The Resolution of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies... Will It Work?

By: Stanley V. Ragalevsky, Sarah J. Ricardi

One of the glaring problems exposed by the recent financial crisis has been the absence of supervisory authority to deal effectively with the insolvency or collapse of significant, nonbank financial companies.  While bank regulators have long been empowered to close and liquidate insolvent banks to protect the public, there was no comparable authority vested in any financial services regulator to close and liquidate insolvent bank holding companies or other kinds of financial companies.  To make matters worse, when several systemically important financial companies were on the verge of collapse in September 2008, they were deemed “too big to fail” and given significant government assistance.  Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”) addresses the absence of regulatory authority to liquidate systemically important, nonbank financial companies by creating an “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) process to allow the Treasury Secretary to close and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to wind up these companies.      

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Loan Servicing Déjà Vu - July 14, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance - July 13, 2010

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

Financial Regulatory Reform Increases Federal Involvement in Insurance

By: Diane E. Ambler, András P. Teleki, Collins R. Clark

Two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) specifically target the insurance industry and are intended to promote a higher level of uniformity in the U.S. insurance industry regulatory landscape. First, the Federal Insurance Office Act of 2010 (“FIO Act”) creates a new Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) within the Department of the Treasury and signals the beginning of a new era of federal involvement, at least at the macro level, in the U.S. insurance industry. Significantly, the FIO Act does not include a federal insurance charter provision, long sought by many in the insurance industry, and the states will remain the primary insurance regulatory authority. Second, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (“NRRA”) changes how authority over some forms of insurance is allocated among the states.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

Preemption for National Banks and Federal Thrifts After Dodd-Frank: Answers to the Ten Most Asked Questions - July 9, 2010

Increased Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers Under the Dodd-Frank Act - July 9, 2010

Hope You Like Plain Vanilla! Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV) - July 8, 2010

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator - July 7, 2010

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010

 

Consumer Financial Services Industry, Meet Your New Regulator

By: Melanie H. Brody, Stephanie C. Robinson

The centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Act from a consumer protection standpoint is Title X, the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. The Act will create a powerful consumer financial protection watchdog, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The majority of existing federal consumer financial protection laws will come under the Bureau's purview, and the Bureau will have broad authority to enforce those laws and to issue its own rules under the Act. This alert describes the Bureau, including its structure, objectives, functions, jurisdiction, rulemaking authority and enforcement powers.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

This client alert is part of a series of alerts focused on monitoring financial regulatory reform. Below is a list of other alerts in the series:

New Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements in Financial Reform Legislation - July 7, 2010

Financial Regulatory Reform - The Next Chapter: Unprecedented Rulemaking and Congressional Activity - July 7, 2010

Investor Protection Provisions of Dodd-Frank - July 1, 2010

Senate Financial Reform Bill Would Dramatically Step Up Regulation of U.S. and Non-U.S. Private Fund Advisers - June 8, 2010

Approaching the Home Stretch: Senate Passes “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” - June 8, 2010
 

The EU's proposed Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive

By: Vanessa C. Edwards and Philip J. Morgan

In separate votes on 17 and 18 May, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (the two arms of the EU legislature) adopted their respective positions on the infamous Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“the Directive”). The versions approved, however, differ significantly from each other, and the discussions will now move on to the so-called “Trialogue” procedure, involving the Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission, in an attempt to arrive at a final, definitive text acceptable to all three institutions. Although the Commission is not strictly part of the legislature, the new Internal Market Commissioner, Michel Barnier, is likely to have a significant influence in negotiating the final text given the differences between the two versions. It is hoped to have the Directive agreed in July, but this is widely regarded as over-ambitious.

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Senator Dodd Releases Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation: The Home Stretch?

On Monday, March 15, 2010, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) released a Chairman's Mark of the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010. The Bill, which has been in development for months, is intended to replace the Discussion Draft previously circulated by Chairman Dodd on November 10, 2009 and is different in many respects from H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, which was passed by the House on December 12, 2009. The Senate Banking Committee is scheduled to begin marking up the legislation on March 22.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

 

Global Government Solutions 2010: The Year Ahead

Contacts: Diane E. Ambler, Michael J. Missal, Matt T. Morley, Mark D. Perlow

2009 brought a further transformation in the relationship between business and government. Regardless of political systems or philosophies, governments around the world became more dynamic and intrusive in response to the financial crisis.

This 2010 Annual Report, prepared by members of the K&L Gates Global Government Solutions initiative, contains concise articles that seek to forecast likely government actions and priorities regarding a broad spectrum of topics.

To view the report, click here.

 

Administration Creates Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Seeking Nationwide Coordination of Law Enforcement Efforts

Matt T. Morley, Richard A. Kirby, and Andrew Edwin Porter

The Obama Administration has recently announced the formation of a task force designed to coordinate federal, state and local efforts to investigate and prosecute fraud and other financial misconduct. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) expands and supplants an earlier task force created to combat corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal.

While the simple reconstitution of a task force is unlikely to dramatically alter the law enforcement landscape, this development may be one part of a more sweeping set of changes that could result in considerable increases in the magnitude, focus and efficiency of efforts to pursue financial wrongdoing. 

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Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation Moves to House Floor

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On December 2, the House Financial Services Committee passed final bills comprising the House version of the financial regulatory reform legislation. House Floor consideration is expected as early as the week of December 7. The Senate Banking Committee is also expected to begin marking up the discussion draft of the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009” the week of December 7.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Senator Dodd Releases Financial Reform Proposal: The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, Summary and Comparison to House Legislation

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, Karishma Shah Page, Collins R. Clark, Justin D. Holman

On November 10, 2009, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT) released a discussion draft of the "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009." Chairman Dodd has been developing the Senate version of the regulatory reform package over several months. Until recently, the Chairman was working in conjunction with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL). However, Chairman Dodd recently decided to proceed only with the Democrats on the Committee.

At the time of this writing, the House Financial Services Committee is completing its markup of the House regulatory reform package. With the Senate and House taking different approaches in several respects, debate on significant aspects of the regulatory reform package will continue.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

SEC/CFTC Report on Harmonization of Regulation and How it May Affect Investment Advisers

By: Lawrence B. Patent, Mary C. Moynihan

On October 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued “A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation” (Report). The Report was issued in response to a request in the Administration White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform.

The Report contains 20 recommendations. This Alert will focus upon the recommendations in the Report that may be of greatest interest to investment advisers: (1) the potential “uniform” standards of “fiduciary” duties for persons providing investment and commodity trading advice for securities and futures; (2) aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act; and (3) aligning the reporting requirements for private funds. The Alert also discusses the other recommendations, some of which may indicate enhanced opportunities for portfolio margining across markets and the prospect of greater clarity and expedited judicial review of new products that straddle jurisdictional lines. 

To view the complete alert online, click here.

K&L Gates' Investment Management Newsletter

By: Stephen J. Crimmins, Nicholas S. Hodge, Melissa S. Holmes, Thomas F. Joyce, Beth R. Kramer, Richard A. Kirby, Mary C. Moynihan, Megan B. Munafo, Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Roger S. Wise

The Fall 2009 Edition of K&L Gates' Investment Management newsletter is offered as a timely aid in addressing the myriad regulatory issues confronting the investment management industry. Watch for future issues discussing up-to-the-minute developments and trends in the industry.

To view the complete newsletter, please click here.

Congress Builds on Obama Financial Regulatory Reform Approach, as Reform Efforts Proceed

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page and Collins R. Clark

Congress continues to move forward expeditiously on the financial services regulatory reform effort. Over the past several weeks, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), in conjunction with other key committee members, has released additional legislative proposals building on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform plan, while Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-AL) develop a separate regulatory reform package. At the same time, these Committees have kept up a remarkably ambitious hearing schedule. This update provides an overview of significant recent developments, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

House and Senate Take Expedited But Divergent Approaches to Financial Regulatory Reform Plan

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley and Karishma Shah Page

As Congress increasingly focuses its attention on the Obama Financial Regulatory Reform (FRR) plan, the biggest change of late has to do with timing. For months, most observers have expected the House Financial Services Committee to consider the Obama proposals piecemeal, with Senate consideration following House approval. Now it is clear that the House and Senate are moving forward simultaneously, but on divergent paths. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) is championing and improving the Administration proposals, and plans to move legislation to the House Floor this fall in five basic pieces (Consumer Financial Protection Agency, OTC derivatives, systemic risk, National Banking Supervisor, investor protection). These pieces reflect the groupings of the various proposals as introduced by the Administration (e.g., “systemic risk” includes the Financial Services Oversight Council, Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies, and securitization). Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) has his own ideas in key areas, many of which go further than the Obama plan. Chairman Dodd currently plans to bring a single, omnibus reform bill to the Senate Floor. Short updates on the major FRR provisions follow:

