindful of the erosion of their regulatory power by federal initiatives advocated by both the SEC and the securities industry itself.  Although the securities industry's clout in Washington today is arguably at its weakest level in decades, the states are also aware that any new financial services regulatory scheme from Washington could still result in a diminution of state authority.  Accordingly, even though recent multi-state regulatory enforcement actions in the areas of research analyst conflict of interests and auction rate securities have been widely viewed as successful by investors, consumer groups and some influential members of Congress, the states clearly do not intend to stray too far from the kitchen while a new regulatory pie is being baked.

To continue demonstrating their value during this time of regulatory change, state securities regulators will continue to focus on local cases with a common national theme (e.g. , auction rate securities and senior citizen issues).   However, since the states have also detected an unprecedented number of registered representatives departing broker-dealers to form smaller, state-registered investment advisory firms, the states have also indicated that they will dramatically increase the number of proactive examinations, investigations and enforcement actions against such firms. 

There are several reasons for the states' increased interest in these new investment advisers.   As an overarching factor, the effects of the Madoff matter cannot be understated.  No state securities regulator, many of whom serve at the pleasure of statewide elected officials, wants to have to explain how or why they missed clues or leads that, if properly investigated, would have shut down a would-be Madoff in their jurisdiction.  Therefore, future state examinations and investigations — regardless of whether or not a whistleblower provides a roadmap of where to look — will be far more thorough than in the past.  As a result, subjects of these inquiries should expect to find that responding to such matters will involve considerably more time and expense than they may have grown accustomed to in prior years. 

Second, state regulators are very concerned that since the majority of the new advisers may not be accustomed to handling compliance and other administrative details themselves, and because adequate compliance takes time and money and may be less of a priority than client development, state regulators theorize that these advisers are more likely to be deficient in carrying out such duties.  Some states will even be taking the unusual step of conducting introductory examinations of newly registered advisory firms. 

Third, some regulators believe that most of the representatives who left broker-dealers to form their own advisory firms may not have been in the upper echelon (or "top producers") at their former firms, and now, under pressure to pay their own way, may be more desperate to generate business through questionable advice or investment opportunities that they would not have attempted to solicit while at their prior firms.   (Interestingly, some state regulators — especially those who considered the term "top producer" to be questionable when viewed from the client's perspective — took a more charitable view of the motives of the lower-producing representatives who recently became state-registered advisers.) 

State securities regulators have identified new, state-registered investment advisers as the latest "at risk" group who will bear the brunt of their regulatory and investigative scrutiny.   Given the deterrent effect and favorable publicity that can be generated from taking strong enforcement actions, the states can also be expected to continue availing themselves of the full array of media outlets on both the local and national level.

SEC Chair Nominee Sets Forth Regulatory Agenda

By: Mark D. Perlow

On January 15, 2009, Mary L. Schapiro, President Obama’s nominee to chair the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (“Committee”) in a hearing to consider whether to recommend her nomination to the full Senate.  Her appointment was confirmed by the Committee and the Senate on January 22.  During her confirmation hearing, Ms. Schapiro outlined her priorities for the days ahead.

Ms. Schapiro stated that her “first and foremost” priority will be to “move aggressively to reinvigorate enforcement at the SEC” — an implicit repudiation of the direction that SEC enforcement has taken under Chairman Christopher Cox.  Under Mr. Cox, the size of the enforcement staff has declined in recent years, and the Commission has instituted additional layers of review for the approval of an investigation.  In addition, it issued guidance that limited the circumstances under which monetary penalties can be imposed upon corporations, noting that in many cases penalties have the effect of harming the corporation’s innocent shareholders.  The SEC also instituted a pilot program requiring the Commission’s pre-approval for the enforcement staff to negotiate monetary penalties in settlements, with the Commission first approving an acceptable range for the penalties.  Critics contend that these measures have hamstrung and demoralized the enforcement staff, while defenders argue that they have restored balance to an overly aggressive program.  In either case, Ms. Schapiro’s chairmanship most likey will result in more aggressive enforcement.

Second, Ms. Schapiro articulated her vision of the SEC’s mission as the “investor’s advocate,” focused on “investor protection, transparency, accountability and disclosure.”  She expressed a desire to preserve these missions in the coming regulatory overhaul, which seems to concede that the SEC would serve as a regulator of business conduct but not as a prudential regulator of safety and soundness.  The U.S. Treasury’s Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, proposed in March 2008, advocated consolidating the many federal financial regulators into three – a market stability regulator, a prudential regulator, and a business conduct regulator, and this broad vision (if not the specifics of the Treasury’s proposals) has gained currency among the Congressional leadership.  Ms. Schapiro may have thus signalled that she will not fight to regain what the SEC has already in fact lost, the power to impose capital, liquidity and other prudential standards on systemically important broker-dealers.  Indeed, she implicitly endorsed regulatory consolidation when she expressed her view that one reason why regulators did not uncover the alleged Madoff fraud was the current “stovepiped” approach to regulation.  Nonetheless, she pointed out to a largely sympathetic Committee that the SEC’s core functions — examinations of investment companies and advisers and securities firms, regulation of corporate disclosure, exchange regulation and oversight — need to be preserved in any combined agency.

Ms. Schapiro also said that the SEC’s approach to regulating credit rating agencies should be reconsidered.  These firms have garnered much criticism for allegedly allowing their standards to slip in overrating many of the asset-backed securities that now clog the balance sheets of financial institutions.  In particular, the business model of these firms has come under attack:  because the issuer of the security pays the rating agency, critics, including the SEC itself, have alleged that this conflict of interest compromised the independence and methods of the ratings agencies.  Ms. Schapiro said that two ideas in particular merit attention – first, requiring that the rating agencies receive their compensation from small transaction or listing fees rather than from the issuers of securities, and second, establishing a dedicated regulator with powers modelled after those of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to set standards and conduct comprehensive examinations.

Ms. Schapiro also advocated mandatory SEC registration and regulation of hedge fund managers.  While she acknowledged that the SEC does not currently have this authority, since the agency’s effort to impose a hedge fund registration rule was struck down by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, Ms. Schapiro recognized that Congress will likely soon expressly grant the SEC this authority.  Ms. Schapiro said that the agency will begin working on proposals that will govern hedge fund disclosures and provide for “better and stronger checks and balances.”  Even before Congress enacts any legislation, such rules could be applied to hedge fund managers currently registered with the SEC.

Ms. Schapiro indicated that the SEC would move forward with shareholder proxy access, an issue with a long and contested history.  In 2004, then-SEC Chairman William Donaldson prompted the Commission to propose a complicated rule that would have allowed shareholders that crossed certain ownership percentage and longevity thresholds to place a limited number of director nominees on an issuer’s own proxy.  However, business groups strongly opposed the rule, and Donaldson stepped down before it could be adopted.  In 2007, pressured by a Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that questioned the SEC staff’s interpretation of the SEC proxy rules, the Commission under Chairman Cox adopted a rule permitting issuers to omit access proposals from their proxy materials, which engendered opposition from some institutional shareholders’ groups.  Ms. Schapiro pointed out that many other leading non-U.S. markets mandate proxy access, and she stated her preference for “the U.S. to enter that club.”  However, she signalled that she would not force through a proposal, only that she was going to immediately begin discussing with other Commissioners a proxy access proposal along Donaldson’s lines.

Ms. Schapiro testified that she will re-evaluate the SEC’s current path towards the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”), thereby moving away from U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  Chairman Cox made the globalization of capital markets a theme of his tenure, and he pushed the SEC to adopt a “roadmap” to the adoption of IFRS, subject to the completion of certain “milestones.”  Ms. Schapiro stated that she would not be bound by this roadmap, and indeed she expressed concerns that make clear that the SEC will move slowly on the issue.  In particular, she questioned the independence of the International Accounting Standards Board, which governs IFRS, and pointed out that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires U.S. public companies to operate under standards promulgated by an independent authority.  She also noted that conversion to IFRS would be extremely expensive and thus more burdensome during a recession, and her comments indicated concerns that IFRS, which are principles-based (rather than rules-based, as is U.S. GAAP), were not detailed enough to be effective.  Each of these concerns mirrors public criticisms of IFRS by opponents of their U.S. adoption.

She similarly indicated that the SEC will reconsider whether to grant “mutual recognition” to other countries’ securities exchanges and broker-dealers.  One of Chairman Cox’s initiatives on globalization, mutual recognition would recognize that certain countries have market regulatory schemes equal in effectiveness to that of the U.S.  Exchanges in these countries would be allowed direct access to U.S. customers, and their broker-dealers would be permitted to operate in the U.S. and transact with U.S. customers, in each case without registration with or regulation by the SEC.  Advocates of mutual recognition argue that it would eliminate unnecessary obstacles to international investing, whereas critics argue that mutual recognition would eliminate the superior investor protections under the U.S. regulatory regime.  Ms. Schapiro sided with the critics and questioned whether mutual recognition was “headed in the right direction.”

Finally, Ms. Schapiro testified that she will rebuild the SEC’s Office of Risk Assessment (“ORA”) and that she wants risk assessment to “permeate everything the SEC does.”  In particular, she pointed out that, given the limited number of SEC examiners, risk assessment would enable them to focus on the issues of greatest importance.  Chairman Donaldson created ORA in response to the market timing and late trading scandals in the mutual fund industry in 2003-2004, but Chairman Cox gave it less emphasis and fewer resources.  It is worth remembering that Chairman Donaldson created ORA in part to organize and give direction to a profusion of industry-wide, issue-focused but partially redundant “sweep” examinations that were burdening the fund and brokerage industries and wasting SEC staff resources.  Ms. Schapiro seemed to be signalling that ORA will perform a similar disciplining function, but it remains to be seen whether it will also inaugurate another era of large-scale sweep examinations.

Ms. Schapiro’s testimony indicates both that she has a clear idea where she wants to lead the SEC and that she is skilled at building political support for her agenda.   As a result, the securities and investment industries are almost certainly facing an era of tougher SEC enforcement and revitalized examinations, while the internationalization of SEC rules will be made a lower priority.  The SEC will also seek to increase the regulation of hedge funds and credit rating agencies.  While the extent of any regulatory reform is still unknown, these initiatives reflect the views of the large majority in Congress that these regulatory regimes need fixing and leave aside broader questions as to the need for a qualitative change of the SEC’s mission. 

Congress Releases Second TARP Tranche; G30 Outlines Major Financial Reforms

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

Congress failed to block release of the second $350 billion tranche of the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), which was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343; H.R. 1424).  The use of these funds was subject to Congressional disapproval by joint resolution enacted within 15 calendar days after the Treasury Department certified its intention to use the funds.  On January 12, the Bush Administration, at the request of then President-elect Obama, formally sought release of the second $350 billion tranche.  The Senate effectively approved the funds when it defeated S.J. Res. 5, a Republican resolution to disapprove the funds, by a vote of 52-42 on January 15.   Notably, on January 22, the House approved the companion resolution, H.J. Res. 3, which would have rejected the release of the TARP funds, by a vote of 270-155.

The House vote was largely symbolic, but it does reflect Congress’ strong dissatisfaction with TARP implementation to date.  On January 21, the House passed H.R. 384, the TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009, by a vote of 266-160.  Introduced by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), H.R. 384, as amended, would place numerous conditions on the TARP program and its beneficiaries, such as:

  • Setting conditions on TARP recipients, including executive compensation restrictions, providing the Treasury Secretary with the authority to apply new executive compensation restrictions retroactively to TARP beneficiaries;
  • Requiring reporting, data collection, and analysis of use of TARP funds;
  • Authorizing Treasury to place observers in board meetings of “assisted organizations” (a newly defined term);
  • Increasing the size of the Financial Stability Oversight Board and providing the Board with the authority to overturn any policy determination made by the Treasury Secretary by a 2/3 vote; and
  • Requiring the Treasury Secretary to commit at least $100 billion, but not less than $40 billion, to foreclosure mitigation.

It is not clear whether the Senate will act on the legislation.  However, a recent letter from National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) indicates that the Obama Administration has agreed in principle to many of the provisions contained in the legislation.  Key elements of the plan include:

  • Placing conditions on TARP recipients, including limits on executive compensation, dividend payments, stock repurchases, and acquisitions of healthy financial companies;
  • Requiring reporting on and analysis of TARP funds use;
  • Extending credit to consumers, homeowners, small businesses, and local governments; and
  • Developing a foreclosure mitigation program, including a possible change to bankruptcy laws.

A number of new TARP programs have been developed to address the continuing credit market crisis.   After Congressional negotiations stalled in December, President Bush announced an auto bailout package, consisting of a $17.4 billion short-term bridge loan to General Motors and Chrysler.  The loan is contingent on the auto companies showing that they are financially viable by March 31, 2009 and also contains conditions allowing the government to block transactions over $100 million, restricting dividends, and limiting executive compensation.  Subsequently, Treasury announced a $6 billion package to GMAC and a $1.5 billion loan to Chrysler Financial under the newly created Automotive Industry Financing Program

On January 2, the Treasury Department released guidelines for the Targeted Investment Program (“TIP”).  TIP was used by the Federal Reserve and Treasury in the Citigroup package announced in November.  On January 16, Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC announced assistance to Bank of America.  In addition to a $118 billion loan guarantee, the deal includes a $20 billion preferred stock purchase through TIP, and requires that Bank of America comply with enhanced executive compensation restrictions and implement a mortgage loan modification program.

On January 14, the Treasury Department issued Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) application guidelines for subchapter S corporation banks; applications are due on February 13, 2009.   Unlike other CPP programs that provide government support through preferred stock purchases, CPP support for S Corporations will come through the issuance of subordinated debt at a rate of 7.75 percent for the first five years and 13.8 percent thereafter. 

Finally, discussions continue on broader financial service industry reforms.   On January 15, the Group of Thirty (“G30”) issued a report entitled Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability.  The G30 Working Group on Financial Reform that issued the report is chaired by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, one of President Obama’s economic advisors and Chairman of the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board.  Mr. Volcker has stated that he will make the recommendations to President Obama and that the report is “a reasonable indication of the direction in which we might go.” 

The G30 report recommends a massive, globally coordinated restructuring of the legislative and regulatory system that governs the financial services industry.  Building on the momentum created by other recent proposals, such as the Treasury Department Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, the Group of 20 Financial Markets and the World Economy Summit Declaration, and the Government Accountability Office Framework for Crafting and Assessing Proposals to Modernize the Outdated U.S. Financial Regulatory System, the G30 report’s core recommendations include:

  • Requiring that all systemically significant financial institutions be subject to prudential oversight;
  • Improving the effectiveness of prudential regulation by increasing international coordination and enhancing resources available to regulators and central banks;
  • Strengthening institutional policies and standards, with a particular focus on governance, risk management, capital, liquidity, credit and counterparty exposure, and leverage; and
  • Increasing transparency and realigning risks associated with financial markets and products.

A detailed analysis of the G30 report is provided in our recent alert, Group of Thirty Issues Roadmap for Financial Reforms.

UK Banking Stabilisation Measures 2008

By: Claudia HarrisonKatie Hillier

1. Introduction

At the start of 2008, few people predicted the dramatic financial events of the past year.  Governments have rallied to stabilise financial systems which have been severely shaken and remain wary of further possible aftershocks.  This article considers the stabilisation measures already implemented by the British government and the draft legislation for a permanent statutory regime to deal with failing banks.

2. Measures already implemented

2.1 Special Liquidity Scheme ("SLS")
The Bank of England (the "BoE") summarises the SLS as a scheme enabling banks "to swap temporarily assets that are currently illiquid in exchange for UK treasury bills".   In fact, the BoE lends treasury bills in return for security over 'swapped' assets.  It is limited by eligibility restrictions for both institutions (only those eligible to subscribe to BoE standing facilities) and assets (only those backed by residential mortgages or credit card debt).  Despite these limitations, it has proved so popular that both its availability period and its value have been extended. 

A key feature of the SLS is that the risk associated with the 'swapped' assets remains with participants.   The public sector would only be exposed if a bank failed to return its treasury bills at maturity and the value of the assets it had pledged as security fell short of the value of the bills borrowed.  The use of a margin or 'haircut', intended to ensure that the value of security assets is always greater than the value of the bills, reduces this risk. 

2.2  Bank Recapitalisation Fund ("BRF")
The government has made available up to £50bn for equity share capital investments in certain UK banks.   The overriding objective of the BRF is to ensure that banks maintain capital positions which support market confidence in them.  The foundations of such confidence include banks having sufficient capital to absorb losses and to continue normal commercial lending.  So far, Lloyds TSB, Halifax Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland are participating in the BRF.  Others intend to increase capital through normal commercial measures.  Naturally, banks wish to minimise any government shareholding to ensure independence and avoid the stigma of public ownership.  However, if the poor uptake of RBS's recent share placing is any indication, the amount needed from the government may be higher than anticipated.  Predictions suggest that the banking system may need capital investment of at least £100bn before confidence in it recovers. 

2.3 Credit Guarantee Scheme
This scheme aims to encourage wholesale lending by issuing government guarantees in respect of certain debt instruments issued by eligible institutions.   In theory, if a bank is backed by a government guarantee, other banks will be less reluctant to lend to it.  Wholesale funds will start to move more readily and LIBOR will fall as confidence between banks is restored.  However, the scheme's eligibility conditions, both for participants and instruments, limit its scope so that it may only boost confidence in institutions least in need of such support. 

