SEC Publishes Concept Release on Market Structure, Proposes Risk Management Rules for Sponsored Access

By: Mark D. Perlow and C. Dirk Peterson

On January 14, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to issue a concept release intended to elicit public comment on a broad range of questions relating to the efficiency and fairness of the public equity markets (the "Concept Release"). The Concept Release revisited issues that the SEC raised and addressed nearly five years ago in a comprehensive set of market, trading and reporting rules codified in Regulation NMS. Shortly after publishing the Concept Release, the SEC also published a release proposing a new risk management rule requiring firms that sponsor trading access to exchanges and alternative trading systems (ATSs) to establish (and periodically evaluate) a system of controls intended to limit potential financial exposure and to ensure compliance with relevant regulatory requirements (the "Sponsored Access Release"). These recent market-structure initiatives form part of the SEC's ongoing review of the equity markets and follow two discrete SEC rule-making initiatives from 2009 currently under consideration.

To read the complete alert online, click here.

Global Government Solutions 2010: The Year Ahead

Contacts: Diane E. Ambler, Michael J. Missal, Matt T. Morley, Mark D. Perlow

2009 brought a further transformation in the relationship between business and government. Regardless of political systems or philosophies, governments around the world became more dynamic and intrusive in response to the financial crisis.

This 2010 Annual Report, prepared by members of the K&L Gates Global Government Solutions initiative, contains concise articles that seek to forecast likely government actions and priorities regarding a broad spectrum of topics.

To view the report, click here.

 

SEC Adopts Amendments to the Proxy Rules Concerning Disclosure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance

By: Phillip J. Kardis IIVincent J. Pisano, Douglas J. Ellis

On December 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted amendments (the “Amendments”) to its executive compensation and corporate governance disclosure requirements. The Amendments are effective on February 28, 2010. Accordingly, many public companies face significant new disclosure requirements for the 2010 proxy season.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Dubai: Growing Pains For Islamic Investments?

By: Jonathan Lawrence, Philip J. Morgan, and Neil Nick Robson

The recent announcements from Dubai have turned the spotlight onto Islamic investments. The attached client alert assesses the structure, enforceability, risks and valuation issues specifically associated with the Dubai Nakheel sukuk bond and the increased uncertainty regarding the legal structures and insolvency regimes underpinning Islamic investment structures in the region. Even though the Government of Abu Dhabi and the UAE Central Bank have recently bailed out the real estate development company Nakheel and its parent company, Dubai World, there is no guarantee that they will do so again in the future. As a result of these factors, investment managers should consider examining all their Islamic investments, particularly those connected to Dubai, and working with valuation firms to determine how to approach the valuation of such investments.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

The SEC Weighs In on the Valuation of Net Equity for Madoff Victims

 By: Richard A. Kirby and R. James Mitchell

On December 9, 2009, almost one year to the day that Bernard L. Madoff was revealed to have perpetrated the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the SEC revealed its position with respect to the approach that it believes the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) should take in defining the net equity of Madoff claimants.

The SIPC Trustee has previously taken the position that net equity for Madoff’s victims should be measured on a cash-in/cash-out basis, rather than using the stated values on account statements fabricated by Madoff. This measure of net equity rejects all claims filed by victims whose net withdrawals equaled or exceeded their principal investments.

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House Passes Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 11, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4173, the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009,” by a vote of 223 to 203. 27 Democrats voted against the bill and no Republicans voted in favor of the bill.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

CFTC and SEC Issue Joint Orders to Permit Increased Trading of Futures Contracts on Volatility Indices and Security Futures

By: Lawrence B. Patent

Last month, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued two Joint Orders that (1) permit increased trading of futures contracts on volatility indices, and (2) expand the universe of security futures under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). In both instances, the agencies worked together to find solutions to permit investors to trade a broader range of products, while retaining meaningful protections to investors in those markets. Given the prospect that regulatory reform will require greater cooperation between these two agencies, these Joint Orders suggest that the agencies can overcome any jurisdictional competition to act for the benefit of investors and the financial markets. 

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Administration Creates Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Seeking Nationwide Coordination of Law Enforcement Efforts

Matt T. Morley, Richard A. Kirby, and Andrew Edwin Porter

The Obama Administration has recently announced the formation of a task force designed to coordinate federal, state and local efforts to investigate and prosecute fraud and other financial misconduct. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) expands and supplants an earlier task force created to combat corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal.

While the simple reconstitution of a task force is unlikely to dramatically alter the law enforcement landscape, this development may be one part of a more sweeping set of changes that could result in considerable increases in the magnitude, focus and efficiency of efforts to pursue financial wrongdoing. 

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Private Funds and Broker-Dealers Under Dodd's Restoring American Financial Stability Act

By: Edward G. Eisert and Carolyn A. Jayne

I. Introduction.

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd introduced his discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009” (“RAFSA”). This draft of more than 1,100 pages in length consolidates the various components of the Administration’s regulatory reform proposals. Set forth below is an overview of those provisions of RAFSA that most directly affect investment advisers to funds that rely upon the exemptions from registration set forth in Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (collectively, “Private Funds”) and that materially differ from the provisions of HR 3818, the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009,” which would require certain private fund managers to register with and be regulated by the SEC, and HR 3817, the “Investor Protection Act of 2009,” passed by the House Financial Services Committee on October 27, 2009 and November 4, 2009, respectively. (For more information about the RAFSA in general, see K&L Gates alert Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009. For a discussion of the Obama Administration’s proposed legislation, see K&L Gates alert The Obama Administration’s Proposal for the Registration of Investment Advisers to Private Investment Funds: The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.)

A. Title IV of RAFSA - “Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others.”

Private Equity Funds. Title IV provides a new exemption from registration for advisers to “Private Equity Funds,” a term to be defined by the SEC within six months after the enactment of the Act. Within the same time frame, the SEC also will be required to issue final rules regarding records to be maintained by such advisers and reports to be provided by such advisers to the SEC.

Venture Capital Funds and Family Offices. In addition, Title IV: (i) provides an exemption from registration for advisers to “Venture Capital Funds,” a term to be defined by the SEC within six months after the enactment of RAFSA; and (ii) provides a new exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) for a “Family Office,” a term to be defined by the SEC. Title IV does not include an exemption for midsized private funds (i.e., funds that have “assets under management in the United States of less than $150,000,000”) and does not impose any recordkeeping and reporting obligations on Venture Capital Funds as does HR 3818.

Financial Thresholds for Registration of an Adviser Under the Advisers Act and for an Accredited Investor. Also, RAFSA raises to $100 million the threshold for non-exempted investment advisers to be required to register with the SEC.

Title IV directs the SEC to increase the “financial threshold for an accredited investor,” as defined in Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, in an amount determined to be “appropriate and in the public interest, in light of price inflation . . .” and to adjust such threshold no less frequently than once every five years to “reflect the percentage increase in the cost of living.”

Independent Custodian. Title IV authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registered investment advisers to use an independent custodian to hold client assets.

Reports and Records. Title IV excludes a provision in HR 3818 requiring registered investment advisers to provide reports, records and other documents to “investors, prospective investors, counterparties, and creditors” as the SEC may prescribe as “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.” At the same time, Title IV increases the required information to be filed in such records or reports to include valuation methodologies of the fund, types of assets held and side arrangements or side letters, whereby certain investors in a fund obtain more favorable rights or entitlements than other investors. However, off-balance sheet leverage, required to be filed with the SEC under HR 3818, is not required to be filed under Title IV. Title IV requires the SEC to report annually to Congress regarding how it has used the data collected thereunder “to monitor the markets for the protection of investors and the integrity of the markets.” Title IV also contemplates an agreement of confidentiality when information is provided to Congress.

Studies and Reports to Congress. Lastly, Title IV directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct studies and submit reports to Congress on three subjects: (i) the appropriate criteria for determining financial thresholds or other criteria needed to qualify as an “accredited investor” and eligibility to invest in “hedge funds (within one year of the enactment of RAFSA)”; (ii) the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization to oversee “hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds (within one year of the enactment of RAFSA)”; and (iii) the state of short selling in the stock market, with particular attention to the impact of recent rule changes and the incidence of the failure to deliver shares sold short (within two years of the enactment of RAFSA).

B. Title IX of RAFSA - “Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities.”

Fiduciary Standards of Broker-Dealers Providing Investment Advice. Title IX takes a different approach than HR 3817, the “Investor Protection Act,” to the issue presented by investment advisers and broker-dealers currently being subject to somewhat different duties to clients. As amended, HR 3817 provides that brokers, dealers, and advisers shall have the duty “to act in the best interest of the customer without regard to [compensation]” and that the standard of conduct for brokers and dealers “shall be no less stringent than” the standard for advisers under the Advisers Act. HR 3817 would retain the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of investment adviser.

In contrast, Title IX would eliminate from the definition of “investment adviser” in the Advisers Act the categorical exception for a broker or dealer (without regard to whether any advice it provides is “incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer . . . ”). Title IX then would amend Section 206 of the Advisers Act to grant the SEC authority by rule to exempt any person or transaction, or any class of persons or transactions, from the prohibition under Section 206(3) thereof regarding principal transactions, if the SEC determines that such exemption is “for the protection of investors; and the adviser provides investors with adequate protections against conflicts of interest or principal transactions that are not in the best interests of the investors.”

Title IX also provides that “[n]othing in [Section 205 of the Advisers Act, which regulates the terms of investment advisory contracts] prohibits an investment adviser from entering into an investment advisory relationship that provides for the payment of an asset management fee or a commission.”

Lastly, Title IX would provide that it would be unlawful for an adviser “to fail to disclose to any client or prospective client any material limitation on the range of investment products about which the investment advisor gives advice . . . .”

Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers. RAFSA also takes a different approach than HR 3817 to the oversight of certain advisers and broker-dealers. Currently, HR 3817 authorizes FINRA to oversee any investment adviser who has any legal or financial connection with a registered broker-dealer (although HFSC Chairman Frank has declared his intention to oppose this last-minute amendment to HR 3817 when presented to the full House). In contrast, by eliminating the exception for brokers or dealers under the definition of “investment adviser,” RAFSA appears to subject both advisers and broker-dealers to oversight by the SEC under the Advisers Act. In addition, as mentioned above, Title IV would require the Comptroller General to conduct a study of the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization to oversee hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds.

II. Analysis.

A. The Definition of a “Hedge Fund.”

There is no statutory definition of a “hedge fund” and, as commonly used, the term “hedge funds” refers to private funds that follow a broad range of different investment strategies and employ leverage to greatly different degrees. If RAFSA is enacted in its present form, exemptions from registration will be provided to “venture capital funds” and “private equity funds” only. As a result of these provisions, and references to “hedge funds” in RAFSA, it appears that, by process of elimination, all other Private Funds might be deemed to be “hedge funds” unless the SEC also defines that term. Because of blurring of the lines between the hedge fund, private equity fund and other private fund industries, it is likely that the SEC will have difficulty in defining these terms and, accordingly, there is the not insignificant risk that the SEC will err on the side of overinclusiveness in requiring adviser registration.

B. Expanded Jurisdiction of State Regulation of Advisers.

If enacted in its present form, investment advisers that do not advise Venture Capital Funds or Private Equity Funds, would not come within one of the other narrow exemptions from registration under the Advisers Act, and have assets under management of less than $100 million would not be eligible to register with the SEC. Such advisers would be subject to regulation under the laws of the states in which they do business and, consequently, if they do business in more than one state might incur increased costs and be subject to increased regulatory burdens.

C. Treatment of Non-U.S. Domiciled Private Funds and Advisers.

Although much of the exemption provided for “foreign private advisers” is identical in both RAFSA and HR 3818, RAFSA includes one key revision to the definition of “foreign private adviser.” HR 3818 provides that a foreign private adviser must have fewer than 15 clients in the U.S. “during the preceding 12 months.” RAFSA provides no time frame for such calculation. Theoretically, non-U.S. domiciled advisers would be unable to rely upon this exemption under RAFSA after they have an aggregate of 15 U.S. clients over an unlimited period of time, regardless of whether such clients remain active clients.

RAFSA also modifies the definition of “Private Fund” in a manner that potentially is beneficial to U.S. and non-U.S. domiciled advisers to certain non-U.S. funds. RAFSA defines a “Private Fund” to be a fund that relies upon either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and “either - (i) is organized or otherwise created under the laws of the United States or of a State; or (ii) has 10 percent or more of its outstanding securities owned by U.S. persons.” HR 3818 defines “Private Fund” to be any fund that relies upon either of those exemptions. Thus, RAFSA provides a limited exception from the definition of “Private Fund” for a fund organized in a non-U.S. jurisdiction if only a small percentage of its interests is held by “United States persons.”

Under RAFSA, non-U.S. domiciled advisers also would benefit to the same extent as U.S. domiciled advisers from the new exemptions from registration for advisers to “venture capital funds” and “private equity funds.”

 

Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, Summary and Comparison to House Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) released a discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009." Chairman Dodd has been developing the Senate version of the regulatory reform package over several months. Until recently, the Chairman was working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL). However, Chairman Dodd recently decided to proceed only with the Democrats on the Committee.

At the time of this writing, the House Financial Services Committee is completing its markup of the House regulatory reform package. With the Senate and House taking different approaches in several respects, debate on significant aspects of the regulatory reform package will continue.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Redoubling Efforts on the Financial Reform Debate: House Approaches Floor Vote, While Senate Gets Underway

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

Over the past several weeks, Congress has accelerated the financial regulatory reform effort, which will dramatically restructure the legislative and regulatory framework that governs the financial services industry. Late last week, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) announced that the Committee will complete its markup of the financial regulatory reform bills by November 20.

As the House approaches Floor consideration of the regulatory reform package, the Senate is getting underway with its parallel effort. On November 10, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT), who until recently had been working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-GA), released a discussion draft in the form of a single large bill. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC/CFTC Report on Harmonization of Regulation and How it May Affect Investment Advisers

By: Lawrence B. Patent, Mary C. Moynihan

On October 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued “A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation” (Report). The Report was issued in response to a request in the Administration White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform.

