Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV)

By: Kristie D. Kully, Laurence E. Platt

The Mortgage Reform Act and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, part of the comprehensive Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform package under final Hill consideration, will likely melt any hopes for other than plain vanilla residential mortgage loans. Makers of "strawberry" or "rocky road" loans will likely face enhanced scrutiny, and may face increased damages, extended exposure to borrower claims, and risk retention requirements. In this client alert, we summarize the hefty provisions in the Mortgage Reform Act that would require creditors to consider a borrower’s ability to repay; the safe harbor for plain vanilla loans; the restructuring of mortgage originator compensation; and other amendments to TILA, HOEPA, FCRA, HMDA, and the S.A.F.E. Act. In the end, as consumers, the industry, and the federal regulatory agencies work to implement these changes, Supreme Court Justice Breyer may be the final authority on plain vanilla mortgages and the Mortgage Reform Act’s other ambiguous provisions.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

Administration Creates Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Seeking Nationwide Coordination of Law Enforcement Efforts

Matt T. Morley, Richard A. Kirby, and Andrew Edwin Porter

The Obama Administration has recently announced the formation of a task force designed to coordinate federal, state and local efforts to investigate and prosecute fraud and other financial misconduct. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) expands and supplants an earlier task force created to combat corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal.

While the simple reconstitution of a task force is unlikely to dramatically alter the law enforcement landscape, this development may be one part of a more sweeping set of changes that could result in considerable increases in the magnitude, focus and efficiency of efforts to pursue financial wrongdoing. 

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Redoubling Efforts on the Financial Reform Debate: House Approaches Floor Vote, While Senate Gets Underway

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

Over the past several weeks, Congress has accelerated the financial regulatory reform effort, which will dramatically restructure the legislative and regulatory framework that governs the financial services industry. Late last week, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) announced that the Committee will complete its markup of the financial regulatory reform bills by November 20.

As the House approaches Floor consideration of the regulatory reform package, the Senate is getting underway with its parallel effort. On November 10, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT), who until recently had been working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-GA), released a discussion draft in the form of a single large bill. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Forfeiture of Madoff's Assets: Challenges for Victims

By: Richard A. KirbyRebecca L. Kline DubillScott P. Lindsay

On March 12, 2009, Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 counts of a criminal information filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”).  The information seeks forfeiture of all proceeds traceable to the commission of Madoff’s fraud in an amount “exceeding” $170 billion.  Assuming that the government can recover any additional assets through the exercise of its criminal or civil forfeiture powers, questions remain as to whether and how those assets will be distributed to Madoff’s victims.  Two recent large-scale securities fraud cases, Adelphia Communications Corp. and the Bayou Group, illustrate how protracted this process can be for victims.

Criminal forfeiture is a powerful tool that permits the government to seize a defendant’s assets that were used in, or were the fruits of, criminal activity.   The government also has civil forfeiture powers and can seize property related to criminal activity even if it does not belong to a convicted defendant.  Although as a separate matter the trustee appointed by the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (“SIPC”) in the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (“BMIS”) liquidation proceeding is also seeking to recover BMIS assets, the full range of the government’s forfeiture powers are broader than those of the SIPC trustee and may result in additional assets being recovered. 

Typically, forfeited assets are distributed to crime victims in one of two ways: (1) the petition for remission process, in which victims apply for remission from a victims’ fund administered by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”); or (2) restitution, in which the U.S. Attorney General “restores” the forfeited assets to the court overseeing the criminal cases, and the court distributes funds to victims through an order of restitution. 

In the Adelphia case, John and Timothy Rigas were convicted in 2004 on various counts relating to their looting of Adelphia’s corporate assets and forced to forfeit significant personal assets, including their Adelphia stock.   In 2005, pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement, the company that the Rigas’ had controlled, Adelphia, agreed to repurchase this forfeited stock for $715 million, which was paid into a victims’ compensation fund.  This victims’ fund is administered by DOJ under the petition for remission process and has faced substantial litigation over its protocols.  As a result, nearly nine years after the fraud was revealed, no distributions from the fund have yet been made to Adelphia’s creditors or shareholders. 