3.  Permanent Statutory Regime

3.1 Banking Bill 2008 (the "Bill")
The Bill, published in October, is the government's proposal introducing for the first time a permanent statutory regime for dealing with troubled banks.  This replaces emergency legislation passed earlier this year, which expires in February 2009.  It proposes a 'Special Resolution Regime', conferring various powers upon the tripartite authorities - the UK government, Financial Services Authority (the "FSA") and BoE.  These powers include three 'stabilisation options' (to be used to rescue a failing bank), a bank insolvency procedure ("BIP") and a bank administration procedure ("BAP").

(a)  Stabilisation options
These options restate and reinforce the authorities' powers under the emergency  legislation.  They are triggered if a bank fails to meet the conditions of its FSA authorisation (normally because of a failure to maintain adequate resources to conduct its business, in the FSA's opinion).  The options are to transfer all or part of the shares or business of a failing bank to either (i) a private sector purchaser, (ii) a 'bridge bank' (a BoE subsidiary), or (iii) temporary public ownership.

(b) BIP and BAP
The FSA already has statutory authority to apply for an administration order or petition for the winding up of a bank. The Bill extends this power so that, where certain conditions are met, any of the authorities can apply for a failing bank to be placed in BIP and the BoE can apply for a failing bank to be placed in BAP. These procedures follow the same structure as existing insolvency and administration regimes, with different 'officeholders' objectives. Ordinarily, a liquidator's objective is to realise an insolvent company's assets for distribution to creditors. A bank liquidator's primary objective is to ensure that eligible depositors receive compensation speedily or have accounts transferred to an alternative institution. Similarly, an administrator has three objectives, in order of priority: first to rescue the company as a going concern, secondly to achieve a better result for the company's creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound up, or, if neither of the first two are possible, to realise assets to make distributions to secured creditors. In contrast, BAP will be used to oversee the operation of the 'residue' of any bank, following a partial property transfer under the stabilisation options referred to above. Consequently, a bank administrator's primary objective is to facilitate such transfer to the bridge bank or private purchaser.

3.2 Comment

In general the Bill has been welcomed, but there is widespread concern about certain of its provisions.  This has led to calls for more consultation time to ensure that haste does not lead to measures which, instead of improving stability in financial markets, actually undermine it further.

  • The Bill is primarily designed to limit the instability caused by failing banks by establishing an orderly regime for dealing with them.  However, some consider that instability is an inevitable consequence of the failure of large financial institutions, and that stability will only be protected by tighter regulation which reduces the inherent risk of such failure.  A consultation document on regulation regarding liquidity risk management and supervision is expected from the FSA in 2009.  Critics suggest that the FSA's measures and the Bill should be developed concurrently.

     
  • The Bill's stabilising effect is limited because it does not apply to foreign or investment banks, two categories with a significant impact on market conditions.

     
  • In the context of a partial property transfer, the transferee may be able to 'cherry pick' the highest quality assets, disproportionately reducing assets available for residual creditors and undermining rights of set-off against other transactions with the same counterparty.  Any such interference in creditors' rights or the ability to override contractual provisions could seriously damage confidence in UK financial markets and in particular London's competitiveness as an international financial centre.  The government is consulting on secondary legislation to address this issue.

     
  • There could be problems regarding transparency in how the authorities' powers are used.   For example, it is proposed that the BoE should no longer have to disclose details of its emergency lending operations.  The aim is to prevent the media-fuelled panic which occurs when news of a bank's financial difficulties breaks.  However, it could lead to a more general sense of uncertainty as opposed to instability concentrated around the institutions which are the source of it. 

OFAC Issues Guidance to Securities and Futures Firms Concerning Account Opening, OFAC Requirements Are Applicable to Everyone

By: Lawrence B. Patent

The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries and designated persons.  OFAC issued guidance dated November 5, 2008, to assist securities and futures firms in fulfilling their OFAC obligations when accepting new clients and evaluating client transactions.  OFAC’s guidance applies to investment advisers (IAs), securities broker-dealers (BDs), futures commission merchants (FCMs), introducing brokers in commodity interests, commodity pool operators (CPOs) and commodity trading advisors (CTAs).  OFAC’s guidance is important in three areas:

  • Although another arm of the Treasury Department, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), recently withdrew as outdated proposals published in 2002 and 2003 that would have required IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering (AML) programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFAC’s guidance notes that all U.S. persons, including securities and futures firms, are subject to the requirements of OFAC.

     
  • OFAC, unlike FinCEN’s approach under the BSA, requires that a BD or an FCM look through the intermediary to the underlying beneficial owners of an omnibus account for purposes of complying with OFAC requirements.

     
  • Although FinCEN permits clearing firms and introducing or executing firms to rely upon each other for performing certain AML functions, OFAC’s guidance states that it does not permit businesses to reallocate their legal liability to a third party with regard to statutes that OFAC administers – thus, if a securities or futures firm delegates OFAC compliance functions to others, the securities or futures firm, as well as the third party, could be held liable for any OFAC violations caused by the third party’s negligence.

OFAC’s guidance, which was issued almost immediately after FinCEN withdrew its outdated AML proposals, appears designed to remind all financial intermediaries of their obligations under OFAC, which is certainly a less well-known regulatory program compared to the AML programs administered by FinCEN.  The OFAC guidance also makes clear that OFAC has less concern than FinCEN about duplicative regulation, and OFAC, unlike FinCEN, does not accept the concept that different intermediaries perform certain roles in financial market transactions that should permit delegation of responsibility.  Despite OFAC’s statement that “[a] strong OFAC compliance program [will be] similar to . . . a brokerage firm’s Customer Identification Program,” in fact OFAC expects more of BDs and FCMs where omnibus accounts and certain other intermediaries are involved than does FinCEN.

OFAC Account Opening Requirements
A new customer’s identity should be verified before an account is opened or within a reasonable time period after account opening.  Securities and futures firms should screen the new customer against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list, known as the SDN list and accessible at www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtml, and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.  OFAC advises that firms should use risk-based factors to assess risks posed by each customer and transaction, asking questions such as:

  • Is the customer regulated by a federal functional regulator, widely known, or listed on an exchange?
  • Has the firm had any previous experience with the customer or does it have prior knowledge about the customer?
  • Is the firm facilitating a U.S. person’s investment in a foreign issuer or other company that conducts business in a sanctioned country?
  • Is the customer located in a high-risk foreign jurisdiction that is considered to be poorly regulated or in a known offshore banking or secrecy haven?
  • Is the customer located or does it maintain accounts in countries where local privacy laws, regulations, or provisions prevent or limit the collection of client identification or beneficial ownership information?

Periodic checks of “non-accountholders,” such as beneficiaries, guarantors or principals, may also be necessary, depending upon each firm’s specific risk profile.

Documenting OFAC Compliance
Securities and futures firms should maintain adequate documentation of the results of their screening against the SDN list and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.   In the event of a potential OFAC violation, both the adequacy of a company’s transaction processing system and its overall OFAC compliance program are taken into consideration when determining the severity of possible enforcement action. 

FinCEN Withdrawal of Proposed AML Rules for IAs, CPOs, CTAs and Hedge Funds
As noted above, in late October FinCEN withdrew rules proposed over five years ago that would have required IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds to adopt AML programs.  In issuing these withdrawal notices, FinCEN noted that it would not adopt such rules in the future without providing interested parties an additional opportunity to comment upon proposals.  FinCEN’s withdrawal appears to be based on the principle that AML programs for IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds are not necessary because their customer accounts are carried by and their transactions are executed through other financial institutions, BDs and FCMs that do have AML programs.  FinCEN noted that it has concluded major rulemakings concerning BSA compliance by BDs and FCMs since it proposed the now-withdrawn proposals related to IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds that have confirmed the adequacy of their AML protections.  OFAC’s guidance also focuses more upon the responsibility of BDs and FCMs and does not permit those entities to avoid liability under OFAC programs by pointing to introducing firms or firms engaged only in the transaction-execution process.

Treasury Looks to Second Half of TARP

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

Treasury has committed the first $350 billion tranche of the $700 billion provided by Congress for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).  The remaining $350 billion is subject to Congressional disapproval by joint resolution enacted within 15 calendar days after Treasury certifies its intention to use those funds.  Outgoing Treasury Secretary Paulson has seemingly been reluctant to utilize this second tranche of TARP funds because of considerable Legislative Branch resistance to the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), as described below.  However, after auto industry bailout negotiations stalled in the Senate, it now appears that the White House and Treasury may be assessing whether to commit additional TARP funds for a short-term bridge loan in order to prevent a bankruptcy filing by a major domestic automaker before President-elect Obama is inaugurated.  There is speculation that Congress may choose not to exercise its disapproval authority as part of a deal to help the auto industry. 

Most of the first tranche of TARP funds was used to purchase preferred stock in banking institutions, including as part of the massive Citigroup bailout.  As the program has matured, Treasury and the Federal Reserve have become increasingly inventive in addressing the continuing credit market crisis.  For example, on November 25, Treasury allocated $20 billion in TARP funds to back a $200 billion Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) established by the Federal Reserve to increase liquidity in the consumer credit market.  The underlying credit exposures of eligible TALF securities initially must be newly or recently originated auto loans, student loans, credit card loans or small business loans guaranteed by the U.S. Small Business Administration.  The facility may be expanded over time and eligible asset classes may be expanded later to include other assets, such as commercial mortgage-backed securities, non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities or other asset classes. 

At a hearing on December 10, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) stated that Treasury should not request use of the second tranche of TARP funds without addressing foreclosure mitigation and oversight issues.   Chairman Frank’s statement reflects mounting Legislative Branch criticisms of Treasury’s implementation of TARP.  The Government Accountability Office released a report on December 2 concluding that Treasury has yet to address critical oversight and compliance issues.  The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), a TARP oversight panel created by EESA, also released its first report on December 10, questioning Treasury’s strategy and oversight.  COP members include Chair Elizabeth Warren (Professor, Harvard Law School), Congressman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Richard Neiman (Superintendent of Banks, New York Banking Department), and Damon Silvers (Associate Counsel, AFL-CIO).  Congress has held a series of hearings on these matters, as well as Treasury’s decision to abandon efforts to purchase or guarantee troubled assets and instead focus on equity injections into banking institutions (see the previous issue of the Global Financial Markets Newsletter).

Congress is considering measures to strengthen oversight of TARP.  On December 10, the Senate passed S. 3731, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2008, by unanimous consent.  The bill clarifies that the Special Inspector General (SIG) has the authority to investigate all actions taken under EESA (including the CPP); provides the SIG with temporary fast-track hiring authority and funds to set up his office; and requires Treasury to take actions to address deficiencies identified by the SIG.  The Senate confirmed Neil Barofsky as the SIG on December 8.

Also on December 10, the House adopted an amendment to the auto industry bailout bill, H.R. 7321, to address the criticism that TARP participants are not using funds to provide loans and increase credit market liquidity.   Adopted 403-0, the amendment would require TARP participants to report their lending activities quarterly.  Both the H.R. 7321 amendment and S. 3731, however, have yet to be considered by the other chamber.  With the end of the session fast approaching, it is not clear whether there will be further action on either measure before Congress adjourns for the year.  Similar legislation may be reintroduced next year.  Other possible provisions could include directing Treasury to require participating institutions to use bailout funds to restart lending; or limitations on the use of funds for acquisitions, dividends, or executive compensation.

Chairman Frank has also indicated interest in pursuing legislation that strengthens foreclosure mitigation efforts.  Such legislation could take several forms.  First, Congress could mandate that Treasury purchase or guarantee troubled assets as it initially contemplated in creating TARP.  Second, Congress could direct Treasury to allocate a portion of the bailout funds to a loan modification and guarantee program, such as the $24 billion program recently proposed by the FDIC to guarantee 2.2 million modified loans.  The FDIC plan would reduce mortgage payments to 31% of income, based on reductions in the applicable interest rate, extension of the loan term, and forbearance of principal.  In exchange, servicers would get $1,000 for each modification and the government would share up to 50% of the re-default loss.  Third, Congress could expand the Hope for Homeowners program (P.L. 110-289), under which the original lender takes a write-down on the loan and the borrower then refinances to a government-backed loan.  Fourth, Congress could provide mortgage-backed security servicers with the legal authority to modify loans and indemnification from investor lawsuits.

Finally, as anticipated in previous newsletters, discussions continue on broader financial service industry reforms.  Notably, COP Chair Elizabeth Warren recently called for the creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission, akin to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, that would regulate financial services products.  On November 14, the G-20 ministers agreed to begin work on a coordinated response to the financial crisis.  At present, the ministers are developing specific recommendations for the next summit, which is scheduled for April 2009.  The bipartisan professionals in the K&L Gates Public Policy and Law Group are monitoring all such proposals for the benefit of firm clients.

TARP Capital Purchase Program Update

By: Daniel F.C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page

The U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) continues to implement the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA,” H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343, click GPO’s PDF Display for EESA text). Among other things, EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. Under this authority, Treasury continues to develop the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) to make equity investments in banking institutions. However, Treasury has recently indicated that it no longer intends to purchase troubled assets as described below.

On October 31, Treasury released additional CPP documents for publicly traded financial institution applicants, including a Securities Purchase Agreement, Form of Letter Agreement, Certificate of Designations, Form of Warrant, Term Sheet, and SEC/FASB Letter on Warrant Accounting. The documents contain terms and conditions and make representations and warranties, to which a CPP applicant must agree. As noted in the previous issue, applications must be submitted by 5 p.m. (EST), November 14, 2008.

In the same notice, Treasury stated it will be posting a CPP application form and term sheet for private and mutual banks in the future. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking on October 23, Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Neel Kashkari noted that Treasury is also developing a mortgage-backed securities program, whole loan purchase program, and insurance program for troubled assets. On November 10, following a speech in New York City, Mr. Kashkari indicated that U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., will determine whether and when to roll out these additional programs.

On November 10, the government announced changes to the AIG bailout totaling $152.5 billion. Using its EESA authority, Treasury will purchase $40 billion in senior preferred stock from AIG. The Federal Reserve will provide AIG with a $60 billion bridge loan, purchase $22.5 billion of its mortgage-backed securities and supply $30 billion to backstop the insurer’s credit default swap agreements. Mr. Kashkari indicated that the AIG deal was a “one-off” arrangement rather than a broadening of the CPP beyond banking institutions.

Treasury has also started to build its CPP implementation group. The Department has named James H. Lambright, former head of the Export-Import Bank, to serve as the interim Chief Investment Officer. Treasury has also posted a solicitation for financial agents to provide asset management services for CPP. Application guidelines are available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1260.htm; the deadline for submission was 5 p.m. (EST), November 13, 2008.

Of the $700 billion in funds authorized by EESA, Treasury has thus far committed $250 billion to banks. The President must certify the use of an additional $100 billion and, for use of the remaining $350 billion, submit a notice to Congress, which has the ability to disapprove. On November 4, 2008, the Treasury submitted its “First Tranche Report” to Congress on the implementation of the EESA. The report noted that “it is premature to assess the impact of the CPP.” Preliminarily, Treasury is “encouraged by recent signs of improvement in the markets and in the confidence in our financial institutions,” but Treasury also reported that restoring liquidity to the long-term credit markets remains a challenge.

On November 12, Secretary Paulson provided an update on the implementation of EESA and indicated that the Department has changed its strategy. Secretary Paulson stated that the Department has abandoned efforts to purchase bad assets under TARP, because the indirect purchase would delay bank recapitalization. Instead, CPP equity purchases would continue to be the central feature of Treasury’s bailout efforts. Secretary Paulson noted that the Department also will pursue two additional strategies: strengthening the asset-backed securitization market in order to support consumer finance and expanding foreclosure mitigation.  (Treasury Secretary Outlines Revised TARP Strategy.)

Strategic shifts in the efforts to ameliorate the credit crisis will presumably continue with the incoming administration. Moreover, with the continued instability of the financial markets, we believe that we are in the beginning stages of what will ultimately prove to be a massive shift of leverage from private balance sheets to the public debt as new programs are implemented.

The K&L Gates Public Policy & Law group consists of senior, bipartisan policy professionals who are closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients. http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=5052

The Obama Transition and the 110th Congress

By: Daniel F.C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page

The U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) is conferring with the Obama transition team, led by former Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta, on policy decisions in order to ensure continuity between administrations. The transition team has also turned its attention to selecting the next Treasury Secretary. The new Secretary is likely to have been involved in the development of programs under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343, click GPO’s PDF Display for EESA text). Possible choices include New York Federal Reserve President Timothy Geithner, Federal Deposit Insurance Commission Chairwoman Sheila Bair, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and former Treasury Secretaries Larry Summers and Robert Rubin.

President Bush hosted the G-20 summit on November 15 in Washington, D.C. to discuss a globally coordinated response to the financial crisis. European Union leaders have urged the President to join them in devising international regulatory measures to govern the banking industry. In his remarks on November 12, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. underscored the importance of reaching a consensus on a broad-based reform agenda during the meeting. Although President-elect Obama was not expected to formally participate, some delegates were planning to engage with him while in Washington, D.C.

Congress is scheduled to reconvene for one week, beginning November 17. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) would like to pass a stimulus package, but the Majority Leader has said there may not be enough support. President-elect Obama has stated that if a bill does not pass in the lame-duck session, he will make it his first order of business upon being sworn in. The stimulus bill may be a vehicle for legislative directives relative to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) , especially in the area of preventing mortgage foreclosures. The FDIC has proposed using $50 billion of TARP funds for a loan modification and guarantee program. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) are supportive of the proposal.