The Report contains 20 recommendations. This Alert will focus upon the recommendations in the Report that may be of greatest interest to investment advisers: (1) the potential “uniform” standards of “fiduciary” duties for persons providing investment and commodity trading advice for securities and futures; (2) aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act; and (3) aligning the reporting requirements for private funds. The Alert also discusses the other recommendations, some of which may indicate enhanced opportunities for portfolio margining across markets and the prospect of greater clarity and expedited judicial review of new products that straddle jurisdictional lines. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

K&L Gates' Investment Management Newsletter

By: Stephen J. Crimmins, Nicholas S. Hodge, Melissa S. Holmes, Thomas F. Joyce, Beth R. Kramer, Richard A. Kirby, Mary C. Moynihan, Megan B. Munafo, Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Roger S. Wise

The Fall 2009 Edition of K&L Gates' Investment Management newsletter is offered as a timely aid in addressing the myriad regulatory issues confronting the investment management industry. Watch for future issues discussing up-to-the-minute developments and trends in the industry.

To view the complete newsletter, please click here.

SEC Holds Securities Lending Roundtable

By: Benoit N. Jacqmotte and Mark D. Perlow

On September 29 and 30, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) held a roundtable on securities lending and short sales. On the first day, four panels of investor and industry representatives provided an overview of the securities lending market and discussed investor protection concerns, potential improvements to securities lending, and potential regulatory action in the area. On the second day, two panels addressed possible short sale pre-borrow requirements and additional short sale disclosure. This summary addresses the first-day roundtable on securities lending.

In a securities lending arrangement, the owner of securities lends out securities to market participants in exchange for a fee, upon posting of collateral (both of which, in the United States, usually take the form of cash). An institutional investor such as a mutual or pension fund will typically engage a custodial bank or other lending agent to handle the lending of securities to brokers and reinvestment of the collateral. Brokers borrow securities for a number of reasons, including for delivery of timely trade settlements and to lend to clients seeking to enter into short sales. In a short sale, a security is borrowed and sold in the market with the expectation that the security will be purchased later at a lower price (and returned to the lender), allowing the short seller to pocket the difference.

The commissioners and panelists generally agreed that securities lending is a critical component of proper market functioning because, among other reasons, such lending creates greater liquidity and enhances the ability to effect short sales (which in turn permit greater price discovery). With the intense scrutiny of short sales during the financial crisis and large losses suffered by certain institutional investors in their securities lending programs, the SEC has decided to shed light on and explore possible regulation in what SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has called an “opaque” market.

Panel discussion focused on transaction price transparency, fee splits, cash reinvestment, proxy voting issues, the possible use of central counterparties and possible regulation. In general, while securities lending-related pricing information is available from various services, the price terms of loans tend to be individually negotiated between lending agents and brokers and depend in part on depth of information available to such parties. SEC staff members have previously expressed concern about the lack of transparency in both pricing and the supply of securities available for lending.

Net prices for borrowing securities are typically negotiated between parties and can range widely depending on such negotiations and market forces. For easy-to-borrow and highly liquid securities, lenders typically “rebate” to borrowers a substantial portion of the return they earn from reinvesting the cash collateral posted by a borrower. For hard-to-borrow securities, lenders can obtain a “negative rebate” from borrowers, in which borrowers must pay lenders a substantial rate of interest on the cash collateral for the right to borrow the relevant securities. This means that the effective cost of borrowing securities can range from a few basis points for easy-to-borrow securities to 20% and higher for hard-to-borrow securities.

Fee split arrangements between lenders and agents, under which an agent generally takes 10 to 50% of the net fees earned by a lender under its securities lending program, and the indemnification, termination and other provisions of these arrangements, appear to depend on the leverage and sophistication of the parties. Under these arrangements, securities lenders frequently delegate to their lending agents the task of reinvesting their cash collateral, usually pursuant to written guidelines in which the agent usually disclaims that it is acting as an investment adviser or manager. Given the fee splits between a lender and agent, an agent has an incentive to manage the reinvestment to yield the highest returns. Before the financial crisis, some agents reinvested securities lending cash collateral in instruments, for example in the securities of structured investment vehicles (or SIVs), that suffered from illiquidity and substantial losses during the financial crisis. Some lenders were unable to return collateral to borrowers who had returned loaned securities, and the decline in the value of these lenders’ cash collateral had to be marked to market, causing net asset value declines for these lenders.

These lenders, who had traditionally viewed the reinvestment of cash collateral as a low-risk business for a small reward, were caught flat-footed with substantial losses and liabilities. Some panelists suggested that such lenders placed undue reliance on their agents to make investment decisions or may not have fully understood the risks involved with these reinvestment programs. According to some panelists, while mutual funds tended to have the capacity and staff sophistication to “shop” among and negotiate these terms with different agents, other lenders, including smaller pension funds, did not have the capacity and expertise to negotiate in the same manner and may have been more susceptible to losses and liabilities under these arrangements. These panelists urged the SEC to consider requiring agents to make greater disclosures to all lenders regarding the range of instruments in which cash collateral may be reinvested and the risks inherent in such programs.

Panelists discussed the potential use of non-cash collateral in the securities lending process, noting that the posting of certain securities as collateral for the borrowing of securities is widely used in Europe. Some panelists suggested that the buildup of cash balances in securities lenders’ accounts caused volatility in lenders’ portfolios because the reinvestment of this collateral drove earnings during good economic periods and led to losses during bad periods. However, other panelists cautioned that while the use of other securities as collateral for securities lending (including short-term government debt securities) could mitigate some of these risks, the use of securities as collateral could introduce other risks, including correlation (or lack thereof) between the market risk of the collateral and that of underlying loaned securities.

Under securities lending arrangements, the borrower of securities generally becomes the record owner of the securities for proxy voting purposes if it owns the securities on the relevant record date. The interests of the short seller may not be aligned with those of the “long” holders of a company’s securities, including the lender: for instance, the short seller might want to vote against accepting a tender offer at a premium to the market price, since the offer would drive up the stock’s price and cause a loss in value in the seller’s short position.

Panelists discussed the record-keeping, conflicts of interests and other issues surrounding such proxy voting issues. Some panelists urged securities lenders to pay more attention to proxy voting to make sure they are able to maintain voting rights, by recalling loaned securities or otherwise, to give input on corporate action in line with their interests as “long” holders. Panelists representing both lenders and broker-dealers agreed that lenders appeared to face no difficulties or adverse consequences from recalling their loaned securities, such as being penalized by broker-dealers by losing future securities lending opportunities, and that lenders could address many of these issues by considering their proxy voting and related goals and adopting policies and procedures to give them effect.

Panelists also considered whether there should be central counterparties for securities lending, both to enhance price discovery for securities lending and to address counterparty risk. Several panelists asserted that, because price discovery was available to many lenders and their agents through pricing services, and since the collateral for borrowed securities was generally made in cash in an amount exceeding the price of the relevant security, the incremental value of using central counterparties would be minimal. Other panelists stated that the expanded use of central counterparties would have a positive impact on risk management and the transparency of the pricing and liquidity of securities lending.

Several panelists also urged the SEC to crack down on unregistered finders seeking to locate securities on behalf of broker-dealers for borrowing purposes, especially from retail owners of securities. According to these panelists, retail investors were particularly susceptible to misapprehending the risks, terms and consequences of lending securities in their portfolios. Richard Ketchum, chief executive of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, stated that the organization is considering the adoption of rules designed to require broker-dealers to better disclose to their customers the risks and consequences of securities lending.

In her closing remarks, Chairman Schapiro stressed the SEC’s commitment to review the securities lending market’s benefits and pitfalls and to assess whether changes should be made in the regulation of the market. The SEC is accepting comments regarding issues addressed in the roundtable until October 30, 2009.
 

Congress Builds on Obama Financial Regulatory Reform Approach, as Reform Efforts Proceed

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page and Collins R. Clark

Congress continues to move forward expeditiously on the financial services regulatory reform effort. Over the past several weeks, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), in conjunction with other key committee members, has released additional legislative proposals building on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform plan, while Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL) develop a separate regulatory reform package. At the same time, these Committees have kept up a remarkably ambitious hearing schedule. This update provides an overview of significant recent developments, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Reforming the SEC and FINRA: Evolution or Revolution?

By: Richard A. Kirby and Melissa S. Holmes

Last week, FINRA released a report by the 2009 Special Review Committee that examines in detail the failure of FINRA’s examination program to detect the Stanford and Madoff frauds (the FINRA Report). The Special Committee recommends a series of reforms to FINRA examinations for adoption by FINRA management and its board, including items that would require SEC approval and – with respect to jurisdiction over registered investment advisers - Congressional action. These reforms would significantly expand FINRA’s enforcement and regulatory reach beyond its current mandate. 

The FINRA Report follows on the heels of the final recommendations of the SEC Inspector General for reforming the agency’s Division of Enforcement operations (the SEC Report), which grew out of his earlier scathing critique of the SEC’s failures to identify the Madoff fraud. The Director of Enforcement has agreed to adopt and implement all of the SEC Report’s recommendations. While many of the proposed FINRA reforms outlined in the FINRA Report would take time to implement (if they are implemented at all), the immediate changes to the respective examination and enforcement programs of FINRA and the SEC triggered by these reviews are being felt by financial services firms immediately and they will need to react to these changes.

FINRA Reforms

A. The FINRA Report concludes that FINRA should seek authority from Congress to regulate activities under the Investment Advisers Act. It suggests that if FINRA had this authority, it may have discovered Madoff’s Ponzi scheme through its regular examination process after he registered as an investment adviser in 2006. The SEC has not taken a public position on this proposal. The current Obama Financial Regulatory Reform does not contemplate an SRO regulatory structure for investment advisers, nor do any of the current proposals being considered by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank or Senate Banking Chairman Chris Dodd. Please see recent Blog posting called "House and Senate Take Expedited But Divergent Approaches to Financial Regulatory Reform Plan." It would be surprising if this jurisdictional reach by FINRA gets traction in the present Congress. 

B. The FINRA Report also recommends that FINRA seek SEC authority to broaden its authority to examine not only outside business activities of associated persons of members, but also affiliates of member firms. This expansion of FINRA’s regulatory reach would give it broader investigative powers than the SEC itself. It remains to be seen how the SEC will react to this proposal.

C. The FINRA Report notes that FINRA staff declined to pursue inquiries into complaints about Stanford’s high-pressure sales of CDs issued by its off-shore Antigua bank affiliate because of a concern that the CDs were not securities. This decision apparently was made by non-attorneys and contrary to the specific position of the SEC Fort Worth Regional Office on the issue, and was taken without fully informed consultation with FINRA General Counsel. The FINRA staff’s surprisingly and well-documented timid view of its jurisdictional limits, which appear to have had a material impact on its failure to pursue complaints related to Stanford, provides an interesting contrast to the Special Committee’s recommendation of a much more expanded and robust jurisdictional scope for FINRA going forward.

D. One recommendation from the FINRA Report that FINRA itself can implement is the proposal to increase FINRA’s fraud detection capacity and to focus more heavily on so-called “cause” examinations. The shift to an examination program focused primarily on items triggered for cause, however, would transform the examination staff to an adjunct of the FINRA enforcement division. Assuming this recommendation is adopted by the FINRA board, it could require members and associated persons to prepare for and approach future examinations with a much more guarded approach. Management will need to promptly assess the allegations that trigger the cause examination and independently determine whether the cause determination is warranted and, if so, whether remedial action is appropriate.

E. The FINRA Report notes that it is standard practice of FINRA not to defer to another regulatory agency’s parallel enforcement efforts, unless there is an express request to defer made by the SEC or other agency. This statement will come as a surprise to many practitioners who have successfully persuaded FINRA to defer its own review of an enforcement matter on burdensomeness grounds where there is a parallel SEC or DOJ investigation into the same conduct. It remains to be seen how this newly announced FINRA policy will be applied in practice. 

SEC Enforcement Reforms

While the SEC IG proposed myriad reforms regarding training and oversight at the SEC, financial services firms are most likely to be affected by reforms relating to the staffing and handling of complaints as well as a proposed more targeted focus of examinations. 

A. A new Office of Market Intelligence will be created within the Enforcement Division to coordinate the process of reviewing and evaluating tips and complaints. In addition, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro is seeking Congressional authority to reward whistleblowers with financial incentives.

B. The SEC will work to deploy adequately qualified staff with experience tailored to the matters at issue in a specific investigation. The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) hopes to fill new “Senior Specialized Examiner” positions with professionals with experience in areas such as valuation, sales and forensic accounting. Dealing with such specialized professionals could result in a streamlining and acceleration of the enforcement investigation and examination process for financial services firms. Whether this results in a fairer process for these firms remains to be seen.

C. Finally, the Enforcement Division will institute a more rigorous and systematized process for the planning, oversight and management of the investigation process, including the processes for both opening and closing investigations. Although more targeted investigations may lighten the burden on financial services firms in some respects, OCIE, like FINRA, intends to increase its focus on “cause” investigations. This focus raises the same concerns as it does with FINRA’s shift in emphasis and puts greater burdens on financial services firms to more carefully prepare for and respond to issues raised in examinations and investigations. It will also increase the need for management to conduct its own independent review of the matter under scrutiny.

Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort

By: Diane E. Ambler, Philip M. Cedar, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Vanessa C. Edwards, Edward G. Eisert, David H. Jones, Steven M. KaplanSean P. Mahoney, J. Matthew Mangan, Philip J. Morgan, Mary C. Moynihan, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Clair E. Pagnano, Lawrence B. Patent, Karishma Shah Page

Since June 17, 2009, when the Obama Administration unveiled its financial regulatory reform plan, there has been a flurry of executive branch and legislative branch activity.  The frenetic pace of the reform effort is expected to resume in the fall, as Congress works to resolve the many highly controversial issues presented by the plan.  The traditional August Congressional recess now underway provides an opportunity to take stock of this historic capital markets reform effort.  This alert provides an overview of the most significant developments so far, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

OTC Derivatives Legislation Continues to Take Form

By: Gordon F. Peery, Lawrence B. Patent, Anthony R.G. Nolan

 Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives in late July 2009 gave the financial services industry a glimpse of legislative initiatives that, if enacted into law, may dramatically transform the over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market. Congress will debate the aggressive legislative initiatives detailed in this Alert soon after it reconvenes following its August recess. The initiatives go hand-in-hand with the rest of the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform mandates. In order to understand the importance of the July 2009 initiatives, it is first necessary to briefly review industry, regulatory and legislative efforts to reform the OTC derivatives market earlier this year.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC Chairman Schapiro Defends Agency, Maps Out Strategy for Revival

By: Mark D. Perlow

Congress, the media and the public have subjected the SEC to harsh criticism in recent months, charging that it failed to prevent the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and to detect the long-running Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff. While the accusations are somewhat unfair – banking regulators failed to prevent the insolvency of many large depository institutions, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority also failed to detect the Madoff fraud – these charges have achieved considerable political traction, and many recent proposals for regulatory reform would strip authority from the SEC or merge it into a new or already existing regulatory agency, such as the CFTC.

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, however, has made clear that she intends to assert aggressively the continuing importance and relevance of the agency. In particular, in a recent speech, Chairman Schapiro made the case for the SEC and its distinctive brand of financial regulation. She stated her view that the capital markets require a different type of regulation than do financial institutions, one that is focused on the protection of investors rather than on the safety and soundness of key institutions. She argued that investor protection requires an agency that is independent and experienced in dealing with the capital markets, an implicit criticism of banking regulators as too closely tied to the banks they regulate. She detailed the SEC’s past regulatory achievements, including regulatory regimes that have fostered successful exchanges, clearing agencies, mutual funds, investment advisers and broker-dealers, all of which (other than the largest investment banks) have functioned without a systemic failure during the current crisis. Although she does not put it this way, she is arguing that if the SEC did not exist, it would have to be invented.

Nonetheless, Chairman Schapiro admitted that the SEC has not performed up to expectations recently, and she mapped out the agency’s recent efforts to revitalize itself. First and foremost, she emphasized that the SEC’s enforcement program would be tougher and more efficient. She signaled the SEC’s intention to bring “meaningful cases that have the greatest impact and send a strong message.” In an effort to achieve these goals, the agency has eliminated controversial procedures requiring the staff to get pre-approval of the full Commission to launch a formal investigation or to negotiate settlements that include penalties. In addition, the SEC will engage a consulting firm to help the agency determine how best to sort through the countless tips and complaints it receives each year. The agency will also improve training and hire staff analysts (who may not necessarily be lawyers) with more financial industry experience. These reforms will resonate with practitioners with experience of the bureaucratic ways of the enforcement program. Subjects of SEC investigations can expect to face an even more relentless Division of Enforcement.

Schapiro also summarized some of the key elements of the SEC’s current pipeline of cases, making clear the agency’s intent to bring “message” cases – 150 hedge fund investigations, two dozen municipal securities investigations, and 50 cases involving credit default swaps (“CDS”), collateralized debt obligations and other derivatives. Recently announced enforcement actions have filled out this story further: the SEC has brought several dozen cases against alleged Ponzi schemes; the first insider trading case based on transactions in CDS; a case alleging manipulation of a municipal securities market; a case alleging that an investment adviser did not have adequate procedures to protect against conflicts of interest in its proxy voting procedures; an action against the manager of a money market fund that broke the buck for allegedly inadequate disclosures; and a case against executives of a subprime lender for allegedly misleading investors about the riskiness of its loan portfolio.

As Schapiro pointed out, the SEC also has a full rule-making agenda. In April, it proposed reinstating the short-sale uptick rule (or some variant on it); in May, it proposed a revamp of the client asset custody regime for registered investment advisers, including proposals to require surprise audits and independent compliance reviews, with the clear intent to prevent another Madoff. The SEC has also issued a controversial proposal to provide public company and investment company shareholders with access to the company’s proxy statement both to nominate a short slate of directors and to propose amendments to company nomination process bylaws. Schapiro’s willingness to take up this topic, which has been considered in various forms almost since the creation of the SEC and vigorously opposed by many industry groups, reflects her determination to restore the agency’s reputation with the public by picking a high-profile fight. Later this month, the SEC will propose new rules on money market funds, and is considering an expansion of the municipal pay-to-play rules and municipal securities disclosure, new rules regulating hedge funds, and seeking authority over whistleblower actions.

The Obama Administration has stated that it wants to see Congress pass a financial regulatory bill by the end of the year, and the chairs of the relevant Congressional committees have agreed to this timetable. The SEC is on a mission to demonstrate its importance and competence before the serious legislative sausage-making begins in the fall, all against the backdrop of deep public disillusionment with the financial sector. As one aspect of that campaign, subjects of SEC investigations and examinations, and industries targeted in SEC rulemaking proposals, should expect a tougher fight than at any time in recent memory.

Regulatory Reform and the Mutual Fund Industry

By: Mary C. MoynihanDiane E. Ambler

Although mutual funds have not been implicated as a cause of the financial crisis, many investors have experienced the crisis most directly through the plummeting value of their mutual fund investments. As Washington moves to address the myriad issues arising from the crisis, the mutual fund industry should expect to see changes that will directly affect how funds—and their advisers, distributors and custodians—do business. Changes of particular interest to the mutual fund industry are discussed below.

Change to Primary Regulator for Registration of Mutual Funds, Broker-Dealers and Advisers
Lawmakers are considering several configurations for a new regulatory regime. These include consolidation of the SEC with the CFTC—although Barney Frank, the powerful chair of the House Financial Services Committee, has expressed doubts as to whether such consolidation will happen. Another idea involves the creation of a financial products safety commission. Whether that proposal will take hold is unclear, although key Democrats in the Senate and House have submitted a bill to create the commission. Even if it were created, the White House is reported to support a plan under which the new financial products safety commission would focus on consumer products such as mortgages and credit cards, but would not have jurisdiction over securities (and therefore mutual funds), which would instead be regulated by the new agency resulting from a merger of the SEC and CFTC. Because the proposals are likely to trigger a turf war in Congress and among the affected agencies, it is still too early to predict the outcome. Lawmakers are also still waiting for final proposals from the Obama administration.

Money Market Funds
Money market funds have drawn closer regulatory scrutiny since the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck in September, spurring large-scale redemptions from money market funds with large institutional investor bases and a guarantee program from the U.S. Treasury. While the Group of 30 proposed earlier this year that funds that maintain a stable $1 NAV be regulated as special purpose banks, this proposal does not seem to have gained traction. However, a consensus has developed on the need to tighten the rules governing money market funds’ portfolio assets’ credit quality, maturity and liquidity. The first detailed proposal came in March from a task force convened by the Investment Company Institute, which included proposals to (1) impose daily and weekly minimum liquidity requirements; (2) stress test the portfolio; (3) tighten portfolio maturity limits; (4) raise credit quality standards on portfolio investments; (5) address client concentration risks; (6) disclose portfolio investments monthly; (7) require additional risk disclosures; (8) authorize suspending redemptions for several days for failing funds; and (9) establish a nonpublic reporting scheme to regulators for all money market investors. The SEC has not yet produced a detailed proposal. However, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has made clear that the SEC will propose tougher rules later this month that will “extend beyond” the ICI task force proposals. The staff is examining the credit quality, maturity and liquidity provisions currently applicable to money market funds and considering whether more fundamental changes are needed, including floating rate net asset values for money market funds.

“Proxy Access” and “Say on Pay”
In May, the SEC proposed a new “proxy access” rule that would set a tiered system under which shareholders may nominate candidates for election to boards of directors. For example, for companies with a market cap of $700 million or more, shareholders owning at least 1% of the voting securities would be eligible to nominate directors. By some estimates, this could increase by three or four times the number of contested director elections that funds must evaluate in exercising proxies. In addition, funds themselves would be subject to the proposed rule, which would allow shareholders to nominate fund directors. Finally, funds with ownership positions in excess of the thresholds would need to determine whether they should be proposing director candidates for portfolio companies. These proposals would transform a fund’s traditional analysis of “buy vs. sell” and force new decision-making concerning voting and management. Also in May, Senators Charles Schumer and Maria Cantwell introduced a “shareholder bill of rights” that would require non-binding shareholder votes on how executives are paid. The bill is not likely to pass in its current form but, particularly in view of the action taken earlier this year by the House to limit compensation of recipients of TARP money, any reform package is likely to include some corporate governance component.

Emerging Best Practices Relating to Risk Management
Many fund advisers and boards are examining whether the events of the past year suggest that they need additional risk monitoring programs to evaluate risk elements in the portfolio and the adviser’s organization. There is no “one size fits all” answer to the risk management puzzle, and the precise actions that a fund family and its board should take with respect to risk assessment are highly subjective and based on many different factors, including the nature of the fund family’s investments, experience with risk, organizational structure, and nature of investors. Nonetheless, the SEC has indicated that risk will be a central concern, suggesting that advisers may need to develop a more robust approach to risk management and that fund boards may wish to consider creating a risk management oversight committee or adding responsibility for risk oversight to an existing committee, such as compliance or investment performance.

Target Date Funds
In a May speech to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum, SEC Chair Schapiro stated that the SEC is closely examining target date funds due to concerns with performance of the funds during the market decline. As these funds approach their “target” date, their asset allocations should move toward a more conservative allocation, often referred to as a fund's “glide path.” Some funds may have established more aggressive glide paths based on the assumption that investors would continue to maintain their investments, and partially live off the proceeds following retirement. This could be particularly problematic for a target date fund underlying a college investment plan, since those investors would need to access their investment at or near the fund’s target date. Chairman Schapiro stated that the SEC staff would be closely reviewing target date funds’ disclosure about their glide paths and asset allocations, examining whether the same target date funds underlie both retirement and college savings plans and considering whether the target dates in some funds’ names are misleading. Chairman Schapiro also challenged fund directors to review their funds’ allocations between asset classes.

Custody of Client Assets by Investment Advisers
Following the Madoff scandal, the SEC has moved swiftly to propose new rules governing the custody of client funds held by all registered investment advisers. The proposed rules would require advisers to undergo an annual surprise examination by an independent public accountant to verify client assets. In the case of assets that are not maintained by an independent qualified custodian, the rules would require a “SAS-70” report from an independent public accountant registered with and inspected by PCAOB that includes an opinion covering controls over custody of client assets. The proposed rules would not apply to custody of assets held by mutual funds, but would affect advisers with respect to other classes of client funds.

When the dust settles, the investment management landscape will undoubtedly be much changed. Mutual funds will likely be subject to new rules, regulated by a reconstituted regulator, and, especially if hedge funds and other unregulated entities face more regulation, will encounter a new competitive environment. Industry participants should closely monitor these developments and may wish to provide input into policy choices that will have direct implications for them and their investors.

Forfeiture of Madoff's Assets: Challenges for Victims

By: Richard A. KirbyRebecca L. Kline DubillScott P. Lindsay

On March 12, 2009, Bernard Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 counts of a criminal information filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”).  The information seeks forfeiture of all proceeds traceable to the commission of Madoff’s fraud in an amount “exceeding” $170 billion.  Assuming that the government can recover any additional assets through the exercise of its criminal or civil forfeiture powers, questions remain as to whether and how those assets will be distributed to Madoff’s victims.  Two recent large-scale securities fraud cases, Adelphia Communications Corp. and the Bayou Group, illustrate how protracted this process can be for victims.

Criminal forfeiture is a powerful tool that permits the government to seize a defendant’s assets that were used in, or were the fruits of, criminal activity.   The government also has civil forfeiture powers and can seize property related to criminal activity even if it does not belong to a convicted defendant.  Although as a separate matter the trustee appointed by the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (“SIPC”) in the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (“BMIS”) liquidation proceeding is also seeking to recover BMIS assets, the full range of the government’s forfeiture powers are broader than those of the SIPC trustee and may result in additional assets being recovered. 

Typically, forfeited assets are distributed to crime victims in one of two ways: (1) the petition for remission process, in which victims apply for remission from a victims’ fund administered by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”); or (2) restitution, in which the U.S. Attorney General “restores” the forfeited assets to the court overseeing the criminal cases, and the court distributes funds to victims through an order of restitution. 

In the Adelphia case, John and Timothy Rigas were convicted in 2004 on various counts relating to their looting of Adelphia’s corporate assets and forced to forfeit significant personal assets, including their Adelphia stock.   In 2005, pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement, the company that the Rigas’ had controlled, Adelphia, agreed to repurchase this forfeited stock for $715 million, which was paid into a victims’ compensation fund.  This victims’ fund is administered by DOJ under the petition for remission process and has faced substantial litigation over its protocols.  As a result, nearly nine years after the fraud was revealed, no distributions from the fund have yet been made to Adelphia’s creditors or shareholders. 

Bayou involved a $400 million Ponzi scheme.   In their plea allocutions, the Bayou principals agreed to forfeit both personal and corporate assets, including $100 million in Bayou funds, as well as several dozen Bayou investment assets.  The S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s Office appointed a receiver to collect and liquidate the assets so that they could be restored to the court overseeing the criminal proceedings for distribution to victims through an order of restitution.  Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office obtained possession of the $100 million in cash and other investments as a part of the preliminary forfeiture orders, it took almost three years to distribute the forfeited assets to victims.  The restitution process was further complicated and delayed due to litigation initiated by former investors, who had been sued in the Bayou bankruptcy on a clawback theory for return of fictitious profits and principal.  These former investors succeeded in establishing themselves as contingent victims for purposes of the restitution fund. 