  1. The Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) - The FSOC is one of the simplest aspects of the FRR and therefore almost certain to occur. It is basically the successor to the current President’s Working Group on Capital Markets, with a dedicated staff at the Treasury Department and the addition of the heads of the FDIC, and the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency and the National Bank Supervisor. A key question is what role the FSOC will play with respect to systemic risk. If Chairman Dodd has his way, it will assume some of the functions contemplated for the Federal Reserve in the Obama/Frank plan.
  2. Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) - As expected, serious questions have been raised about the Fed’s capacity to provide consolidated supervision of large, integrated financial institutions. There is a growing political backlash to what some view as overreaching to position the Federal Reserve as the primary systemic risk regulator. The fact that large non-depository institutions could be regulated as Tier 1 FHCs is reminding many on the Hill that they really do not trust the Federal Reserve, and that the role of a central bank may be somewhat inconsistent with such a prominent regulatory function.
  3. National Bank Supervisor - As many expected, the Administration’s effort to squeeze all federally chartered financial institutions into the bank model is falling short. The thrift charter appears likely to be preserved, industrial loan companies (ILCs) grandfathered, and credit card lenders will not be deemed banks. Given the failure to close the other Bank Holding Company Act “non-bank loopholes,” many also see no reason to abolish the exception for non-depository trust companies. Nonetheless, Chairman Dodd has said the Administration proposal does not go far enough and would like to see further consolidation among the banking regulators. Chairman Frank favors preserving the dual state and federal banking systems. The outcome is uncertain.
  4. Securitization - This remains a four-letter word for the time being. It is currently disfavored and, certainly, the days of passing along 100% of the default risk to investors are over. In short, keeping originators’ “skin in the game” remains a primary objective of Chairman Frank and other key policy makers.
  5. The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) - In the interest of co-opting business interests, Congressional Oversight Panel Chairwoman Elizabeth Warren, who first proposed the CFPA, has been thrown under the proverbial bus. Chairman Frank recently circulated an updated CFPA bill. In its current form, the bill exempts non-financial companies and jettisons requirements for “plain vanilla” products. As such, Chairman Frank has made it much harder for even some Republicans to oppose the CFPA. Indeed, banks may even conclude that subjecting their competitors (e.g., non-depository mortgage originators, payday lenders, etc.) to the same regulatory burdens they have faced for years might be worthwhile after all. 
  6. Private Fund Investment Advisor Registration Act - As currently drafted, the Obama plan would require the registration and regulation of virtually all private fund managers, including hedge funds, private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, and even family investment pools. Much of the alternative fund industry seems to have embraced “reform” in hopes of being favorably positioned in the rulemaking process. Alas, such a strategy failed convincingly in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley.
  7. Resolution authority - There has been much discussion about how to unwind systemically significant failing institutions. Chairman Frank has referred to such powers as a “death sentence.” The FDIC resolution powers regarding banks will be expanded, probably extended to Treasury, and the SEC will be given similar responsibility with regard to the regulated entities within its purview. As an aside, requiring Treasury to sign off on Federal Reserve uses of authority under FRA section 13(3) is (discount) window dressing, since Treasury is de facto fulfilling that role now.
  8. OTC derivatives - In the wake of AIG and its credit default swaps, there is a clear consensus around centralized clearing of all derivatives, and a majority preference for exchange trading of standardized contracts. On August 11, the Administration introduced its OTC derivatives proposal as the “final piece” of its legislative proposals. However, there are a number of competing proposals, including S. 1691, which was recently introduced by Senate Securities Subcommittee Chairman Jack Reed (D-RI). All of these proposals would provide strong regulation of all major participants in the OTC derivative markets, and would create new anti-fraud and market manipulation enforcement powers.
  9. Credit rating agencies - House Financial Services Capital Markets Subcommittee Chairman Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) recently circulated a discussion draft that builds on the Obama proposal to have the SEC comprehensively regulate Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs), and would impose information sharing requirements, as well as “collective liability” on the entire industry for a monetary judgment against any NRSRO relating to a credit rating. It is difficult to imagine that this provision will survive, but it clearly reflects a great deal of consternation about the industry (see pp. 30-31).
  10. Executive compensation - Shareholder say-on-pay proxy votes and compensation committee independence are soon to become part of the ever-expanding corporate governance montage.
  11. Insurance - While the insurance industry appears to have escaped the CFPA, there will be a new Office of National Insurance at Treasury that will aggregate state insurance data. Together with the FSOC, and Tier 1 FHC supervision by the Fed, the insurance industry may end up wishing it had reached consensus on a federal charter. Stay tuned for more in the next Congress.

Finally, with both the House and Senate moving forward quickly, the timetable for successfully advocating changes in much of the legislation will likely be truncated. Ultimately, the differences between the House and Senate versions will be reconciled in conference committee, a process largely shielded from public scrutiny (or influence). Please see the K&L Gates alert Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort for a comprehensive overview of the Obama plan. In addition, detailed analysis on many of the Obama proposals may be found on http://www.globalfinancialmarketwatch.com/.

Eye of the Storm: A Summer Recess Assessment of the Capital Markets Reform Effort

By: Diane E. Ambler, Philip M. Cedar, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Vanessa C. Edwards, Edward G. Eisert, David H. Jones, Steven M. KaplanSean P. Mahoney, J. Matthew Mangan, Philip J. Morgan, Mary C. Moynihan, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Clair E. Pagnano, Lawrence B. Patent, Karishma Shah Page

Since June 17, 2009, when the Obama Administration unveiled its financial regulatory reform plan, there has been a flurry of executive branch and legislative branch activity.  The frenetic pace of the reform effort is expected to resume in the fall, as Congress works to resolve the many highly controversial issues presented by the plan.  The traditional August Congressional recess now underway provides an opportunity to take stock of this historic capital markets reform effort.  This alert provides an overview of the most significant developments so far, as well as the outlook moving forward.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

A New Playing Field for the Banking Industry: the National Banking Supervisor and Systemic Risk

By: Rebecca H. Laird, Edward G. Eisert, Stanley V. Ragalevsky, Sean P. Mahoney, Daniel F. C. Crowley, Collins R. Clark

On July 22 and 23, 2009, the U.S. Department of Treasury released nine legislative proposals affecting banking institutions and their holding companies.  The various parts of this proposed legislation interact in a manner that, if enacted, will change the banking industry’s playing field in unprecedented ways.  These changes aim to end regulatory arbitrage and minimize systemic risk.

To view the complete alert online, click here.

Regulatory Reform and the Mutual Fund Industry

By: Mary C. MoynihanDiane E. Ambler

Although mutual funds have not been implicated as a cause of the financial crisis, many investors have experienced the crisis most directly through the plummeting value of their mutual fund investments. As Washington moves to address the myriad issues arising from the crisis, the mutual fund industry should expect to see changes that will directly affect how funds—and their advisers, distributors and custodians—do business. Changes of particular interest to the mutual fund industry are discussed below.

Change to Primary Regulator for Registration of Mutual Funds, Broker-Dealers and Advisers
Lawmakers are considering several configurations for a new regulatory regime. These include consolidation of the SEC with the CFTC—although Barney Frank, the powerful chair of the House Financial Services Committee, has expressed doubts as to whether such consolidation will happen. Another idea involves the creation of a financial products safety commission. Whether that proposal will take hold is unclear, although key Democrats in the Senate and House have submitted a bill to create the commission. Even if it were created, the White House is reported to support a plan under which the new financial products safety commission would focus on consumer products such as mortgages and credit cards, but would not have jurisdiction over securities (and therefore mutual funds), which would instead be regulated by the new agency resulting from a merger of the SEC and CFTC. Because the proposals are likely to trigger a turf war in Congress and among the affected agencies, it is still too early to predict the outcome. Lawmakers are also still waiting for final proposals from the Obama administration.

Money Market Funds
Money market funds have drawn closer regulatory scrutiny since the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck in September, spurring large-scale redemptions from money market funds with large institutional investor bases and a guarantee program from the U.S. Treasury. While the Group of 30 proposed earlier this year that funds that maintain a stable $1 NAV be regulated as special purpose banks, this proposal does not seem to have gained traction. However, a consensus has developed on the need to tighten the rules governing money market funds’ portfolio assets’ credit quality, maturity and liquidity. The first detailed proposal came in March from a task force convened by the Investment Company Institute, which included proposals to (1) impose daily and weekly minimum liquidity requirements; (2) stress test the portfolio; (3) tighten portfolio maturity limits; (4) raise credit quality standards on portfolio investments; (5) address client concentration risks; (6) disclose portfolio investments monthly; (7) require additional risk disclosures; (8) authorize suspending redemptions for several days for failing funds; and (9) establish a nonpublic reporting scheme to regulators for all money market investors. The SEC has not yet produced a detailed proposal. However, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has made clear that the SEC will propose tougher rules later this month that will “extend beyond” the ICI task force proposals. The staff is examining the credit quality, maturity and liquidity provisions currently applicable to money market funds and considering whether more fundamental changes are needed, including floating rate net asset values for money market funds.

“Proxy Access” and “Say on Pay”
In May, the SEC proposed a new “proxy access” rule that would set a tiered system under which shareholders may nominate candidates for election to boards of directors. For example, for companies with a market cap of $700 million or more, shareholders owning at least 1% of the voting securities would be eligible to nominate directors. By some estimates, this could increase by three or four times the number of contested director elections that funds must evaluate in exercising proxies. In addition, funds themselves would be subject to the proposed rule, which would allow shareholders to nominate fund directors. Finally, funds with ownership positions in excess of the thresholds would need to determine whether they should be proposing director candidates for portfolio companies. These proposals would transform a fund’s traditional analysis of “buy vs. sell” and force new decision-making concerning voting and management. Also in May, Senators Charles Schumer and Maria Cantwell introduced a “shareholder bill of rights” that would require non-binding shareholder votes on how executives are paid. The bill is not likely to pass in its current form but, particularly in view of the action taken earlier this year by the House to limit compensation of recipients of TARP money, any reform package is likely to include some corporate governance component.

Emerging Best Practices Relating to Risk Management
Many fund advisers and boards are examining whether the events of the past year suggest that they need additional risk monitoring programs to evaluate risk elements in the portfolio and the adviser’s organization. There is no “one size fits all” answer to the risk management puzzle, and the precise actions that a fund family and its board should take with respect to risk assessment are highly subjective and based on many different factors, including the nature of the fund family’s investments, experience with risk, organizational structure, and nature of investors. Nonetheless, the SEC has indicated that risk will be a central concern, suggesting that advisers may need to develop a more robust approach to risk management and that fund boards may wish to consider creating a risk management oversight committee or adding responsibility for risk oversight to an existing committee, such as compliance or investment performance.

Target Date Funds
In a May speech to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum, SEC Chair Schapiro stated that the SEC is closely examining target date funds due to concerns with performance of the funds during the market decline. As these funds approach their “target” date, their asset allocations should move toward a more conservative allocation, often referred to as a fund's “glide path.” Some funds may have established more aggressive glide paths based on the assumption that investors would continue to maintain their investments, and partially live off the proceeds following retirement. This could be particularly problematic for a target date fund underlying a college investment plan, since those investors would need to access their investment at or near the fund’s target date. Chairman Schapiro stated that the SEC staff would be closely reviewing target date funds’ disclosure about their glide paths and asset allocations, examining whether the same target date funds underlie both retirement and college savings plans and considering whether the target dates in some funds’ names are misleading. Chairman Schapiro also challenged fund directors to review their funds’ allocations between asset classes.