As expected, congressional oversight of EESA implementation has continued apace. On October 24, Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY), Jack Reed (D-RI), and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) wrote a letter recommending Treasury adopt guidelines to ensure that institutions use bailout funds to restart lending activities rather than acquisitions or dividends. On October 29, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid sent a letter urging Treasury to strengthen the interim final rules on executive compensation for CPP institutions. In addition, the following congressional hearings have recently taken place or are planned to take place:

Private Sector Cooperation with Mortgage Modifications
Wed., Nov. 12, 10:00 a.m., 2128 Rayburn Bldg.
House Financial Services Committee

Regulation of Hedge Funds
Thurs., Nov. 13, 10:00 a.m., 2154 Rayburn Bldg.
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

Oversight of Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Thurs., Nov. 13, 10:00 a.m., 538 Dirksen Bldg.
Senate Banking Committee

Is Treasury Using Bailout Funds for Foreclosure Prevention, as Congress Intended?
Fri., Nov. 14, 10:00 a.m., 2154 Rayburn Bldg.
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Domestic Policy

Troubled Asset Purchase Program Oversight
Tues., Nov. 18, 10:00 a.m., 2128 Rayburn Bldg.
House Financial Services Committee

Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Tues, Dec. 9, 10:00 a.m., 2154 Rayburn Bldg. 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

Congress is preparing to consider comprehensive financial services reform legislation early next year. Senator Schumer, a member of both the Senate Finance and Banking Committees, has outlined six principles that he believes should guide the deliberations:

  1. A key focus should be on controlling systemic risk and ensuring stability.
  2. The regulatory structure should be unified under a single regulatory authority, or at a minimum, simplified.
  3. Complex financial instruments should be subject to regulation under clear regulatory authority.
  4. Global financial markets require globally coordinated solutions.
  5. Increased transparency should be a central goal.
  6. The laissez-faire view of regulation must come to an end.

For more details on the impact of the recent election on current and future policy initiatives relating to the financial services industry, please see the recent K&L Gates Public Policy and Law Alert, “Financial Services Reform: What Comes Next?

The K&L Gates Public Policy & Law group consists of senior, bipartisan policy professionals who are closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program

By: Stanley V. RagalevskySean P. Mahoney

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)-insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, financial holding companies and certain thrift holding companies have until December 5, 2008 to decide whether to participate in the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (“TLGP”).   FDIC established the TLGP as of October 14, 2008 after determining that rapid and substantial outflows of uninsured deposits from banks threatened the stability of our financial system.  The purpose of the TLGP is to preserve public confidence and encourage liquidity in the banking system.  Participation by FDIC-insured institutions is voluntary. 

The TLGP has two components:   an FDIC guaranty of certain senior unsecured debt ("Debt Guarantee Program") and unlimited FDIC deposit insurance coverage for non-interest bearing transaction accounts through 2009 ("Transaction Account Guarantee Program").  Under the Debt Guarantee Program, covered debt in an amount up to 125 percent of the senior unsecured debt of a participating institution outstanding on September 30, 2008 that matures no later than June 30, 2009 will be guaranteed by FDIC, for an annual fee of seventy-five basis points of the covered amount.  Covered senior unsecured debt includes commercial paper and unsecured borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks but excludes derivatives, deposits in foreign currency, and convertible debt.  If investors in an institution's unsecured debt do not insist upon the FDIC guaranty, the cost of the Debt Guarantee Program may not be a worthwhile expense. 

The Transaction Account Guarantee Program supplements existing FDIC insurance with temporary, unlimited deposit insurance coverage on non-interest bearing transaction accounts such as demand deposit accounts, payroll and other processing accounts, certain custodial accounts for loan servicing or similar activities and non-interest bearing savings accounts into which funds from transaction accounts are swept.   Institutions that participate in the Transaction Account Guarantee Program will be assessed an annual premium in an amount equal to 0.10 percent of covered transaction account balances in excess of standard FDIC coverages. 

Although it is theoretically voluntary, participation in the Transaction Account Guarantee Program may effectively be mandatory for most banks that depend upon commercial demand deposit accounts for funding.   The market may simply demand this coverage.  This may not be the case for institutions with specialized balance sheets or business models. 

Institutions have until 11:59 p.m. (EST) on December 5, 2008 to opt out of participation in the Debt Guarantee Program or Transaction Account Guarantee Program.   For institutions that do not opt out, the TLGP is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009, although senior unsecured debt guaranteed under the TLGP will remain guaranteed until the later of maturity or June 30, 2012.  Each institution will be required to disclose whether or not it is participating in the Transaction Account Guarantee Program.  If an institution participates in the Debt Guarantee Program, it will have to disclose to investors in a commercially reasonable manner whether or not the debt instrument being offered is guaranteed under the TLGP.

IRS: Little Noticed Notice Unlocks Losses in Bank Mergers

By: Roger S. Wise

Notice 2008-83, quietly issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) on September 30, 2008, removes significant limitations that would otherwise apply to a category of tax losses upon a change of control involving a bank.  The notice’s brevity – its operative section contains a single sentence – should not obscure the profound impact that it may have on merger and acquisition activity involving banks.

Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), was originally enacted to prevent “trafficking” in loss corporations.  Congress was concerned about transactions where one corporation would acquire a target corporation – perhaps even one that had disposed of its historic business – solely to utilize the target’s loss carryforwards.  Under current law, when a corporation undergoes an “ownership change,” Section 382 limits the amount of income that may be offset with historic losses.  This limit is generally equal to the value of the loss corporation at the time of the ownership change multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate, a rate which is published monthly by the IRS.  In essence, this limitation gives the acquiring corporation the benefit of the target’s losses only to the extent of the benefit it would have received if it had instead made an investment in tax-exempt bonds.

An ownership change generally occurs when there is a more than 50 percentage point change in the ownership of the loss corporation by 5 percent shareholders during the three-year period ending on the testing date.  An ownership change can arise if shares of a target corporation are acquired from existing shareholders, or if a new equity investment is made in the target.

The rules described above deal with losses that have already been recognized.  Section 382(h) of the Code extends these limitations to certain built-in losses – i.e., losses existing at the time of an ownership change that are not recognized until later.  If a corporation has a net unrealized built-in loss (“NUBIL”) at the time of an ownership change and meets certain other conditions, any deductions relating to the recognition of those NUBILs during the following 5 years will be subject to the limitations described above.  Certain deductions during the 5-year period that are attributable to periods before the ownership change may also be treated similarly.

Under the new IRS notice, the rules on NUBILs do not apply “to any deduction properly allowed after an ownership change . . . to a bank with respect to losses on loans or bad debts (including any deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts).”  This simple statement appears designed to encourage mergers with, and investments in, troubled banks, by permitted loss deductions arising from bad debts held by the banks.  By removing a significant limitation that would otherwise apply to these losses, the notice in effect creates a tax asset that would otherwise not be available.

A bank is defined in Section 581 of the Code as a bank or trust company incorporated and doing business under the laws of the United States (including laws relating to the District of Columbia) or of any state, which among other things is subject by law to supervision and examination by State, Territorial, or Federal authority having supervision over banking institutions, and also includes a domestic building and loan association.

The long-term impact of the notice is difficult to predict, but it had an almost immediate impact on the takeover of Wachovia, in that the bid by Wells Fargo – which came shortly after the release of the notice, when an offer by Citibank was nearly finalized – appears to have been encouraged by the change in tax law.

The notice was effective upon issuance and may be relied upon unless and until additional guidance is issued.

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State Attorneys General - A Force to be Reckoned With

By: Paul F. Hancock

State attorneys general aspire to be the primary protectors of consumers. The housing collapse provided new opportunities for them to flex their muscles and seek a role in the development of solutions.  Federal preemption remains a controversial issue, but the threat of preemption has only caused state attorneys general to be more aggressive in the areas where they have legal authority.   Recently elected attorneys general have pledged to focus attention on the housing and financial markets, and we can reasonably expect attorneys general, as a group, to push the limits of their authority in addressing the issues.  Some examples of their actions in recent months are described below.

Auction-Rate Securities
Allegations of deception have provided a basis for attorney general involvement in auction-rate securities markets.  New York Attorney General Cuomo reached agreement with twelve financial institutions on claims that they “sold auction-rate securities as safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk.”  The institutions agreed to buy back the securities from certain customers, generally individuals and foundations, and otherwise provide restitution to “individual investors who were fraudulently sold auction-rate securities.”  Cuomo says that the settlements “returned over $50 billion back to investors’ hands.”  Similar settlements were reached by attorneys general in Massachusetts and Michigan.

Mortgage Fraud
Attorneys general have identified mortgage fraud, particularly inflated appraisals, as a major contributor to the housing crisis.  The Florida Attorney General sued ten companies and fifteen individuals that defrauded lenders by recruiting “straw buyers'” with good credit and conspiring with realtors to artificially inflate purchase prices.  Other states have filed similar claims.

Foreclosures
The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group released its third report on mortgage foreclosures at the end of September, contending that 80 percent of delinquent borrowers are not receiving meaningful foreclosure relief.  Although the Group’s collaboration with servicers is described as cooperative, a stronger stick is laying in wait.  After a number of states announced a settlement with Bank of America regarding the Countrywide portfolio that centers on loan modification, on October 7, the Group sent a letter to sixteen subprime servicers stating: “We urge you in the strongest possible terms to adopt a comprehensive, streamlined, and effective loan modification program as soon as possible.”  The implicit threat of prosecution is clear.

State attorneys general investigated and prosecuted deceptive conduct by foreclosure rescue companies.  This issue is a neat fit for traditional attorney general enforcement and is a priority in many states.

Loan Origination
The settlement with Bank of America regarding the Countrywide portfolio continues a trend of aggressive state attorney general action regarding home mortgage lending practices.  The attorneys general already have extracted major business changes in the lending industry through lawsuits and compelled settlements.  The monetary value of the attorney general settlements with Household ($484 million) and Ameriquest ($295 million), as well as the extensive loan modification relief obtained from Countrywide, certainly overshadow any action by federal agencies.  The only real question is which firm will be the next target – perhaps one of the sixteen servicers that received the October 7 letter, or the originators of the loans that they are servicing.

2008 Attorney General Elections
Eleven seats were up for election and the announced plans of the winners indicate a continued, and perhaps increased, focus on mortgage and financial markets. 

Chris Koster, newly elected in Missouri, and Richard Cordray, newly elected in Ohio, focused their campaigns on credit and foreclosure issues.  Other well-known attorneys general who already enjoy a strong reputation in seeking mortgage reform and foreclosure relief – such as Roy Cooper in North Carolina and Rob McKenna in Washington – were reelected.  Mark Shurtleff was reelected in Utah, as was Darrell McGraw in West Virginia; they have prioritized mortgage fraud and other credit-related issues.

First-term attorneys general were elected in Indiana (Greg Zoeller), Montana (Steve Bullock) and Oregon (John Kroger), and incumbents were reelected in Pennsylvania (Tom Corbett) and Vermont (William Sorrell).   All emphasized the importance of consumer protection in seeking office.

Conclusion
The states want a place at the remedial table.   Some offer an olive branch of cooperative efforts to work through the present crisis.  Others are more aggressive from the start.  But if conditions do not improve quickly, it can be expected that many states will join forces to compel reform, based on claims that consumers and investors were deceived or otherwise were victims of unfair practices of loan originators, servicers or secondary market participants.

Regulatory Implications of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley Becoming Financial Holding Companies

By: Rebecca H. LairdEdward G. Eisert

On September 22, 2008, in simultaneous actions, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) announced that it had approved the joint application of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC (collectively, “Goldman Sachs”), and the joint application of Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Capital Management LLC and Morgan Stanley Domestic Holdings, Inc. (collectively, “Morgan Stanley”), to become bank holding companies.   Each company already owned an institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) (a Utah industrial loan company), which was converted into a commercial bank with full deposit taking and lending powers.   Though initially bank holding companies, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have each stated their intention to become a “financial holding company,” i.e., a company that is permitted under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to engage in activities that are “financial in nature,” including securities underwriting, merchant banking, and insurance underwriting and sales (“FHC”). 

Set forth below are answers to a number of frequently asked questions about the regulatory implications of an investment banking firm, such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley, becoming an FHC:

  1. What are the minimum capital and liquidity requirements for a company to become an FHC?  The FHC’s bank must be “well-capitalized” on a consolidated basis, which means that the bank must maintain a “total risk-based capital ratio” of 10.0 percent or greater and the bank must maintain a “Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” of 6.0 percent or greater.  The “total risk-based capital ratio” is the ratio of total capital to assets, which are calculated on a risk-weighted basis.  The “Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio” is the ratio of Tier 1 capital – basically common and perpetual preferred stock and surplus minus goodwill and intangibles – to total assets, which are calculated on a risk-weighted basis.  In addition, the bank’s leverage ratio, which is the ratio of capital to total assets (which are not calculated on a risk-weighted basis), cannot be less than 3.0 percent.  The FRB has stated that at least 100 to 200 basis points above the 3.0 percent leverage ratio is required of all but the very strongest banking organizations.  There are no express liquidity requirements in the regulations.

     
  2. How would an investment banking firm have to restructure its business if it were to become an FHC?  An FHC is permitted to engage in activities that are “financial in nature,” including securities activities, insurance activities, and other financial services activities, such as merchant banking and private equity investing, and may do so in addition to owning banks under a single corporate umbrella.  To the extent an activity of an investment banking firm is not “financial in nature” and is not in compliance with applicable regulations, the firm would have two years in which to divest the activity, which the FRB may extend for three one-year periods.

     
  3. What discretionary powers does the FRB have over an FHC?  The FRB is vested with broad supervisory powers and enforcement tools with which to oversee FHCs.  The FRB has the power to conduct examinations, not just at the bank level, but at the holding company and affiliate level.  The FRB conducts examinations on a regular basis at each supervised institution and maintains offices at, and continuously monitors the activities of, the largest holding companies.  In addition to its general rulemaking authority, the FRB also imposes reporting requirements, restricts activities, imposes operational and managerial standards, and may bring enforcement actions to maintain the “safety and soundness” of the companies it regulates.  The FRB also has the authority to require undercapitalized FHCs to take “prompt corrective action” to raise additional capital or find a merger partner.

    The jurisdiction of the FRB does not supplant the jurisdiction of other federal banking regulators (such as the FDIC) over the banks owned by the FHC, or state banking regulators over such banks organized under state law.  Perhaps most importantly from the investment banking perspective, the SEC remains the primary federal regulator of any registered broker-dealer and investment adviser controlled by the FHC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission remains the primary federal regulator of any registered commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator and futures commission merchant controlled by the FHC.  However, the FRB retains ultimate supervisory authority.

    This multifaceted regulatory regime has far-reaching and significant consequences for new FHCs, including the regulatory compliance programs that are required and the manner in which regulatory examinations and deficiencies are addressed.   For example, historically, the FRB and other bank regulators have been viewed as “prudential” regulators that apply a more “principles based,” collaborative approach to supervision, which is often handled behind closed doors on a confidential basis, as opposed to federal and state securities regulators that are generally viewed as more public-action, enforcement-based regulators. 

     
  4. What are the rules on capital for separate subsidiaries of FHCs and how does the FRB regulate transfers of funds from subsidiaries?  In general, the FRB wants the FHC to be a source of strength to the bank; it does not want the bank to be used to support the FHC.  Consequently, the FRB will generally not allow funds to flow from the bank to the FHC to support its debt, pay dividends or fund general operations, unless there is clearly no detriment to the bank in doing so.

EESA: No Guarantees of Federal Loan Guarantees

By: Laurence E. Platt

Press reports claim that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) are close to announcing a plan pursuant to which the federal government will guarantee the timely repayment of principal and interest on modified eligible residential mortgage loans held by private parties pursuant to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”).  Such a plan might conflict with legal and accounting rules for mortgage-backed securities, raises questions about its relationship to other recent federal initiatives, requires Treasury to develop an actuarially sound, self-funded mortgage insurance program, and calls for loan holders to make principal write-downs they might not be willing to make.  Because of these issues, we are not convinced that the proposal will morph into a real program. As events unfold, we want to take the opportunity to highlight certain issues for which you should watch if a home loan guarantee program actually is promulgated by Treasury. These issues are addressed in the article, “EESA: No Guarantees of Federal Loan Guarantees.” They include the following:

  1. What residential mortgage loans will be eligible for loan guarantees?

     
  2. What is the difference between an FHA-insured, refinancing mortgage loan under the HOPE for Homeowners Program (“HOPE Program”), which Congress created earlier this year as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, and a Treasury-guaranteed modified loan?

     
  3. Will loan holders permanently write down the existing indebtedness by the amount necessary to qualify for a loan guarantee?

     
  4. Given the write-downs that it will take to qualify an existing loan for a HOPE Program refinancing or a federal loan guarantee, why not just sell the loans to Treasury under the recently enacted Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)?

     
  5. Does a federal loan guarantee provide a comparative advantage to loan holders over the HOPE Program or TARP?

     
  6. How will Treasury ensure that the insurance premiums are sufficient to meet the statutory standard of actuarial soundness?

As Treasury Implements EESA, Congress Prepares for Significant Reform Legislation

By Daniel F. C. Crowley

The TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
On October 3, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives passed and President Bush signed into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343, click  GPO's PDF Display for the text of EESA).  Among other things, EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions.

On October 14, 2008, Treasury announced the creation of the TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP), and issued an interim final rule on CPP executive compensation and corporate governance standards.  Treasury also issued executive compensation notices with respect to two additional EESA programs that are currently being developed by Treasury, the Troubled Asset Auction Program (TAAP) and Programs for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (PSSFI). 