Bayou involved a $400 million Ponzi scheme.   In their plea allocutions, the Bayou principals agreed to forfeit both personal and corporate assets, including $100 million in Bayou funds, as well as several dozen Bayou investment assets.  The S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s Office appointed a receiver to collect and liquidate the assets so that they could be restored to the court overseeing the criminal proceedings for distribution to victims through an order of restitution.  Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office obtained possession of the $100 million in cash and other investments as a part of the preliminary forfeiture orders, it took almost three years to distribute the forfeited assets to victims.  The restitution process was further complicated and delayed due to litigation initiated by former investors, who had been sued in the Bayou bankruptcy on a clawback theory for return of fictitious profits and principal.  These former investors succeeded in establishing themselves as contingent victims for purposes of the restitution fund. 

If Adelphia and Bayou serve as a guide, it likely could be years before Madoff’s victims receive any distribution of property seized by the government through the exercise of its forfeiture powers.   This may provide an opportunity — given the massive scale of the fraud and the quasi-governmental nature of SIPC — for the government to chart a different course and use the established SIPC liquidation proceeding to distribute any assets it seizes to victims of Madoff’s scheme through a transfer of forfeited assets to the SIPC trustee.  Such a transfer could expedite the ultimate distribution of funds to Madoff’s victims and create certain efficiencies in the processing of claims and the handling of objections.  While it remains to be seen whether the government will be successful in identifying and seizing assets not already under the control of the SIPC trustee, it is not too soon to consider an alternative paradigm to the government’s traditional and slow-working forfeiture distribution mechanisms. 

State Attorneys General - A Force to be Reckoned With

By: Paul F. Hancock

State attorneys general aspire to be the primary protectors of consumers. The housing collapse provided new opportunities for them to flex their muscles and seek a role in the development of solutions.  Federal preemption remains a controversial issue, but the threat of preemption has only caused state attorneys general to be more aggressive in the areas where they have legal authority.   Recently elected attorneys general have pledged to focus attention on the housing and financial markets, and we can reasonably expect attorneys general, as a group, to push the limits of their authority in addressing the issues.  Some examples of their actions in recent months are described below.

Auction-Rate Securities
Allegations of deception have provided a basis for attorney general involvement in auction-rate securities markets.  New York Attorney General Cuomo reached agreement with twelve financial institutions on claims that they “sold auction-rate securities as safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk.”  The institutions agreed to buy back the securities from certain customers, generally individuals and foundations, and otherwise provide restitution to “individual investors who were fraudulently sold auction-rate securities.”  Cuomo says that the settlements “returned over $50 billion back to investors’ hands.”  Similar settlements were reached by attorneys general in Massachusetts and Michigan.

Mortgage Fraud
Attorneys general have identified mortgage fraud, particularly inflated appraisals, as a major contributor to the housing crisis.  The Florida Attorney General sued ten companies and fifteen individuals that defrauded lenders by recruiting “straw buyers'” with good credit and conspiring with realtors to artificially inflate purchase prices.  Other states have filed similar claims.

Foreclosures
The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group released its third report on mortgage foreclosures at the end of September, contending that 80 percent of delinquent borrowers are not receiving meaningful foreclosure relief.  Although the Group’s collaboration with servicers is described as cooperative, a stronger stick is laying in wait.  After a number of states announced a settlement with Bank of America regarding the Countrywide portfolio that centers on loan modification, on October 7, the Group sent a letter to sixteen subprime servicers stating: “We urge you in the strongest possible terms to adopt a comprehensive, streamlined, and effective loan modification program as soon as possible.”  The implicit threat of prosecution is clear.

State attorneys general investigated and prosecuted deceptive conduct by foreclosure rescue companies.  This issue is a neat fit for traditional attorney general enforcement and is a priority in many states.

Loan Origination
The settlement with Bank of America regarding the Countrywide portfolio continues a trend of aggressive state attorney general action regarding home mortgage lending practices.  The attorneys general already have extracted major business changes in the lending industry through lawsuits and compelled settlements.  The monetary value of the attorney general settlements with Household ($484 million) and Ameriquest ($295 million), as well as the extensive loan modification relief obtained from Countrywide, certainly overshadow any action by federal agencies.  The only real question is which firm will be the next target – perhaps one of the sixteen servicers that received the October 7 letter, or the originators of the loans that they are servicing.

2008 Attorney General Elections
Eleven seats were up for election and the announced plans of the winners indicate a continued, and perhaps increased, focus on mortgage and financial markets. 