Custody of Client Assets by Investment Advisers
Following the Madoff scandal, the SEC has moved swiftly to propose new rules governing the custody of client funds held by all registered investment advisers. The proposed rules would require advisers to undergo an annual surprise examination by an independent public accountant to verify client assets. In the case of assets that are not maintained by an independent qualified custodian, the rules would require a “SAS-70” report from an independent public accountant registered with and inspected by PCAOB that includes an opinion covering controls over custody of client assets. The proposed rules would not apply to custody of assets held by mutual funds, but would affect advisers with respect to other classes of client funds.

When the dust settles, the investment management landscape will undoubtedly be much changed. Mutual funds will likely be subject to new rules, regulated by a reconstituted regulator, and, especially if hedge funds and other unregulated entities face more regulation, will encounter a new competitive environment. Industry participants should closely monitor these developments and may wish to provide input into policy choices that will have direct implications for them and their investors.

"The Days of Big Bonuses are Over ..."

By: Daniel Wise

So said Gordon Brown in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis that shook the City in October of last year. This sentiment has been echoed by the Treasury Committee’s report published on 15 May which stated that “bonus driven remuneration structures led to a lethal combination of reckless and excessive risk taking.” As the recession begins to deepen in the UK, unemployment continues to rise and city financiers lick their wounds following a record low bonus round this year, a web of employment law issues arise out of employer reaction to this paradigm shift in the financial markets.

Primary among these are issues as to the legality of City employers’ attempts to slash bonus awards or recoup payments already received, and how to shape the bonus elements of remuneration structures in senior level service contracts to reflect changes in the expectations of both employers and employees in an environment that has grown intolerant of the fat cat/big bonus City culture.

Bonus Litigation
Hundreds of staff members at Dresdner Kleinwort have lodged claims to recover tens of millions of pounds in unpaid bonuses resulting from the decision of its new owner, Commerzbank, to slash compensation payouts. A raft of similar claims are expected against other financial institutions as employers come under increased commercial pressure to reduce or eliminate bonus payments, particularly in circumstances where organisations are now effectively Government run.

Depending on the specific employer bonus structure, the legal ramifications of trimming such bonus payments may be significant. Many employers will have established contractual obligations to certain levels of bonus payment in recent years, either through custom and practice, or as a part of negotiated service agreements to attract particular stars in the financial community. For example, many banks in recent years have introduced a “Golden Hello” scheme to new joiners, guaranteeing a minimum level of bonus for all or a portion of their first bonus year, regardless of performance during that period. These payments are designed to compensate new recruits for the bonus they have lost leaving their previous employer midway through a bonus year. A refusal to honour such a contractual provision will almost certainly be unlawful.

Another common trend that has developed in the City in recent years has been to link bonuses to performance targets, creating an irreducible contractual entitlement once these personal performance targets are hit, irrespective of the bank’s overall performance. These targets are often short term, and often paid out in lump sum cash awards. Despite the current climate and the potential difficulties banks are now facing, if such bonuses are not paid in circumstances where performance targets have been hit, again the employee is likely to have a strong claim for the recovery of this sum.

Thus where banks have bowed to commercial pressure to reduce bonuses as a result of a disastrous bonus year and a pessimistic financial forecast for 2009, the Courts may well rule against them, given the case law in recent years in favour of an employee’s contractual entitlement to certain levels of bonus payment irrespective of the economic climate and/or the strength of the particular bank’s financial position.

When addressing the restructure of bonus schemes for future years, many UK employment lawyers caution against changing too much too quickly, although in the current economic climate many financial institutions will have no choice. For example, adoption of the recent FSA Code’s principles and replacing what was previously a contractual bonus structure with deferred bonus scheme, may cause wholesale team moves to competing institutions along with a raft of constructive unfair dismissal claims from departing employees arising out of the bank’s breach of its implied duty of trust and confidence. However, the financial landscape will also be a major factor in assessing the commercial risk of these claims being brought. If either the majority of other banks are unwilling to take on new recruits or are adopting similar schemes for their employees, there will be little practicable risk of this legal consequence.

Repaying a Bonus
The clarion call through both the press and in political circles for high-profile, senior-level executives to repay bonuses which have already been awarded also throws up some interesting issues for UK employment lawyers. One individual who bowed to public pressure and repaid a substantial bonus is Michael Fingleton, chief executive of Irish Nationwide, who in March of this year voluntarily returned his €1 million bonus awarded for 2008. In his statement to the press at the time. Mr. Fingleton was at pains to point out that the bonus was “a contractual and binding agreement... which [he] was legally entitled to receive….” His move came in response to both political and commercial pressure, rather than as a consequence of any legal obligation to do so. This is of course correct. In circumstances of this kind, particularly where payment of the bonus is pursuant to a contractual entitlement, any employer’s remedies against senior executives to compel repayment are limited, unless specific contractual provision has been made for this within the service agreement. In circumstances of alleged regulatory breach by a financial institution, employers are in a much weaker position in the UK than in the US, where the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires certain levels of senior executives to repay incentive based remuneration in specific instances of securities law breaches.

Making provision for a contractual term forcing repayment in these circumstances is now an issue that many UK banks are grappling with. The move to include such a term is not without its difficulties.

Firstly, the UK law on penalty clauses will cause such a contractual provision to be unenforceable if it provides for repayment of a bonus as a result of a breach of contract and the repayment is deemed to be a penalty. In determining this, a Court will consider whether the payment is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered by the bank arising out of the breach or simply a penalty. If it is the latter, the clause will be unenforceable. However, case law on this subject suggests that where there is a bona fide attempt to pre-estimate loss, such a clause may be upheld, despite the fact that the figures differ from the actual loss caused.

Secondly, the purpose behind the clause must be to compensate the employer rather than to act as a deterrent. It is often the case in a financial context that breach by a senior executive could lead to substantial monetary losses, and in circumstances where such losses far exceed the amount required to be repaid by the director it will be easy for the employee to suggest the repayment was not to compensate the bank, but to act as a deterrent. Whilst it is possible to put together a sliding scale of repayment which is directly linked to loss flowing from the breach, persuading a senior executive to sign up to such a clause may well be an unsurpassable hurdle to any subsequent challenge.

Thirdly, proving that the breach occurred is often a practical difficulty in consequent litigation, particularly in the context of complex financial dealing structures where a Court is asked to determine the reasonableness of a decision arrived at based on complex assessments of commercial risk. This hurdle can often make such a clause unworkable.

An alternative approach to clauses of this kind is to avoid any linkage with a breach of contract by connecting a repayment obligation to external measures of some kind. These alternative contractual terms are commonly known as “no fault” repayment agreements. These provisions eliminate the risk of being struck down as a penalty clause, and can provide the employer with the ability to require repayment in various different circumstances, including when the bank itself has performed particularly badly in any given year. Whilst it is important that such clauses are drafted to ensure that sufficient clarity exists to allow them to be enforceable, other than this drafting hurdle such a clause can be relatively effective.

Employers generally have not previously used such clauses due to a concern that such a provision in a bank’s standard service agreement may deter strong senior executives from joining. However, depending on the mood of the general public going forward, both in the US and the UK, as well as an increased scarcity of positions at a senior level, banks may well find themselves in much stronger negotiating positions when drafting senior level service agreements.

Some of the suggested models for recovering all or a portion of a bonus already paid without linking this repayment request to contractual breach have been discussed in the context of clawback provisions which are also referred to in the FSA Code. The three common types of clause are as follows:

  • Clawbacks due to over-estimated performance - Such a clause can be used when a bonus is linked directly to performance conditions or performance is one of the criteria taken into account when awarding a discretionary payment. The clawback provision will be operative where the performance criteria were initially thought to be satisfied but later turned out to have been overstated. This clause will be effective provided it is exercised objectively and reasonably.
  • Clawbacks for negative developments - This provision is triggered by certain specified negative developments occurring within a set period after the bonus is paid. The negative development should be something which is not personally linked to the employee but rather an objective development such as the bank announcing a major loss.
  • Clawbacks for unrecognised breach at the time of payments - This form of provision is not as safe legally given its close nexus to the penalty clause principle. However, case law suggests that such a clawback provision which becomes operative when an employer discovers serious breach by the employee (which occurred prior to payment of a bonus) may well be enforceable, and will not be struck down as an unenforceable penalty clause.

The extent to which some or all of these contractual measures will become commonplace will in a large part be shaped by global trends, and in particular the US’s reaction. Now that the world’s key financial centres are so closely aligned, it would be foolhardy to approach these sorts of issues as isolated domestic problems, and any reaction and/or solution will almost inevitably follow the tide of global opinion.

TALF Investments: Progress and Political Risk

By: Anthony R.G. Nolan

The Term Asset-Backed Securities Liquidity Facility (“TALF”) was announced in February 2009 and first implemented in the following month. As an emergency lending facility established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “New York Fed”) pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, TALF provides non-recourse term financing for the purchase of highly rated asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities at attractive rates. Although it is backed by a $200 billion credit facility from the Treasury, it is not considered a TARP program subject to the Emergency Economic Stimulus Act of 2009 (“EESA”). However, because of the involvement of the New York Fed in the program as well as its close association with TARP, prospective borrowers have had to weigh the political risks of their involvement and the extent to which governmental authorities could access information about their activities and their investors. 

In the first three subscriptions that occurred in March, April and May 2009, TALF borrowings financed approximately $16 billion in newly issued asset-backed securities, facilitating over $24 billion in issuance of asset-backed securities. After a slow start, and considerable hesitation by investors over participating in the April subscription owing to political and other risks, the TALF program appears to have come into its own in the May subscription, with approximately $10.5 billion of TALF subscriptions facilitating the issuance of approximately $13.5 billion of TALF eligible securities. Subscriptions for the June funding appear to be on track to increase substantially from the May subscription level.

The acceleration of TALF subscriptions reflects several factors. These include

  • expansion of the scope of asset classes eligible for TALF funding;
  • clarification by the New York Fed and the Treasury that private TALF participants are not (without more) subject to the executive compensation restrictions of the EESA;
  • increased experience with the TALF subscription process and the streamlining of TALF borrowing logistics, which increased the comfort level of investors and others with the program; and
  • the sense that TALF was a constructive force in the markets for asset-backed securities and consumer credit.