Through CPP, Treasury will provide $250 billion in equity capital under standardized terms directly to certain U.S. financial institutions in the form of preferred stock.  The minimum subscription amount available to a participating institution is 1 percent of risk-weighted assets.  The maximum subscription amount is the lesser of $25 billion or 3 percent of risk-weighted assets.  Although the original Treasury proposal did not contemplate this use of the TARP, the addition of the phrase “any other financial instrument” by Congress provided Treasury with the flexibility to inject equity capital directly into banks.  Members of Congress largely indicated their support for the CPP, as did the American Bankers Association.

On October 20, Treasury issued application guidelines for the CPP which indicate that all applications must be submitted to the appropriate Federal banking agency (FBA) no later than 5 pm (EST), November 14, 2008.

To be eligible for the CPP, the applicant must ultimately receive Treasury approval.   According to Secretary Paulson, Treasury “will give considerable weight to” the primary regulator’s recommendation.  More detailed information, including submission instructions, can be found at the applicable FBA website: www.fdic.gov, www.federalreserve.gov, www.occ.treas.gov, or www.ots.treas.gov as the case may be.

In addition, the applicant must agree to certain terms and conditions and make certain representations and warranties described in various agreements available on Treasury’s website:  www.treas.gov.  A detailed investment agreement and associated documentation will be posted soon.  Among the conditions to participation in the CPP is the requirement that, for so long as the Treasury owns shares or warrants in the applicant, certain senior officers of the applicant meet executive compensation standards, which are explained on the Treasury website  here.  With respect to the CCP, the following standards apply: (a) limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers (SEOs) of financial institutions to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (b) required recovery of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to an SEO based on statements of earnings, gains or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; (c) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden parachute payment to any SEO; and (d) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for an SEO.  Treasury did not give much guidance as to what constitutes an appropriate limit on incentives to take excessive risks.

These conditions make a CPP investment less attractive to a financial institution, which would find itself with diluted equity and bound by stricter rules on compensation than its competitors.   In addition, it was feared that capitalization by the Treasury could carry the potential stigma that the firm cannot attract financing on its own, leading to a potential run on the bank.  For these reasons, among others, the Treasury essentially compelled nine of the largest U.S. banks to accept investments under the CPP program.  It is not clear yet how much this move will address other banks’ concerns or how many smaller banks will participate.  Also unclear is whether the banks receiving CPP investments will use the funds merely to shore up their capital bases or, as is clearly Treasury’s intention, to serve as the capital base for additional lending.  To encourage other banks to apply, the guidelines provide that confidentiality may be requested with respect to certain information, and Secretary Paulson has indicated that Treasury will not announce any applications that are withdrawn or denied.

Upcoming Congressional Hearings
As indicated in the last issue, we anticipate that Congress will consider far-reaching reforms of the financial services industry.  As Treasury implements EESA, numerous Congressional committees continue to conduct oversight hearings in order to lay the foundation for what will likely be the most significant revisions to the nation’s financial services laws since the Great Depression.  Among the hearings that have already occurred or are currently scheduled are:

Future of Financial Services Industry Oversight and Regulation
House Financial Services Committee
Date: Tuesday, Oct. 21, 10 a.m.
Location: 2128 Rayburn Bldg.
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/hr102108.shtml

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Workers’ Retirement Security
House Education and Labor Committee
Date: Wednesday, Oct. 22, 9:30 a.m.
Location: 1 Dr. Carlton B Goodlett Place, Room 250, San Francisco, Calif.
Witnesses: Shlomo Benartzi - professor, Anderson School of Management, University of California at Los Angeles
Mark Davis - partner, Kravitz Davis Sansone, Encino, Calif.
Jacob S. Hacker - professor, University of California at Berkeley
http://edlabor.house.gov/committee/schedule.shtml

Turmoil in the Financial Markets
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

  • Topic: Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis
    Date: Wednesday, Oct. 22, 10 a.m.
    Location: 2154 Rayburn Bldg.
    Witnesses: Deven Sharma - president, Standard and Poor's
    Raymond W. McDaniel - chairman and CEO, Moody's Corp
    Stephen Joynt - president and CEO, Fitch Ratings

     
  • Topic: The Role of Federal Regulators
    Date: Thursday, Oct. 23, 10 a.m.
    Location: 2154 Rayburn Bldg.
    Witnesses: Alan Greenspan - former chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
    John Snow - former secretary of the Treasury
    Christopher Cox - chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission

     
  • Topic: The Regulation of Hedge Funds
    Date: Thursday, Nov. 13, 10 a.m.
    Location: 2154 Rayburn Bldg
    Note: Date changed to Nov. 13 from Oct. 16.
    Witnesses: John Alfred Paulson - president, Paulson and Co. Inc., George Soros - chairman, Soros Fund Management LLC, Philip A. Falcone - senior managing director, Harbinger Capital Partners, James Simons - director, Renaissance Technologies LLC, Kenneth C. Griffin - CEO and managing director, Citadel Investment Group
    http://oversight.house.gov/

Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Recent Regulatory Responses 
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee
Date: Thursday, Oct. 23, 10 a.m.
Location: 538 Dirksen Bldg.
More information

The Public Policy & Law group is closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

FDIC Insurance Coverage for Securitization Servicing Accounts Leaves Some Investors in the Cold

By Anthony R.G. Nolan and Drew A. Malakoff

On October 10, 2008, the FDIC adopted an interim rule (the “Interim Rule”) that increases the standard maximum deposit insurance amount from $100,000 to $250,000, in accordance with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Of particular interest to securitization investors and servicers, the Interim Rule also simplifies the deposit insurance rules as they apply to mortgage servicing accounts. By doing so, it increases certainty for investors while enhancing liquidity for servicers of mortgage assets.

Prior to the enactment of the Interim Rule, funds on deposit in mortgage servicing accounts that represented principal and interest received on the underlying loans were insurable on a pass-through basis to each investor or security holder of a securitization or fund. The theory behind this approach was that payments of principal and interest on securitized mortgages were beneficially owned by the investors in the related mortgage-backed securities. As a practical matter, however, the FDIC’s prior approach to mortgage servicing accounts created some ambiguity as to the ability of individual investors to make a claim against the FDIC for amounts in a servicing account held by a depository institution that became subject to a receivership or conservatorship, particularly as securitizations became more complicated and incorporated different tranches of bonds with varying degrees of seniority or with specific rights to sub-pools of assets.

Under the FDIC’s prior approach, in order to determine what portion of each investor’s interest in the principal and interest payments deposited into a mortgage servicing account was covered by FDIC insurance, it was necessary to determine not only which investors had not exceeded their respective deposit insurance limits, but also which investors should have been allocated the next dollar of principal or interest based on the complex paydown rules contained in the transaction documents. This complex calculus, based on a deal’s distribution waterfall and the percentage of the relevant security each investor held, made it increasingly difficult to determine which of the many investors in a securitization vehicle had the rights to each dollar of principal or interest. Moreover, given the size of many of these transactions, it was also very likely that individual investors would far exceed the applicable insurance limit.

These considerations resulted in uncertainty among securitization investors as to the extent to which their allocated portions of loan payments would be covered by deposit insurance. Consequently, investors and rating agencies require that servicers remit funds from servicing accounts to a trustee account on a daily basis (or in some cases transfer the servicing account to another institution) whenever the servicers’ creditworthiness (as measured by credit ratings) decline below certain levels. This imposed a cost to depository institutions in the form of reduced liquidity, which has become a significant threat to the stability of financial markets in the recent challenging market conditions.

The Interim Rule reconciles the needs of mortgage-backed security investors for security with the needs of depository institutions for liquidity by changing the basis for insuring accounts in mortgage servicing accounts and, in many cases, increasing the amount actually covered in each such account. Because the Interim Rule makes it easier to determine what portion of payments beneficially owned by securitization investors are covered by FDIC deposit insurance, investors and rating agencies will be more likely to permit depository institutions that maintain mortgage servicing accounts to commingle amounts received on mortgage loans for longer periods, thus enhancing their liquidity. For this reason, the Interim Rule is a welcome development for depository institutions and investors participating in the mortgage securitization market. However, the Interim Rule as currently drafted — to cover only mortgage servicing accounts — does not go far enough in that it does not address these concerns as they arise in the securitization of non-mortgage related assets.

SEC and FASB Relax Fair Value Rules; Controversy Continues

By Edward G. Eisert and Mark D. Perlow

On September 30, the Office of the Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Staff of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB Staff”) issued guidance on the determination of “fair value” under FAS 157 (the “FAS 157 Guidance”), addressing the use of internal assumptions, the use of broker quotes, and transactions in disorderly or inactive markets to measure fair value. On October 10 , the FASB published a FASB Staff Position (“FSP”) intended to clarify the application of the FAS 157 Guidance. FAS 157, which became effective in November 2007, defines “fair value” as the price that would be obtained in an orderly transaction between market participants in the principal or most advantageous market.

The FSP provides an illustrative example to demonstrate how the fair value of a financial asset might be determined when there is a “disorderly” or “inactive” market and the basis on which a determination could be made that a market is, in fact, "inactive." Although the FSP provides helpful commentary on the FAS 157 Guidance, it does not eliminate the need for investors and auditors to make difficult judgment calls.

The FAS 157 Guidance and the FSP were issued in response to a campaign by the banking industry, based on the argument that the emphasis under FAS 157 on “fair market” valuations for financial assets was forcing banks to write down performing assets to “fire sale” or distressed prices, compelling them to sell more assets to raise capital, and thereby depressing prices further in a downward spiral. Conversely, many supporters of FAS 157, including investors’ groups, have expressed the view that current market values provide a more accurate picture of the health of financial institutions than values based on cost or cash flow models. The SEC rarely involves itself in FASB policy-making, and the SEC’s action is clearly an attempt to reach a compromise between the two positions: it relaxed the interpretation of some of FAS 157’s market valuation provisions, but did not suspend market valuation, as some have requested.

The compromise has not appeased either side in the debate. Some in the industry continue to believe that the FAS 157 Guidance and the FSP do not go far enough. On October 13, in a letter to Chairman Cox of the SEC (the “October 13 Letter”), the American Bankers Association (“ABA”) commented that FASB’s fair value standard “needs serious work,” that it “is always going to create a downward bias on values” and requested the SEC “to use its statutory authority to step in and override the guidance issued by FASB.” http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/ChrmnCoxLtr.101308.pdf. Two specific issues highlighted by the October 13 Letter are the requirement in the FSP that “liquidity risk from the buyer’s perspective” be included in cash flow calculations that can be used to determine fair value and that the FSP did not address “other than temporary impairment” in an illiquid market. In addition, a number of members of Congress have been making public statements calling upon the SEC to suspend mark-to-market accounting, thereby politicizing the issue.

Apparently in response to the October 13 Letter and Congressional pressure, on October 15, in a joint letter to Chairman Cox, the Center for Audit Quality, the Consumer Federation of America, the CFA Institute and the Council of Institutional Investors “expressed grave concern regarding recent calls for the SEC to override [the FAS 157 Guidance] that would effectively suspend fair value or mark-to-market accounting.” http://www.thecaq.org/newsroom/pdfs/SECJointLetter2008-10-15.pdf. The joint letter did not specifically mention the October 13 Letter or address the specific issues it raised.

Underlying these positions is a basic disagreement as to the role that the adoption of FAS 157 has played in the liquidity and credit crisis. The ABA believes that FAS 157 has had a significant detrimental impact on the crisis, while auditor and investor groups believe that the crisis was not caused by fair value accounting and that, in fact, FAS 157 has been helpful in exposing problems.

In time-honored Washington fashion, this controversy is now being simultaneously addressed and avoided through a study group. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act mandates that the SEC “in consultation with the [Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury] shall conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting standards as provided in [FAS 157], as such standards are applicable to financial institutions, including depository institutions.” The SEC is required to submit a report of such study (the “SEC Study”) no later than January 2, 2009 (that is, after the election, but before the new Congress takes office), including “such administrative and legislative recommendations as the [SEC] determines appropriate.”

Work on the SEC Study has commenced and the SEC has announced that it is scheduling public roundtables to obtain input from “investors, accountants, standard setters, business leaders, and other interested parties.”

With the preparation of third quarter financial statements now in process, presumably in reliance on the FAS 157 Guidance and the FSP, and the SEC Study underway, with further public input to be provided, it appears likely that any further regulatory action on these issues will be deferred until 2009, when it will unquestionably be a subject for further debate during the upcoming effort by Congress to reform financial regulation.

We will continue to provide updates on these important issues as events unfold.

SEC Inspector General Finds Staff Misconduct in Investigations of Wall Street Firms. Reports Will Increase Pressure on SEC to "Get Tough"

By Brian A. Ochs

Significant disruptions in the market invariably lead to an increase in SEC enforcement activity, as regulators seek to determine whether those negative events resulted from violations of the federal securities laws. The aggressiveness of the SEC’s efforts in this regard will likely be further enhanced by two new reports from the SEC’s Inspector General (“IG”), H. David Kotz, that are highly critical of the Enforcement Division’s prior conduct of investigations involving major Wall Street firms. In each report, the IG raised questions about the Enforcement staff’s appearance of impartiality and recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the staff members involved, including the Director of the Enforcement Division and the head of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office.

The Enforcement Division has publicly, and in strong terms, contested the findings of at least one of the IG’s reports. Nonetheless, the IG’s charges of lax enforcement and the appearance of favorable treatment for major participants in the financial services industry seem certain to result in an even tougher and more difficult enforcement environment in the context of the SEC’s response to the current financial crisis.

Aguirre termination. The first report, issued on September 30, stemmed from charges by a former SEC Enforcement staff attorney, Gary Aguirre, that his supervisors gave improper preferential treatment to Morgan Stanley Chairman and CEO John Mack, and terminated Aguirre’s employment, when Aguirre sought to take Mack’s testimony as a possible tipper in an insider trading investigation involving hedge fund Pequot Capital Management. See “Re-Investigation of Claims by Gary Aguirre of Improper Preferential Treatment and Retaliatory Termination,” SEC Office of Inspector General (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg100708.pdf. An initial IG investigation in 2005, conducted by the current IG’s predecessor, exonerated the Enforcement staff. Congress held hearings, and in August 2007, the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committees issued a report critical of the Enforcement Division’s conduct of the Pequot investigation, and faulting the IG for failing to conduct a credible investigation into Aguirre’s charges. Following the Senate report, the IG retired, and Kotz was appointed as the SEC’s new IG in December 2007.

Importantly, the Kotz re-investigation did not find that Mack received any favorable treatment regarding the taking of his testimony. The IG received testimony from numerous past and present Enforcement officials that Enforcement cases are not affected by political considerations or the prominence of particular individuals. The IG also found that there had been reasonable strategic reasons for delaying Mack’s testimony.

Notwithstanding these findings, the IG went on to conclude that Enforcement staff supervisors had “conducted themselves in a manner that raised serious questions about the impartiality and fairness of the Pequot investigation.” Further, the IG determined that “there was a connection between the decision to terminate Aguirre and his seeking to take Mack’s testimony,” and that Enforcement “allowed inappropriate reasons to factor into its decision to terminate him.” The IG went on to directly criticize Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen and recommended that the SEC Chairman take disciplinary action against her for disclosing non-public information about the evidence against Mack to counsel for Morgan Stanley’s board of directors. In response to a request for information (because Morgan Stanley’s board was considering hiring Mack as CEO), Thomsen told the board’s counsel that the investigation had uncovered “smoke,” but no “fire,” concerning Mack.

Bear Stearns Investigation. In a second report, the IG found that the Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office had “failed to administer his statutory obligations and responsibilities to vigorously enforce compliance with [applicable] securities laws” in connection with an investigation into Bear Stearns’ role in valuing certain collateralized bond obligations and collateralized loan obligations that a client purchased from Bear Stearns. See “Failure to Vigorously Enforce Action Against W. Holding and Bear Stearns at the Miami Regional Office,” SEC Office of Inspector General (Sept. 30, 2008). The report was prepared in response to a request from Senator Charles Grassley (R. Iowa), ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, seeking information as to why the SEC had closed the investigation without any enforcement action.

According to the IG’s report, the head of the Miami office “abruptly” closed the investigation in 2007 after the staff had made progress negotiating several settlements. Further, the IG found that the fact that two of the defense counsel involved in the case were longtime friends of the head of the Miami office created an “appearance, to some, that they may have received favorable treatment.” While acknowledging that there was “no evidence of a direct connection between the relationship … and the decision to close the investigation,” the IG found the appearance of a conflict “disturbing,” noting that it “could potentially damage the reputation of the Commission.” (This finding of the IG seems particularly ill-considered, given that a large portion of the defense bar consists of attorneys who have previously served on the SEC staff. To suggest an apparent conflict of interest merely because defense attorneys may deal with former friends and colleagues on the SEC staff is to risk depriving clients of the best and most experienced counsel of their choice, a position that the SEC itself has never asserted.)

The IG went on to fault the Miami office staff for not coordinating its investigation with the Department of Justice, which was investigating a similar matter involving another Bear Stearns employee. The IG found that “[a] significant opportunity to coordinate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and uncover evidence of a systematic problem at Bear Stearns was also lost through neglect.” The IG recommended that the SEC Chairman take disciplinary action against the Director of the Miami office.

In a strongly worded response, the Enforcement Division characterized the IG’s report as “misleading,” filled with “speculation and innuendo,” as ignoring testimony showing that the decision to close the investigation was a sound one, and failing to comply with the IG’s “fundamental obligation to conduct a fair and impartial fact-finding.”