Chris Koster, newly elected in Missouri, and Richard Cordray, newly elected in Ohio, focused their campaigns on credit and foreclosure issues.  Other well-known attorneys general who already enjoy a strong reputation in seeking mortgage reform and foreclosure relief – such as Roy Cooper in North Carolina and Rob McKenna in Washington – were reelected.  Mark Shurtleff was reelected in Utah, as was Darrell McGraw in West Virginia; they have prioritized mortgage fraud and other credit-related issues.

First-term attorneys general were elected in Indiana (Greg Zoeller), Montana (Steve Bullock) and Oregon (John Kroger), and incumbents were reelected in Pennsylvania (Tom Corbett) and Vermont (William Sorrell).   All emphasized the importance of consumer protection in seeking office.

Conclusion
The states want a place at the remedial table.   Some offer an olive branch of cooperative efforts to work through the present crisis.  Others are more aggressive from the start.  But if conditions do not improve quickly, it can be expected that many states will join forces to compel reform, based on claims that consumers and investors were deceived or otherwise were victims of unfair practices of loan originators, servicers or secondary market participants.

DOJ'S Resource Crunch Offers Strategic Options for Corporations in White Collar Cases

By Michael D. RicciutiClarence H. Brown and Leanne E. Hartmann

With the advent of the credit crisis, the Department of Justice (DOJ) – and particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorneys’ Offices – is faced with a daunting challenge at a time of decreasing budgets and strained resources. DOJ’s resource shortage presents an enhanced strategic opportunity to corporations who suspect that they are at risk for investigation or prosecution for criminal activity – or have been victimized by it. In brief, sometimes the distinction between a criminally culpable company and one that has been victimized is in the eyes of the beholder. Emphasizing the latter status serves as an opportunity.

Background. After the events of September 11, 2001, DOJ and the FBI made national security their top priority, but with a more refined focus. No longer was it enough for DOJ to investigate and prosecute terrorists. Instead, DOJ now seeks to prevent acts of terrorism – a far more difficult task than merely prosecuting terrorism, which are among the most challenging criminal cases. Unsurprisingly, to fulfill this aggressive mission, a huge portion of the resources of the FBI and DOJ were redeployed to fight terrorism. Now, with the massive credit crisis to contend with, DOJ and FBI have opened a series of financial investigations, reportedly involving Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, among approximately 1,500 others. Reports indicate that the FBI plans to double the number of agents focusing on financial crime, but also make clear that the FBI has hundreds fewer agents focused on this work than it did during the financial crisis involving savings and loans in the 1980s. It will be extremely challenging for the government to find the resources to handle these new complex and difficult cases.

Internal Investigations: Defensive Use. As discussed in the previous Global Financial Markets Group newsletter, the government has wide authority to bring charges in the corporate criminal context, but its own policies restrict its power to do so. In brief, a corporation may be criminally liable for the conduct (or omissions) of its agents committed within the scope of their duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation. This means that, as a matter of law, the crimes of any employee in the organization, regardless of his or her position on the organization chart, may be attributable to the company and the company could thus be charged criminally for them. DOJ has the discretion to bring a criminal case against the company under these circumstances – or not to do so. Whether DOJ exercises its discretion not to charge a company depends upon its analysis of the factors under DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (“the Principles”). The Principles put a premium on a company’s cooperation in helping DOJ investigate the alleged crime – exactly the type of cooperation DOJ sorely needs now that it is facing a global financial crisis and its own resource shortage.

Revised this past August, the Principles recognize that corporate crime is more difficult to investigate than crimes committed by individuals. As the Principles note:

In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation itself. It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries. Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been promoted, transferred or fired, or they may have quit or retired.

Because of these difficulties, the Principles acknowledge that “a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant evidence, among other things, and in doing so expeditiously.” (For more information regarding the Principles, see the United States Attorney’s Manual, Title 9, Chapter 9-28.700 et seq.)