These considerations acted to counter prospective participants’ concerns about political risk, which appeared to have come to a peak following the disclosure in March 2009 that employees of AIG Financial Products had been paid $165 million in retention bonuses after the company had received TARP funds. However, recent political and legislative developments may make it more likely that Congress will obtain information about TALF investment funds and their investors through audits of the New York Fed or of TALF borrowers by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).  This concern may dampen the willingness of funds to borrow under TALF to the extent that spreads on TALF-eligible ABS continue to compress to a point where perceived risks outweigh rewards.

The contractual path of transparency is familiar to participants in the TALF borrowing process. Section 11.1 of the TALF Master Loan and Security Agreement (the “MLSA”) authorizes the Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”) to obtain reports or statements that it reasonably requests with respect to the borrowing and the collateral. Section 11.3 of the MLSA also authorizes the New York Fed to obtain “know-your-customer” (“KYC”) information submitted by a borrower to the primary dealer acting as its agent for TALF borrowings.

Primary dealers have recently been expanding the scope of KYC diligence required for TALF investment funds to “look through” the fund to get information about investors who own (directly or indirectly) 10% or more of a class of securities in the fund.  The extent of the look-through varies among dealers, with different formulations covering direct, intermediate and/or ultimate owners of the borrower. KYC information is typically given to dealers under confidentiality restrictions, and the MLSA obligates the New York Fed to comply with any confidentiality restrictions.  However, the New York Fed is permitted to disclose any information it receives to oversight bodies (including Congress) to the extent required by applicable law or regulations or by subpoena.  Once so disclosed, information given in confidence may become publicly available.  Therefore, the scope of KYC disclosure that TALF investment funds make to their primary dealers could be a crucial issue for direct and indirect investors in those funds.

The increasing level of KYC diligence has coincided with expressions of concern by the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, in its April report to Congress, that a look-through is appropriate to ensure that TALF not be used to leverage proceeds of crime. Even though TALF is not a TARP program, policymakers and enforcement agencies have been concerned about moral hazard implications of non-recourse TALF borrowings (at a 6-1 leverage ratio) by public-private investment funds established under the Treasury’s Public-Private Investment Program (“PPIP”). This moral hazard arises from the potential of such leverage to dilute the risk of loss of private equity investors in PPIP funds even beyond the dilution implicit in the Treasury’s co-investments in the equity of those vehicles. To the extent that private parties have limited “skin in the game,” they may have disincentives to conduct appropriate due diligence on financed assets or establish a fair price, which could harm a fundamental taxpayer protection in the design of TALF and PPIP by potentially exposing the public purse, as represented by the New York Fed and the Treasury, to a heightened risk of loss.

Recent legislative developments may also be providing a separate avenue to disclosure of information about investors in TALF funds.  Section 8.01(d) of the enrolled version of Senate bill S.896 (Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009) permits the GAO to conduct audits, including onsite examinations, of any action taken by the Board under the authorizing legislation for TALF “with respect to a single and specific partnership or corporation.”  Section 8.01(c) of that bill provides that it may obtain access to any entity receiving TALF funding in connection with such audits.  A separate bill introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R.1207 (Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009), provides for a report to Congress with respect to GAO audits of the Board.  It appears that sponsors of this legislation conceive of it as a basis for Congress to obtain information with respect to TALF borrowers and their investors.

Financial Stability Plan Begins to Take Shape

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

On February 10, 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner outlined the Obama Administration’s plan to address the financial crisis.  The Financial Stability Plan (FSP) represents a shift from the previous Administration’s implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which focused largely on capital injections into financial institutions under the Capital Purchase Plan (CPP).  In addition to continuing capital injections, the FSP expands efforts to increase consumer and small business lending, will create a public-private investment fund to purchase toxic assets from banks, and includes a housing support and foreclosure mitigation component. 

Capital Assistance Program
The Treasury Department will continue to make TARP equity investments in certain financial institutions through the Capital Assistance Program (CAP).  Under CAP, the 19 largest banking institutions with assets over $100 billion will be required to participate in a coordinated supervisory forward-looking capital assessment (i.e., a “stress test”) to determine whether the firm has the capital necessary to continue lending and to absorb future losses.  If Treasury determines that a firm has inadequate capital, it will have six months to raise it privately, and if it does not succeed, it will be compelled to take CAP funds.  Banking institutions with consolidated assets of less than $100 billion will also be eligible for CAP funds.  Eligibility is consistent with the criteria and process established for CPP. 

Capital provided under CAP will be in the form of cumulative mandatorily convertible preferred stock and will carry a nine percent dividend yield.  The security will be convertible into common equity, at the issuer’s option, at a ten percent discount to the price prevailing prior to February 9, 2009; however, the security will automatically be converted into common equity if it has not been redeemed or converted after seven years.  Treasury will place its capital investments in a newly created entity, the Financial Stability Trust, and will publicly disclose its CAP investments on the Internet.  At this time, CAP is only available to publicly traded qualifying financial institutions.  The deadline for applying is May 25, 2009.

Consumer and Small Business Lending
The FSP aims to increase consumer and small business lending through a massive expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) from $200 billion to $1 trillion.  The Treasury will provide $100 billion in TARP funds to backstop the Federal Reserve loan facility. 

Under TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) will provide non-recourse funding to eligible borrowers owning eligible collateral.  Eligible collateral includes certain asset-backed securities (ABS) that have at least two AAA ratings and that have auto loans, student loans, credit card loans, or small business loans as the underlying credit exposure.  The minimum TALF loan amount is $10 million, and the loan will have a three-year term and be subject to either a fixed or a floating interest rate.  In addition, the TALF loans will be subject to haircuts ranging from five to 16 percent, depending on the category of the ABS offered as collateral.  For additional details on TALF, see K&L Gates Newsstand Alerts The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility in Sharper Focus and The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Takes Form.  The initial round of loans will be awarded on March 25, 2009; TALF terms and conditions may be modified for subsequent rounds.  The Federal Reserve has indicated that ABS backed by rental, commercial, and government vehicle fleet leases and ABS backed by small ticket equipment, heavy equipment, and agricultural equipment loans and leases might be made eligible for the April funding of the TALF.

In addition, Treasury and the Small Business Administration (SBA) will launch the Small Business and Community Lending Initiative.  Although details have not yet been announced, initial plans indicate that the Initiative will finance the purchase of AAA-rated SBA loans in an effort to increase liquidity in secondary markets for small business loans and increase SBA loan guarantees up to 90 percent.

Public-Private Investment Fund
The FSP will also create a much-anticipated new Public-Private Investment Fund (Fund) to purchase toxic assets from banking institutions.  The Fund would make these purchases by providing government capital and financing to leverage purchases by private capital.  In addition, the Fund would rely on private sector buyers to price the value of the assets.  The initial scale of the Fund will be $500 billion, but may be expanded up to $1 trillion.  Treasury is expected to release details on the operation of the Fund in the near future.

Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
The FSP also includes a housing component, the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (Plan).  The first pillar of the Plan will support borrowers who have a solid payment history but are unable to refinance their mortgages because their current loan-to-value ratios are above 80 percent due to a loss in home value.  The program would make 4 to 5 million of these homeowners eligible to refinance their existing Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac mortgages at today’s low interest rates.  

The second pillar of the Plan, the $75 billion Homeowner Stability Initiative, creates a mortgage modification program for at-risk homeowners that have loans on owner-occupied properties with unpaid balances up to $729,750.  Loan servicers must enter into a program agreement with Treasury in order to participate.  Participating loan servicers must then apply a net present value (NPV) test on each loan at risk of imminent default or at least 60 days delinquent, unless explicitly prohibited by contract.  If the NPV of the expected cash flow is greater under a modification scenario, the servicer must modify the loan such that the monthly payment is no more than 31 percent of the borrower’s gross monthly income.  In exchange for the modification, the government will:

  • Subsidize the lender or investor for the cost of reducing monthly payments from 38 to 31 percent of gross monthly income;
  • Provide servicers with a $1,000 payment for each modification and an additional $1,000 per year for loans that continue to perform; and
  • Provide payments of $1,500 to lenders or investors and $500 to servicers for modifications made to borrowers that are current on their payments.

Finally, Treasury will increase funding to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through the purchase of preferred stock.  In order to fund this commitment, Treasury will use $200 billion made available under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act.

Additional Conditions
Increasingly, government assistance comes with stricter terms and conditions.  Firms receiving assistance from the FSP will be subject to the following conditions:

  • Recipients will be required to submit lending plans and monthly lending reports.  This information will be publicly disclosed on the website financialstability.gov.
  • Recipients will be required to commit to participating in mortgage foreclosure mitigation programs consistent with Treasury guidelines.
  • Recipients will be restricted from paying quarterly common dividend payments, repurchasing privately-held shares, and pursuing acquisitions until the government’s investment is repaid.
  • Recipients must comply with Treasury’s guidelines on executive compensation, “say on pay” shareholder votes, and luxury purchase disclosure.
  • Recipients are prohibited from certain lobbying activities.

The FSP initiatives will continue to take shape in the coming months as details are released.  The K&L Gates public policy group is closely monitoring these developments on behalf of the firm’s policy clients.

Compliance with TARP Executive Compensation Restrictions Subject to SEC Enforcement

By: Brian A. Ochs

A little-noticed recent amendment to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §5221 (“EESA”), may provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with a prominent role in enforcing the executive compensation and corporate governance requirements under the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).  The amendment, which was signed into law on February 17 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “Recovery Act”) (Pub. L. No. 111-5), requires the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or their equivalents) of any public company that receives TARP funds to certify compliance with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance restrictions as part of the company’s annual SEC filing.  Much like the required officer certifications regarding internal controls and disclosure controls that have been part of the legal landscape since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the effect of the EESA certification requirement is to focus personal responsibility for EESA compliance on CEOs and CFOs, with the potential for securities fraud or other charges to be brought by the SEC in the event of false certifications.