Likely impact of the IG reports. Against the backdrop of existing criticisms of the SEC for regulatory failures that contributed to the current financial crisis, the IG’s reports may provide the impetus for a period of unusually difficult, contentious, and highly critical oversight of the SEC’s enforcement function. Regardless of whether the IG’s conclusions in these cases were sound, the IG’s reports are likely to fuel critics in Congress and elsewhere who seek to contend that the Enforcement Division has failed in its responsibility to pursue aggressively misconduct at large banking firms.

To cite just one such example, Sen. Grassley has commented that the IG’s report on the Bear Stearns investigation provides “yet another example of the lack of vigorous enforcement at the SEC,” and “demonstrates the culture of deference at the SEC in dealing with big players on Wall Street.” http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg101008.pdf. Similarly, on October 21, Sen. Grassley wrote to SEC Chairman Cox concerning anonymous allegations he has received that, during the negotiations earlier this year that led to JP Morgan Chase’s (“JPMC”) takeover of Bear Stearns, Enforcement Director Thomsen disclosed information concerning the status of various investigations involving Bear Stearns to JPMC’s General Counsel, Stephen Cutler, who preceded Ms. Thomsen as Director of the Enforcement Division. Sen. Grassley wrote to Chairman Cox that “Such conduct would reinforce the appearance that Enforcement decisions, and disclosures of information about them, are sometimes based not on the merits, but rather on access to senior officials by influential representatives of power brokers on Wall Street. In light of these allegations and the ongoing financial crisis, there has never been a more critical time to take swift action to restore confidence in the SEC Enforcement Division.” http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg102108.pdf.

The SEC’s Enforcement Division and the Commission thus are likely to feel pressure to demonstrate heightened aggressiveness and firmness in future investigations and enforcement actions, particularly where major participants in the financial services sector are involved. The Enforcement staff will likely seek even more rapid progress in priority investigations than in the past, and may curtail opportunities for meaningful deliberation and dialogue that have historically proven beneficial both to the staff and to the subjects of complex investigations. While the staff will undoubtedly maintain its high standards of professionalism, it would be unsurprising if there is less flexibility and less willingness to entertain sound arguments regarding factual and legal defenses in an environment where staff members may be concerned that any concessions they make may subject them to criticism or even disciplinary action if they are perceived to be insufficiently vigorous in their enforcement of the securities laws.

New SEC Enforcement Manual Directs Staff Not to Seek Waivers of Attorney-Client Privilege

By Brian A. Ochs

On October 6, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) posted on its web site the first-ever SEC Enforcement Manual. (See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.) The publication of the manual reflects the first time that the SEC has committed to writing, in a single document, the various policies and procedures that govern investigations conducted by its Division of Enforcement. According to press accounts, the manual was prepared in response to a report issued in August 2007 by the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committees that criticized the SEC for its handling of an insider trading investigation involving hedge fund Pequot Capital Management (see separate article in this newsletter), and recommended that the SEC adopt a consistent set of procedures similar to the U.S. Attorneys Manual.

In large measure the Enforcement Manual does not break new ground, but instead describes practices that have been commonly understood for years. Notably, however, the Enforcement Manual does include the first comprehensive, written statement by the SEC on its view of the relationship between “cooperation” in an investigation and the assertion of attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. After years of controversy over this issue in the post-Enron era, during which parties often felt pressured by government investigators to waive privilege in order to receive full credit for cooperation, the Enforcement Manual makes clear that waiver is neither necessary nor expected. The manual’s key statements on this topic include:

  • “As a matter of public policy, the SEC wants to encourage individuals, corporate officers, and employees to consult counsel about potential violations of the securities laws.”

     
  • “The staff should not ask a party to waive the attorney-client or work product privileges, and is directed not to do so.” (Emphasis in original.) (This express direction is significant given that, as recently as last year, Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen acknowledged in a speech that waivers were still sometimes being requested – albeit “judiciously.”)

     
  • “The voluntary disclosure of information need not include a waiver of privilege to be an effective form of cooperation, as long as all relevant facts are disclosed.”

     
  • “Waiver of a privilege is not a pre-requisite to obtaining credit for cooperation. A party’s assertion of a legitimate privilege will not negatively affect their claim to credit for cooperation. The appropriate inquiry in this regard is whether, notwithstanding a legitimate claim of privilege, the party has disclosed all relevant underlying facts within its knowledge.”

With its emphasis on obtaining underlying facts, rather than on waivers of privilege, and in its direction that the SEC Staff should not seek waivers, the Enforcement Manual follows the path of the Department of Justice’s recent “Filip Memorandum,” which prohibits federal prosecutors from requesting privilege waivers (seeDOJ Issues New Guidance That Retreats From Aggressive Policies Followed in White Collar Cases,” K&L Gates White Collar Crime/Criminal Defense Alert (Sept. 24, 2008)).

Although senior Enforcement Division officials stated in the past that waiver of privilege was not required in order to obtain credit for cooperation, they had also indicated that the voluntary decision to waive privilege would receive enhanced credit, and some SEC enforcement orders reflected this approach. Among others, former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins had been a vocal critic of the practice of holding out privilege waiver as a “plus factor” in determining credit for cooperation.

Although it remains to be seen how the Enforcement Manual is applied in practice, the manual does not suggest that any “plus factor” calculus will be used in future cases. Instead, the manual emphasizes that waiver of privileges is not necessary to “effective cooperation.”

As the SEC expands and increases the pace of its investigations into possible wrongdoing in relation to the crisis in the financial sector, these provisions of the Enforcement Manual will hopefully bring clarity and consistency to Enforcement Division practices when parties seek to cooperate while still preserving attorney-client and work product privileges. This should provide important protections to companies (in particular those that conduct internal investigations), as well as to their officers and employees, as compared with the environment of a few years ago, when waivers of privilege were often viewed as necessary to receiving full credit for cooperation.

An End to Light Touch Regulation in the UK?

By Robert V. Hadley and Philip J. Morgan

Last week, two leading UK newspapers reported interviews with the new Chairman of the FSA, Lord Adair Turner, in which he is said to have warned that the days of “soft-touch regulation” are over. He also spoke of the FSA’s plans to pump more resources, and to recruit high quality people from the private sector at considerable expense, into the regulation of systemically important institutions.

Earlier last week FSA Chief Executive Hector Sants struck a slightly different tone when he noted that the concept of “heightened supervision” - jargon for an FSA enhanced regulatory regime for banks where failure appears possible - was a last resort. He also said that the term “heightened supervision” was a colloquialism that reflects the fact that the FSA adopts a risk-based approach. Certain risks now being clear it is appropriate, and consistent with the FSA’s stated and historic approach, and nothing new, for supervision in relation to such risks to be “heightened.”

The new Chairman is plainly looking to stamp his authority in a very public way. Interviews with national newspapers are not a common occurrence for leaders at the FSA. And “light-touch regulation” has long been a mantra of FSA leaders, Mr Sants included. But does Lord Turner's intervention last week signal a real change of direction for the FSA?

Risk-based regulation, which continues to be at the heart of the FSA’s approach, and light-touch regulation run hand in hand - a business that presents a limited risk to the FSA’s statutory objectives can be regulated in a less hands-on fashion than higher risk businesses the failure of which may have systemic consequences. We suspect therefore that many people regulated by the FSA will notice little difference with the tougher stance signalled by Lord Turner.

On the other hand, it is clear that the FSA is currently far more focused, as a matter of necessity, on issues that can have consequences for the stability of the financial system as a whole. Lord Turner mentioned in particular FSA work in three areas:

(i) the capital adequacy regime for banks - in relation to which he noted that the current regime seems to encourage the banks to lend too much in the boom times and too little when times get tough;

(ii) liquidity - where the focus would be on whether the business model of financial institutions was solid enough in bad times as well as good; and

(iii) pay - although Lord Turner was clear that this area plays second fiddle to capital adequacy and liquidity

Also, it would appear that under Lord Turner's watch the FSA will be taking a renewed close look at the risks posed by hedge funds. For example, it was reported that he thinks that hedge funds, up to now beneficiaries of “light-touch regulation” in the UK, could evolve to pose a systemic risk, much as the Wall Street banks did during the past few decades.

The truth, it seems to us, is that whilst the FSA is set to get tougher with high-impact, systemically important firms, notably significant banks and insurance companies, much of the rest of the FSA’s work will probably carry on as before, at least for a while. Lord Turner himself summed up the balancing act as follows:

“There is no doubt the touch will be heavier… We have to make sure that it is intelligent and focussed on where the risks really are.”

It does remain interesting, though, that the new Chairman, unlike the last, does not seem minded to defend the concept of “light-touch regulation,” even choosing to refer to it by the more pejorative “soft-touch regulation.” It remains to be seen whether Mr. Sants will adjust his tone to be more in keeping with his new boss’s tough talking.

DOJ'S Resource Crunch Offers Strategic Options for Corporations in White Collar Cases

By Michael D. RicciutiClarence H. Brown and Leanne E. Hartmann

With the advent of the credit crisis, the Department of Justice (DOJ) – and particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorneys’ Offices – is faced with a daunting challenge at a time of decreasing budgets and strained resources. DOJ’s resource shortage presents an enhanced strategic opportunity to corporations who suspect that they are at risk for investigation or prosecution for criminal activity – or have been victimized by it. In brief, sometimes the distinction between a criminally culpable company and one that has been victimized is in the eyes of the beholder. Emphasizing the latter status serves as an opportunity.

Background. After the events of September 11, 2001, DOJ and the FBI made national security their top priority, but with a more refined focus. No longer was it enough for DOJ to investigate and prosecute terrorists. Instead, DOJ now seeks to prevent acts of terrorism – a far more difficult task than merely prosecuting terrorism, which are among the most challenging criminal cases. Unsurprisingly, to fulfill this aggressive mission, a huge portion of the resources of the FBI and DOJ were redeployed to fight terrorism. Now, with the massive credit crisis to contend with, DOJ and FBI have opened a series of financial investigations, reportedly involving Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, among approximately 1,500 others. Reports indicate that the FBI plans to double the number of agents focusing on financial crime, but also make clear that the FBI has hundreds fewer agents focused on this work than it did during the financial crisis involving savings and loans in the 1980s. It will be extremely challenging for the government to find the resources to handle these new complex and difficult cases.

Internal Investigations: Defensive Use. As discussed in the previous Global Financial Markets Group newsletter, the government has wide authority to bring charges in the corporate criminal context, but its own policies restrict its power to do so. In brief, a corporation may be criminally liable for the conduct (or omissions) of its agents committed within the scope of their duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation. This means that, as a matter of law, the crimes of any employee in the organization, regardless of his or her position on the organization chart, may be attributable to the company and the company could thus be charged criminally for them. DOJ has the discretion to bring a criminal case against the company under these circumstances – or not to do so. Whether DOJ exercises its discretion not to charge a company depends upon its analysis of the factors under DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (“the Principles”). The Principles put a premium on a company’s cooperation in helping DOJ investigate the alleged crime – exactly the type of cooperation DOJ sorely needs now that it is facing a global financial crisis and its own resource shortage.

Revised this past August, the Principles recognize that corporate crime is more difficult to investigate than crimes committed by individuals. As the Principles note:

In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself. It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries. Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been promoted, transferred or fired, or they may have quit or retired.

Because of these difficulties, the Principles acknowledge that “a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant evidence, among other things, and in doing so expeditiously.” (For more information regarding the Principles, see the United States Attorney’s Manual, Title 9, Chapter 9-28.700 et seq.)

From a defensive perspective, then, the company may seek to curry favor from DOJ and avoid being criminally charged through its cooperation. In cooperating under the Principles, a company with a good track record of compliance seeks, in essence, to demonstrate to the government that it should not be charged criminally on the basis of an employee’s criminal acts because that employee’s activities are inconsistent with the company’s otherwise positive compliance record, among other factors. Typically, conducting an independent internal investigation is a critical initial element in the company seeking credit for cooperation. Through an investigation of itself, the company discovers the relevant facts and – if it chooses to do so – can provide DOJ with a roadmap of the potential case from it. From DOJ’s perspective, cooperation credit is awarded where the corporation “timely disclosed the relevant facts about the putative misconduct” – and can result in DOJ not seeking to prosecute an otherwise well-run, compliant company because of its cooperation, among other factors.

There are significant risks to providing this cooperation. For instance, preparing an internal investigation develops a factual record which private litigants may later use to assert claims against the company and its officers and directors. Even so, with DOJ in short supply of agents to perform detailed investigations, providing this cooperation may be at a premium for the government – and may earn companies significant consideration when DOJ decides whether to bring criminal charges against the corporation. With an internal investigation in hand, companies can also often reap other benefits, such as identifying personnel who should be terminated for misconduct and deficient systems and procedures that need improvement, preparing earlier for shareholder and third-party litigation, and permitting the company to more effectively assist its board members, officers and employees in preparing for and giving testimony.

Internal Investigations: Offensive Use. There is also an offensive aspect to the use of internal investigations that is often overlooked. A company that suffers from the criminal conduct of an employee may be a defendant in a resulting prosecution – but may also be a victim of the wayward employee’s criminal acts. The company’s status as a victim is a fact on which the government does not always focus. A company thus should consider whether to use an internal investigation to proactively prod the United States Attorney’s Office to bring a criminal case against the employee wrongdoer. When the government is strapped for resources, it will often look favorably on a completed investigation that shows readily provable criminal wrongdoing, which will increase the likelihood that the government will take the case and prosecute it. Offensive use of the internal investigation accomplishes at least three goals:

First, it makes it clear to DOJ that the company should not be viewed as a potential defendant but rather as a victim, and, as such, is entitled to victim’s rights, to include the right to restitution from the employee. In a fraud case, where an employee has made off with company funds, a court in sentencing a convicted employee wrongdoer is empowered to order restitution as an element of the criminal judgment – forcing the employee to repay the company through a restitution order enforced by the Probation Department, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the Court. Such an order saves the company from pursuing repayment from the employee civilly, often an expensive and fruitless endeavor.

Second, seeking prosecution from the government is often relatively inexpensive. Once the internal investigation is done by the company, and the government accepts the case for prosecution, it is the government that bears the costs of the prosecution. The company only needs to cooperate with the government, typically far cheaper than defending itself and its employees in a criminal probe.

Third, a prosecution of a criminal employee sends a very clear message to other employees and to the government that the company will not tolerate criminal wrongdoing and will take very aggressive action against those who violate the rules. There can be no clearer zero-tolerance approach for criminal activity.

Conclusion. With DOJ facing a likely crush of new financial crimes cases, companies with potential exposure need to consider their options strategically. One important option is a credible, independent internal investigation done early and proactively, which can provide the company with both defensive and offensive benefits.

Litigation: Financial Institutions Have Remedies for a Breach of Contract by the Federal Government

By David T. Case

The evolving efforts of the U.S. Government to address the turmoil in the financial markets echo in many respects Government actions to address the “crisis” in the savings and loan industry in the 1980s. As a consequence, the litigation against the Government resulting from the regulatory reform of the savings and loan industry provides a useful template in the event that the current reforms cause the Government to breach promises of specific regulatory treatment. In particular, under the previous litigation, the Government has been held liable for breach of contract, and substantial damages have been awarded, including damages for lost profits.

Looking back to the 1980s, regulators were faced with the possibility of widespread failure by savings and loans, along with a corresponding threat to the deposit insurance funds and potentially enormous liquidation costs. Many early efforts to solve the savings and loan crisis resulted in contracts between savings and loans and the Government in which the Government promised specific treatment under pertinent regulations. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) entered into varying forms of such agreements, either as a means of directly avoiding seizure of failing institutions, or indirectly avoiding such seizures by encouraging healthy thrifts to acquire failing institutions.

Subsequent efforts to resolve the savings and loan crisis culminated in the passage and implementation of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), and in implementing the provisions of that law, the Government breached many of its earlier promises. These breaches caused a wave of claims against the Government, and one critical lesson from the tumult is that contracts with the Government for specific regulatory treatment are enforceable, and the Government will be liable for damages caused by its breach of contract. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, where the Government entered into contracts with regulated financial institutions, promising to provide financial institutions with “particular regulatory treatment in exchange for their assumption of liabilities that threatened to produce claims against the Government as insurer,” the risk of regulatory change fell to the Government, even though “Congress subsequently changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements.” United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996).

The application of these principles was recently affirmed in a case presenting a scenario remarkably reminiscent of current Government attempts to address the turmoil in the financial markets: First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rochester v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 106 (2007), aff’d 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17331 (Aug. 13, 2008). Four failing savings and loans were merged into First Federal, and the Government provided financial assistance to the institution, replaced senior management, selected members of the Board of Directors, and exercised substantial control over First Federal’s operations.

First Federal later claimed that the Government had breached its contract with First Federal by failing to honor its agreement to allow First Federal to operate at reduced capital levels. The contract had been agreed to between First Federal and FSLIC as part of a reorganization of First Federal, and the agreement was intended to permit the Association to return to financial health as an alternative to seizure, following a lengthy period of insolvency, and to save FSLIC the costs of liquidating the Association. Following this 1986 agreement, First Federal’s business prospered until 1989, when Congress passed FIRREA, nullifying all contracts between the FSLIC and thrift institutions to the extent that those contracts relaxed regulatory capital requirements for specific thrift institutions.

Finding liability against the Government, the court awarded First Federal $85 million in damages, primarily for lost profits, plus attorney’s fees and costs. The award was recently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. First Federal, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17331 (Aug. 13, 2008).

First Federal provides a roadmap for claims that arise as a result of the Government’s breach of contract, and if a financial institution believes it has such a claim against the Government, counsel should be consulted to evaluate appropriate steps to preserve and perfect the claim.