If Adelphia and Bayou serve as a guide, it likely could be years before Madoff’s victims receive any distribution of property seized by the government through the exercise of its forfeiture powers.   This may provide an opportunity — given the massive scale of the fraud and the quasi-governmental nature of SIPC — for the government to chart a different course and use the established SIPC liquidation proceeding to distribute any assets it seizes to victims of Madoff’s scheme through a transfer of forfeited assets to the SIPC trustee.  Such a transfer could expedite the ultimate distribution of funds to Madoff’s victims and create certain efficiencies in the processing of claims and the handling of objections.  While it remains to be seen whether the government will be successful in identifying and seizing assets not already under the control of the SIPC trustee, it is not too soon to consider an alternative paradigm to the government’s traditional and slow-working forfeiture distribution mechanisms. 

Stanford Prosecutions Highlight Difficult Issues Posed by Company Counsel's Representation of Employees in Government Investigations

By: Matt T. MorleyMichael D. Ricciuti

The triggering event for the SEC’s action against Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and several of its senior executives appears to have been the abrupt public resignation of the company’s outside counsel.  This occurred the day after SEC testimony by one of Stanford’s executives, Laura Pendergest-Holt.  In apparently making what is known as a “noisy withdrawal,” counsel resigned and disavowed to the SEC all prior statements made by them in the matter.  The SEC promptly filed an action against Stanford and several executives, including Ms. Pendergest-Holt, who was also arrested on obstruction of justice charges.

In connection with the SEC’s investigation, company counsel had represented both the company and Ms. Pendergest-Holt.  According to press reports, counsel told the SEC that he represented the witness “insofar as she is an officer or director of one of the Stanford-affiliated companies.”  In many cases, it is potentially more efficient for company counsel to also represent individual officers and directors in government investigations.  But doing so often poses serious risks for conflict.  Although we do not know, and may never know, what precisely caused counsel to resign in the Stanford case, these events serve as a reminder of the risks involved where several parties share the same lawyers.  In such cases, parties need to consider in advance whether separate counsel should be retained and, if not, what will occur if a conflict subsequently arises.

When law enforcement officials first contact a company, it may seem – and may be the case – that the interests of individual employees are fully aligned with those of their employer. In some cases, at the outset of a criminal or SEC investigation, when the facts and/or the scope and focus of the probe may be unclear, corporate counsel may jointly represent the corporation and its individual officers, directors, and employees.  Pursuant to Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, such joint representation is permissible as long as it does not involve a conflict of interest.  For example, in the event that an individual becomes a “subject” or “target” of an investigation – that is, someone who may be indicted as the result of a criminal probe – joint representation of the company and any such individual is not possible, and the employee will need separate counsel.  Other circumstances, such as the discovery of additional facts, may also give rise to conflicts of interest between the company and its employees.

Indeed, in the internal investigation context, where company counsel represents only the company, employees are ordinarily provided with “Upjohn” warnings, making clear counsel is acting solely for the company, and that while the interview may be subject to the attorney-client privilege, the company and not the employee controls whether to assert that privilege.   Employees are told that the company remains free to waive the privilege and disclose the substance of the interview to third parties, including the government, as part of its effort to cooperate. 

Where company counsel also represents an employee, however, the Upjohn warning doesn’t fit, because counsel also has attorney-client relationships both with the company and with the employee, and the employee’s confidences cannot be revealed without his or her consent.   If the interests of the company and the employee diverge, a number of critical issues will promptly arise.  Counsel will generally be unable to represent both the company and the employee, and a change in representation will be required.  Will the individual be required to get separate counsel?  If that occurs, will company counsel remain free to represent the company?  If so, what will happen to the employee’s confidences that have been shared with company counsel?  Will the company be free to use that information as it chooses?  Will the company be able to disclose this information to the government?  The failure to resolve these questions in advance can harm both the company and the individual involved and thus, in a joint representation, it is wise to reach a clear and common understanding from the outset as to what will happen if the parties develop conflicting interests or objectives. 

These questions take on even greater significance given that, in recent years, it has become increasingly common for the SEC to cooperate closely with criminal authorities.  Documents and witness statements may be shared with criminal prosecutors without notice to the company or its employees – and in the current environment, one should assume that almost any SEC investigation involves criminal charges.  Indeed, press reports indicate that, at the beginning of Ms. Pendergest-Holt’s SEC testimony, counsel tried without success to learn whether there was a parallel criminal investigation in the matter.

No single solution to these issues can fit every situation, but there are a variety of ways to address these issues.  At a minimum, where counsel will represent multiple interests, the engagement letter should spell out the parties’ agreement as to what will happen in the event of a conflict.  Sometimes, individuals may decide to retain “shadow” counsel, who are fully involved in providing advice and preparing for testimony, but who may not make a public appearance in the matter.  In other circumstances, separate counsel may be the best choice.  One thing remains clear – those who become the focus of attention by government authorities need to consider these issues at the very start.

CFTC Nominee Calls for Increased Regulation of Derivatives

By: Lawrence B. Patent

Introduction
Gary Gensler, President Obama’s nominee for Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), testified at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (the “Agriculture Committee”) on February 25, 2009; the Agriculture Committee approved his nomination on March 16.  In his opening statement, he mentioned four priorities that he would pursue if confirmed by the full Senate:  (1) vigorous enforcement to prevent fraud and manipulation in futures and options markets; (2) position limits across all markets and platforms where there is a finite supply of the underlying commodity; (3) generally requiring the clearing and exchange trading of derivative instruments, and direct regulation of derivatives dealers; and (4) working with regulators around the globe to protect Americans impacted by world financial markets.  The first and last of these goals are often cited by nominees to federal regulatory positions, and they are to be expected.  The remainder of this article will focus upon his other goals, those concerning position limits and enhanced regulation of derivatives, which represent a departure from the current regulatory framework yet are in keeping with recent legislative initiatives.

Trading and Clearing of Derivatives
Mr. Gensler’s statements at his confirmation hearing are consistent with some of the recent bills before Congress addressing regulation of derivatives and the energy markets.   Mr. Gensler did acknowledge that his current views may not be consistent with positions that he took as a senior official in the Treasury Department under President Clinton in the late 1990s, leading up to the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).  The CFMA provided greater legal certainty for trading in financial and energy swaps by exempting those instruments (and certain related markets) from regulation by the CFTC or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Mr. Gensler stated that his views have since “evolved” and that there should have been more aggressive regulation of derivatives to protect the American public.  Thus, Mr. Gensler’s current views are generally compatible with the regulatory direction of the provisions of H.R. 977, the “Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009,” addressing over-the-counter (“OTC”) commodity derivatives.  That bill was approved by voice vote of the House Committee on Agriculture on February 12, 2009 (and the subject of a prior K&L Gates Alert).  H.R. 977 would generally require the clearing of all swap transactions, but would leave open the possibility of reporting certain swap transactions to the CFTC if a clearing organization did not want to clear them. 

S. 272, the “Derivatives Integrity Act of 2009,” which was introduced by Senator Harkin (D-Iowa) on January 15, 2009, goes beyond H.R. 977’s requirement for clearing to require that all swaps be traded exclusively on CFTC-regulated exchanges.  That provision would effectively eliminate all OTC transactions in commodity derivatives.  Senator Harkin, who is Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, tried to press Mr. Gensler during the confirmation hearing to support the thrust of his bill.  Although Mr. Gensler indicated that he generally supported the concept of the greater transparency that would be provided by exchange trading and clearing of swaps, he resisted committing to support exchange trading of all swaps with no exceptions.  Mr. Gensler recognized that there could be cases where customized transactions would not fit readily into an exchange-traded, clearinghouse framework, and exceptions might be necessary to accommodate such instruments.  Senator Harkin expressed the view that it would be too easy to vary a particular term of a contract so that it could be labeled as “customized” rather than standardized and thereby permit such instruments to evade the exchange-trading requirement.

Regulation of Financial Swap Dealers
Mr. Gensler did express support for another facet of S. 272 -- the regulation of financial swap dealers (H.R. 977 does not provide for such regulation).  Mr. Gensler stated that the entities involved in financial swap transactions needed to be subject to minimum financial, business conduct and reporting requirements.  He stated that it was not enough for other affiliates of a swap dealer or its corporate parent holding company to be subject to regulation by the CFTC or the SEC; rather, in his view, the entity that is a party to financial swap transactions must itself be subject to minimum financial, business conduct and reporting requirements.  Mr. Gensler indicated that the new requirements would apply to the 15 or 20 swap dealers that are involved in the vast majority of such transactions.  Such a policy reversal would certainly be a large step away from the exemptive framework for swaps under the CFMA.

Position Limits
Mr. Gensler also indicated his support for H.R. 977’s objective of establishing position limits for physically deliverable commodities that have a finite supply.  Part of the original purpose of H.R. 977 when it was introduced last year was to impose speculative limits on energy-related futures and options, because trading in those products has been blamed by many as contributing heavily to the run-up in gasoline prices last summer (although that view is disputed by the CFTC’s Office of Chief Economist and several other studies).  In addition, Mr. Gensler expressed support for the regulation of OTC trading of energy and metals in the same manner as agricultural swaps.  Agricultural swaps currently trade in accordance with CFTC regulations that date back almost 20 years, rather than pursuant to statutory exemptions, which in the case of energy and metals can fully exclude them from the reach of the CFTC.  Accordingly, regulating OTC trading in energy and metals in the same manner as agricultural commodities would confer more power to the CFTC to impose restrictions on such trading.  It appears that Mr. Gensler would not slow down efforts to increase the regulatory scrutiny of energy derivatives.

Relief Requests
Legislation regulating derivatives and imposing new speculative limits will likely take several months to finalize.  Mr. Gensler also noted during his testimony two areas of CFTC procedures that he would want to review that may not require any additional legislative action (although H.R. 977 would mandate that CFTC conduct such a review).  Mr. Gensler indicated that he wants to review any exemptions granted from hedging restrictions and position limits in the past 20 years by the CFTC, and that he also wants to review the “no-action” letter process, which is used, among other purposes, to grant exemptions for foreign energy markets.  Mr. Gensler indicated that some decisions on requests for no-action relief could remain at the staff level, but he implied that certain matters previously handled by staff should be considered by the Commissioners.  The overall message from Mr. Gensler is clear:  his regime as Chairman of the CFTC will tend towards greater regulation and stricter scrutiny of requests for exemption or no-action relief.

Compliance with TARP Executive Compensation Restrictions Subject to SEC Enforcement

By: Brian A. Ochs

A little-noticed recent amendment to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §5221 (“EESA”), may provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with a prominent role in enforcing the executive compensation and corporate governance requirements under the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).  The amendment, which was signed into law on February 17 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “Recovery Act”) (Pub. L. No. 111-5), requires the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or their equivalents) of any public company that receives TARP funds to certify compliance with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance restrictions as part of the company’s annual SEC filing.  Much like the required officer certifications regarding internal controls and disclosure controls that have been part of the legal landscape since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the effect of the EESA certification requirement is to focus personal responsibility for EESA compliance on CEOs and CFOs, with the potential for securities fraud or other charges to be brought by the SEC in the event of false certifications.

EESA and the Treasury Department’s Interim Rules on Executive Compensation
As originally enacted, section 111(b) of EESA directed that any financial institution that sells troubled assets to the Treasury Department must meet certain standards of executive compensation and corporate governance.  These standards included: (1) eliminating incentives for senior executives to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the financial value of the institution; (2) a “clawback” provision for the recovery by the institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on financial statements or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and (3) a prohibition on “golden parachute” payments to senior executive officers.  (Generally, “senior executives” means the five highest paid officers of the company.)

In October 2008 and January 2009, the Treasury Department announced rules to implement the executive compensation requirements of section 111 for participants in the TARP Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”).   (The Treasury Department separately provided guidance for certain other TARP programs.)  Among other things, the January rule required the principal executive officer of each participating financial institution to certify to TARP’s Chief Compliance Officer that the institution was in compliance with the executive compensation requirements set forth in EESA.  The Treasury Department further noted in the January rule that a false certification could subject the certifier to federal criminal penalties for false statements under 18 U.S.C. §1001.  See CPP Executive Compensation Final Rule (Jan. 16, 2009). 

The Recovery Act Amendments
The Recovery Act (Section 7001) expanded the significance of these provisions in several important respects.  First, it directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose new and expanded executive compensation and corporate governance standards on all recipients of TARP funds.   In addition to the restrictions found in the original section 111, these standards must bar payment of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation during the period that a TARP obligation is outstanding (except for payments made in restricted stock comprising no more than one-third of the individual’s total compensation, and not fully vesting during the period that the obligation is outstanding), and must prohibit any compensation plan that would encourage earnings manipulation.  The number of employees to which the new compensation limitations apply varies by provision, in many cases going beyond the original five “senior executive officers” to as many as the next 20 most highly compensated officers.  In addition, the Recovery Act amendments require SEC registrants that receive TARP funds to establish a board compensation committee, comprised entirely of independent directors, and also require boards of directors to implement company-wide policies regarding excessive or luxury expenditures.

Section 7001 of the Recovery Act also requires the CEO and CFO (or their equivalents) of each recipient of TARP funds that has publicly traded securities to “provide a written certification of compliance by the TARP recipient with the requirements of this section … together with annual filings required under the securities laws….”  (Certifications are to be provided to the Secretary of the Treasury if the entity receiving TARP funds is not a publicly traded company.)  The SEC has determined that it will not give effect to the certification requirement until the Secretary of the Treasury establishes standards to implement section 7001 of the Recovery Act.  This approach follows the views expressed by Senator Christopher Dodd, the author of the executive compensation provisions of the Recovery Act, in a February 20 letter to SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro.

Analysis
The requirement that CEO and CFO certifications be filed with a TARP recipient’s annual report to the SEC will unambiguously subject public companies that receive TARP funds and their executives to SEC scrutiny and potential enforcement action for failure to comply with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance requirements.  This is because any material false statement in an SEC filing may be charged as a securities fraud or other securities violation, depending on the actor’s level of intent.  In the current environment, regulators are likely to view a certification that an entity receiving TARP funds is in compliance with requirements concerning executive compensation and corporate governance as being material to investors.  In particularly egregious cases, criminal prosecution for securities fraud could also result.