EESA and the Treasury Department’s Interim Rules on Executive Compensation
As originally enacted, section 111(b) of EESA directed that any financial institution that sells troubled assets to the Treasury Department must meet certain standards of executive compensation and corporate governance.  These standards included: (1) eliminating incentives for senior executives to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the financial value of the institution; (2) a “clawback” provision for the recovery by the institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on financial statements or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and (3) a prohibition on “golden parachute” payments to senior executive officers.  (Generally, “senior executives” means the five highest paid officers of the company.)

In October 2008 and January 2009, the Treasury Department announced rules to implement the executive compensation requirements of section 111 for participants in the TARP Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”).   (The Treasury Department separately provided guidance for certain other TARP programs.)  Among other things, the January rule required the principal executive officer of each participating financial institution to certify to TARP’s Chief Compliance Officer that the institution was in compliance with the executive compensation requirements set forth in EESA.  The Treasury Department further noted in the January rule that a false certification could subject the certifier to federal criminal penalties for false statements under 18 U.S.C. §1001.  See CPP Executive Compensation Final Rule (Jan. 16, 2009). 

The Recovery Act Amendments
The Recovery Act (Section 7001) expanded the significance of these provisions in several important respects.  First, it directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose new and expanded executive compensation and corporate governance standards on all recipients of TARP funds.   In addition to the restrictions found in the original section 111, these standards must bar payment of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation during the period that a TARP obligation is outstanding (except for payments made in restricted stock comprising no more than one-third of the individual’s total compensation, and not fully vesting during the period that the obligation is outstanding), and must prohibit any compensation plan that would encourage earnings manipulation.  The number of employees to which the new compensation limitations apply varies by provision, in many cases going beyond the original five “senior executive officers” to as many as the next 20 most highly compensated officers.  In addition, the Recovery Act amendments require SEC registrants that receive TARP funds to establish a board compensation committee, comprised entirely of independent directors, and also require boards of directors to implement company-wide policies regarding excessive or luxury expenditures.

Section 7001 of the Recovery Act also requires the CEO and CFO (or their equivalents) of each recipient of TARP funds that has publicly traded securities to “provide a written certification of compliance by the TARP recipient with the requirements of this section … together with annual filings required under the securities laws….”  (Certifications are to be provided to the Secretary of the Treasury if the entity receiving TARP funds is not a publicly traded company.)  The SEC has determined that it will not give effect to the certification requirement until the Secretary of the Treasury establishes standards to implement section 7001 of the Recovery Act.  This approach follows the views expressed by Senator Christopher Dodd, the author of the executive compensation provisions of the Recovery Act, in a February 20 letter to SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro.

Analysis
The requirement that CEO and CFO certifications be filed with a TARP recipient’s annual report to the SEC will unambiguously subject public companies that receive TARP funds and their executives to SEC scrutiny and potential enforcement action for failure to comply with EESA’s executive compensation and corporate governance requirements.  This is because any material false statement in an SEC filing may be charged as a securities fraud or other securities violation, depending on the actor’s level of intent.  In the current environment, regulators are likely to view a certification that an entity receiving TARP funds is in compliance with requirements concerning executive compensation and corporate governance as being material to investors.  In particularly egregious cases, criminal prosecution for securities fraud could also result.

Further, because the CEO and CFO will each be considered the “maker” of statements in the EESA certifications, these executives could be exposed to personal liability under the securities laws for compliance failures that result in false certifications.  Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most companies have instituted formal procedures such as compliance checklists, sub-certifications by managers with line responsibilities, and disclosure committee reviews, to support the CEO and CFO certifications required by that Act.  Entities that receive TARP funds will need to consider implementing similar structured processes to support the CEO’s and CFO’s annual certifications under EESA.
 

UK Banking Stabilisation Measures - March 2009 Update

By: Claudia HarrisonKatie Hillier

1. Introduction
Since our reports in the December 2008 and January 2009 editions of this newsletter, the UK government has released further details on several initiatives intended to combat the current economic downturn, and a number of UK based banks have announced their participation in the initiatives.   In addition, the Banking Act 2009 received royal assent on 12 February 2009.

2.  Update on Existing Measures

2.1 Special Liquidity Scheme ("SLS")
This scheme, which enabled banks to borrow liquid UK treasury bills in return for security over their illiquid assets, closed on 30 January 2009.   The Bank of England ("BoE") have confirmed that use of the scheme was considerable: 32 institutions borrowed £185bn in return for £287bn of collateral, mainly residential mortgage-backed securities and residential mortgage covered bonds. 

2.2 Bank Recapitalisation Scheme
On 7 March 2009, following recent falls in Lloyds Banking Group's share price and the release of Halifax Bank of Scotland's 2008 results, the UK government announced that its £4bn of preference shares in the Lloyds Banking Group will be converted into ordinary shares, which could increase the government's holding in the bank from 43.5% to 65%.

3.  New Measures

3.1 Asset Purchase Facility ("APF")
This commercial paper facility has been operational since 13 February 2009, and the BoE is in the process of consulting in relation to facilities to purchase corporate bonds, paper issued under the Credit Guarantee Scheme (under which the UK government issued guarantees in respect of certain debt instruments), syndicated loans and asset-backed securities created in viable securitisation structures.  Further, on 5 March 2009 the UK government authorised the BoE to use the APF for monetary policy purposes (including quantitative easing), giving permission to finance asset purchases using central bank reserves.  UK government debt, purchased in the secondary markets, has been added to the list of eligible assets, and purchases up to £150bn have been authorised, although at least £50bn of this should still be used to purchase private sector assets, as initially intended.

3.2 Asset Protection Scheme
Under this scheme, the UK government will 'insure' banks against losses on their riskiest assets.  Both the Royal Bank of Scotland ("RBS") and the Lloyds Banking Group have announced their intentions to participate in this scheme, in respect of assets totalling £325bn and £260bn respectively.  RBS will pay a £6.5bn fee and bear a first loss of up to £19.5bn, with Lloyds Banking Group paying a fee of £15.6bn and bearing a first loss of up to £25bn.  In order to support wider economic recovery, RBS and Lloyds have given lending commitments for 2009 of £25bn and £14bn respectively.  In response to political and popular pressure, the UK government has also secured assurances relating to remuneration policies in these banks.  What such assurances amount to is not yet known.  Lloyds, for example, has agreed to review its remuneration policies and implement changes needed to ensure its policies comply with the Financial Services Authority's (“FSA”) guidance in this area.  Whether this will produce substantive changes to policies remains to be seen. 

4. Banking Act 2009 (The "Act")
The Act is in substantially the same form as the bill which was presented to parliament last October (and referred to in the December edition of this newsletter); however some important amendments were made as the bill progressed through the legislative process and are incorporated in the legislation, which was passed on 12 February 2009. 

4.1 Reverse Transfers
Under the Act, the Treasury or the BoE (as applicable) can order that shares or property of a bank which have been transferred to a bridge bank or into temporary public ownership be transferred back to the seller even if the shares or property have been subject to subsequent onward transfers.   This flexibility was introduced as the UK government considered the time and information available prior to taking over a failing bank may not be sufficient to allow detailed due diligence of every part of the bank's business. 

4.2 Parent Companies
Following consultation with the FSA and the BoE, the Treasury may now take a UK-incorporated parent company of a bank into temporary public ownership, provided that the powers for dealing with failing banks under the special resolution regime have been triggered. Once under public ownership, the Treasury will have the same powers in respect of the parent company (and the banks within its group) as it would have in respect of the bank itself, including the ability to make forward and reverse transfers as well as appoint, remove and vary the service contracts of directors. 

4.3 Investment Banks
The Treasury may now adopt regulations to modify the application of insolvency law to, or establish a new insolvency procedure for, investment banks.   The Treasury can specify whether an institution is considered an investment bank for the purposes of such regulations, provided that it holds client assets and is authorised under Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 to carry out a "regulated activity".

5. Conclusion
The UK government hopes that the combination of purchasing assets together with providing guarantees and insurance will free up the credit markets for commercial and retail lending.  They are also attempting to deal with recent bonus and transparency issues by setting compliance with remuneration and disclosure policies as conditions to participation in certain schemes.  Whilst the statutory regulatory regime introduced under the Act has been hailed as the biggest shake up of the industry in a decade, it grants the UK government significant powers in relation to troubled banks which many commentators consider unnecessary and enables support which is given to the banks to be kept secret.   With the UK government now having majority stakes in two major high street banks, other global banks such as HSBC seeking to raise large amounts of capital through their existing shareholders, and reports that the level of national debt is equal to GDP, the jury is out on whether these latest measures will achieve their aim of improving market trust and confidence.

OFAC Issues Guidance to Securities and Futures Firms Concerning Account Opening, OFAC Requirements Are Applicable to Everyone

By: Lawrence B. Patent

The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries and designated persons.  OFAC issued guidance dated November 5, 2008, to assist securities and futures firms in fulfilling their OFAC obligations when accepting new clients and evaluating client transactions.  OFAC’s guidance applies to investment advisers (IAs), securities broker-dealers (BDs), futures commission merchants (FCMs), introducing brokers in commodity interests, commodity pool operators (CPOs) and commodity trading advisors (CTAs).  OFAC’s guidance is important in three areas:

  • Although another arm of the Treasury Department, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), recently withdrew as outdated proposals published in 2002 and 2003 that would have required IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering (AML) programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFAC’s guidance notes that all U.S. persons, including securities and futures firms, are subject to the requirements of OFAC.

     
  • OFAC, unlike FinCEN’s approach under the BSA, requires that a BD or an FCM look through the intermediary to the underlying beneficial owners of an omnibus account for purposes of complying with OFAC requirements.

     
  • Although FinCEN permits clearing firms and introducing or executing firms to rely upon each other for performing certain AML functions, OFAC’s guidance states that it does not permit businesses to reallocate their legal liability to a third party with regard to statutes that OFAC administers – thus, if a securities or futures firm delegates OFAC compliance functions to others, the securities or futures firm, as well as the third party, could be held liable for any OFAC violations caused by the third party’s negligence.