Proposed FTC Anti-Manipulation Rule Could Affect Energy Businesses and Futures Traders

By Charles R. Mills and Lawrence B. Patent

Energy businesses and traders in energy futures markets should be aware that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), acting under authority granted in last year’s energy bill, proposed a new anti-manipulation rule in August that would prohibit the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances in wholesale crude oil, gasoline or petroleum distillate markets. The FTC states in the Federal Register notice announcing the proposals that its rules in this area are modeled on SEC Rule 10b-5. The FTC thus would become part of the posse of federal agencies searching for villains to blame for the run-up in energy prices earlier this year. The FTC is taking this action despite the fact that, in response to its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this area, even very few consumer commenters supported an FTC anti-manipulation rule.

No safe harbor for futures traders. Despite comments on an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that a safe harbor provision or other explicit exemption for the futures markets is necessary to avoid overlap with CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) jurisdiction over futures markets, the FTC does not believe that a safe harbor or exemption is warranted. Although the FTC points to its prior practice of coordinating enforcement efforts with other agencies, the CFTC has continued to urge the FTC to reconsider its opposition to a carve-out of the futures markets from the FTC’s rule. The extended comment period on the FTC’s proposed rule closed on October 17, 2008, and the FTC has scheduled a public workshop on the proposals for November 6, 2008.

Are three heads better than one? Energy businesses and futures traders may need to be mindful of the FTC in addition to the CFTC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The CFTC and FERC continue to debate their respective jurisdictions over energy futures markets, which has been highlighted by the agencies separately bringing competing enforcement actions against the now-defunct hedge fund Amaranth Advisors, LLC with respect to its trading in the natural gas futures market.

Will the Federal Government Force Innocent Parties to Bear the Cost of Loan Modifications?

By Laurence E. Platt

A critical question to be answered concerning the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”) is who will bear the cost of loan modifications. There are great pressures on the federal, state and local governments to keep defaulting borrowers in their homes. However, loan servicers and holders, who did not originate the loans but have a financial interest in them, could suffer significant costs if the government forces certain loan modifications. Both loan holders and loan servicers generally support the government's strategic objective of home retention. However, EESA leaves open the issue of when should a borrower be eligible for a loan modification that exceeds the cost of foreclosure? Click here to read a recent alert that describes the requirements for loan modifications under EESA and compares and contrasts these requirements with the pronouncement of the FDIC and the actions of state attorneys general. To read the full alert, please click here.

Efforts to Stem the Financial Crisis Likely to be Followed by Significant Reform of Financial Services Regulation

By:  Daniel F. C. Crowley, Patrick G. Heck

Recent Policy Responses
The recent public policy responses to the credit crisis have been geared toward restoring liquidity in the credit markets, enhancing transparency, and prohibiting certain trading practices.   Foremost among these measures has been H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008   (“EESA” or “the Act”), in response to the Department of the Treasury’s (“Treasury”) request for authority to spend up to $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets.  The Act is intended to improve the capital positions of financial institutions and allow them to once again extend credit.  Other stop-gap measures by the regulatory agencies, as discussed elsewhere in this newsletter, have been geared toward reducing volatility and restoring orderly markets.

EESA, which was passed by the House and signed by President Bush on Friday, October 3, 2008, authorizes up to $700 billion for the Treasury for a troubled asset relief program (TARP) to purchase, and a Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund to insure, illiquid financial instruments. The Act allows Treasury to immediately use $250 billion, with an additional $100 billion if the president certifies such a need. The president would have to provide a written request for the remaining $350 billion, which could be subject to expedited congressional approval.

The Act

  • Creates the Financial Stability Oversight Board, comprised of the Fed Chairman, the Secretaries of Treasury and HUD, the FHFA Director, and the SEC Chairman.
  • Creates various reporting and oversight requirements.
  • Waives FAR and provides for streamlined contracting procedures.
  • Establishes a Congressional Oversight Panel in the legislative branch to “review the current state of the financial markets and the regulatory system.”
  • Places limits on senior executive compensation for some participating financial institutions.
  • Requires Treasury to develop programs to reduce foreclosures and encourage lenders to modify mortgage terms.
  • Prohibits use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for future money market guarantee programs.
  • Authorizes the SEC to suspend mark-to-market accounting (FAS 157).
  • Increases the federal budget debt ceiling to $11.315 trillion.
  • Temporarily increases the FDIC insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000.

The text of the Act and a section-by-section analysis may be found on the House Financial Services Committee website: http://financialservices.house.gov/.  

EESA Tax Provisions
EESA also contains a number of important tax provisions that have not received a great deal of attention. There are three tax provisions related to the rescue plan:

  1. Extension of exclusion of income from discharge of qualified principal residence indebtedness.  Generally, when homeowners have parts of their mortgages forgiven, they immediately owe income taxes on the amount of indebtedness forgiven.   To prevent homeowners from facing higher tax bills, the housing relief bill passed by Congress earlier this year allowed homeowners caught up in the mortgage crisis to avoid paying tax on forgiven mortgage debts through 2009.  EESA will extend through 2012 the housing bill provision that forgives income from the cancellation of indebtedness.  The proposal does not extend the relief to home equity loans.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $362 million over ten years. 

     
  2. Gain or loss from sale or exchange of certain preferred stock.  Federal law limits the allowable investments for banks, and many community banks therefore invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock – which became worthless when the government bailed out those companies.  EESA includes a proposal to allow financial institutions or financial institution holding companies to treat their Fannie and Freddie losses as ordinary losses. Applying to any preferred stock that was owned on September 6, 2008 or sold between January 1 and September 6, 2008, this provision will allow banks to claim the book benefit of the loss on their tax returns, therefore reducing the need to obtain additional capital from the FDIC or investors.  Policy makers believe that this proposal should also prevent some community banks from becoming insolvent.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $3.045 billion over ten years, with $2.7 billion of the cost occurring in 2009. 

     
  3. Special rules for tax treatment of executive compensation of employers participating in the troubled assets relief program.  The EESA contains non-tax measures aimed at limiting executive compensation and “golden parachute” severance packages overall for companies and executives participating in the buyout.  Additionally, EESA modifies the tax treatment of executive compensation and severance packages.  The deductibility of executive compensation for companies participating in the troubled asset relief program will be cut in half – from the $1 million level in current law – to $500,000.  Performance-based compensation is included in the $500,000 limitation.  Companies will also lose deductions currently available for excessively large severance packages.  Executives receiving severance packages will continue to face a 20 percent excise tax on payments once they reach an excessive threshold, and that tax will now be due if the executive leaves for reasons other than a standard retirement for which they are eligible – not just if the company changes hands, as in current law.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the amount of revenue gain from these provisions is indeterminate as it will depend on how the underlying troubled asset program is implemented.     

In addition, the Act extends dozens of expired or expiring tax provisions (the so-called “tax extender package”), including the Alternative Minimum Tax and disaster relief, energy tax incentives and a host of other provisions.  Several of these provisions might be of interest to the financial services community.  For example, the package includes: 1) broker reporting of a customer’s basis in securities transactions; 2) an extension of tax-free distributions from IRAs to certain public charities through 2009; 3) an extension of the exception under Subpart F for active financing income through 2009; 4) an extension of the look-through treatment of payments between related CFCs under foreign personal holding company income rules; and 5) the modification of the tax treatment of offshore nonqualified deferred compensation for certain tax indifferent parties.  The package does not include a further delay in the implementation of the worldwide interest allocation rules.

Finally, in addition to the various tax provisions listed above, the package contains a provision that would lower the tax preparer standard for undisclosed positions from “more likely than not” to “substantial authority” (the same standard that currently applies to taxpayers) with the exception for tax shelters (reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies). 

The Long View
In the slightly longer term, these unprecedented market events will likely lead to the most significant revisions to the legal and regulatory framework for financial services since the Great Depression. 

  • Revamping the structure of financial services regulation.   Beginning in January 2009, the 111th Congress will consider comprehensive legislation to restructure the regulation of financial services.  A primary consideration will be the respective roles of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC and the CFTC with respect to oversight of the capital markets.  Some of the proposals under consideration were outlined in the Treasury’s March 2008 “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”

     
  • Regulation of previously unregulated products and entities. Current discussions also include new reporting and other regulatory requirements for a broad array of financial products and market participants that have, until now, been subject to relatively little regulation, including commodities, derivatives, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds.  Some products that currently trade over-the-counter may soon be required to trade on exchanges and, more generally, all market participants with the potential to impact the economy will almost certainly be under increased scrutiny.

     
  • Among the other issues that will likely be considered as part of this comprehensive reform effort are:
    • Credit rating agency reforms,
    • Enhanced government agency enforcement authorities, and
    • Recommendations of the Congressional Oversight Panel created by EESA. 

       
  • Tax. With respect to federal tax issues relating to investments, determination of the appropriate tax rates on capital gains and dividends and the appropriate tax treatment of derivatives, as well as retirement savings incentives, will receive considerable attention.

     
  • Retirement Plans. Finally, there will almost certainly be a renewal of efforts to increase disclosure with respect to defined contribution plan fees. 

Our Public Policy & Law group is closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

Industry and Regulators Respond to Extraordinary Pressures on Money Market Funds

By: Arthur C. Delibert 

Recent turmoil in the securities markets, affecting financial companies in particular, has imposed unprecedented stress on money market funds, as some institutional investors have sought to liquefy their holdings at the very moment that many money funds have found it difficult to raise cash.  These pressures have resulted in some extraordinary market and regulatory events.  Illustrative of the pressures facing the industry and regulators:

  • On September 16, The Primary Fund, a money market series of The Reserve Fund, announced that it had “broken the dollar” – i.e., that the mark-to-market value of its portfolio assets had fallen below $0.995 per share. (LINK)  In fact, the fund said, its per-share net asset value had fallen to 97 cents, primarily from holding paper issued by Lehman Brothers, which had filed for bankruptcy on September 15.  This is only the second time a registered money fund has broken the dollar, the last such event having occurred in 1994. (Reserve has subsequently reported that the assets available may be higher than 97 cents per share.)

    Subsequently, Ameriprise Financial Services filed suit against The Reserve Fund and its manager, alleging that certain large investors had been tipped off about the Fund’s impending problem, allowing those investors to remove their money before the NAV was reduced.

     
  • On September 18, Putnam Investments announced that it was suspending sales of its institutional Putnam Prime Money Market Fund and would liquidate the fund.  Within days, Putnam and Federated Investors, Inc. announced that Federated Prime Obligations Fund would acquire the assets of the Putnam money fund and that all shareholders would receive shares of the Federated fund worth $1.00 per share.

In the face of these pressures, many money funds have resorted to extraordinary measures:

  • Many funds have drawn on lines of credit previously arranged through their custodian banks and others.  The Federal Reserve made extra cash available to these banks to fund the loans.

     
  • Some funds have made use of their authority under Section 22 of the 1940 Act to withhold payment on redemption orders for up to seven days, rather than the same-day or overnight payment offered in fund prospectuses “under normal circumstances.”  Such extensions can be difficult for customers, who expect to have prompt access to assets held in money funds.

     
  • Other funds have used authority reserved in their prospectuses to pay redemptions through the in-kind distribution of portfolio securities.  These distributions potentially raise two questions under the 1940 Act:
  1. Funds may have filed with the SEC irrevocable elections under Section 18 of the 1940 Act, allowing them to make redemptions in kind for shareholders seeking redemptions in excess of $250,000 or 1% of the fund’s net assets, whichever is less, in any 90 day period, but committing them to pay lesser redemptions in cash.  Such filings have become less common since 1996, meaning that some funds have greater flexibility in this area.
  2. Redemptions paid in kind to shareholders that are affiliates of the fund because they hold 5% or more of the fund’s outstanding securities may raise questions under Section 17 of the 1940 Act, which restricts principal transactions with affiliates.  Funds can rely on a 1999 no-action letter issued by the SEC staff, which permits in-kind payments to affiliates provided the fund’s board either approves the transaction or has adopted certain procedures to assure the fairness of such distributions. 

There have also been extraordinary actions from the regulators:

  • Some money funds have sought permission from the SEC under Section 22(e) of the 1940 Act to suspend redemptions.   On September 22, the SEC issued an order (effective as of September 17) authorizing two Reserve Funds to suspend redemptions for an indefinite period, while they engage in an orderly liquidation. (LINK)

     
  • On September 19, the Federal Reserve temporarily exempted member banks from provisions of the Federal Reserve Act to permit the banks to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from affiliated money market funds. (LINK)

    On September 25, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter permitting such purchases. Such purchases by fund affiliates would normally raise issues under Section 17 of the 1940 Act.  Rule 17a-9 permits fund affiliates to purchase securities from money market funds if they are no longer “eligible securities” under Rule 2a-7 – i.e., if they have deteriorated in quality. The no-action letter permits such purchases even if the security is still eligible. 

     
  • On September 19, the Treasury announced a program of money market fund insurance.   Funds wishing to apply for the insurance must do so by Wednesday, October 8.  (LINK)

According to the announcement, Treasury is establishing this program under existing authority, using the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund.  Treasury’s authority may be limited somewhat by the Economic Stabilization Act which, as of this writing, is still under consideration by Congress.  The insurance initially will be available for a period of three months, at which point Treasury may renew it for a total period of up to a year, but participating funds would be required to pay an additional fee.

The insurance applies only to assets in a fund on September 19, the day the program was announced.  This limit was apparently adopted at the urging of the banking industry, which was concerned that if money fund insurance were available for unlimited amounts of new assets flowing into the funds, large deposits would flee the banks. The program is available only to funds registered under both the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act.

Funds wishing to apply to the program must obtain approval of their boards of directors, as the application requires that the board, including a majority of independent directors, determine that “entering into” the Guarantee Agreement, as well as “fulfillment of its obligations …  are in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders.”  Fund boards must take into consideration a number of factors before entering into such an Agreement.

Recent Short Selling Regulations and Their Potential Impact on Financial Markets

By: Kay A. Gordon, Mark D. Perlow 

In response to the recent extraordinary events in the U.S. and worldwide markets, during the past two weeks the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a series of emergency regulatory measures regarding short sales of securities.  First, on September 17 and 18, 2008, the SEC issued orders temporarily banning short sales in certain financial stocks and requiring certain institutional money managers to report their new short sales of certain publicly traded securities on new Form SH (collectively, the “Emergency Orders”).  The SEC also amended Regulation SHO and Rule 10b-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit “naked” short selling—the short sale of securities that one has not already borrowed—and adopted a new antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21, aimed at manipulative and deceptive practices in short selling.  In addition, the SEC chairman announced enforcement initiatives aimed at preventing “naked” and “manipulative” short selling.   The SEC has taken these actions in the hope that they would help to restore fair and orderly markets and curtail declines in securities prices.  On October 1, the SEC extended all of these emergency measures until October 17.  However, the ban on selling certain financial stocks provided that it would expire after the effectiveness of the EESA.  Therefore, the ban expires on Wednesday October 8 at 11:59 p.m.

On September 21, the SEC amended the Emergency Orders to expand (1) the list of issuers in whose securities the SEC has temporarily banned short selling, (2) the scope and duration of certain market maker exceptions, and (3) the types of securities exempted.  The SEC also stated that institutional investment managers’ short sale disclosures would be non-public for two weeks after filing. The SEC adopted these amendments to address the current and anticipated technical and operational issues raised by the Emergency Orders, as well as to coordinate with similar actions restricting short sales by foreign regulators.

In addition to the actions of the SEC, the U.K. Financial Services Authority and the French, German, Australian and many other regulators have adopted similar restrictions on short selling and, in certain cases, increased short selling disclosure requirements in an effort to restore market integrity and stability in these extreme market conditions.  Consequently, the policy level response to the perceived threat and the uncertainty generated by naked short selling was global, if not globally coordinated, in practice making it difficult for any manager to engage in forum shopping.

Many financial institutions, lawmakers and regulators have supported the SEC’s ban and limits on short sales, based on their concern that short sellers have contributed to the current market turmoil by spreading false information and using manipulative trading tactics.   In contrast, many hedge fund managers and other investors have objected to these measures, suggesting that risk management failures and poor business strategies are to blame for the current market instability.  They have argued that short selling provides liquidity and an important price discovery mechanism in the market and that the inability of managers to engage in short selling with respect to certain securities may adversely affect the markets both in the long and short terms.  Critics of the ban also point out that a temporary SEC order banning naked short selling in July failed to prevent the decline of stock prices while it was in effect.

The increased disclosure obligations have also given rise to concerns that managers will have to disclose proprietary methods and that companies whose securities are being sold short would retaliate against these managers when the managers’ short positions are publicly released.   The short selling ban may have also been particularly damaging to certain quantitative funds, which  were left unable to implement their disclosed and intended strategies.  In addition, short sellers were also constrained on another front:  many institutional investors that lend portfolio stock holdings have been recalling their stock, and some have suspended their stock lending programs altogether, which has made it harder or more expensive to borrow certain stocks.   Some industry participants believe that short sellers will adjust to the ban by switching to other instruments that are not subject to the ban, e.g., single stock futures and options, whose price movements will ultimately be reflected in the prices of the affected stocks.

Manipulation Tied to Short Selling a Top Enforcement Priority

By: Brian A. Ochs

On September 19, 2008, the SEC announced a “sweeping expansion” of its ongoing investigation into possible market manipulation in connection with short selling in the securities of financial institutions. (LINK)  The investigation is focused on broker-dealers, hedge fund managers, and institutional investors with significant trading activity in financial issuers and with positions in credit default swaps.