Further, because the CEO and CFO will each be considered the “maker” of statements in the EESA certifications, these executives could be exposed to personal liability under the securities laws for compliance failures that result in false certifications.  Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most companies have instituted formal procedures such as compliance checklists, sub-certifications by managers with line responsibilities, and disclosure committee reviews, to support the CEO and CFO certifications required by that Act.  Entities that receive TARP funds will need to consider implementing similar structured processes to support the CEO’s and CFO’s annual certifications under EESA.
 

Arbitration of Disputes Arising from the Financial Crisis

By: Clare TannerPaul F. Donahue

The current turmoil in financial markets has led to an increase in disputes involving financial institutions.   Parties may have entered into transactions in better times with little consideration given to the forum in which future disputes would play out.  In today’s far more challenging circumstances, the choice of forum may be central to the satisfactory resolution of disputes. 

In some areas, it is common for disputes involving financial institutions to be resolved through arbitration.  The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest self-regulatory organization, i.e., non-governmental regulator, for all securities firms doing business in the United States.  (FINRA’s rulemaking, however, is subject to approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).)  Both individual and institutional customers can require a FINRA member to arbitrate disputes.  Indeed, most, if not all, securities broker/dealers will refuse to do business with customers who do not agree to arbitrate disputes.  Disputes between FINRA members may also be submitted to arbitration.

The financial crisis has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of cases referred to FINRA arbitration.   In 2007, slightly more than 3,000 arbitration cases were filed.  In 2008, the number was almost 5,000 and the upward trend has only increased in 2009.  The number of cases filed in January 2009 was double that of a year earlier. 

An award handed down by a FINRA tribunal last month, arising from transactions in auction rate securities, illustrates the enormous magnitude of disputes arising from the financial crisis and the speed with which they can be resolved through arbitration.  The FINRA tribunal ordered Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, a brokerage unit of the Swiss bank, to pay $400 million to its customer STMicroelectronics NV, a European semiconductor maker.  STMicroelectronics claimed it had authorized Credit Suisse to make investments in top-rated securities backed by U.S. Government guaranteed student loans, but instead the funds were invested in collateralized debt obligations some of which were backed by sub-prime mortgages.  The entire process including 28 hearing sessions over two months took just under a year.  Any court proceeding would undoubtedly have taken far longer.  Nonetheless, STMicroelectronics, according to the award, incurred more than $4 million in legal fees during that time.

While FINRA members can be compelled to arbitrate customer disputes and most require their customers to agree to arbitrate disputes, other financial institutions have traditionally been reluctant to commit to arbitration and have preferred to submit disputes to national courts.   Some of the risks and benefits associated with arbitration as a means of resolving disputes involving financial institutions can be illustrated by reference to FINRA’s procedures. 

Confidentiality
As is common with arbitration, FINRA arbitrations are confidential.   The evidence submitted and procedural and substantive hearings are not open to the public.  Although FINRA arbitral awards are made public, that is the exception, not the rule for most arbitrations unless the parties agree otherwise.  FINRA awards are not necessarily fully reasoned and may simply amount to a requirement that one party pay as was the case in the STMicroelectronics case.  Under a recent rule approved by the SEC, however, beginning next month, if both parties request it, FINRA arbitrators will have to give an “explained decision,” i.e., “a fact based award stating the general reasons for the decision” but which need not include legal authorities or damage calculations.

Confidentiality can be a significant attraction of arbitration as it avoids both financial institutions and their institutional clients airing their dirty laundry in public.   In current markets, disputes may give rise to a damaging loss of confidence in the financial institution.  Equally, even if sophisticated institutional customers feel they have been misled by a financial institution, they may wish to avoid public allegations that they share some responsibility or may not want detailed aspects of their financial dealings laid open to public scrutiny.  In disputes between sophisticated commercial enterprises, the risk of adverse publicity is seldom limited to one party. 

Arbitration will not be appropriate where a financial institution seeks to establish a legal precedent that will be publicly available.  Only a court ruling can provide that and, of course, it can be a double-edged sword.

The Tribunal
FINRA’s arbitration rules for customer disputes generally provide for a three-person tribunal with one “industry member” and two independent members.  Under a rule change effective at the end of this month the size of cases to be decided by a single arbitrator will increase to $100,000.  Three-arbitrator panels are intended to provide both industry knowledge and experience while also protecting the customer’s interests, but some have criticised such panels as too industry friendly.  Under a pilot program now underway for 400 cases, several securities firms have agreed to have panels made up of three independent arbitrators.  FINRA’s approach may not be appropriate in all cases and, for example, the arbitration rules of the London-based City Disputes Panel provide that the tribunal will usually consist of a legally qualified chairman and two experienced financial services practitioners.

Given the complex and technical nature of modern financial products, there may be a significant advantage in decisions being reached by tribunals with necessary expert knowledge.   Both financial institutions and their institutional customers may prefer such a tribunal to the vagaries of a jury trial in the U.S.  The speed at which law and market practice change are such that, even in jurisdictions where disputes may come before an experienced judge, a tribunal made up of industry experts may still be preferable.  

Procedure
Recent rule changes have sharply curtailed the ability to obtain a summary determination of a dispute in FINRA arbitrations.   The loss of the opportunity of having a frivolous claim dismissed at an early stage may be unattractive for respondents and correspondingly attractive for claimants in those jurisdictions where summary determination is only available to a claimant.  However, expedited procedures are available by agreement between the parties in both FINRA arbitrations and in other arbitral rules.  Equally, the absence of, or restrictions on, wide-ranging discovery exercises and pre-trial depositions found in FINRA and other arbitral rules may mean that, even without a summary determination, arbitration is still more attractive than litigation through national courts.

Finality
The ability to challenge an arbitration award is usually strictly limited and FINRA arbitration is no exception.   The attraction of a final award is that the cost and risk associated with any given dispute can be more easily judged.  The prospect of a defaulting party endlessly prolonging the proceedings while attempting to protect assets against enforcement is greatly diminished as is the prospect of a successful party deciding to settle simply to end the bloodletting.  

Enforcement
Many financial transactions will have an international element, as illustrated by the STMicroelectronics case.   A party may be reluctant to commence proceedings in the home court of the other party fearing “home advantage.”  Even if the parties agree to resolve disputes in the courts of a neutral state, many national courts will not permit parties to “manufacture” jurisdiction and simply will not hear such cases.  Even when they do, the successful party still faces the cost and difficulty of enforcing that judgment in another country. 

Arbitration awards made in a country which is a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards can be enforced in any other Convention State, by the local court giving effect to the award as if it were a court judgment.  This is subject to limited, mostly due process, exceptions.

Conclusion
Arbitration is not a panacea — as with litigation through the courts, expense and delay can be features of arbitration — but there are advantages for disputes between financial institutions or between financial institutions and their institutional clients, particularly where there is an international element.   Even parties who did not commit to arbitration at the outset may still agree, after a dispute has arisen, that arbitration is a more suitable dispute resolution mechanism.  A failure to consider arbitration may leave parties at a disadvantage and, of course, it is always best to make the decision at the outset, before disputes arise.

State Securities Regulators -- Stepping Up Enforcement Examinations and Investigations in the Wake of Madoff and Industry Migration Trends

By: David N. Jonson

The North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") started the new year off with an ambitious agenda at its annual Winter Enforcement Conference on January 8-11, in Coronado, California.  The conference, which is open only to state, federal and FINRA enforcement attorneys and investigators, featured panels on Enforcement Trends, Enforcement Best Practices, Broker-Dealer Sales Tactics, and Enforcement Implications of the Financial Crisis.  The attendees also met to discuss strategy and tactics in six specialized NASAA enforcement groups: Enforcement Technology, Enforcement Trends, Special Project Development and Coordination, Attorney Investigator Training, Litigation Forum, and Enforcement Zones.

State securities regulators, who have regulated the securities industry since before federal securities laws and the SEC were created by Congress during the New Deal, have always been mindful of the erosion of their regulatory power by federal initiatives advocated by both the SEC and the securities industry itself.  Although the securities industry's clout in Washington today is arguably at its weakest level in decades, the states are also aware that any new financial services regulatory scheme from Washington could still result in a diminution of state authority.  Accordingly, even though recent multi-state regulatory enforcement actions in the areas of research analyst conflict of interests and auction rate securities have been widely viewed as successful by investors, consumer groups and some influential members of Congress, the states clearly do not intend to stray too far from the kitchen while a new regulatory pie is being baked.

To continue demonstrating their value during this time of regulatory change, state securities regulators will continue to focus on local cases with a common national theme (e.g. , auction rate securities and senior citizen issues).   However, since the states have also detected an unprecedented number of registered representatives departing broker-dealers to form smaller, state-registered investment advisory firms, the states have also indicated that they will dramatically increase the number of proactive examinations, investigations and enforcement actions against such firms. 

There are several reasons for the states' increased interest in these new investment advisers.   As an overarching factor, the effects of the Madoff matter cannot be understated.  No state securities regulator, many of whom serve at the pleasure of statewide elected officials, wants to have to explain how or why they missed clues or leads that, if properly investigated, would have shut down a would-be Madoff in their jurisdiction.  Therefore, future state examinations and investigations — regardless of whether or not a whistleblower provides a roadmap of where to look — will be far more thorough than in the past.  As a result, subjects of these inquiries should expect to find that responding to such matters will involve considerably more time and expense than they may have grown accustomed to in prior years. 

Second, state regulators are very concerned that since the majority of the new advisers may not be accustomed to handling compliance and other administrative details themselves, and because adequate compliance takes time and money and may be less of a priority than client development, state regulators theorize that these advisers are more likely to be deficient in carrying out such duties.  Some states will even be taking the unusual step of conducting introductory examinations of newly registered advisory firms. 

Third, some regulators believe that most of the representatives who left broker-dealers to form their own advisory firms may not have been in the upper echelon (or "top producers") at their former firms, and now, under pressure to pay their own way, may be more desperate to generate business through questionable advice or investment opportunities that they would not have attempted to solicit while at their prior firms.   (Interestingly, some state regulators — especially those who considered the term "top producer" to be questionable when viewed from the client's perspective — took a more charitable view of the motives of the lower-producing representatives who recently became state-registered advisers.) 

State securities regulators have identified new, state-registered investment advisers as the latest "at risk" group who will bear the brunt of their regulatory and investigative scrutiny.   Given the deterrent effect and favorable publicity that can be generated from taking strong enforcement actions, the states can also be expected to continue availing themselves of the full array of media outlets on both the local and national level.

SEC and FASB Relax Fair Value Rules; Controversy Continues

By Edward G. Eisert and Mark D. Perlow

On September 30, the Office of the Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Staff of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB Staff”) issued guidance on the determination of “fair value” under FAS 157 (the “FAS 157 Guidance”), addressing the use of internal assumptions, the use of broker quotes, and transactions in disorderly or inactive markets to measure fair value. On October 10 , the FASB published a FASB Staff Position (“FSP”) intended to clarify the application of the FAS 157 Guidance. FAS 157, which became effective in November 2007, defines “fair value” as the price that would be obtained in an orderly transaction between market participants in the principal or most advantageous market.

The FSP provides an illustrative example to demonstrate how the fair value of a financial asset might be determined when there is a “disorderly” or “inactive” market and the basis on which a determination could be made that a market is, in fact, "inactive." Although the FSP provides helpful commentary on the FAS 157 Guidance, it does not eliminate the need for investors and auditors to make difficult judgment calls.

The FAS 157 Guidance and the FSP were issued in response to a campaign by the banking industry, based on the argument that the emphasis under FAS 157 on “fair market” valuations for financial assets was forcing banks to write down performing assets to “fire sale” or distressed prices, compelling them to sell more assets to raise capital, and thereby depressing prices further in a downward spiral. Conversely, many supporters of FAS 157, including investors’ groups, have expressed the view that current market values provide a more accurate picture of the health of financial institutions than values based on cost or cash flow models. The SEC rarely involves itself in FASB policy-making, and the SEC’s action is clearly an attempt to reach a compromise between the two positions: it relaxed the interpretation of some of FAS 157’s market valuation provisions, but did not suspend market valuation, as some have requested.

The compromise has not appeased either side in the debate. Some in the industry continue to believe that the FAS 157 Guidance and the FSP do not go far enough. On October 13, in a letter to Chairman Cox of the SEC (the “October 13 Letter”), the American Bankers Association (“ABA”) commented that FASB’s fair value standard “needs serious work,” that it “is always going to create a downward bias on values” and requested the SEC “to use its statutory authority to step in and override the guidance issued by FASB.” http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/ChrmnCoxLtr.101308.pdf. Two specific issues highlighted by the October 13 Letter are the requirement in the FSP that “liquidity risk from the buyer’s perspective” be included in cash flow calculations that can be used to determine fair value and that the FSP did not address “other than temporary impairment” in an illiquid market. In addition, a number of members of Congress have been making public statements calling upon the SEC to suspend mark-to-market accounting, thereby politicizing the issue.

Apparently in response to the October 13 Letter and Congressional pressure, on October 15, in a joint letter to Chairman Cox, the Center for Audit Quality, the Consumer Federation of America, the CFA Institute and the Council of Institutional Investors “expressed grave concern regarding recent calls for the SEC to override [the FAS 157 Guidance] that would effectively suspend fair value or mark-to-market accounting.” http://www.thecaq.org/newsroom/pdfs/SECJointLetter2008-10-15.pdf. The joint letter did not specifically mention the October 13 Letter or address the specific issues it raised.

Underlying these positions is a basic disagreement as to the role that the adoption of FAS 157 has played in the liquidity and credit crisis. The ABA believes that FAS 157 has had a significant detrimental impact on the crisis, while auditor and investor groups believe that the crisis was not caused by fair value accounting and that, in fact, FAS 157 has been helpful in exposing problems.