OFAC’s guidance, which was issued almost immediately after FinCEN withdrew its outdated AML proposals, appears designed to remind all financial intermediaries of their obligations under OFAC, which is certainly a less well-known regulatory program compared to the AML programs administered by FinCEN.  The OFAC guidance also makes clear that OFAC has less concern than FinCEN about duplicative regulation, and OFAC, unlike FinCEN, does not accept the concept that different intermediaries perform certain roles in financial market transactions that should permit delegation of responsibility.  Despite OFAC’s statement that “[a] strong OFAC compliance program [will be] similar to . . . a brokerage firm’s Customer Identification Program,” in fact OFAC expects more of BDs and FCMs where omnibus accounts and certain other intermediaries are involved than does FinCEN.

OFAC Account Opening Requirements
A new customer’s identity should be verified before an account is opened or within a reasonable time period after account opening.  Securities and futures firms should screen the new customer against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list, known as the SDN list and accessible at www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/index.shtml, and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.  OFAC advises that firms should use risk-based factors to assess risks posed by each customer and transaction, asking questions such as:

  • Is the customer regulated by a federal functional regulator, widely known, or listed on an exchange?
  • Has the firm had any previous experience with the customer or does it have prior knowledge about the customer?
  • Is the firm facilitating a U.S. person’s investment in a foreign issuer or other company that conducts business in a sanctioned country?
  • Is the customer located in a high-risk foreign jurisdiction that is considered to be poorly regulated or in a known offshore banking or secrecy haven?
  • Is the customer located or does it maintain accounts in countries where local privacy laws, regulations, or provisions prevent or limit the collection of client identification or beneficial ownership information?

Periodic checks of “non-accountholders,” such as beneficiaries, guarantors or principals, may also be necessary, depending upon each firm’s specific risk profile.

Documenting OFAC Compliance
Securities and futures firms should maintain adequate documentation of the results of their screening against the SDN list and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.   In the event of a potential OFAC violation, both the adequacy of a company’s transaction processing system and its overall OFAC compliance program are taken into consideration when determining the severity of possible enforcement action. 

FinCEN Withdrawal of Proposed AML Rules for IAs, CPOs, CTAs and Hedge Funds
As noted above, in late October FinCEN withdrew rules proposed over five years ago that would have required IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds to adopt AML programs.  In issuing these withdrawal notices, FinCEN noted that it would not adopt such rules in the future without providing interested parties an additional opportunity to comment upon proposals.  FinCEN’s withdrawal appears to be based on the principle that AML programs for IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds are not necessary because their customer accounts are carried by and their transactions are executed through other financial institutions, BDs and FCMs that do have AML programs.  FinCEN noted that it has concluded major rulemakings concerning BSA compliance by BDs and FCMs since it proposed the now-withdrawn proposals related to IAs, CPOs, CTAs and hedge funds that have confirmed the adequacy of their AML protections.  OFAC’s guidance also focuses more upon the responsibility of BDs and FCMs and does not permit those entities to avoid liability under OFAC programs by pointing to introducing firms or firms engaged only in the transaction-execution process.

Treasury Looks to Second Half of TARP

By: Daniel F. C. CrowleyKarishma Shah Page

Treasury has committed the first $350 billion tranche of the $700 billion provided by Congress for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).  The remaining $350 billion is subject to Congressional disapproval by joint resolution enacted within 15 calendar days after Treasury certifies its intention to use those funds.  Outgoing Treasury Secretary Paulson has seemingly been reluctant to utilize this second tranche of TARP funds because of considerable Legislative Branch resistance to the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), as described below.  However, after auto industry bailout negotiations stalled in the Senate, it now appears that the White House and Treasury may be assessing whether to commit additional TARP funds for a short-term bridge loan in order to prevent a bankruptcy filing by a major domestic automaker before President-elect Obama is inaugurated.  There is speculation that Congress may choose not to exercise its disapproval authority as part of a deal to help the auto industry. 

Most of the first tranche of TARP funds was used to purchase preferred stock in banking institutions, including as part of the massive Citigroup bailout.  As the program has matured, Treasury and the Federal Reserve have become increasingly inventive in addressing the continuing credit market crisis.  For example, on November 25, Treasury allocated $20 billion in TARP funds to back a $200 billion Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) established by the Federal Reserve to increase liquidity in the consumer credit market.  The underlying credit exposures of eligible TALF securities initially must be newly or recently originated auto loans, student loans, credit card loans or small business loans guaranteed by the U.S. Small Business Administration.  The facility may be expanded over time and eligible asset classes may be expanded later to include other assets, such as commercial mortgage-backed securities, non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities or other asset classes. 

At a hearing on December 10, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA) stated that Treasury should not request use of the second tranche of TARP funds without addressing foreclosure mitigation and oversight issues.   Chairman Frank’s statement reflects mounting Legislative Branch criticisms of Treasury’s implementation of TARP.  The Government Accountability Office released a report on December 2 concluding that Treasury has yet to address critical oversight and compliance issues.  The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), a TARP oversight panel created by EESA, also released its first report on December 10, questioning Treasury’s strategy and oversight.  COP members include Chair Elizabeth Warren (Professor, Harvard Law School), Congressman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Richard Neiman (Superintendent of Banks, New York Banking Department), and Damon Silvers (Associate Counsel, AFL-CIO).  Congress has held a series of hearings on these matters, as well as Treasury’s decision to abandon efforts to purchase or guarantee troubled assets and instead focus on equity injections into banking institutions (see the previous issue of the Global Financial Markets Newsletter).

Congress is considering measures to strengthen oversight of TARP.  On December 10, the Senate passed S. 3731, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2008, by unanimous consent.  The bill clarifies that the Special Inspector General (SIG) has the authority to investigate all actions taken under EESA (including the CPP); provides the SIG with temporary fast-track hiring authority and funds to set up his office; and requires Treasury to take actions to address deficiencies identified by the SIG.  The Senate confirmed Neil Barofsky as the SIG on December 8.

Also on December 10, the House adopted an amendment to the auto industry bailout bill, H.R. 7321, to address the criticism that TARP participants are not using funds to provide loans and increase credit market liquidity.   Adopted 403-0, the amendment would require TARP participants to report their lending activities quarterly.  Both the H.R. 7321 amendment and S. 3731, however, have yet to be considered by the other chamber.  With the end of the session fast approaching, it is not clear whether there will be further action on either measure before Congress adjourns for the year.  Similar legislation may be reintroduced next year.  Other possible provisions could include directing Treasury to require participating institutions to use bailout funds to restart lending; or limitations on the use of funds for acquisitions, dividends, or executive compensation.

Chairman Frank has also indicated interest in pursuing legislation that strengthens foreclosure mitigation efforts.  Such legislation could take several forms.  First, Congress could mandate that Treasury purchase or guarantee troubled assets as it initially contemplated in creating TARP.  Second, Congress could direct Treasury to allocate a portion of the bailout funds to a loan modification and guarantee program, such as the $24 billion program recently proposed by the FDIC to guarantee 2.2 million modified loans.  The FDIC plan would reduce mortgage payments to 31% of income, based on reductions in the applicable interest rate, extension of the loan term, and forbearance of principal.  In exchange, servicers would get $1,000 for each modification and the government would share up to 50% of the re-default loss.  Third, Congress could expand the Hope for Homeowners program (P.L. 110-289), under which the original lender takes a write-down on the loan and the borrower then refinances to a government-backed loan.  Fourth, Congress could provide mortgage-backed security servicers with the legal authority to modify loans and indemnification from investor lawsuits.

Finally, as anticipated in previous newsletters, discussions continue on broader financial service industry reforms.  Notably, COP Chair Elizabeth Warren recently called for the creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission, akin to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, that would regulate financial services products.  On November 14, the G-20 ministers agreed to begin work on a coordinated response to the financial crisis.  At present, the ministers are developing specific recommendations for the next summit, which is scheduled for April 2009.  The bipartisan professionals in the K&L Gates Public Policy and Law Group are monitoring all such proposals for the benefit of firm clients.

TARP Capital Purchase Program Update

By: Daniel F.C. Crowley, Karishma Shah Page

The U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) continues to implement the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA,” H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343, click GPO’s PDF Display for EESA text). Among other things, EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. Under this authority, Treasury continues to develop the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) to make equity investments in banking institutions. However, Treasury has recently indicated that it no longer intends to purchase troubled assets as described below.

On October 31, Treasury released additional CPP documents for publicly traded financial institution applicants, including a Securities Purchase Agreement, Form of Letter Agreement, Certificate of Designations, Form of Warrant, Term Sheet, and SEC/FASB Letter on Warrant Accounting. The documents contain terms and conditions and make representations and warranties, to which a CPP applicant must agree. As noted in the previous issue, applications must be submitted by 5 p.m. (EST), November 14, 2008.

In the same notice, Treasury stated it will be posting a CPP application form and term sheet for private and mutual banks in the future. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking on October 23, Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Neel Kashkari noted that Treasury is also developing a mortgage-backed securities program, whole loan purchase program, and insurance program for troubled assets. On November 10, following a speech in New York City, Mr. Kashkari indicated that U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., will determine whether and when to roll out these additional programs.

On November 10, the government announced changes to the AIG bailout totaling $152.5 billion. Using its EESA authority, Treasury will purchase $40 billion in senior preferred stock from AIG. The Federal Reserve will provide AIG with a $60 billion bridge loan, purchase $22.5 billion of its mortgage-backed securities and supply $30 billion to backstop the insurer’s credit default swap agreements. Mr. Kashkari indicated that the AIG deal was a “one-off” arrangement rather than a broadening of the CPP beyond banking institutions.

Treasury has also started to build its CPP implementation group. The Department has named James H. Lambright, former head of the Export-Import Bank, to serve as the interim Chief Investment Officer. Treasury has also posted a solicitation for financial agents to provide asset management services for CPP. Application guidelines are available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1260.htm; the deadline for submission was 5 p.m. (EST), November 13, 2008.

Of the $700 billion in funds authorized by EESA, Treasury has thus far committed $250 billion to banks. The President must certify the use of an additional $100 billion and, for use of the remaining $350 billion, submit a notice to Congress, which has the ability to disapprove. On November 4, 2008, the Treasury submitted its “First Tranche Report” to Congress on the implementation of the EESA. The report noted that “it is premature to assess the impact of the CPP.” Preliminarily, Treasury is “encouraged by recent signs of improvement in the markets and in the confidence in our financial institutions,” but Treasury also reported that restoring liquidity to the long-term credit markets remains a challenge.