As part of the investigation, the SEC is invoking its authority under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain information in the form of sworn, written statements.   According to published reports, the first of these demands was sent out on September 22 to more than two dozen hedge fund managers, requiring information relating to AIG, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Washington Mutual.  The SEC seldom invokes its section 21(a) power in enforcement investigations — usually opting to subpoena documents and testimony instead — and the fact that the Commission is doing so in this instance indicates the speed and seriousness with which the SEC plans to pursue these investigations.

The SEC’s expanded investigation promises heightened scrutiny of two issues which have been the subject of enforcement focus since early this year: the dissemination of false rumors to the marketplace as part of short selling schemes and abusive “naked” short selling.

  • False rumors and short selling

    • Last April, the SEC brought its first case alleging that a trader engaged in market manipulation by selling a company’s stock short at the same time that he intentionally disseminated a false rumor that had a depressing effect on the stock price. See SEC v. Paul S. Berliner (April 24, 2008). (LINK)  Other investigations are in progress, as well as an industry-wide sweep examination undertaken in conjunction with FINRA and the NYSE, that is focused on whether broker-dealers and investment advisers have reasonable controls and procedures to prevent the intentional creation or dissemination of false information. (LINK)

       
    • Given the prevalence of rumors of all types in the investment community, and how quickly rumors can spread, a key challenge to the SEC in any investigation will be to determine who is responsible for disseminating false rumors and whether those persons acted intentionally and with knowledge that the rumors were false. 

       
    • At the same time, the SEC’s focus on firm procedures indicates that the SEC will be looking to bring enforcement actions not only against individuals who are responsible for creating or disseminating false rumors, but also against any broker-dealers or investment advisers in the rumor chain that the SEC determines had lax oversight. 

       
    • Complicating matters is the fact that, on September 18, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced his own investigation into allegations of short selling in financial securities based upon false information. NYAG involvement not only increases pressure on the SEC to bring cases in this area, but is also a direct and formidable threat to the individuals and entities under scrutiny. Unlike SEC Enforcement staff, New York’s Assistant Attorneys General have considerably fewer levels of bureaucracy to wind through before they can bring a case - as they have repeatedly demonstrated in matters involving market timers, insurance brokers, lenders, ratings agencies, and purveyors of auction-rate securities, to name a few. Contrary to popular belief, Section 352 et seq. of NY General Business Law (aka the “Martin Act”) is not without its jurisdictional limitations and defenses, but it is nonetheless a potent starting point for the NYAG. Subpoenas issued thereunder must be handled with considerable caution.

       
  • “Naked” short selling

    • SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has observed that naked short selling can “turbocharge” false rumor/manipulation schemes. (LINK) 

      • Generally, the SEC defines naked short selling as “abusive” when the seller does not have shares available for delivery and intentionally fails to deliver stock within the standard three-day settlement cycle.

         
    • On September 18, 2008, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, which had been proposed in March 2008 to address the problem of short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or others about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. (LINK) The rule formed part of the SEC’s response, in the current financial crisis, to concerns about possible false rumors and abusive naked short selling of financial institutions and other issuers. 

       
      • Rule 10b-21 prohibits any person from submitting an order to sell an equity “if such person deceives a broker or dealer, a participant of a registered clearing agency, or a purchaser about its intention or ability to deliver the security on or before the settlement date, and such person fails to deliver the security on or before the settlement date.” (LINK)

         
      • In adopting the rule, the SEC noted that while, in its view, naked short selling as part of a manipulative scheme was already prohibited under general antifraud provisions, Rule 10b-21 is intended to highlight the specific fraud liability of persons who deceive other participants about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.

Of course, when short selling is facilitated by deceptive practices – such as intentionally spreading false rumors or misleading other participants about an intention to deliver stock – there is little doubt that the SEC can bring a case for securities fraud.   Another example of deceptive practices might be the use of nominee accounts or similar efforts to disguise the identity of the short seller.  But what if short selling is done in the open, with no accompanying acts of deception, albeit in large amounts and with the intent to drive a company’s stock price down? 

  • The SEC takes the position that even open trading, when done for a manipulative purpose (so-called “open market manipulation”), is fraudulent.   See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Thus, the Division of Trading and Markets has cautioned that “short sales effected to manipulate the price of a stock are prohibited” as an “abusive” short sale practices. (LINK)

     
  • Courts have taken varying positions on whether “open market manipulation,” without other deceptive conduct, can give rise to a cause of action.   However, in a recent opinion dealing with aggressive short selling by purchasers of “toxic convertible” securities, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “short selling – even in high volumes – is not, by itself manipulative.  … To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”  ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Wolfson, 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).

Given the Second Circuit precedent, in any future cases directed at aggressive short selling, the SEC will likely seek to allege other deceptive conduct in addition to short sales.   However, in light of the SEC’s need to demonstrate a strong response to the current crisis, the Commission can also be expected to press its theory that short selling, even if unaccompanied by any other deceptive practices, is unlawful if done for the purpose of depressing a company’s stock.

SEC and FASB Relax Fair Value Rules

By: Mark D. Perlow

On September 30, the SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and the FASB staff provided guidance on fair value under FAS 157, addressing when internal assumptions can be used to measure fair value, when to use broker quotes, and when transactions in disorderly or inactive markets represent fair value.   FAS 157, which became effective in November 2007, defines fair value as the price that would be obtained in an orderly transaction between market participants in the principal or most advantageous market. 

The SEC’s guidance came in response to banking industry complaints that the emphasis under FAS 157 on such market valuations for financial assets was forcing banks to write down performing assets to “fire sale” or distressed prices, compelling them to sell more assets to raise capital and thereby depressing prices further in a downward spiral.   Many supporters of FAS 157, including investors’ groups, expressed the view that market values gave a more accurate picture of the health of financial institutions than values based on cost or cash flow models. 

The SEC rarely involves itself in FASB policy making, and its action is clearly an attempt to reach a compromise between the two positions:   the SEC relaxed the interpretation of some of FAS 157’s market valuation provisions but did not suspend market valuation, as some have requested. 

Some of the key elements of the SEC/FASB guidance are:

  • Distressed or forced liquidation sales are not orderly transactions, and thus the fact that a transaction is distressed or forced should be considered when weighing the available evidence.   Unfortunately, the only further guidance that the SEC and the FASB give is that “determining whether a particular transaction is forced or disorderly requires judgment.”  However, by placing this determination in the realm of judgment, the SEC can still second-guess the firm that follows in good faith a strong, well-documented, consistent and independent process.

     
  • FAS 157 sets forth a three-tier framework for disclosure of fair values, where Level 1 prices derive from trades in an active market, Level 2 prices derive from observable inputs, or prices in related markets, and Level 3 prices derive in part or whole from unobservable inputs such as models.  The SEC’s guidance states that, in some cases, using internal assumptions and unobservable inputs (e.g., an internal discounted cash flow model) may be more appropriate than using observable inputs (e.g., prices in markets for similar but not identical securities).  For instance, if the observable inputs (say, prices in related markets) require too many adjustments and the internal model is more accurate, under the guidance the Level 3 price would be more appropriate. Before the SEC’s guidance, many market participants interpreted this disclosure hierarchy as implying that Level 3 prices were less appropriate than Level 2 prices.

     
  • Broker quotes are not necessarily fair value if there is no active market in the security, defined as a market in which transactions occur with sufficient frequency and volume to provide pricing information on an ongoing basis. 

     
  • A significant increase in the bid-ask spread or the existence of a relatively small number of bidders are indicators that may suggest that a market is inactive.

     
  • Broker quotes based on models warrant less weight than those based on market transactions.

     
  • Whether a broker is giving an “accommodation” quote (i.e., one not binding on the broker) “should be considered”, which probably means that such quotes deserve less weight in pricing judgments.

CFTC to Propose New Rules Affecting Swap Dealers' Trading and Trade Reporting

By: Charles R. Mills, Lawrence B. Patent

Responding to Congressional pressure to improve the transparency of futures market activity of swap dealers and index traders, the CFTC will be issuing rule proposals that could, among other things, increase swap dealers’ futures trading reporting obligations and impose new terms for them to qualify for exemptions from regulatory limits on the number of futures positions they may hold.  The proposals are intended to effectuate recommendations contained in a CFTC staff report released September 11, 2008, including the following:

  • CFTC to separately report swap dealer futures position.   The CFTC issues a weekly Commitments of Traders Report, which provides a breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest for futures markets in which 20 or more traders hold futures positions required to be reported by CFTC rules.  This information is currently sorted into categories of “commercial” and “non-commercial” traders, with swap dealers’ futures transactions included in the “commercial” category.  The anticipated rule proposal would for the first time report swap dealers under a separate “swap dealer” classification.

     
  • Swap dealers may be required to report client information.   One of the provocative, albeit still opaque aspects, of the rulemaking will be to propose the creation of a supplemental CFTC market report that will disclose information regarding the particular types of trading by the swap dealers’ counterparties.

    • The staff describes the contemplated report as one designed to “look through from swap dealers to their clients and identify the types and amounts of trading occurring through these intermediaries, including index trading.”  Details about the scope, content and source of information for the supplemental report must await the CFTC’s proposing release, but the descriptions in the staff report suggest that swap dealers may be required to gather and report discrete information about the relationship between the swap transactions and the counterparties’ futures market positions.

       
    • This could put swap dealers in the perhaps undesirable position of requiring clients to disclose to them otherwise sensitive, confidential proprietary trading information that clients would not otherwise disclose.   It also would create a seemingly incongruous regimen that makes entering into swap transactions that otherwise are fully excluded from the reach of the Commodity Exchange Act a triggering event for gathering and reporting on clients’ futures market positions, at least on an aggregate basis.

       
  • Changes to the hedge exemption for swap dealers.   The CFTC also instructed the staff to develop an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit comments on whether the current exemption from regulatory limits on the number of open futures contracts a trader may hold that is accorded to hedge positions should be eliminated for swap dealers and replaced with something different.  The CFTC will solicit comment regarding whether exemption from position limits for swap dealers should be governed by a new “risk management” exemption that would require a swap dealer to agree to:
  1. report to the CFTC and applicable self-regulatory organizations whenever certain “non-commercial” swap clients reach certain position levels in related exchange-traded futures contracts and/or
  2. certify that none of a swap dealer’s “non-commercial” swap clients exceed specified position limits in related exchange-traded contracts.

This proposal, too, could be problematic for swap dealers by making them the “cop on the block” to police their clients’ futures positions, even when the swap dealer does not carry those positions for the client and does not otherwise have independent access to the information. 

Second Circuit Rules on Federal Preemption for Third Party Agents of National Banks

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the National Bank Act (“NBA”) limits the ability of states to regulate tax preparers that facilitate tax refund anticipation loans (“RALs”) for national banks.  The decision in Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Blumenthal is of particular interest to any federally regulated lender (national bank, federal savings association, or operating subsidiary of either) that relies on third party agents (including brokers) to source loans or other bank products.

At issue was a Connecticut statute that capped interest rates on RALs.  National banks were exempt from the law by its terms (and federal law would have preempted it for national banks anyway), but the Connecticut Attorney General concluded in a legal opinion that a tax preparer or other party that facilitated an RAL with an interest rate in excess of the statutory cap violated the statute, even if the lender was a national bank.

The court held that federal law preempted the interest rate limitation for facilitators of RALs made by national banks, at least in connection with RALs made through the arrangement at issue in the case, finding that “the natural effect” of enforcing the interest rate limits against facilitators that assist national banks offering RALs “would . . . be either to prevent a facilitator from assisting such national banks with respect to RALs or to cause it to refuse such assistance unless the national banks agreed to forgo their NBA-permitted rates and limit themselves to the lower rates specified by” the Connecticut law.   The court concluded that “[i]f a state statute subjects non-bank entities to punishment for acting as agents for national banks with respect to a particular NBA-authorized activity and thereby significantly interferes with national banks’ ability to carry on that activity, the state statute does not escape preemption on the theory that, on its face, it regulates only non-bank entities.”

The court’s reasoning could extend past the RAL context to other situations where states try to regulate parties that arrange loans for federally regulated lenders.   For example, this decision calls into question whether recently enacted state laws that prohibit mortgage brokers from arranging loans that do not meet certain underwriting standards could be applied to brokers when they are arranging loans for federally regulated lenders.

HUD/VA/GSE Developments

Moratorium on Risk-Based Premiums for FHA-Insured Loans
In July 2008, HUD shifted its mortgage insurance premium structure to a risk-based structure based on a combination of borrower credit scores and loan-to-value ratios.   In response to the FHA Modernization provisions of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, however, HUD is now required to implement a one-year moratorium on its new risk-based premium structure.  HUD recently released Mortgagee Letter 2008-22, which, effective October 1, 2008, rescinds the Department’s risk-based premium guidance and sets forth new requirements for up-front and annual mortgage insurance premiums for FHA-insured loans.  The Mortgagee Letter also provides guidance with regard to the use of borrower credit scores to assess a borrower’s credit risk.  For instance, FHA has determined that borrowers with decision credit scores below 500 and with loan-to-value ratios at or above 90 percent are not eligible for FHA-insured mortgage financing.  Such a provision appears to be HUD’s attempt to salvage some parts of its now-rescinded risk-based premium insurance program. (LINK)  

Borrower Downpayment Requirement Increases for FHA-Insured Loans
Until the recent enactment of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, FHA guidelines required borrowers to make a 3% cash investment in the transaction, which could include a downpayment and borrower-paid closing costs.   This requirement will change effective January 1, 2009, and HUD recently released Mortgagee Letter 2008-23 to provide guidance to mortgage lenders regarding these changes.  Notably, for all new FHA case number assignments on or after January 1, 2009, the Mortgagee Letter advises that a borrower must make a 3.5% cash downpayment, and closing costs may not be used to meet the minimum amount.  Moreover, given the 3.5% downpayment requirement, the appropriate loan-to-value ratio for all purchase-money mortgages will be 96.5%.  Thus, to determine the maximum mortgage amount for which FHA borrowers are eligible, lenders will be required to apply the 96.5% figure to the lesser of either (i) the appraiser’s estimate of value; or (ii) the contract sales price for the property (minus any required adjustments, such as seller concessions above 6% of the sales price). (LINK

Broker Advisors No Longer Permitted in HECM Transactions
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 also enacted provisions affecting Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (“HECM”), which are FHA-insured reverse mortgage loans.   One such provision requires that all parties that participate in the origination of HECM loans must be approved by HUD. 

While this language itself does not appear to be groundbreaking, its effect is sure to change the way many HECM loans are currently originated - namely, with the assistance of non-approved advisors.   In response to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008’s HECM requirements, HUD recently issued Mortgagee Letter 2008-24, which effectively outlaws the use of non-FHA-approved advisors in connection with HECM transactions.  It does so by rescinding Mortgagee Letter 2008-14, which HUD issued in May 2008.  Beginning with case number assignments made on or after October 1, 2008, only FHA-approved mortgagees may participate and be compensated for the origination of HECM loans.  As a result, the use and compensation of “advisors” in connection with the origination of HECM loans may no longer be permissible. (LINK)

Freddie Mac Underscores Requirements Related to Quality Control Reviews
On September 4, 2008, Freddie Mac released an Industry Letter to its approved sellers and servicers as a reminder of Freddie Mac’s requirements related to post-funding quality control underwriting reviews.   Notably, the Industry Letter highlighted many of the timing requirements imposed on seller/servicers.  For instance, if a loan is selected for a post-funding quality control review, the seller/servicer must submit the requested loan file to Freddie Mac within 15 days of Freddie Mac’s request.  If Freddie Mac discovers any underwriting deficiencies with the loan, the seller/servicer has 30 days from the date of Freddie Mac’s request to take remedial action.  Similarly, if Freddie Mac requires repurchase of a loan following a post-funding quality control review, the seller/servicer must appeal the action or else remit the repurchase funds within 30 days from the date of Freddie Mac’s letter requiring repurchase.  Freddie Mac emphasizes in the Industry Letter that these requirements are not new ones.  Rather, given the unprecedented times in the mortgage market, Freddie Mac expects to increase its quality control efforts. (LINK)  

State Developments

Illinois Imposes Default and Foreclosure Reporting Requirements on Servicers
Many state regulators, such as those in New York and North Carolina, have begun imposing reporting requirements on mortgage servicers so that they can get a handle on the severity of loan delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures, and perhaps an early warning before those borrowers get into trouble.   With little prior notice, Illinois regulators joined those states, announcing new biannual reporting obligations on loan servicers.  In addition to asking for statistical information about modifications, the reporting form asks servicers to provide narrative descriptions of such things as the servicers’ proactive loss mitigation steps, “including calls and mailings to borrowers" and "participation at community outreach events.”  The first of these reports is due this week.

Massachusetts Applies Community Investment Regulations to Mortgage Lenders and Brokers
Community-type reinvestment provisions are common fare for depository institutions, but that has not been true for non-depository lenders, such as mortgage lenders and brokers.   That has now changed in Massachusetts, where community investment regulations applicable to mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers became effective on September 5, 2008.  The regulations implement a new provision of that state’s licensing law, which was passed as part of the state’s response to the foreclosure crisis. 

The statute and implementing regulations subject Massachusetts mortgage lenders and brokers to standards that are very similar to those set forth in the federal Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”).   Mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers will be assessed on their record of meeting the mortgage credit needs of borrowers in Massachusetts, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals.  The assessment will be based upon a lending test and a service test — but not an investment test — that are similar to those applicable to banks.  A licensee’s community investment rating will affect the procedures for it to obtain approvals of any applications, including license renewals, establishment or renewal of any branch, and mergers and acquisitions. 