From a defensive perspective, then, the company may seek to curry favor from DOJ and avoid being criminally charged through its cooperation. In cooperating under the Principles, a company with a good track record of compliance seeks, in essence, to demonstrate to the government that it should not be charged criminally on the basis of an employee’s criminal acts because that employee’s activities are inconsistent with the company’s otherwise positive compliance record, among other factors. Typically, conducting an independent internal investigation is a critical initial element in the company seeking credit for cooperation. Through an investigation of itself, the company discovers the relevant facts and – if it chooses to do so – can provide DOJ with a roadmap of the potential case from it. From DOJ’s perspective, cooperation credit is awarded where the corporation “timely disclosed the relevant facts about the putative misconduct” – and can result in DOJ not seeking to prosecute an otherwise well-run, compliant company because of its cooperation, among other factors.

There are significant risks to providing this cooperation. For instance, preparing an internal investigation develops a factual record which private litigants may later use to assert claims against the company and its officers and directors. Even so, with DOJ in short supply of agents to perform detailed investigations, providing this cooperation may be at a premium for the government – and may earn companies significant consideration when DOJ decides whether to bring criminal charges against the corporation. With an internal investigation in hand, companies can also often reap other benefits, such as identifying personnel who should be terminated for misconduct and deficient systems and procedures that need improvement, preparing earlier for shareholder and third-party litigation, and permitting the company to more effectively assist its board members, officers and employees in preparing for and giving testimony.

Internal Investigations: Offensive Use. There is also an offensive aspect to the use of internal investigations that is often overlooked. A company that suffers from the criminal conduct of an employee may be a defendant in a resulting prosecution – but may also be a victim of the wayward employee’s criminal acts. The company’s status as a victim is a fact on which the government does not always focus. A company thus should consider whether to use an internal investigation to proactively prod the United States Attorney’s Office to bring a criminal case against the employee wrongdoer. When the government is strapped for resources, it will often look favorably on a completed investigation that shows readily provable criminal wrongdoing, which will increase the likelihood that the government will take the case and prosecute it. Offensive use of the internal investigation accomplishes at least three goals:

First, it makes it clear to DOJ that the company should not be viewed as a potential defendant but rather as a victim, and, as such, is entitled to victim’s rights, to include the right to restitution from the employee. In a fraud case, where an employee has made off with company funds, a court in sentencing a convicted employee wrongdoer is empowered to order restitution as an element of the criminal judgment – forcing the employee to repay the company through a restitution order enforced by the Probation Department, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the Court. Such an order saves the company from pursuing repayment from the employee civilly, often an expensive and fruitless endeavor.

Second, seeking prosecution from the government is often relatively inexpensive. Once the internal investigation is done by the company, and the government accepts the case for prosecution, it is the government that bears the costs of the prosecution. The company only needs to cooperate with the government, typically far cheaper than defending itself and its employees in a criminal probe.

Third, a prosecution of a criminal employee sends a very clear message to other employees and to the government that the company will not tolerate criminal wrongdoing and will take very aggressive action against those who violate the rules. There can be no clearer zero-tolerance approach for criminal activity.

Conclusion. With DOJ facing a likely crush of new financial crimes cases, companies with potential exposure need to consider their options strategically. One important option is a credible, independent internal investigation done early and proactively, which can provide the company with both defensive and offensive benefits.

Manipulation Tied to Short Selling a Top Enforcement Priority

By: Brian A. Ochs

On September 19, 2008, the SEC announced a “sweeping expansion” of its ongoing investigation into possible market manipulation in connection with short selling in the securities of financial institutions. (LINK)  The investigation is focused on broker-dealers, hedge fund managers, and institutional investors with significant trading activity in financial issuers and with positions in credit default swaps.

As part of the investigation, the SEC is invoking its authority under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain information in the form of sworn, written statements.   According to published reports, the first of these demands was sent out on September 22 to more than two dozen hedge fund managers, requiring information relating to AIG, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Washington Mutual.  The SEC seldom invokes its section 21(a) power in enforcement investigations — usually opting to subpoena documents and testimony instead — and the fact that the Commission is doing so in this instance indicates the speed and seriousness with which the SEC plans to pursue these investigations.

The SEC’s expanded investigation promises heightened scrutiny of two issues which have been the subject of enforcement focus since early this year: the dissemination of false rumors to the marketplace as part of short selling schemes and abusive “naked” short selling.