In time-honored Washington fashion, this controversy is now being simultaneously addressed and avoided through a study group. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act mandates that the SEC “in consultation with the [Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury] shall conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting standards as provided in [FAS 157], as such standards are applicable to financial institutions, including depository institutions.” The SEC is required to submit a report of such study (the “SEC Study”) no later than January 2, 2009 (that is, after the election, but before the new Congress takes office), including “such administrative and legislative recommendations as the [SEC] determines appropriate.”

Work on the SEC Study has commenced and the SEC has announced that it is scheduling public roundtables to obtain input from “investors, accountants, standard setters, business leaders, and other interested parties.”

With the preparation of third quarter financial statements now in process, presumably in reliance on the FAS 157 Guidance and the FSP, and the SEC Study underway, with further public input to be provided, it appears likely that any further regulatory action on these issues will be deferred until 2009, when it will unquestionably be a subject for further debate during the upcoming effort by Congress to reform financial regulation.

We will continue to provide updates on these important issues as events unfold.

SEC Inspector General Finds Staff Misconduct in Investigations of Wall Street Firms. Reports Will Increase Pressure on SEC to "Get Tough"

By Brian A. Ochs

Significant disruptions in the market invariably lead to an increase in SEC enforcement activity, as regulators seek to determine whether those negative events resulted from violations of the federal securities laws. The aggressiveness of the SEC’s efforts in this regard will likely be further enhanced by two new reports from the SEC’s Inspector General (“IG”), H. David Kotz, that are highly critical of the Enforcement Division’s prior conduct of investigations involving major Wall Street firms. In each report, the IG raised questions about the Enforcement staff’s appearance of impartiality and recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the staff members involved, including the Director of the Enforcement Division and the head of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office.

The Enforcement Division has publicly, and in strong terms, contested the findings of at least one of the IG’s reports. Nonetheless, the IG’s charges of lax enforcement and the appearance of favorable treatment for major participants in the financial services industry seem certain to result in an even tougher and more difficult enforcement environment in the context of the SEC’s response to the current financial crisis.

Aguirre termination. The first report, issued on September 30, stemmed from charges by a former SEC Enforcement staff attorney, Gary Aguirre, that his supervisors gave improper preferential treatment to Morgan Stanley Chairman and CEO John Mack, and terminated Aguirre’s employment, when Aguirre sought to take Mack’s testimony as a possible tipper in an insider trading investigation involving hedge fund Pequot Capital Management. See “Re-Investigation of Claims by Gary Aguirre of Improper Preferential Treatment and Retaliatory Termination,” SEC Office of Inspector General (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg100708.pdf. An initial IG investigation in 2005, conducted by the current IG’s predecessor, exonerated the Enforcement staff. Congress held hearings, and in August 2007, the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committees issued a report critical of the Enforcement Division’s conduct of the Pequot investigation, and faulting the IG for failing to conduct a credible investigation into Aguirre’s charges. Following the Senate report, the IG retired, and Kotz was appointed as the SEC’s new IG in December 2007.

Importantly, the Kotz re-investigation did not find that Mack received any favorable treatment regarding the taking of his testimony. The IG received testimony from numerous past and present Enforcement officials that Enforcement cases are not affected by political considerations or the prominence of particular individuals. The IG also found that there had been reasonable strategic reasons for delaying Mack’s testimony.

Notwithstanding these findings, the IG went on to conclude that Enforcement staff supervisors had “conducted themselves in a manner that raised serious questions about the impartiality and fairness of the Pequot investigation.” Further, the IG determined that “there was a connection between the decision to terminate Aguirre and his seeking to take Mack’s testimony,” and that Enforcement “allowed inappropriate reasons to factor into its decision to terminate him.” The IG went on to directly criticize Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen and recommended that the SEC Chairman take disciplinary action against her for disclosing non-public information about the evidence against Mack to counsel for Morgan Stanley’s board of directors. In response to a request for information (because Morgan Stanley’s board was considering hiring Mack as CEO), Thomsen told the board’s counsel that the investigation had uncovered “smoke,” but no “fire,” concerning Mack.

Bear Stearns Investigation. In a second report, the IG found that the Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office had “failed to administer his statutory obligations and responsibilities to vigorously enforce compliance with [applicable] securities laws” in connection with an investigation into Bear Stearns’ role in valuing certain collateralized bond obligations and collateralized loan obligations that a client purchased from Bear Stearns. See “Failure to Vigorously Enforce Action Against W. Holding and Bear Stearns at the Miami Regional Office,” SEC Office of Inspector General (Sept. 30, 2008). The report was prepared in response to a request from Senator Charles Grassley (R. Iowa), ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, seeking information as to why the SEC had closed the investigation without any enforcement action.

According to the IG’s report, the head of the Miami office “abruptly” closed the investigation in 2007 after the staff had made progress negotiating several settlements. Further, the IG found that the fact that two of the defense counsel involved in the case were longtime friends of the head of the Miami office created an “appearance, to some, that they may have received favorable treatment.” While acknowledging that there was “no evidence of a direct connection between the relationship … and the decision to close the investigation,” the IG found the appearance of a conflict “disturbing,” noting that it “could potentially damage the reputation of the Commission.” (This finding of the IG seems particularly ill-considered, given that a large portion of the defense bar consists of attorneys who have previously served on the SEC staff. To suggest an apparent conflict of interest merely because defense attorneys may deal with former friends and colleagues on the SEC staff is to risk depriving clients of the best and most experienced counsel of their choice, a position that the SEC itself has never asserted.)

The IG went on to fault the Miami office staff for not coordinating its investigation with the Department of Justice, which was investigating a similar matter involving another Bear Stearns employee. The IG found that “[a] significant opportunity to coordinate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and uncover evidence of a systematic problem at Bear Stearns was also lost through neglect.” The IG recommended that the SEC Chairman take disciplinary action against the Director of the Miami office.

In a strongly worded response, the Enforcement Division characterized the IG’s report as “misleading,” filled with “speculation and innuendo,” as ignoring testimony showing that the decision to close the investigation was a sound one, and failing to comply with the IG’s “fundamental obligation to conduct a fair and impartial fact-finding.”

Likely impact of the IG reports. Against the backdrop of existing criticisms of the SEC for regulatory failures that contributed to the current financial crisis, the IG’s reports may provide the impetus for a period of unusually difficult, contentious, and highly critical oversight of the SEC’s enforcement function. Regardless of whether the IG’s conclusions in these cases were sound, the IG’s reports are likely to fuel critics in Congress and elsewhere who seek to contend that the Enforcement Division has failed in its responsibility to pursue aggressively misconduct at large banking firms.

To cite just one such example, Sen. Grassley has commented that the IG’s report on the Bear Stearns investigation provides “yet another example of the lack of vigorous enforcement at the SEC,” and “demonstrates the culture of deference at the SEC in dealing with big players on Wall Street.” http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg101008.pdf. Similarly, on October 21, Sen. Grassley wrote to SEC Chairman Cox concerning anonymous allegations he has received that, during the negotiations earlier this year that led to JP Morgan Chase’s (“JPMC”) takeover of Bear Stearns, Enforcement Director Thomsen disclosed information concerning the status of various investigations involving Bear Stearns to JPMC’s General Counsel, Stephen Cutler, who preceded Ms. Thomsen as Director of the Enforcement Division. Sen. Grassley wrote to Chairman Cox that “Such conduct would reinforce the appearance that Enforcement decisions, and disclosures of information about them, are sometimes based not on the merits, but rather on access to senior officials by influential representatives of power brokers on Wall Street. In light of these allegations and the ongoing financial crisis, there has never been a more critical time to take swift action to restore confidence in the SEC Enforcement Division.” http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg102108.pdf.

The SEC’s Enforcement Division and the Commission thus are likely to feel pressure to demonstrate heightened aggressiveness and firmness in future investigations and enforcement actions, particularly where major participants in the financial services sector are involved. The Enforcement staff will likely seek even more rapid progress in priority investigations than in the past, and may curtail opportunities for meaningful deliberation and dialogue that have historically proven beneficial both to the staff and to the subjects of complex investigations. While the staff will undoubtedly maintain its high standards of professionalism, it would be unsurprising if there is less flexibility and less willingness to entertain sound arguments regarding factual and legal defenses in an environment where staff members may be concerned that any concessions they make may subject them to criticism or even disciplinary action if they are perceived to be insufficiently vigorous in their enforcement of the securities laws.

New SEC Enforcement Manual Directs Staff Not to Seek Waivers of Attorney-Client Privilege

By Brian A. Ochs

On October 6, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) posted on its web site the first-ever SEC Enforcement Manual. (See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.) The publication of the manual reflects the first time that the SEC has committed to writing, in a single document, the various policies and procedures that govern investigations conducted by its Division of Enforcement. According to press accounts, the manual was prepared in response to a report issued in August 2007 by the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committees that criticized the SEC for its handling of an insider trading investigation involving hedge fund Pequot Capital Management (see separate article in this newsletter), and recommended that the SEC adopt a consistent set of procedures similar to the U.S. Attorneys Manual.

In large measure the Enforcement Manual does not break new ground, but instead describes practices that have been commonly understood for years. Notably, however, the Enforcement Manual does include the first comprehensive, written statement by the SEC on its view of the relationship between “cooperation” in an investigation and the assertion of attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. After years of controversy over this issue in the post-Enron era, during which parties often felt pressured by government investigators to waive privilege in order to receive full credit for cooperation, the Enforcement Manual makes clear that waiver is neither necessary nor expected. The manual’s key statements on this topic include:

  • “As a matter of public policy, the SEC wants to encourage individuals, corporate officers, and employees to consult counsel about potential violations of the securities laws.”

     
  • “The staff should not ask a party to waive the attorney-client or work product privileges, and is directed not to do so.” (Emphasis in original.) (This express direction is significant given that, as recently as last year, Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen acknowledged in a speech that waivers were still sometimes being requested – albeit “judiciously.”)

     
  • “The voluntary disclosure of information need not include a waiver of privilege to be an effective form of cooperation, as long as all relevant facts are disclosed.”

     
  • “Waiver of a privilege is not a pre-requisite to obtaining credit for cooperation. A party’s assertion of a legitimate privilege will not negatively affect their claim to credit for cooperation. The appropriate inquiry in this regard is whether, notwithstanding a legitimate claim of privilege, the party has disclosed all relevant underlying facts within its knowledge.”

With its emphasis on obtaining underlying facts, rather than on waivers of privilege, and in its direction that the SEC Staff should not seek waivers, the Enforcement Manual follows the path of the Department of Justice’s recent “Filip Memorandum,” which prohibits federal prosecutors from requesting privilege waivers (seeDOJ Issues New Guidance That Retreats From Aggressive Policies Followed in White Collar Cases,” K&L Gates White Collar Crime/Criminal Defense Alert (Sept. 24, 2008)).

Although senior Enforcement Division officials stated in the past that waiver of privilege was not required in order to obtain credit for cooperation, they had also indicated that the voluntary decision to waive privilege would receive enhanced credit, and some SEC enforcement orders reflected this approach. Among others, former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins had been a vocal critic of the practice of holding out privilege waiver as a “plus factor” in determining credit for cooperation.

Although it remains to be seen how the Enforcement Manual is applied in practice, the manual does not suggest that any “plus factor” calculus will be used in future cases. Instead, the manual emphasizes that waiver of privileges is not necessary to “effective cooperation.”

As the SEC expands and increases the pace of its investigations into possible wrongdoing in relation to the crisis in the financial sector, these provisions of the Enforcement Manual will hopefully bring clarity and consistency to Enforcement Division practices when parties seek to cooperate while still preserving attorney-client and work product privileges. This should provide important protections to companies (in particular those that conduct internal investigations), as well as to their officers and employees, as compared with the environment of a few years ago, when waivers of privilege were often viewed as necessary to receiving full credit for cooperation.

Proposed FTC Anti-Manipulation Rule Could Affect Energy Businesses and Futures Traders

By Charles R. Mills and Lawrence B. Patent

Energy businesses and traders in energy futures markets should be aware that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), acting under authority granted in last year’s energy bill, proposed a new anti-manipulation rule in August that would prohibit the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances in wholesale crude oil, gasoline or petroleum distillate markets. The FTC states in the Federal Register notice announcing the proposals that its rules in this area are modeled on SEC Rule 10b-5. The FTC thus would become part of the posse of federal agencies searching for villains to blame for the run-up in energy prices earlier this year. The FTC is taking this action despite the fact that, in response to its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this area, even very few consumer commenters supported an FTC anti-manipulation rule.

No safe harbor for futures traders. Despite comments on an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that a safe harbor provision or other explicit exemption for the futures markets is necessary to avoid overlap with CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) jurisdiction over futures markets, the FTC does not believe that a safe harbor or exemption is warranted. Although the FTC points to its prior practice of coordinating enforcement efforts with other agencies, the CFTC has continued to urge the FTC to reconsider its opposition to a carve-out of the futures markets from the FTC’s rule. The extended comment period on the FTC’s proposed rule closed on October 17, 2008, and the FTC has scheduled a public workshop on the proposals for November 6, 2008.

Are three heads better than one? Energy businesses and futures traders may need to be mindful of the FTC in addition to the CFTC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The CFTC and FERC continue to debate their respective jurisdictions over energy futures markets, which has been highlighted by the agencies separately bringing competing enforcement actions against the now-defunct hedge fund Amaranth Advisors, LLC with respect to its trading in the natural gas futures market.

Efforts to Stem the Financial Crisis Likely to be Followed by Significant Reform of Financial Services Regulation

By:  Daniel F. C. Crowley, Patrick G. Heck

Recent Policy Responses
The recent public policy responses to the credit crisis have been geared toward restoring liquidity in the credit markets, enhancing transparency, and prohibiting certain trading practices.   Foremost among these measures has been H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008   (“EESA” or “the Act”), in response to the Department of the Treasury’s (“Treasury”) request for authority to spend up to $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets.  The Act is intended to improve the capital positions of financial institutions and allow them to once again extend credit.  Other stop-gap measures by the regulatory agencies, as discussed elsewhere in this newsletter, have been geared toward reducing volatility and restoring orderly markets.