The consequences of a poor record under the new regulations for a mortgage lender may be far greater than a poor CRA record for a bank.   A poor record could possibly result in non-renewal of a license, which would force a mortgage lender to cease lending operations in Massachusetts. (LINK)

While the federal government continues to struggle with the foreclosure crisis, states are adopting a variety of approaches to slow down foreclosures in their communities.  New Jersey is the latest to join the ranks of more than ten other jurisdictions that have enacted such laws during 2008, but the New Jersey law takes a novel approach by extending the introductory rate of an adjustable rate mortgage for 3 years. 

Effective September 15, 2008, AB 2780, the Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008  applies to certain borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who have received a foreclosure notice with respect to their principal residence and whose introductory rate or rate reset terms meet defined criteria. To be eligible for this three-year rate relief and the statutory suspension of foreclosure proceedings, the borrower must, among other things, certify that he or she does not have sufficient income to pay the monthly payments after the rate resets, and agree to repay all deferred interest at the time the mortgage is paid off. The Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008 requires creditors to send written notices containing prescribed language and carries significant penalties for willful violations of its terms. (LINK)

State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group Issues Data Report #3
The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, a multi-state group made up of state attorneys general and state banking regulators, recently issued its third report on the performance of subprime mortgage servicing, calling the evidence “profoundly disappointing.” 

Over the past year, the Working Group has been collecting data from servicers on a monthly basis.   Their latest report finds:

  • that the majority of seriously delinquent borrowers are not on track for any loss mitigation,
  • the use of short sales is increasing while loan modifications are on the decline,
  • 20% of loan modifications made in the past year are currently delinquent, and
  • foreclosure rates remain high. 

According to the Working Group, “[s]ervicers appear to have reached the ‘low hanging fruit’ of subprime loans facing interest rate resets, while not developing effective approaches to address the bulk of subprime loans which are in default before interest rate resets.” This has led to property value declines and additional losses on mortgage loan foreclosures, according to the report.   Given the number of ARM loans facing reset over the next two years, the Working Group predicts another wave of preventable foreclosures.

With the exact terms of a federal bailout plan uncertain at the time of this writing, this report may fuel a more aggressive implementation of a foreclosure mitigation program at the federal level should a bailout plan be enacted.   A copy of the report is available here.

DOJ Opens Criminal Investigations Under New Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Entities

Perhaps not surprisingly, the FBI and DOJ have joined a host of other federal and state authorities and opened investigations stemming from the credit crisis.   On September 29, 2008, both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae separately announced that, in connection with a federal criminal investigation regarding accounting, disclosure and corporate governance matters, they had received federal grand jury subpoenas from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.  Both have pledged cooperation. Reportedly, the FBI is also looking into Lehman Brothers, AIG and 22 other institutions. 

The opening of such investigations was predictable.   Less predictable is whether DOJ will find evidence of criminal activity — particularly in an area as complex as mortgage financing. 

The New Guidelines
Leaving aside the likely results of these probes, the investigations come at something of a turning point for DOJ.  A little over a month ago, on August 28, DOJ revised its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (the “Principles”), which are part of the United States Attorneys’ Manual (“USAM”), the guidebook for all federal prosecutors.   (See the DOJ’s press release; the relevant USAM provisions can be found here.)

In the revision (henceforth the “2008 Principles”), DOJ retreated from its widely-criticized position that federal prosecutors could demand that corporations — and by extension, individuals — waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection as a necessary precondition in earning credit for cooperating with DOJ, a point of major dispute with the legal community at large.   This policy change, likely forced by Congress’ threats to mandate just such a reversal, is significant.  Most critically, in cases handled by DOJ, the new policy largely re-establishes the right of a corporation to confer with its attorneys without fear that the attorney-client privilege which protects those communications from disclosure will be sacrificed.  That said, it remains to be seen how the changed guidance will work in practice as these new Principles are tested in the crucible of high-profile investigations growing out of the current crisis. 

Federal prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to charge a corporate entity with a crime.  Companies may be held criminally liable for the conduct (or omissions) of their agents committed within the scope of their duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.  Thus, as a matter of law, the crimes of any employee in the organization, regardless of whether he or she occupies a high or low position on the organization chart, may be attributable to the company and the company can be charged criminally for them.  Whether DOJ seeks to bring a federal criminal case against the corporation in circumstances like these is a matter of discretion, which in turn depends upon the corporation’s cooperation as measured under the Principles.

The 2008 Principles contain several significant changes to DOJ policy guidance on charging companies with criminal conduct. 

  • Prohibition on requesting privilege waivers.   The 2008 Principles no longer require waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection to qualify for cooperation credit.  Indeed, the 2008 Principles prohibit prosecutors from requesting attorney-client and work-product waivers.  But they do permit those prosecutors to request that corporations produce facts, however they are gathered; “credit for cooperation will not depend on the corporation’s waiver of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, but rather on the disclosure of relevant facts.”  In other words, the 2008 Principles recognize that companies may voluntarily choose to waive the work-product and attorney-client privilege protections in providing facts, but they are not required to do so, and prosecutors cannot expressly seek an attorney-client waiver in making such a request. 

     
  • Indemnification of employees.  The 2008 Principles provide that prosecutors generally should not consider whether corporations indemnify their employees for legal fees incurred in defending themselves in criminal investigations or prosecutions, nor should prosecutors ask corporations to refrain from advancing attorney’s fees or providing counsel to employees under investigation or indictment.  Such practices should only be questioned by prosecutors if they are part of an effort to obstruct justice – such as “if fees were advanced on the condition that an employee adhere to a [false] version of the facts.”  

     
  • Joint defense agreements.   The 2008 Principles state that a corporation’s involvement in a joint defense agreement — an agreement by which potential defendants share information regarding the defense without losing the attorney-client privilege protecting the shared information from disclosure — “does not render a corporation ineligible to receive cooperation credit, and prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from entering into such agreement.”  The 2008 Principles add, however, that the government may properly request the corporation not share “sensitive information about the investigation that the government provided to the corporation” with others to get cooperation credit. 

It is unclear whether the sometimes fine line between a government request for facts and one that seeks a waiver of the privilege will be adhered to in practice by prosecutors.   In practical terms, companies and their lawyers involved in investigations into the credit crisis must be careful to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work-product protections, as the 2008 Principles put the burden of preserving these confidences on them.  Doing so may be critical – waiver of the privilege in producing information to the government in a criminal investigation is almost always considered by courts to be a waiver as to all other parties, including parties in civil actions.  Corporations facing criminal exposure are thus well advised to consult as early as possible with qualified criminal counsel to assist them in navigating these still-dangerous waters. 

State Securities Regulators Seem Confident of a Place at the Table

By: David N. Jonson

In mid-September, the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) held its 91st Annual Conference in Las Vegas. Securities regulators, industry experts and political commentators appeared on several panels before almost 400 attendees and discussed topics ranging from risk/reward analysis to how the next administration will regulate the financial services industry to the future of global financial services. 

The general consensus of these panelists was that the financial services industry and federal regulators had failed on a number of levels, and for a number of reasons, to understand and manage the increasing amounts of risk being taken by market participants who had been driven to excesses by unduly focusing on short-term profits and compensation rather than long-term value creation. Panelists repeatedly blamed federal financial and securities regulators for failing to exercise their authority over the financial services industry. 

State securities regulators, however, largely escaped the panelists’ criticism because they had quickly coordinated their enforcement efforts and reached settlements in matters of national import, such as Auction Rate Securities, which traditionally would have been spearheaded by federal regulators such as the SEC.  By demonstrating their value and proactivity at the very same time that federal regulators have been considered to be lacking, the states have all but ensured themselves a place at the table as a new financial regulatory scheme is crafted in the coming months.  Flush with their recent successes, state securities regulators can be expected to be more assertive in 2009 and beyond in matters of national importance, such as annuities, brokered CDs, reverse mortgage schemes and virtually any investment promotion affecting America’s increasing population of senior citizens.  As NASAA’s president Fred Joseph said in his inaugural speech, invoking The Blues Brothers, “We can’t be stopped.  We’re on a mission.”

SEC and FINRA Focusing on Individuals in Auction Rate Securities Investigation,

By: Michael J. King

In testimony before the House Financial Services Committee (“Committee”) on September 18, 2008, Linda Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, and Susan Merrill, FINRA Executive Vice-President and Chief of Enforcement, said that they were investigating individuals in connection with the sale of auction rate securities (“ARS”) and that they would bring enforcement actions against individuals if their ongoing investigations revealed misconduct.  Their prepared remarks may be found here and here.  Their complete testimony may be viewed here.  Committee Chairman Barney Frank convened the hearing in order to examine the continuing crisis in the market for ARS and to explore potential resolutions.

In August, the SEC announced preliminary settlements in principle with four broker-dealers (Citigroup, UBS, Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch) that will make available more than $40 billion in liquidity to purchasers of ARS.  Specific charges were not announced, but they will relate to alleged misrepresentations concerning safety and liquidity in the sale of ARS.  During the September 18 testimony, Ms. Merrill announced that FINRA had also entered into agreements in principle with five broker-dealers to settle charges related to the sale of ARS, pursuant to which the firms would offer to repurchase up to $1.8 billion of ARS from individual investors and some institutions.  FINRA charged the firms with supervisory violations and with using advertising and marketing materials that did not provide a sound basis for evaluating the purchase of ARS.  FINRA’s Press Release describing the agreements in principle in more detail can be read here.  Both the SEC and FINRA are continuing to investigate conduct at the settling firms and at other firms as well.  According to FINRA’s Press Release, 50 additional investigations have been opened and more are expected.

None of the SEC or FINRA actions announced to date have named any individuals. However, in response to Committee member questions about individual misconduct and accountability, Ms. Merrill stated that FINRA was investigating individual brokers and implied that they could be suspended or barred from the industry if FINRA found that they engaged in misrepresentations or suitability violations in connection with the sale of ARS.  In response to separate questions, Ms. Thomsen also said that the SEC’s investigations were ongoing and to the extent that individuals were involved in “bad behavior,” the SEC will pursue actions against them to the extent that they can “establish cases.”

Given the testimony of Ms. Thomsen and Ms. Merrill, and FINRA’s announcement that more investigations will be opened, even firms that are not currently the subject of regulatory inquiries should closely examine the conduct of individuals if the firm has sold a significant amount of ARS.  Although, so far, FINRA has only charged violations of advertising and supervision rules, sales practice violations can provide a separate basis for liability for the firm, and, of course, the individual salesperson.  Since the potential sanctions identified by Ms. Merrill are severe, firms will certainly want to know if they have salespersons who could face such sanctions.

Any firm that discovers clear misconduct in connection with ARS sales should consider disciplining the employee and making the customer whole, regardless of whether they are currently subject to regulatory scrutiny.   If there is a regulatory investigation, individuals may need separate counsel and the firm should review its indemnification and professional liability policies.  Firms should also review their compliance and supervisory procedures with regard to sales practices and make enhancements when appropriate.  Firms that have closely examined their employees’ activities, taken corrective and remedial action when necessary, and upgraded their compliance and supervisory procedures will be in a better position to deal with regulators whether they are currently involved in a regulatory investigation or become subject to one. 

Confronting Market Abuse: FSA Steps Up Criminal Enforcement in 2008

By: Philip J. Morgan, Robert V. Hadley

A hallmark of enforcement by the U.K. Financial Services Authority (the “FSA”) in 2008 has been the effort to establish that abusive behavior is likely to trigger severe personal consequences - so-called “credible deterrence.”  The FSA is now spreading the message that it is “getting tough” and intends to increase its focus on deterrence through enforcement action.

The FSA has been saying for some time that it intends to boost credible deterrence and engage senior management in particular in relation to its strategic priorities of combating market abuse and insider dealing by three strategies: higher financial penalties; greater focus on enforcement actions against individuals rather than or as well as firms; and the prosecution of criminal cases.  Yet many have wondered when the rhetoric would be matched by action.  In all of 2007 the FSA imposed just one fine for abuse-related activity.  By the start of 2008 the FSA had brought one successful criminal prosecution since its establishment under the current regulatory regime on 1 December 2001.  It had prosecuted nobody for the criminal offence of insider dealing.

Now, things appear to be starting to change. The FSA has said that in order to achieve its aim of credible deterrence it must prosecute “a steady stream” of criminal cases.  Thus, in January of this year the FSA launched its first criminal prosecution for insider dealing against two individuals, one of whom was an in-house counsel.  In July it commenced two more prosecutions, one against a former Cazenove partner. There are said to be several others in the pipeline.

Also, on July 29, 2008, an extensive dawn raid operation was mounted on various addresses by the FSA under search warrants.  Eight individuals were arrested. The FSA said that this was in connection with “a major ongoing investigation into insider dealing rings.” The FSA does not comment on ongoing investigations, but this was a further clear demonstration of intent.

Individuals, and especially senior management and others in the regulated sector, can be in no doubt that there is at least some risk of criminal prosecution for insider dealing and other market manipulation offences. The risk is not merely of financial penalty imposed on their firm, or even on them personally.  Certainly no one can any longer say that the FSA has never prosecuted anyone for such activities.  The FSA’s aim is that any person with access to inside information or other opportunity to abuse the market should believe that these criminal cases are the first of its “steady stream,” and to think clearly that that is not where they wish to swim.

The FSA also will point to other recent actions as evidence of its new, more aggressive posture toward enforcement.

In the past two months, the FSA fined Credit Suisse £5.6 million for the mismarking of certain positions resulting in an overstatement in published accounts corrected some eight days later, and fined a GE Money mortgage brokerage operation £1.1 million for defective systems and controls leading to its not accounting correctly for customer funds, so that, for example, mortgages were overpaid on redemption and clients’ money was not applied to their mortgage accounts promptly or accurately (both fines imposed after the FSA acknowledged the full cooperation of the firms and after applying the 30 percent reduction for settling at an early stage of the enforcement process).  These cases are examples of the higher financial penalties that the FSA intends to seek.

The FSA fined Land of Leather Limited in May in relation to inadequate systems and controls to prevent the sale of Payment Protection Insurance which was unsuitable for customers’ needs, but will stress that it also fined the company’s Chief Executive £14,000 (after a 30 percent early settlement reduction) in respect of the same matter. This shows the FSA’s willingness to pursue senior management on the basis of senior management’s responsibility for a firm’s regulatory compliance.

Similarly the FSA extracted an undertaking from Mr. Steven Harrison, an investment manager at a hedge fund, effectively that he stay out of the financial services industry for 12 months (in addition to a financial penalty of £52,500 - after the 30 percent early settlement reduction).  The allegation was market abuse in the sense of instructing colleagues to purchase certain bonds while in possession of inside information.  The final notice acknowledges that Mr. Harrison’s conduct was not deliberate in the sense that he did not consider at the time that he had inside information, but the FSA’s position was that he should have recognized that fact.  The FSA thus intends to promote deterrence not only by fining individuals, but also by affecting their continued ability to earn their livelihood in the financial services sector.

SEC Loosens Regulation of Cross-Border Business Combinations to Benefit Both U.S. and Non-U.S. Investors

By: Edward G. Eisert

On September 19, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued Release No. 33-8957 (the “Release”), adopting final rules implementing significant changes to its regulation of cross-border business combinations and rights offerings by foreign private issuers (the “Cross-Border Rules”).   The Cross-Border Rules, adopted after eight years of experience with the current cross-border exemptions, are intended to encourage offerors and issuers in cross-border business combinations and in rights offerings by foreign private issuers to permit U.S. security holders to participate in these transactions in the same manner as other holders.  The Cross-Border Rules address certain recurring issues and unintended consequences of the existing exemptions that have impeded their usefulness.   

The Release also adopts revisions to the beneficial ownership reporting rules under Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to permit non-U.S. entities similar to U.S. brokers, dealers, banks, investment companies, investment advisers and employee benefit plans to use the short form Schedule 13G thereunder to report beneficial ownership of U.S. registered securities, if certain conditions are met (the “Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules” and, together with the Cross-Border Rules, the “Final Rules”). Reporting beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G is materially less burdensome than reporting beneficial ownership on Schedule 13D under the Exchange Act, as would be required, absent exemptive order or “no-action” relief. 

Generally speaking, each set of the Final Rules represents an expansion and refinement of current exemptions and “no-action” positions, and in some areas, would codify relief previously granted only on an individual basis.  The codification of various interpretive positions of the SEC staff makes such relief available as a matter of right, thereby reducing associated burdens and costs.  The Final Rules were adopted substantially as proposed.

Although the Final Rules benefit both global investment managers and foreign private issuers, their thrust is primarily to benefit U.S. investors in foreign private issuers and non-U.S. institutional investors in U.S. registered securities.  First, from the U.S. investment manager’s perspective, the Cross-Border Rules should lessen the burden on foreign private issuers to include U.S. holders in tender offers, exchange offers and business combinations.  As a consequence, U.S. holders should be more likely to receive the same treatment as other holders in such transactions and, in turn, this should lessen a concern for U.S. persons investing in foreign private issuers.  Second, from the non-U.S. investment manager’s perspective, the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules should reduce the administrative burden of holding U.S. registered equity securities.

The specific changes adopted in the Final Rules are complex and a detailed discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article.  For a more complete discussion of these issues, see  Eisert and Berkeley, Global Investment Managers Benefit Under Revisions to Cross-Border Regulation of Business Transactions and Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules, 15 The Investment Lawyer 9 (2008).