On November 12, Secretary Paulson provided an update on the implementation of EESA and indicated that the Department has changed its strategy. Secretary Paulson stated that the Department has abandoned efforts to purchase bad assets under TARP, because the indirect purchase would delay bank recapitalization. Instead, CPP equity purchases would continue to be the central feature of Treasury’s bailout efforts. Secretary Paulson noted that the Department also will pursue two additional strategies: strengthening the asset-backed securitization market in order to support consumer finance and expanding foreclosure mitigation.  (Treasury Secretary Outlines Revised TARP Strategy.)

Strategic shifts in the efforts to ameliorate the credit crisis will presumably continue with the incoming administration. Moreover, with the continued instability of the financial markets, we believe that we are in the beginning stages of what will ultimately prove to be a massive shift of leverage from private balance sheets to the public debt as new programs are implemented.

The K&L Gates Public Policy & Law group consists of senior, bipartisan policy professionals who are closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients. http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=5052

EESA: No Guarantees of Federal Loan Guarantees

By: Laurence E. Platt

Press reports claim that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) are close to announcing a plan pursuant to which the federal government will guarantee the timely repayment of principal and interest on modified eligible residential mortgage loans held by private parties pursuant to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”).  Such a plan might conflict with legal and accounting rules for mortgage-backed securities, raises questions about its relationship to other recent federal initiatives, requires Treasury to develop an actuarially sound, self-funded mortgage insurance program, and calls for loan holders to make principal write-downs they might not be willing to make.  Because of these issues, we are not convinced that the proposal will morph into a real program. As events unfold, we want to take the opportunity to highlight certain issues for which you should watch if a home loan guarantee program actually is promulgated by Treasury. These issues are addressed in the article, “EESA: No Guarantees of Federal Loan Guarantees.” They include the following:

  1. What residential mortgage loans will be eligible for loan guarantees?

     
  2. What is the difference between an FHA-insured, refinancing mortgage loan under the HOPE for Homeowners Program (“HOPE Program”), which Congress created earlier this year as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, and a Treasury-guaranteed modified loan?

     
  3. Will loan holders permanently write down the existing indebtedness by the amount necessary to qualify for a loan guarantee?

     
  4. Given the write-downs that it will take to qualify an existing loan for a HOPE Program refinancing or a federal loan guarantee, why not just sell the loans to Treasury under the recently enacted Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)?

     
  5. Does a federal loan guarantee provide a comparative advantage to loan holders over the HOPE Program or TARP?

     
  6. How will Treasury ensure that the insurance premiums are sufficient to meet the statutory standard of actuarial soundness?

As Treasury Implements EESA, Congress Prepares for Significant Reform Legislation

By Daniel F. C. Crowley

The TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
On October 3, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives passed and President Bush signed into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343, click  GPO's PDF Display for the text of EESA).  Among other things, EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions.

On October 14, 2008, Treasury announced the creation of the TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP), and issued an interim final rule on CPP executive compensation and corporate governance standards.  Treasury also issued executive compensation notices with respect to two additional EESA programs that are currently being developed by Treasury, the Troubled Asset Auction Program (TAAP) and Programs for Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (PSSFI). 

Through CPP, Treasury will provide $250 billion in equity capital under standardized terms directly to certain U.S. financial institutions in the form of preferred stock.  The minimum subscription amount available to a participating institution is 1 percent of risk-weighted assets.  The maximum subscription amount is the lesser of $25 billion or 3 percent of risk-weighted assets.  Although the original Treasury proposal did not contemplate this use of the TARP, the addition of the phrase “any other financial instrument” by Congress provided Treasury with the flexibility to inject equity capital directly into banks.  Members of Congress largely indicated their support for the CPP, as did the American Bankers Association.

On October 20, Treasury issued application guidelines for the CPP which indicate that all applications must be submitted to the appropriate Federal banking agency (FBA) no later than 5 pm (EST), November 14, 2008.

To be eligible for the CPP, the applicant must ultimately receive Treasury approval.   According to Secretary Paulson, Treasury “will give considerable weight to” the primary regulator’s recommendation.  More detailed information, including submission instructions, can be found at the applicable FBA website: www.fdic.gov, www.federalreserve.gov, www.occ.treas.gov, or www.ots.treas.gov as the case may be.

In addition, the applicant must agree to certain terms and conditions and make certain representations and warranties described in various agreements available on Treasury’s website:  www.treas.gov.  A detailed investment agreement and associated documentation will be posted soon.  Among the conditions to participation in the CPP is the requirement that, for so long as the Treasury owns shares or warrants in the applicant, certain senior officers of the applicant meet executive compensation standards, which are explained on the Treasury website  here.  With respect to the CCP, the following standards apply: (a) limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers (SEOs) of financial institutions to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution; (b) required recovery of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to an SEO based on statements of earnings, gains or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; (c) prohibition on the financial institution from making any golden parachute payment to any SEO; and (d) agreement not to deduct for tax purposes executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for an SEO.  Treasury did not give much guidance as to what constitutes an appropriate limit on incentives to take excessive risks.

These conditions make a CPP investment less attractive to a financial institution, which would find itself with diluted equity and bound by stricter rules on compensation than its competitors.   In addition, it was feared that capitalization by the Treasury could carry the potential stigma that the firm cannot attract financing on its own, leading to a potential run on the bank.  For these reasons, among others, the Treasury essentially compelled nine of the largest U.S. banks to accept investments under the CPP program.  It is not clear yet how much this move will address other banks’ concerns or how many smaller banks will participate.  Also unclear is whether the banks receiving CPP investments will use the funds merely to shore up their capital bases or, as is clearly Treasury’s intention, to serve as the capital base for additional lending.  To encourage other banks to apply, the guidelines provide that confidentiality may be requested with respect to certain information, and Secretary Paulson has indicated that Treasury will not announce any applications that are withdrawn or denied.

Upcoming Congressional Hearings
As indicated in the last issue, we anticipate that Congress will consider far-reaching reforms of the financial services industry.  As Treasury implements EESA, numerous Congressional committees continue to conduct oversight hearings in order to lay the foundation for what will likely be the most significant revisions to the nation’s financial services laws since the Great Depression.  Among the hearings that have already occurred or are currently scheduled are:

Future of Financial Services Industry Oversight and Regulation
House Financial Services Committee
Date: Tuesday, Oct. 21, 10 a.m.
Location: 2128 Rayburn Bldg.
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/hr102108.shtml

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Workers’ Retirement Security
House Education and Labor Committee
Date: Wednesday, Oct. 22, 9:30 a.m.
Location: 1 Dr. Carlton B Goodlett Place, Room 250, San Francisco, Calif.
Witnesses: Shlomo Benartzi - professor, Anderson School of Management, University of California at Los Angeles
Mark Davis - partner, Kravitz Davis Sansone, Encino, Calif.
Jacob S. Hacker - professor, University of California at Berkeley
http://edlabor.house.gov/committee/schedule.shtml

Turmoil in the Financial Markets
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

  • Topic: Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis
    Date: Wednesday, Oct. 22, 10 a.m.
    Location: 2154 Rayburn Bldg.
    Witnesses: Deven Sharma - president, Standard and Poor's
    Raymond W. McDaniel - chairman and CEO, Moody's Corp
    Stephen Joynt - president and CEO, Fitch Ratings

     
  • Topic: The Role of Federal Regulators
    Date: Thursday, Oct. 23, 10 a.m.
    Location: 2154 Rayburn Bldg.
    Witnesses: Alan Greenspan - former chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
    John Snow - former secretary of the Treasury
    Christopher Cox - chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission

     
  • Topic: The Regulation of Hedge Funds
    Date: Thursday, Nov. 13, 10 a.m.
    Location: 2154 Rayburn Bldg
    Note: Date changed to Nov. 13 from Oct. 16.
    Witnesses: John Alfred Paulson - president, Paulson and Co. Inc., George Soros - chairman, Soros Fund Management LLC, Philip A. Falcone - senior managing director, Harbinger Capital Partners, James Simons - director, Renaissance Technologies LLC, Kenneth C. Griffin - CEO and managing director, Citadel Investment Group
    http://oversight.house.gov/

Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Recent Regulatory Responses 
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee
Date: Thursday, Oct. 23, 10 a.m.
Location: 538 Dirksen Bldg.
More information

The Public Policy & Law group is closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

Efforts to Stem the Financial Crisis Likely to be Followed by Significant Reform of Financial Services Regulation

By:  Daniel F. C. Crowley, Patrick G. Heck

Recent Policy Responses
The recent public policy responses to the credit crisis have been geared toward restoring liquidity in the credit markets, enhancing transparency, and prohibiting certain trading practices.   Foremost among these measures has been H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008   (“EESA” or “the Act”), in response to the Department of the Treasury’s (“Treasury”) request for authority to spend up to $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets.  The Act is intended to improve the capital positions of financial institutions and allow them to once again extend credit.  Other stop-gap measures by the regulatory agencies, as discussed elsewhere in this newsletter, have been geared toward reducing volatility and restoring orderly markets.

EESA, which was passed by the House and signed by President Bush on Friday, October 3, 2008, authorizes up to $700 billion for the Treasury for a troubled asset relief program (TARP) to purchase, and a Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund to insure, illiquid financial instruments. The Act allows Treasury to immediately use $250 billion, with an additional $100 billion if the president certifies such a need. The president would have to provide a written request for the remaining $350 billion, which could be subject to expedited congressional approval.

The Act

  • Creates the Financial Stability Oversight Board, comprised of the Fed Chairman, the Secretaries of Treasury and HUD, the FHFA Director, and the SEC Chairman.
  • Creates various reporting and oversight requirements.
  • Waives FAR and provides for streamlined contracting procedures.
  • Establishes a Congressional Oversight Panel in the legislative branch to “review the current state of the financial markets and the regulatory system.”
  • Places limits on senior executive compensation for some participating financial institutions.
  • Requires Treasury to develop programs to reduce foreclosures and encourage lenders to modify mortgage terms.
  • Prohibits use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for future money market guarantee programs.
  • Authorizes the SEC to suspend mark-to-market accounting (FAS 157).
  • Increases the federal budget debt ceiling to $11.315 trillion.
  • Temporarily increases the FDIC insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000.