  • False rumors and short selling

    • Last April, the SEC brought its first case alleging that a trader engaged in market manipulation by selling a company’s stock short at the same time that he intentionally disseminated a false rumor that had a depressing effect on the stock price. See SEC v. Paul S. Berliner (April 24, 2008). (LINK)  Other investigations are in progress, as well as an industry-wide sweep examination undertaken in conjunction with FINRA and the NYSE, that is focused on whether broker-dealers and investment advisers have reasonable controls and procedures to prevent the intentional creation or dissemination of false information. (LINK)

       
    • Given the prevalence of rumors of all types in the investment community, and how quickly rumors can spread, a key challenge to the SEC in any investigation will be to determine who is responsible for disseminating false rumors and whether those persons acted intentionally and with knowledge that the rumors were false. 

       
    • At the same time, the SEC’s focus on firm procedures indicates that the SEC will be looking to bring enforcement actions not only against individuals who are responsible for creating or disseminating false rumors, but also against any broker-dealers or investment advisers in the rumor chain that the SEC determines had lax oversight. 

       
    • Complicating matters is the fact that, on September 18, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced his own investigation into allegations of short selling in financial securities based upon false information. NYAG involvement not only increases pressure on the SEC to bring cases in this area, but is also a direct and formidable threat to the individuals and entities under scrutiny. Unlike SEC Enforcement staff, New York’s Assistant Attorneys General have considerably fewer levels of bureaucracy to wind through before they can bring a case - as they have repeatedly demonstrated in matters involving market timers, insurance brokers, lenders, ratings agencies, and purveyors of auction-rate securities, to name a few. Contrary to popular belief, Section 352 et seq. of NY General Business Law (aka the “Martin Act”) is not without its jurisdictional limitations and defenses, but it is nonetheless a potent starting point for the NYAG. Subpoenas issued thereunder must be handled with considerable caution.

       
  • “Naked” short selling

    • SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has observed that naked short selling can “turbocharge” false rumor/manipulation schemes. (LINK) 

      • Generally, the SEC defines naked short selling as “abusive” when the seller does not have shares available for delivery and intentionally fails to deliver stock within the standard three-day settlement cycle.

         
    • On September 18, 2008, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, which had been proposed in March 2008 to address the problem of short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or others about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. (LINK) The rule formed part of the SEC’s response, in the current financial crisis, to concerns about possible false rumors and abusive naked short selling of financial institutions and other issuers. 

       
      • Rule 10b-21 prohibits any person from submitting an order to sell an equity “if such person deceives a broker or dealer, a participant of a registered clearing agency, or a purchaser about its intention or ability to deliver the security on or before the settlement date, and such person fails to deliver the security on or before the settlement date.” (LINK)

         
      • In adopting the rule, the SEC noted that while, in its view, naked short selling as part of a manipulative scheme was already prohibited under general antifraud provisions, Rule 10b-21 is intended to highlight the specific fraud liability of persons who deceive other participants about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.

Of course, when short selling is facilitated by deceptive practices – such as intentionally spreading false rumors or misleading other participants about an intention to deliver stock – there is little doubt that the SEC can bring a case for securities fraud.   Another example of deceptive practices might be the use of nominee accounts or similar efforts to disguise the identity of the short seller.  But what if short selling is done in the open, with no accompanying acts of deception, albeit in large amounts and with the intent to drive a company’s stock price down? 

  • The SEC takes the position that even open trading, when done for a manipulative purpose (so-called “open market manipulation”), is fraudulent.   See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Thus, the Division of Trading and Markets has cautioned that “short sales effected to manipulate the price of a stock are prohibited” as an “abusive” short sale practices. (LINK)

     
  • Courts have taken varying positions on whether “open market manipulation,” without other deceptive conduct, can give rise to a cause of action.   However, in a recent opinion dealing with aggressive short selling by purchasers of “toxic convertible” securities, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “short selling – even in high volumes – is not, by itself manipulative.  … To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”  ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Wolfson, 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).

Given the Second Circuit precedent, in any future cases directed at aggressive short selling, the SEC will likely seek to allege other deceptive conduct in addition to short sales.   However, in light of the SEC’s need to demonstrate a strong response to the current crisis, the Commission can also be expected to press its theory that short selling, even if unaccompanied by any other deceptive practices, is unlawful if done for the purpose of depressing a company’s stock.