EESA, which was passed by the House and signed by President Bush on Friday, October 3, 2008, authorizes up to $700 billion for the Treasury for a troubled asset relief program (TARP) to purchase, and a Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund to insure, illiquid financial instruments. The Act allows Treasury to immediately use $250 billion, with an additional $100 billion if the president certifies such a need. The president would have to provide a written request for the remaining $350 billion, which could be subject to expedited congressional approval.

The Act

  • Creates the Financial Stability Oversight Board, comprised of the Fed Chairman, the Secretaries of Treasury and HUD, the FHFA Director, and the SEC Chairman.
  • Creates various reporting and oversight requirements.
  • Waives FAR and provides for streamlined contracting procedures.
  • Establishes a Congressional Oversight Panel in the legislative branch to “review the current state of the financial markets and the regulatory system.”
  • Places limits on senior executive compensation for some participating financial institutions.
  • Requires Treasury to develop programs to reduce foreclosures and encourage lenders to modify mortgage terms.
  • Prohibits use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for future money market guarantee programs.
  • Authorizes the SEC to suspend mark-to-market accounting (FAS 157).
  • Increases the federal budget debt ceiling to $11.315 trillion.
  • Temporarily increases the FDIC insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000.

The text of the Act and a section-by-section analysis may be found on the House Financial Services Committee website: http://financialservices.house.gov/.  

EESA Tax Provisions
EESA also contains a number of important tax provisions that have not received a great deal of attention. There are three tax provisions related to the rescue plan:

  1. Extension of exclusion of income from discharge of qualified principal residence indebtedness.  Generally, when homeowners have parts of their mortgages forgiven, they immediately owe income taxes on the amount of indebtedness forgiven.   To prevent homeowners from facing higher tax bills, the housing relief bill passed by Congress earlier this year allowed homeowners caught up in the mortgage crisis to avoid paying tax on forgiven mortgage debts through 2009.  EESA will extend through 2012 the housing bill provision that forgives income from the cancellation of indebtedness.  The proposal does not extend the relief to home equity loans.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $362 million over ten years. 

     
  2. Gain or loss from sale or exchange of certain preferred stock.  Federal law limits the allowable investments for banks, and many community banks therefore invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock – which became worthless when the government bailed out those companies.  EESA includes a proposal to allow financial institutions or financial institution holding companies to treat their Fannie and Freddie losses as ordinary losses. Applying to any preferred stock that was owned on September 6, 2008 or sold between January 1 and September 6, 2008, this provision will allow banks to claim the book benefit of the loss on their tax returns, therefore reducing the need to obtain additional capital from the FDIC or investors.  Policy makers believe that this proposal should also prevent some community banks from becoming insolvent.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $3.045 billion over ten years, with $2.7 billion of the cost occurring in 2009. 

     
  3. Special rules for tax treatment of executive compensation of employers participating in the troubled assets relief program.  The EESA contains non-tax measures aimed at limiting executive compensation and “golden parachute” severance packages overall for companies and executives participating in the buyout.  Additionally, EESA modifies the tax treatment of executive compensation and severance packages.  The deductibility of executive compensation for companies participating in the troubled asset relief program will be cut in half – from the $1 million level in current law – to $500,000.  Performance-based compensation is included in the $500,000 limitation.  Companies will also lose deductions currently available for excessively large severance packages.  Executives receiving severance packages will continue to face a 20 percent excise tax on payments once they reach an excessive threshold, and that tax will now be due if the executive leaves for reasons other than a standard retirement for which they are eligible – not just if the company changes hands, as in current law.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the amount of revenue gain from these provisions is indeterminate as it will depend on how the underlying troubled asset program is implemented.     

In addition, the Act extends dozens of expired or expiring tax provisions (the so-called “tax extender package”), including the Alternative Minimum Tax and disaster relief, energy tax incentives and a host of other provisions.  Several of these provisions might be of interest to the financial services community.  For example, the package includes: 1) broker reporting of a customer’s basis in securities transactions; 2) an extension of tax-free distributions from IRAs to certain public charities through 2009; 3) an extension of the exception under Subpart F for active financing income through 2009; 4) an extension of the look-through treatment of payments between related CFCs under foreign personal holding company income rules; and 5) the modification of the tax treatment of offshore nonqualified deferred compensation for certain tax indifferent parties.  The package does not include a further delay in the implementation of the worldwide interest allocation rules.

Finally, in addition to the various tax provisions listed above, the package contains a provision that would lower the tax preparer standard for undisclosed positions from “more likely than not” to “substantial authority” (the same standard that currently applies to taxpayers) with the exception for tax shelters (reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies). 

The Long View
In the slightly longer term, these unprecedented market events will likely lead to the most significant revisions to the legal and regulatory framework for financial services since the Great Depression. 

  • Revamping the structure of financial services regulation.   Beginning in January 2009, the 111th Congress will consider comprehensive legislation to restructure the regulation of financial services.  A primary consideration will be the respective roles of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC and the CFTC with respect to oversight of the capital markets.  Some of the proposals under consideration were outlined in the Treasury’s March 2008 “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”

     
  • Regulation of previously unregulated products and entities. Current discussions also include new reporting and other regulatory requirements for a broad array of financial products and market participants that have, until now, been subject to relatively little regulation, including commodities, derivatives, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds.  Some products that currently trade over-the-counter may soon be required to trade on exchanges and, more generally, all market participants with the potential to impact the economy will almost certainly be under increased scrutiny.

     
  • Among the other issues that will likely be considered as part of this comprehensive reform effort are:
    • Credit rating agency reforms,
    • Enhanced government agency enforcement authorities, and
    • Recommendations of the Congressional Oversight Panel created by EESA. 

       
  • Tax. With respect to federal tax issues relating to investments, determination of the appropriate tax rates on capital gains and dividends and the appropriate tax treatment of derivatives, as well as retirement savings incentives, will receive considerable attention.

     
  • Retirement Plans. Finally, there will almost certainly be a renewal of efforts to increase disclosure with respect to defined contribution plan fees. 

Our Public Policy & Law group is closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

Industry and Regulators Respond to Extraordinary Pressures on Money Market Funds

By: Arthur C. Delibert 

Recent turmoil in the securities markets, affecting financial companies in particular, has imposed unprecedented stress on money market funds, as some institutional investors have sought to liquefy their holdings at the very moment that many money funds have found it difficult to raise cash.  These pressures have resulted in some extraordinary market and regulatory events.  Illustrative of the pressures facing the industry and regulators:

  • On September 16, The Primary Fund, a money market series of The Reserve Fund, announced that it had “broken the dollar” – i.e., that the mark-to-market value of its portfolio assets had fallen below $0.995 per share. (LINK)  In fact, the fund said, its per-share net asset value had fallen to 97 cents, primarily from holding paper issued by Lehman Brothers, which had filed for bankruptcy on September 15.  This is only the second time a registered money fund has broken the dollar, the last such event having occurred in 1994. (Reserve has subsequently reported that the assets available may be higher than 97 cents per share.)

    Subsequently, Ameriprise Financial Services filed suit against The Reserve Fund and its manager, alleging that certain large investors had been tipped off about the Fund’s impending problem, allowing those investors to remove their money before the NAV was reduced.

     
  • On September 18, Putnam Investments announced that it was suspending sales of its institutional Putnam Prime Money Market Fund and would liquidate the fund.  Within days, Putnam and Federated Investors, Inc. announced that Federated Prime Obligations Fund would acquire the assets of the Putnam money fund and that all shareholders would receive shares of the Federated fund worth $1.00 per share.

In the face of these pressures, many money funds have resorted to extraordinary measures:

  • Many funds have drawn on lines of credit previously arranged through their custodian banks and others.  The Federal Reserve made extra cash available to these banks to fund the loans.

     
  • Some funds have made use of their authority under Section 22 of the 1940 Act to withhold payment on redemption orders for up to seven days, rather than the same-day or overnight payment offered in fund prospectuses “under normal circumstances.”  Such extensions can be difficult for customers, who expect to have prompt access to assets held in money funds.

     
  • Other funds have used authority reserved in their prospectuses to pay redemptions through the in-kind distribution of portfolio securities.  These distributions potentially raise two questions under the 1940 Act:
  1. Funds may have filed with the SEC irrevocable elections under Section 18 of the 1940 Act, allowing them to make redemptions in kind for shareholders seeking redemptions in excess of $250,000 or 1% of the fund’s net assets, whichever is less, in any 90 day period, but committing them to pay lesser redemptions in cash.  Such filings have become less common since 1996, meaning that some funds have greater flexibility in this area.
  2. Redemptions paid in kind to shareholders that are affiliates of the fund because they hold 5% or more of the fund’s outstanding securities may raise questions under Section 17 of the 1940 Act, which restricts principal transactions with affiliates.  Funds can rely on a 1999 no-action letter issued by the SEC staff, which permits in-kind payments to affiliates provided the fund’s board either approves the transaction or has adopted certain procedures to assure the fairness of such distributions. 

There have also been extraordinary actions from the regulators:

  • Some money funds have sought permission from the SEC under Section 22(e) of the 1940 Act to suspend redemptions.   On September 22, the SEC issued an order (effective as of September 17) authorizing two Reserve Funds to suspend redemptions for an indefinite period, while they engage in an orderly liquidation. (LINK)

     
  • On September 19, the Federal Reserve temporarily exempted member banks from provisions of the Federal Reserve Act to permit the banks to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from affiliated money market funds. (LINK)

    On September 25, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter permitting such purchases. Such purchases by fund affiliates would normally raise issues under Section 17 of the 1940 Act.  Rule 17a-9 permits fund affiliates to purchase securities from money market funds if they are no longer “eligible securities” under Rule 2a-7 – i.e., if they have deteriorated in quality. The no-action letter permits such purchases even if the security is still eligible. 

     
  • On September 19, the Treasury announced a program of money market fund insurance.   Funds wishing to apply for the insurance must do so by Wednesday, October 8.  (LINK)

According to the announcement, Treasury is establishing this program under existing authority, using the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund.  Treasury’s authority may be limited somewhat by the Economic Stabilization Act which, as of this writing, is still under consideration by Congress.  The insurance initially will be available for a period of three months, at which point Treasury may renew it for a total period of up to a year, but participating funds would be required to pay an additional fee.

The insurance applies only to assets in a fund on September 19, the day the program was announced.  This limit was apparently adopted at the urging of the banking industry, which was concerned that if money fund insurance were available for unlimited amounts of new assets flowing into the funds, large deposits would flee the banks. The program is available only to funds registered under both the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act.

Funds wishing to apply to the program must obtain approval of their boards of directors, as the application requires that the board, including a majority of independent directors, determine that “entering into” the Guarantee Agreement, as well as “fulfillment of its obligations …  are in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders.”  Fund boards must take into consideration a number of factors before entering into such an Agreement.

Recent Short Selling Regulations and Their Potential Impact on Financial Markets

By: Kay A. Gordon, Mark D. Perlow 

In response to the recent extraordinary events in the U.S. and worldwide markets, during the past two weeks the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a series of emergency regulatory measures regarding short sales of securities.  First, on September 17 and 18, 2008, the SEC issued orders temporarily banning short sales in certain financial stocks and requiring certain institutional money managers to report their new short sales of certain publicly traded securities on new Form SH (collectively, the “Emergency Orders”).  The SEC also amended Regulation SHO and Rule 10b-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit “naked” short selling—the short sale of securities that one has not already borrowed—and adopted a new antifraud rule, Rule 10b-21, aimed at manipulative and deceptive practices in short selling.  In addition, the SEC chairman announced enforcement initiatives aimed at preventing “naked” and “manipulative” short selling.   The SEC has taken these actions in the hope that they would help to restore fair and orderly markets and curtail declines in securities prices.  On October 1, the SEC extended all of these emergency measures until October 17.  However, the ban on selling certain financial stocks provided that it would expire after the effectiveness of the EESA.  Therefore, the ban expires on Wednesday October 8 at 11:59 p.m.

On September 21, the SEC amended the Emergency Orders to expand (1) the list of issuers in whose securities the SEC has temporarily banned short selling, (2) the scope and duration of certain market maker exceptions, and (3) the types of securities exempted.  The SEC also stated that institutional investment managers’ short sale disclosures would be non-public for two weeks after filing. The SEC adopted these amendments to address the current and anticipated technical and operational issues raised by the Emergency Orders, as well as to coordinate with similar actions restricting short sales by foreign regulators.

In addition to the actions of the SEC, the U.K. Financial Services Authority and the French, German, Australian and many other regulators have adopted similar restrictions on short selling and, in certain cases, increased short selling disclosure requirements in an effort to restore market integrity and stability in these extreme market conditions.  Consequently, the policy level response to the perceived threat and the uncertainty generated by naked short selling was global, if not globally coordinated, in practice making it difficult for any manager to engage in forum shopping.

Many financial institutions, lawmakers and regulators have supported the SEC’s ban and limits on short sales, based on their concern that short sellers have contributed to the current market turmoil by spreading false information and using manipulative trading tactics.   In contrast, many hedge fund managers and other investors have objected to these measures, suggesting that risk management failures and poor business strategies are to blame for the current market instability.  They have argued that short selling provides liquidity and an important price discovery mechanism in the market and that the inability of managers to engage in short selling with respect to certain securities may adversely affect the markets both in the long and short terms.  Critics of the ban also point out that a temporary SEC order banning naked short selling in July failed to prevent the decline of stock prices while it was in effect.

The increased disclosure obligations have also given rise to concerns that managers will have to disclose proprietary methods and that companies whose securities are being sold short would retaliate against these managers when the managers’ short positions are publicly released.   The short selling ban may have also been particularly damaging to certain quantitative funds, which  were left unable to implement their disclosed and intended strategies.  In addition, short sellers were also constrained on another front:  many institutional investors that lend portfolio stock holdings have been recalling their stock, and some have suspended their stock lending programs altogether, which has made it harder or more expensive to borrow certain stocks.   Some industry participants believe that short sellers will adjust to the ban by switching to other instruments that are not subject to the ban, e.g., single stock futures and options, whose price movements will ultimately be reflected in the prices of the affected stocks.