The text of the Act and a section-by-section analysis may be found on the House Financial Services Committee website: http://financialservices.house.gov/.  

EESA Tax Provisions
EESA also contains a number of important tax provisions that have not received a great deal of attention. There are three tax provisions related to the rescue plan:

  1. Extension of exclusion of income from discharge of qualified principal residence indebtedness.  Generally, when homeowners have parts of their mortgages forgiven, they immediately owe income taxes on the amount of indebtedness forgiven.   To prevent homeowners from facing higher tax bills, the housing relief bill passed by Congress earlier this year allowed homeowners caught up in the mortgage crisis to avoid paying tax on forgiven mortgage debts through 2009.  EESA will extend through 2012 the housing bill provision that forgives income from the cancellation of indebtedness.  The proposal does not extend the relief to home equity loans.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $362 million over ten years. 

     
  2. Gain or loss from sale or exchange of certain preferred stock.  Federal law limits the allowable investments for banks, and many community banks therefore invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock – which became worthless when the government bailed out those companies.  EESA includes a proposal to allow financial institutions or financial institution holding companies to treat their Fannie and Freddie losses as ordinary losses. Applying to any preferred stock that was owned on September 6, 2008 or sold between January 1 and September 6, 2008, this provision will allow banks to claim the book benefit of the loss on their tax returns, therefore reducing the need to obtain additional capital from the FDIC or investors.  Policy makers believe that this proposal should also prevent some community banks from becoming insolvent.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that this provision will cost $3.045 billion over ten years, with $2.7 billion of the cost occurring in 2009. 

     
  3. Special rules for tax treatment of executive compensation of employers participating in the troubled assets relief program.  The EESA contains non-tax measures aimed at limiting executive compensation and “golden parachute” severance packages overall for companies and executives participating in the buyout.  Additionally, EESA modifies the tax treatment of executive compensation and severance packages.  The deductibility of executive compensation for companies participating in the troubled asset relief program will be cut in half – from the $1 million level in current law – to $500,000.  Performance-based compensation is included in the $500,000 limitation.  Companies will also lose deductions currently available for excessively large severance packages.  Executives receiving severance packages will continue to face a 20 percent excise tax on payments once they reach an excessive threshold, and that tax will now be due if the executive leaves for reasons other than a standard retirement for which they are eligible – not just if the company changes hands, as in current law.  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the amount of revenue gain from these provisions is indeterminate as it will depend on how the underlying troubled asset program is implemented.     

In addition, the Act extends dozens of expired or expiring tax provisions (the so-called “tax extender package”), including the Alternative Minimum Tax and disaster relief, energy tax incentives and a host of other provisions.  Several of these provisions might be of interest to the financial services community.  For example, the package includes: 1) broker reporting of a customer’s basis in securities transactions; 2) an extension of tax-free distributions from IRAs to certain public charities through 2009; 3) an extension of the exception under Subpart F for active financing income through 2009; 4) an extension of the look-through treatment of payments between related CFCs under foreign personal holding company income rules; and 5) the modification of the tax treatment of offshore nonqualified deferred compensation for certain tax indifferent parties.  The package does not include a further delay in the implementation of the worldwide interest allocation rules.

Finally, in addition to the various tax provisions listed above, the package contains a provision that would lower the tax preparer standard for undisclosed positions from “more likely than not” to “substantial authority” (the same standard that currently applies to taxpayers) with the exception for tax shelters (reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies). 

The Long View
In the slightly longer term, these unprecedented market events will likely lead to the most significant revisions to the legal and regulatory framework for financial services since the Great Depression. 

  • Revamping the structure of financial services regulation.   Beginning in January 2009, the 111th Congress will consider comprehensive legislation to restructure the regulation of financial services.  A primary consideration will be the respective roles of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC and the CFTC with respect to oversight of the capital markets.  Some of the proposals under consideration were outlined in the Treasury’s March 2008 “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”

     
  • Regulation of previously unregulated products and entities. Current discussions also include new reporting and other regulatory requirements for a broad array of financial products and market participants that have, until now, been subject to relatively little regulation, including commodities, derivatives, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds.  Some products that currently trade over-the-counter may soon be required to trade on exchanges and, more generally, all market participants with the potential to impact the economy will almost certainly be under increased scrutiny.

     
  • Among the other issues that will likely be considered as part of this comprehensive reform effort are:
    • Credit rating agency reforms,
    • Enhanced government agency enforcement authorities, and
    • Recommendations of the Congressional Oversight Panel created by EESA. 

       
  • Tax. With respect to federal tax issues relating to investments, determination of the appropriate tax rates on capital gains and dividends and the appropriate tax treatment of derivatives, as well as retirement savings incentives, will receive considerable attention.

     
  • Retirement Plans. Finally, there will almost certainly be a renewal of efforts to increase disclosure with respect to defined contribution plan fees. 

Our Public Policy & Law group is closely monitoring these developments in order to provide insights to and effective advocacy on behalf of firm clients.

Industry and Regulators Respond to Extraordinary Pressures on Money Market Funds

By: Arthur C. Delibert 

Recent turmoil in the securities markets, affecting financial companies in particular, has imposed unprecedented stress on money market funds, as some institutional investors have sought to liquefy their holdings at the very moment that many money funds have found it difficult to raise cash.  These pressures have resulted in some extraordinary market and regulatory events.  Illustrative of the pressures facing the industry and regulators:

  • On September 16, The Primary Fund, a money market series of The Reserve Fund, announced that it had “broken the dollar” – i.e., that the mark-to-market value of its portfolio assets had fallen below $0.995 per share. (LINK)  In fact, the fund said, its per-share net asset value had fallen to 97 cents, primarily from holding paper issued by Lehman Brothers, which had filed for bankruptcy on September 15.  This is only the second time a registered money fund has broken the dollar, the last such event having occurred in 1994. (Reserve has subsequently reported that the assets available may be higher than 97 cents per share.)

    Subsequently, Ameriprise Financial Services filed suit against The Reserve Fund and its manager, alleging that certain large investors had been tipped off about the Fund’s impending problem, allowing those investors to remove their money before the NAV was reduced.

     
  • On September 18, Putnam Investments announced that it was suspending sales of its institutional Putnam Prime Money Market Fund and would liquidate the fund.  Within days, Putnam and Federated Investors, Inc. announced that Federated Prime Obligations Fund would acquire the assets of the Putnam money fund and that all shareholders would receive shares of the Federated fund worth $1.00 per share.

In the face of these pressures, many money funds have resorted to extraordinary measures:

  • Many funds have drawn on lines of credit previously arranged through their custodian banks and others.  The Federal Reserve made extra cash available to these banks to fund the loans.

     
  • Some funds have made use of their authority under Section 22 of the 1940 Act to withhold payment on redemption orders for up to seven days, rather than the same-day or overnight payment offered in fund prospectuses “under normal circumstances.”  Such extensions can be difficult for customers, who expect to have prompt access to assets held in money funds.

     
  • Other funds have used authority reserved in their prospectuses to pay redemptions through the in-kind distribution of portfolio securities.  These distributions potentially raise two questions under the 1940 Act:
  1. Funds may have filed with the SEC irrevocable elections under Section 18 of the 1940 Act, allowing them to make redemptions in kind for shareholders seeking redemptions in excess of $250,000 or 1% of the fund’s net assets, whichever is less, in any 90 day period, but committing them to pay lesser redemptions in cash.  Such filings have become less common since 1996, meaning that some funds have greater flexibility in this area.
  2. Redemptions paid in kind to shareholders that are affiliates of the fund because they hold 5% or more of the fund’s outstanding securities may raise questions under Section 17 of the 1940 Act, which restricts principal transactions with affiliates.  Funds can rely on a 1999 no-action letter issued by the SEC staff, which permits in-kind payments to affiliates provided the fund’s board either approves the transaction or has adopted certain procedures to assure the fairness of such distributions. 

There have also been extraordinary actions from the regulators:

  • Some money funds have sought permission from the SEC under Section 22(e) of the 1940 Act to suspend redemptions.   On September 22, the SEC issued an order (effective as of September 17) authorizing two Reserve Funds to suspend redemptions for an indefinite period, while they engage in an orderly liquidation. (LINK)

     
  • On September 19, the Federal Reserve temporarily exempted member banks from provisions of the Federal Reserve Act to permit the banks to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from affiliated money market funds. (LINK)

    On September 25, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter permitting such purchases. Such purchases by fund affiliates would normally raise issues under Section 17 of the 1940 Act.  Rule 17a-9 permits fund affiliates to purchase securities from money market funds if they are no longer “eligible securities” under Rule 2a-7 – i.e., if they have deteriorated in quality. The no-action letter permits such purchases even if the security is still eligible. 

     
  • On September 19, the Treasury announced a program of money market fund insurance.   Funds wishing to apply for the insurance must do so by Wednesday, October 8.  (LINK)

According to the announcement, Treasury is establishing this program under existing authority, using the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund.  Treasury’s authority may be limited somewhat by the Economic Stabilization Act which, as of this writing, is still under consideration by Congress.  The insurance initially will be available for a period of three months, at which point Treasury may renew it for a total period of up to a year, but participating funds would be required to pay an additional fee.

The insurance applies only to assets in a fund on September 19, the day the program was announced.  This limit was apparently adopted at the urging of the banking industry, which was concerned that if money fund insurance were available for unlimited amounts of new assets flowing into the funds, large deposits would flee the banks. The program is available only to funds registered under both the 1933 Act and the 1940 Act.

Funds wishing to apply to the program must obtain approval of their boards of directors, as the application requires that the board, including a majority of independent directors, determine that “entering into” the Guarantee Agreement, as well as “fulfillment of its obligations …  are in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders.”  Fund boards must take into consideration a number of factors before entering into such an Agreement.