DOJ Opens Criminal Investigations Under New Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Entities

Perhaps not surprisingly, the FBI and DOJ have joined a host of other federal and state authorities and opened investigations stemming from the credit crisis.   On September 29, 2008, both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae separately announced that, in connection with a federal criminal investigation regarding accounting, disclosure and corporate governance matters, they had received federal grand jury subpoenas from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.  Both have pledged cooperation. Reportedly, the FBI is also looking into Lehman Brothers, AIG and 22 other institutions. 

The opening of such investigations was predictable.   Less predictable is whether DOJ will find evidence of criminal activity — particularly in an area as complex as mortgage financing. 

The New Guidelines
Leaving aside the likely results of these probes, the investigations come at something of a turning point for DOJ.  A little over a month ago, on August 28, DOJ revised its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (the “Principles”), which are part of the United States Attorneys’ Manual (“USAM”), the guidebook for all federal prosecutors.   (See the DOJ’s press release; the relevant USAM provisions can be found here.)

In the revision (henceforth the “2008 Principles”), DOJ retreated from its widely-criticized position that federal prosecutors could demand that corporations — and by extension, individuals — waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection as a necessary precondition in earning credit for cooperating with DOJ, a point of major dispute with the legal community at large.   This policy change, likely forced by Congress’ threats to mandate just such a reversal, is significant.  Most critically, in cases handled by DOJ, the new policy largely re-establishes the right of a corporation to confer with its attorneys without fear that the attorney-client privilege which protects those communications from disclosure will be sacrificed.  That said, it remains to be seen how the changed guidance will work in practice as these new Principles are tested in the crucible of high-profile investigations growing out of the current crisis. 

Federal prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to charge a corporate entity with a crime.  Companies may be held criminally liable for the conduct (or omissions) of their agents committed within the scope of their duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.  Thus, as a matter of law, the crimes of any employee in the organization, regardless of whether he or she occupies a high or low position on the organization chart, may be attributable to the company and the company can be charged criminally for them.  Whether DOJ seeks to bring a federal criminal case against the corporation in circumstances like these is a matter of discretion, which in turn depends upon the corporation’s cooperation as measured under the Principles.

The 2008 Principles contain several significant changes to DOJ policy guidance on charging companies with criminal conduct. 

  • Prohibition on requesting privilege waivers.   The 2008 Principles no longer require waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection to qualify for cooperation credit.  Indeed, the 2008 Principles prohibit prosecutors from requesting attorney-client and work-product waivers.  But they do permit those prosecutors to request that corporations produce facts, however they are gathered; “credit for cooperation will not depend on the corporation’s waiver of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, but rather on the disclosure of relevant facts.”  In other words, the 2008 Principles recognize that companies may voluntarily choose to waive the work-product and attorney-client privilege protections in providing facts, but they are not required to do so, and prosecutors cannot expressly seek an attorney-client waiver in making such a request. 

     
  • Indemnification of employees.  The 2008 Principles provide that prosecutors generally should not consider whether corporations indemnify their employees for legal fees incurred in defending themselves in criminal investigations or prosecutions, nor should prosecutors ask corporations to refrain from advancing attorney’s fees or providing counsel to employees under investigation or indictment.  Such practices should only be questioned by prosecutors if they are part of an effort to obstruct justice – such as “if fees were advanced on the condition that an employee adhere to a [false] version of the facts.”  

     
  • Joint defense agreements.   The 2008 Principles state that a corporation’s involvement in a joint defense agreement — an agreement by which potential defendants share information regarding the defense without losing the attorney-client privilege protecting the shared information from disclosure — “does not render a corporation ineligible to receive cooperation credit, and prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from entering into such agreement.”  The 2008 Principles add, however, that the government may properly request the corporation not share “sensitive information about the investigation that the government provided to the corporation” with others to get cooperation credit. 

It is unclear whether the sometimes fine line between a government request for facts and one that seeks a waiver of the privilege will be adhered to in practice by prosecutors.   In practical terms, companies and their lawyers involved in investigations into the credit crisis must be careful to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work-product protections, as the 2008 Principles put the burden of preserving these confidences on them.  Doing so may be critical – waiver of the privilege in producing information to the government in a criminal investigation is almost always considered by courts to be a waiver as to all other parties, including parties in civil actions.  Corporations facing criminal exposure are thus well advised to consult as early as possible with qualified criminal counsel to assist them in navigating these still-dangerous waters.