Manipulation Tied to Short Selling a Top Enforcement Priority

By: Brian A. Ochs

On September 19, 2008, the SEC announced a “sweeping expansion” of its ongoing investigation into possible market manipulation in connection with short selling in the securities of financial institutions. (LINK)  The investigation is focused on broker-dealers, hedge fund managers, and institutional investors with significant trading activity in financial issuers and with positions in credit default swaps.

As part of the investigation, the SEC is invoking its authority under section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain information in the form of sworn, written statements.   According to published reports, the first of these demands was sent out on September 22 to more than two dozen hedge fund managers, requiring information relating to AIG, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Washington Mutual.  The SEC seldom invokes its section 21(a) power in enforcement investigations — usually opting to subpoena documents and testimony instead — and the fact that the Commission is doing so in this instance indicates the speed and seriousness with which the SEC plans to pursue these investigations.

The SEC’s expanded investigation promises heightened scrutiny of two issues which have been the subject of enforcement focus since early this year: the dissemination of false rumors to the marketplace as part of short selling schemes and abusive “naked” short selling.

  • False rumors and short selling

    • Last April, the SEC brought its first case alleging that a trader engaged in market manipulation by selling a company’s stock short at the same time that he intentionally disseminated a false rumor that had a depressing effect on the stock price. See SEC v. Paul S. Berliner (April 24, 2008). (LINK)  Other investigations are in progress, as well as an industry-wide sweep examination undertaken in conjunction with FINRA and the NYSE, that is focused on whether broker-dealers and investment advisers have reasonable controls and procedures to prevent the intentional creation or dissemination of false information. (LINK)

       
    • Given the prevalence of rumors of all types in the investment community, and how quickly rumors can spread, a key challenge to the SEC in any investigation will be to determine who is responsible for disseminating false rumors and whether those persons acted intentionally and with knowledge that the rumors were false. 

       
    • At the same time, the SEC’s focus on firm procedures indicates that the SEC will be looking to bring enforcement actions not only against individuals who are responsible for creating or disseminating false rumors, but also against any broker-dealers or investment advisers in the rumor chain that the SEC determines had lax oversight. 

       
    • Complicating matters is the fact that, on September 18, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced his own investigation into allegations of short selling in financial securities based upon false information. NYAG involvement not only increases pressure on the SEC to bring cases in this area, but is also a direct and formidable threat to the individuals and entities under scrutiny. Unlike SEC Enforcement staff, New York’s Assistant Attorneys General have considerably fewer levels of bureaucracy to wind through before they can bring a case - as they have repeatedly demonstrated in matters involving market timers, insurance brokers, lenders, ratings agencies, and purveyors of auction-rate securities, to name a few. Contrary to popular belief, Section 352 et seq. of NY General Business Law (aka the “Martin Act”) is not without its jurisdictional limitations and defenses, but it is nonetheless a potent starting point for the NYAG. Subpoenas issued thereunder must be handled with considerable caution.

       
  • “Naked” short selling

    • SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has observed that naked short selling can “turbocharge” false rumor/manipulation schemes. (LINK) 

      • Generally, the SEC defines naked short selling as “abusive” when the seller does not have shares available for delivery and intentionally fails to deliver stock within the standard three-day settlement cycle.

         
    • On September 18, 2008, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, which had been proposed in March 2008 to address the problem of short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or others about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. (LINK) The rule formed part of the SEC’s response, in the current financial crisis, to concerns about possible false rumors and abusive naked short selling of financial institutions and other issuers. 

       
      • Rule 10b-21 prohibits any person from submitting an order to sell an equity “if such person deceives a broker or dealer, a participant of a registered clearing agency, or a purchaser about its intention or ability to deliver the security on or before the settlement date, and such person fails to deliver the security on or before the settlement date.” (LINK)

         
      • In adopting the rule, the SEC noted that while, in its view, naked short selling as part of a manipulative scheme was already prohibited under general antifraud provisions, Rule 10b-21 is intended to highlight the specific fraud liability of persons who deceive other participants about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.

Of course, when short selling is facilitated by deceptive practices – such as intentionally spreading false rumors or misleading other participants about an intention to deliver stock – there is little doubt that the SEC can bring a case for securities fraud.   Another example of deceptive practices might be the use of nominee accounts or similar efforts to disguise the identity of the short seller.  But what if short selling is done in the open, with no accompanying acts of deception, albeit in large amounts and with the intent to drive a company’s stock price down? 

  • The SEC takes the position that even open trading, when done for a manipulative purpose (so-called “open market manipulation”), is fraudulent.   See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Thus, the Division of Trading and Markets has cautioned that “short sales effected to manipulate the price of a stock are prohibited” as an “abusive” short sale practices. (LINK)

     
  • Courts have taken varying positions on whether “open market manipulation,” without other deceptive conduct, can give rise to a cause of action.   However, in a recent opinion dealing with aggressive short selling by purchasers of “toxic convertible” securities, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “short selling – even in high volumes – is not, by itself manipulative.  … To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”  ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Wolfson, 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).

Given the Second Circuit precedent, in any future cases directed at aggressive short selling, the SEC will likely seek to allege other deceptive conduct in addition to short sales.   However, in light of the SEC’s need to demonstrate a strong response to the current crisis, the Commission can also be expected to press its theory that short selling, even if unaccompanied by any other deceptive practices, is unlawful if done for the purpose of depressing a company’s stock.

SEC and FASB Relax Fair Value Rules

By: Mark D. Perlow

On September 30, the SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and the FASB staff provided guidance on fair value under FAS 157, addressing when internal assumptions can be used to measure fair value, when to use broker quotes, and when transactions in disorderly or inactive markets represent fair value.   FAS 157, which became effective in November 2007, defines fair value as the price that would be obtained in an orderly transaction between market participants in the principal or most advantageous market. 

The SEC’s guidance came in response to banking industry complaints that the emphasis under FAS 157 on such market valuations for financial assets was forcing banks to write down performing assets to “fire sale” or distressed prices, compelling them to sell more assets to raise capital and thereby depressing prices further in a downward spiral.   Many supporters of FAS 157, including investors’ groups, expressed the view that market values gave a more accurate picture of the health of financial institutions than values based on cost or cash flow models. 

The SEC rarely involves itself in FASB policy making, and its action is clearly an attempt to reach a compromise between the two positions:   the SEC relaxed the interpretation of some of FAS 157’s market valuation provisions but did not suspend market valuation, as some have requested. 

Some of the key elements of the SEC/FASB guidance are:

  • Distressed or forced liquidation sales are not orderly transactions, and thus the fact that a transaction is distressed or forced should be considered when weighing the available evidence.   Unfortunately, the only further guidance that the SEC and the FASB give is that “determining whether a particular transaction is forced or disorderly requires judgment.”  However, by placing this determination in the realm of judgment, the SEC can still second-guess the firm that follows in good faith a strong, well-documented, consistent and independent process.

     
  • FAS 157 sets forth a three-tier framework for disclosure of fair values, where Level 1 prices derive from trades in an active market, Level 2 prices derive from observable inputs, or prices in related markets, and Level 3 prices derive in part or whole from unobservable inputs such as models.  The SEC’s guidance states that, in some cases, using internal assumptions and unobservable inputs (e.g., an internal discounted cash flow model) may be more appropriate than using observable inputs (e.g., prices in markets for similar but not identical securities).  For instance, if the observable inputs (say, prices in related markets) require too many adjustments and the internal model is more accurate, under the guidance the Level 3 price would be more appropriate. Before the SEC’s guidance, many market participants interpreted this disclosure hierarchy as implying that Level 3 prices were less appropriate than Level 2 prices.

     
  • Broker quotes are not necessarily fair value if there is no active market in the security, defined as a market in which transactions occur with sufficient frequency and volume to provide pricing information on an ongoing basis. 

     
  • A significant increase in the bid-ask spread or the existence of a relatively small number of bidders are indicators that may suggest that a market is inactive.

     
  • Broker quotes based on models warrant less weight than those based on market transactions.

     
  • Whether a broker is giving an “accommodation” quote (i.e., one not binding on the broker) “should be considered”, which probably means that such quotes deserve less weight in pricing judgments.

SEC and FINRA Focusing on Individuals in Auction Rate Securities Investigation,

By: Michael J. King

In testimony before the House Financial Services Committee (“Committee”) on September 18, 2008, Linda Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, and Susan Merrill, FINRA Executive Vice-President and Chief of Enforcement, said that they were investigating individuals in connection with the sale of auction rate securities (“ARS”) and that they would bring enforcement actions against individuals if their ongoing investigations revealed misconduct.  Their prepared remarks may be found here and here.  Their complete testimony may be viewed here.  Committee Chairman Barney Frank convened the hearing in order to examine the continuing crisis in the market for ARS and to explore potential resolutions.

In August, the SEC announced preliminary settlements in principle with four broker-dealers (Citigroup, UBS, Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch) that will make available more than $40 billion in liquidity to purchasers of ARS.  Specific charges were not announced, but they will relate to alleged misrepresentations concerning safety and liquidity in the sale of ARS.  During the September 18 testimony, Ms. Merrill announced that FINRA had also entered into agreements in principle with five broker-dealers to settle charges related to the sale of ARS, pursuant to which the firms would offer to repurchase up to $1.8 billion of ARS from individual investors and some institutions.  FINRA charged the firms with supervisory violations and with using advertising and marketing materials that did not provide a sound basis for evaluating the purchase of ARS.  FINRA’s Press Release describing the agreements in principle in more detail can be read here.  Both the SEC and FINRA are continuing to investigate conduct at the settling firms and at other firms as well.  According to FINRA’s Press Release, 50 additional investigations have been opened and more are expected.

None of the SEC or FINRA actions announced to date have named any individuals. However, in response to Committee member questions about individual misconduct and accountability, Ms. Merrill stated that FINRA was investigating individual brokers and implied that they could be suspended or barred from the industry if FINRA found that they engaged in misrepresentations or suitability violations in connection with the sale of ARS.  In response to separate questions, Ms. Thomsen also said that the SEC’s investigations were ongoing and to the extent that individuals were involved in “bad behavior,” the SEC will pursue actions against them to the extent that they can “establish cases.”

Given the testimony of Ms. Thomsen and Ms. Merrill, and FINRA’s announcement that more investigations will be opened, even firms that are not currently the subject of regulatory inquiries should closely examine the conduct of individuals if the firm has sold a significant amount of ARS.  Although, so far, FINRA has only charged violations of advertising and supervision rules, sales practice violations can provide a separate basis for liability for the firm, and, of course, the individual salesperson.  Since the potential sanctions identified by Ms. Merrill are severe, firms will certainly want to know if they have salespersons who could face such sanctions.

Any firm that discovers clear misconduct in connection with ARS sales should consider disciplining the employee and making the customer whole, regardless of whether they are currently subject to regulatory scrutiny.   If there is a regulatory investigation, individuals may need separate counsel and the firm should review its indemnification and professional liability policies.  Firms should also review their compliance and supervisory procedures with regard to sales practices and make enhancements when appropriate.  Firms that have closely examined their employees’ activities, taken corrective and remedial action when necessary, and upgraded their compliance and supervisory procedures will be in a better position to deal with regulators whether they are currently involved in a regulatory investigation or become subject to one. 

SEC Loosens Regulation of Cross-Border Business Combinations to Benefit Both U.S. and Non-U.S. Investors

By: Edward G. Eisert

On September 19, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued Release No. 33-8957 (the “Release”), adopting final rules implementing significant changes to its regulation of cross-border business combinations and rights offerings by foreign private issuers (the “Cross-Border Rules”).   The Cross-Border Rules, adopted after eight years of experience with the current cross-border exemptions, are intended to encourage offerors and issuers in cross-border business combinations and in rights offerings by foreign private issuers to permit U.S. security holders to participate in these transactions in the same manner as other holders.  The Cross-Border Rules address certain recurring issues and unintended consequences of the existing exemptions that have impeded their usefulness.   

The Release also adopts revisions to the beneficial ownership reporting rules under Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to permit non-U.S. entities similar to U.S. brokers, dealers, banks, investment companies, investment advisers and employee benefit plans to use the short form Schedule 13G thereunder to report beneficial ownership of U.S. registered securities, if certain conditions are met (the “Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules” and, together with the Cross-Border Rules, the “Final Rules”). Reporting beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G is materially less burdensome than reporting beneficial ownership on Schedule 13D under the Exchange Act, as would be required, absent exemptive order or “no-action” relief. 

Generally speaking, each set of the Final Rules represents an expansion and refinement of current exemptions and “no-action” positions, and in some areas, would codify relief previously granted only on an individual basis.  The codification of various interpretive positions of the SEC staff makes such relief available as a matter of right, thereby reducing associated burdens and costs.  The Final Rules were adopted substantially as proposed.

Although the Final Rules benefit both global investment managers and foreign private issuers, their thrust is primarily to benefit U.S. investors in foreign private issuers and non-U.S. institutional investors in U.S. registered securities.  First, from the U.S. investment manager’s perspective, the Cross-Border Rules should lessen the burden on foreign private issuers to include U.S. holders in tender offers, exchange offers and business combinations.  As a consequence, U.S. holders should be more likely to receive the same treatment as other holders in such transactions and, in turn, this should lessen a concern for U.S. persons investing in foreign private issuers.  Second, from the non-U.S. investment manager’s perspective, the Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules should reduce the administrative burden of holding U.S. registered equity securities.

The specific changes adopted in the Final Rules are complex and a detailed discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article.  For a more complete discussion of these issues, see  Eisert and Berkeley, Global Investment Managers Benefit Under Revisions to Cross-Border Regulation of Business Transactions and Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules, 15 The Investment Lawyer 9 (2008).